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When  we  think  about  Plato’s  philosophy,  Laws  is  usually  not  the  first  text  that  
comes  to  mind.  Even  at  first  sight,  it  exhibits  a  number  of  characteristics  that  
seem   to   be   at   odds   with   what   we   consider   typical   of   Platonic   philosophy.  
Some  of  the  most  striking  are:   the  strongly  diminished  prominence  of   justice  
(δικαιοσύύνη)  and  the  absence  of  philosophy  (φιλοσοφίία);   the  absence  of   the  
figure  of  Socrates;  the  setting  of  the  conversation,  which,  instead  of  the  city  of  
Athens   is   the   island  of  Crete;   the  defence  of   the   symposion  and  drunkenness;  
Laws’   outright   positive   attitude   to   persuasion   (πειθώώ);   and   lastly,   the  
peculiarity   of   Laws’   language   and   style:   the   text   seems   to   be   written   in   a  
contrived  and  less  plain  Greek  that  is  criticized  for  different  reasons,  already  
in  antiquity.  
   But  something  else  is  puzzling  as  well.  Plato’s  final  work  purports  to  be  
a  conversation  between  three  elderly  interlocutors.  Laws  at  large  is  thus  set  up  
as   a  work   of   dialectic.   Of   course,   this   is   not   surprising.   Plato  wrote  mostly  
dialogues.  But  within   the  overarching  dialectical  conversation  are  embedded  
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normative  texts:   the  interlocutors  formulate  laws1  as  part  of  the  founding  of  a  
city  “in  speech”  (λόόγῳ).2  There  are  other  texts  in  the  Platonic  corpus  in  which  
a  character   formulates  discourse   that   lays  claim   to  authority—we  may  recall  
Socrates’   rhetoric   in  Apology,   Socrates’  use  of   a  myth   to   conclude  a  dialogue  
(in,  for  example,  Gorgias  and  Republic),  and  the  laying  down  of  laws  as  part  of  
the  city-­‐‑founding  in  Republic.  Yet  whereas  in  these  cases  the  normative  claims  
are  legitimated  by  a  reference  to  an  authority  of  some  kind  (ὁ  θεόός  in  Apology,  
an   eschatological  myth,   the   philosopher-­‐‑king   in  Republic—see   chapter   two),  
what  makes  the  legislative  discourse  in  Laws  particularly  odd  is  the  fact  that  a  
reference   to   an   authority   is   lacking.   The   laws   are   presented   simply   as   the  
product  of  dialectic.    
   Plato’s   texts   in   general   reflect   the   assumption   that   there   exists   an  
objective  moral  truth.  Works  such  as  Apology  and  Republic  testify  to  the  belief  
on  the  part  of  their  author  that  claims  to  absolute  truth  are  the  preserve  of  the  
moral  expert.3  Dialectic   is  a  step-­‐‑by-­‐‑step  quest   in  search   for   this  moral   truth.  
The   advance   towards   its   goal   depends   on   the   ὁµμολογίία   (“agreement”)  
between   the   interlocutors,   and  dialectic’s   outcomes  are  provisional  only.  Any  
claims  to  the  truth  of  its  results  and  assumptions  therefore  need  confirmation  
by  a  higher  authority.4  It  is  in  terms  of  an  authority-­‐‑conferring  device  that  the  
                                                                                                              
1   Lawgiving   was   considered   a   genre   in   antiquity:   Plato,   Phdr.   278c3-­‐‑4:   Solon   and   ὅστις   ἐν  
πολιτικοῖς  λόόγοις  νόόµμους  ὀνοµμάάζων  συγγράάµμµματα  ἔγραψεν  are  juxtaposed  to  Lysias  and  other  
speechwriters,  and   to  Homer  and  other  composers  of  poetry.  Cf.  Symp.   209d1-­‐‑e4:  Lycurgus  and  
Solon   are   juxtaposed   to   Homer   and   Hesiod   as   begetters   of   the   finest   descendants   (laws   and  
poems   respectively),   that   have   produced   manifold   virtue   (παντοίίαν   ἀρετήήν,   209e2-­‐‑3).   See  
SLUITER  (2000),  297  n.  47  on  lawgiving  as  genre  in  antiquity.  The  title  of  the  work,  Νόόµμοι  ἢ  περὶ  
νοµμοθεσίίας,  and  the  classification  of  the  dialogue  as  πολιτικόός  are  given  by  Thrasyllus,  see  Diog.  
Laert.  III.60.  
2  Leg.  702e1-­‐‑2:  ἀτὰρ  πειρώώµμεθα  λόόγῳ  πρῶτον  κατοικίίζειν  τὴν  πόόλιν.  Cf.  Resp.  369c9:  ἴθι  δήή,  (…),  
τῷ  λόόγῳ  ἐξ  ἀρχῆς  ποιῶµμεν  πόόλιν.  
3  See  chapter  two  for  a  discussion  of  the  Apology,  Crito  and  Republic  from  the  perspective  of  their  
genre  and  authority.    
4  ROBINSON  (1941):  “The  principle  that  the  answerer  must  say  what  he  really  thinks  is  a  part  of  the  
principle  that  dialectic  recognizes  no  authority”  (83).  
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Platonic  myths  concluding  some  of  the  dialogues,  and  of  the  philosopher-­‐‑king  
in  the  polis-­‐‑construction  of  Republic,  can  be  viewed.5  
   It  may  therefore  be  asked  what  would  be  the  basis  of  a  code  of  laws  in  a  
Platonic   text,   if   not   true,   objective   justice   (δικαιοσύύνη).  Who   else  would   be  
qualified  to  lay  down  good  laws  but  the  moral  expert?6  It  is  therefore  natural  
to  expect  that  a  Platonic  law  code  contains  some  sort  of  a  reference  to  a  higher  
sanction,  on  the  authority  of  which  we  are  expected  to  accept  that  these  laws  
are   the   just   laws.   Yet,   whereas   the   Socrates   of   Apology   appeals   to   various  
divine   authorities   to   back   up   his   claims   about   the   nature   of   the   life   worth  
living,  and  Republic  puts  the  moral  expert  at  the  top  of  its  political  hierarchy,  
Laws  appears  to  offer  nothing  comparable.    
   Laws’  composition  thus  confronts  us  with  a  puzzle:  rules  of  conduct  are  
offered,  yet  without  the  conclusive  confirmation  that  these  rules  are  based  on  
expert   knowledge.   On   the   contrary,   by   embedding   the   laws   in   a   dialectical  
conversation,   Plato   presents   the   law   code   as   the   product   of   dialectic.   So,  why  
did  Plato  compose  Laws  in  this  way?  Is  there  some  sort  of  reference  to  a  higher  
authority,   and   what   is   the   ontological   status   of   these   laws?   Does   the  
surprisingly  minimal  role  of   justice   (δικαιοσύύνη)   in  a  Platonic  work  on   laws  
have  anything  to  do  with  all  of  this?    
   The  present  study  investigates  the  complex  of  problems  that  arises  from  
the   absence   of   an   authority   in   Plato’s   Laws.   It   tackles   this   set   of   problems  
through  an  analysis  of  Laws’  composition  and  the  structure  of  its  argument.  It  
investigates   how   Laws   contextualizes   and   conceptualizes   its   own   law   code   in  
order  to  grasp  the  epistemological  status  of  the  law  code,  and  its  justification.  
                                                                                                              
5  On  the  “confirmative”  function  of  the  myth  in  Gorgias,  see  VAN  RAALTE  (1991).  For  a  discussion  
of  different  Platonic  myths  in  their  context,  see  MORGAN  (2000).  
6   The   (presumably)   autobiographical  Epistula   VII   also   testifies   to   the   importance   of   good   laws:  
324b2,  325c5-­‐‑326a5,  332b4-­‐‑6,  334c6-­‐‑7,  336a3-­‐‑5,  and  337a2-­‐‑8.  For  the  question  of  the  authenticity  of  
Epist.  VII   see  MORROW   (1935),  BLUCK   (1947),   1-­‐‑2;  HACKFORTH   (1976).  EDELSTEIN   (1966)  disputes  
the   letter’s  genuineness.  For   literature  see   the  notes   in  EDELSTEIN   ibid.,  1-­‐‑4;  also  on   its  history  of  
attestation  in  antiquity.  MORROW  (1935),  47-­‐‑79,  considers  Epistula  VII  genuine  and  observes  that  
“in  style  and  diction  it  has  the  traits  of  the  Laws  and  other  dialogues  of  Plato’s  latest  period”  (47).  
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Taking   the   peculiarities   summed   up   at   the   beginning   of   this   chapter   as  my  
point  of  departure,  it  will  be  argued  that  they  add  up  to  a  coherent  framework  
once   it   is   accepted   that   in  Laws  politics   is   naturalistic   and   pragmatic   rather  
than  metaphysical  and  absolute.  The  absence  of  a  moral  expert  from  the  world  
of   Laws   is,   I   submit,   a   large   part   of   the   reason   why   Laws’   philosophical  
principles  are  at  odds  with  the  philosophy  of  Republic.  The  present  thesis  will  
commence  with  a  brief  discussion  of  three  Platonic  texts  on  absolute  justice  as  
a  comparative  framework  before  embarking  on  an  investigation  of  Laws.  
  
This  Introduction  will  offer  a  set  of  necessary  preliminaries.  The  chapter  starts  
off   with   a   summary   of   the   status   quaestionis   (section   1.1).   After   a   succinct  
survey  of  the  scholarly  debate  about  Laws  and  especially  about  its  relation  to  
Republic,  I  will  explain  the  specific  interpretation  of  the  “principle  of  charity”  
that  is  adopted  in  this  study  and  its  methodological  implications.    
   The  methodological  implications  of  the  principle  of  charity  discussed  in  
section   1.1   gain   a   special   urgency   against   the   background   of   the   history   of  
Laws’   interpretation,   to   be   discussed   in   section   1.2.   Section   1.2   will   briefly  
dwell  on  this  history.  It  will  discuss  two  factors  that  seem  to  have  discouraged  
a   reading   of   the   text   as   it   stands.   Each   of   these   has   its   origin   in   an   ancient  
source.   The   first   is   the   alleged   unfinished   state   of   Laws.   The   second   is   the  
discussion  of  Laws  in  ancient  literary  criticism  (1st  and  2nd  centuries  A.D.).  Both  
of  these  are  connected  with  the  peculiar  prose  style  of  Laws.  Since  part  of  the  
aim  of  the  present  study  is  to  elucidate  what  makes  Laws  such  an  idiosyncratic  
and  to  some  extent  inaccessible  work,  these  will  be  discussed  in  some  detail,  
though  the  peculiar  prose  style  of  Laws  would  definitely  merit  closer  study  in  
its  own  right.    
   With  the  second  half  of  the  Introduction  we  enter  the  conceptual  realm.  
Section  1.3  analyzes  a  notion  central  to  Platonic  epistemology,  τέέχνη,  “expert  
knowedge”.  The  notion  of  τέέχνη  reflects  the  conceptual  underpinnings  of  the  
CHAPTER   ONE    5  
idea  that  the  basis  of  moral  action  is  expert  knowledge,  and  that  there  exists  a  
convincing  moral   authority.   The   conceptual   system   of   τέέχνη   as   knowledge,  
and  its  implications,  are  an  important  frame  of  reference  for  the  present  study:  
it  is  only  from  the  perspective  of  what  is  standard  or  common  in  Plato  that  we  
can   appreciate   how   Plato   applies   his   stock   terminology   to   the   conceptually  
different  environment  of  Laws.  Since  a   large  part  of   this  stock  terminology—
ἀρετήή,   and   the   four   virtues   ἀνδρείία,   σωφροσύύνη,   δικαιοσύύνη   and  
σοφίία/φρόόνησις—depends   on   his   intellectualist   interpretation   of   τέέχνη,   a  
discussion   of   Platonic   τέέχνη   is   a   necessary   background   for   perceiving   the  
differences   between   Laws   and   more   prototypical   Platonic   thought.   After  
discussing   the  Platonic  notion  of  τέέχνη,  we  will   look  briefly  at   the  notion  of  
τέέχνη   prevalent   in   competing,   sophistic   theories,   anticipating   one   of   my  
conclusions,   that   Laws   has  more   affinity  with   the   sophistic  manifestation   of  
τέέχνη.  
   The  penultimate   section  of   this   Introduction   (section   1.4)  will   offer   an  
overview  of  the  structure  of  Laws  according  to  its  own  internal  caesuras.  This  
succinct  anatomy  serves  as   the  background  for   this  study’s  chapter  division,  
and   for   the   thematically  oriented  discussions   in   the   individual  chapters.  The  
final  section  (section  1.5)  will  also  present  a  brief  prospect  of  the  argument  of  
each  of  the  chapters  of  this  thesis.  
  
  
1 . 1       Sta tus    quaes t ion i s    and   p r in c ip l e s   o f    cha r i ty   
The  relation  between  Plato’s  two  major  works  of  political  philosophy  is,  until  
this   day,   a   vexed   problem.   Why   write   Laws,   a   second   constitution,   after  
Republic?  This  question  seems  to  have  puzzled  the  ancients  as  well.7  However,  
                                                                                                              
7  As  may  be  surmised  from  an  anecdote  reported  in  Stobaeus,  Anthol.  III.  13,  45  (HENSE  =  MEINEKE  
13,  37):  Διογέένης  ἤρετο  Πλάάτωνα  εἰ  νόόµμους  γράάφει·∙  ὃ  δὲ  ἔφη.  Τίί  δαίί;  πολιτείίαν  ἔγραψας;  Πάάνυ  
µμὲν   οὖν.   Τίί   οὖν,   ἡ  πολιτείία   νόόµμους   οὐκ   εἶχεν;   Εἶχεν.   Τίί   οὖν   ἔδει   σε  πάάλιν   νόόµμους   γράάφειν;  
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not  only  the  plain  fact  that  Plato  wrote  a  second  constitution  is  startling  about  
Laws.8  It  is  also  the  impression,  shared  by  many  scholars,  that  the  Plato  of  Laws  
is  beyond  recognition  for  anyone  familiar  with  Republic.9  This  section  will  take  
us  through  a  brief  overview  of  the  main  currents  in  the  modern  history  of  the  
interpretation   of   Laws   from   the   19th   century   onwards.10   Given   the   sheer  
amount   of   existing   (modern)   scholarship   on   the   subject,   which   has  
experienced   a   renewed   impetus   since   the   ‘80’s   and   early   ‘90’s   of   the   20th  
century,   this   overview   can   in   no  way   aspire   to   completeness.  My   objective,  
however,   is   not   to   be   exhaustive,   but   to   illuminate   the   principles   governing  
the   main   interpretative   currents,   in   order   to   better   contextualize   the  
contribution  of  this  study.      
   In   the   first   half   of   the   19th   century   both   content   and   language   of   the  
work  were  deemed  unplatonic  by  AST.11  He  disputed  Platonic  authorship  (and  
suggested   that   its   writer   may   have   been   Xenocrates,   one   of   Plato’s   pupils),  
and  was  followed  in  this  by  others,  even  into  the  middle  of  the  20th  century.12  
This  is  of  course  to  attach  a  very  extreme  consequence  to  the  observation  that  
Laws   in   many   ways   appears   unlike   the   familiar   Plato.   A   somewhat   less  
extreme  view,  also  put  forward  in  the  19th  century,  was  the  idea  that  the  text  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Unforunately,  no  answer  is  reported.  Cf.  JAEGER  III  (1945),  213-­‐‑214:  “But  it  is  remarkable  that  after  
he  finished  The  Republic  he  still  felt  the  need  of  composing  the  same  kind  of  general  survey  once  
again,  in  another  form,  and  of  constructing  a  second  state,  after  once  making  the  perfect  state,  the  
ideally  just  Republic.”    
8  Assuming   that   this   is   the   correct   chronological  order.  For   the   relative  dating  of  Laws   as   a   late  
dialogue,  see  BOBONICH  (2002),  n.  8  on  482-­‐‑483  and  the  literature  in  ZUCKERT  (2009),  51,  n.  1.  For  
the  question  of  Platonic  chronology  in  general,  see  BOBONICH  ibid.  and  KLOSKO  (2006),  14-­‐‑19,  with  
the  literature  in  nn.  5  and  6  on  15-­‐‑16.      
9  Cf.  NIGHTINGALE  (1993),  279.  
10  See  for  a  compact  overview  also  LISI  (2001b).  
11  AST  (1816),  387:  “Ist  der  Inhalt  der  Gesetze  unplatonisch,  so  ist  es  noch  weit  mehr  der  Geist  und  
Ton  des  Werkes  und  die  Sprache.”  
12  AST   (1816),   384-­‐‑392,   and   (1818);  ZELLER   (1839);  MÜLLER   (1968).  ZELLER   (1839),   128-­‐‑133,   claims  
that  Aristotle’s  attribution  of  Laws  to  Plato  in  his  Politics  was  mistaken,  but  considered  the  work  
genuine  in  his  history  of  Greek  philosophy  (51922).    
CHAPTER   ONE    7  
of  Laws  had  been  drastically  edited  after  Plato’s  death,  it  having  been  left  in  a  
state  of  disorder.13    
   Once  Platonic  authorship  had  become  the  consensus,14  the  beginning  of  
the   20th   century   witnessed   the   emergence   of   two   interpretative   trends   that  
today  still  dominate  the  debate:  the  distinction  between  (1)  ideal  and  practice  
and  the  distinction  between  (2)  best  and  second  best.  They  centred  primarily  
on   discussing   the   relation   of   Laws   to   Republic,   and,   to   a   lesser   extent,   to  
Statesman.    
   The   scholars   who   initiated   the   distinction   between   ideal   and   practice  
did   so   in   reaction   to   the  earlier  denial  of  Platonic  authorship  of  Laws.  Those  
scholars   asserted  virtually   the  opposite   thesis,   that   is,   the   thesis   that  Laws   is  
complementary   to   Republic.15   According   to   this   view,   Republic   is   meant   to  
depict  a  purely  theoretical  ideal.  To  supplement  this,  Laws  presents  a  realistic  
design,   adapted   to   the   demands   of   practice.16   The   differences   between  
                                                                                                              
13  This   is  the  view  of  Ivo  BRUNS  (Platons  Gesetze  vor  und  nach  ihrer  Herausgabe  durch  Philippos  von  
Opus,   Weimar   1880),   Ernst   PRAETORIUS   (De   legibus   Platonicis   a   Philippo   opuntio   retractatis,   diss.  
Bonn  1884),  and  BERGK  (1893);  cf.  GIGON  (1954),  230.  BERGK  argues  that  the  text  of  Laws  as  we  have  
it  is  a  compilation  made  by  Philippus  of  Opus  of  “Bruchstücke”  of  what  were  in  fact  two  different  
texts,   each   already   partly   lost   when   Philippus   began   his   work.   The   one   BERGK   calls   πρόότεροι  
Νόόµμοι,  the  other  δεύύτεροι  Νόόµμοι.  Hypothesizing  two  different  texts  according  to  him  solves  the  
problem  of  why  we  never  get  the  τρίίτη  πολιτείία  mentioned  in  Leg.  739e5  (ibid.,  48-­‐‑52).  Assuming  
that   the   πρώώτη   πολιτείία   is   Republic,   he   alleges   that   the   πρόότεροι   Νόόµμοι   are   (somewhat  
confusingly)   the   laws   for   the   δευτέέρα   πολιτείία   (“ideale[n]   Forderungen”,   114),   whereas   the  
δεύύτεροι   Νόόµμοι   are   the   laws   for   the   τρίίτη   πολιτείία   (the   laws   for   the   Cretan   colony,  
“Bedürfnisse[n]  des  wirklichen  Lebens”,  ibid.).  
14   For   an   overview   of   the   arguments   for   Laws’   genuineness   see   MORROW   (1960),   515-­‐‑518.   An  
overview  of  the  debate  about  the  authenticity  of  Laws  until  1974  is  presented  in  ISNARDI  PARENTE  
(1974).  The  ancient  testimonia,   in  particular  that  of  Aristotle  (Pol.   II.  1265a2-­‐‑1266a28),  give  us  no  
reason   to   doubt   Platonic   authorship.  Other   testimonia   include   that   of   Plutarch   in  Adv.   Colotem  
1126c:  Plato  left  behind  καλοὺς  µμὲν  ἐν  γράάµμµμασι  λόόγους  περὶ  νόόµμων  καὶ  πολιτείίας.  Among  the  
books  of  Aristotle  enumerated  in  Diog.  Laert.  V.22  are  three  books  of  extracts  from  Plato’s  Laws  
(Τὰ   ἐκ   τῶν   νόόµμων  Πλάάτωνος   α’   β’   γ’).   Persaeus,   a   pupil   of   Zeno,   is   reported   in  Diog.   Laert.  
VII.36  to  have  written  a  reaction  to  Plato’s  Laws  in  seven  books  (Πρὸς  τοὺς  Πλάάτωνος  νόόµμους  ζ’).    
15  Initiated  by  SHOREY  (1914):  Laws  is  “essentially  finished”  and  the  slight  differences  between  the  
two  are  “outweighed”  by  “all-­‐‑pervading  correspondences  in  principle  and  in  detail”  (347).  
16  Already  in  antiquity,  it  seems:  Apuleius,  De  Plat.  II,  caput  26-­‐‑27  (“civitas  …  non  ut  superior  [the  
polis  of  the  Resp.]  sine  evidentia,  sed  iam  cum  aliqua  substantia”,  c.  26).  The  most  prominent  defender  
of   this   position   today   is   LAKS   (1990),   (1991),   (2000).   Similarly:   FESTUGIÈRE   (1936),   423,   426,   444;  
SAUNDERS  (Republic  and  Laws  “opposite  sides  of  the  same  coin”,  transl.  xxxiii);  HENTSCHKE  (1971),  
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Callipolis   and  Magnesia   are   therefore   solely   to   be   explained   by  Magnesia’s  
practical  purpose,  and  should  not  be  attributed  to  any  change  of  mind  on  the  
part   of   their   author.17   It   is   wise   to   realize   that   at   the   bottom   of   this  
ideal/practice-­‐‑interpretation   lies   the   interpretative   assumption   that   Plato   is  
consistent   in  his  entire  oeuvre.  This   is  a   interpretative  principle  of  charity   in  
its  own  right,  but  a  charity  grounded  in  a  different  basis  (doctrinal  consistency)  
than   the   principle   of   charity   that   I   shall   be   defending   here   (text-­‐‑internal  
consistency).  In  fact,  it  is  Aristotle  who  reports  that  Plato  in  Laws  intended  to  
design   a  more   realistic   constitution,   one   that   has  more   in   common   (sc.   than  
Callipolis)   with   existing   constitutions   (κοινωτέέραν   …   ταῖς   πόόλεσι,   Pol.  
1265a318).  Yet  this  point  of  departure  makes  interpreters  prone  to  exaggerating  
the   similarities  between  Callipolis   and  Magnesia.19  The  primary  weakness   is  
that   it   ignores   the   literary   character  of   the   composition  of   the  Platonic   texts,  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
especially  233,   252-­‐‑253,   258-­‐‑259,   264-­‐‑265,   284-­‐‑287;  STALLEY   (1983),   (2007);  KAMTEKAR   (1997);  LISI  
(2001b);  SIMPSON  (2003),  drawing  on  Aristotle  as  evidence:  BROOKS  (2006);  STALLEY  (2007);  ROWE  
(2010).   See   also   the   literature   in   LISI   (2001b),   14,   n.   10.   According   to   LISI   ibid.,   p.   14,   this  
ideal/practice   interpretation   originated   after   World   War   II,   as   a   consequence   of   the   polemic  
(initiated  by  Karl  POPPER  in  The  Open  Society  and  Its  Enemies)  about  the  “totalitarian  character”  of  
Plato’s  political  philosophy.    
17   SHIELL   (1991),   388,   has   emphasized   that   this   dualism  disregards   the   fact   that  Republic   is   to   a  
certain  extent  practical,  and  Laws  to  a  certain  extent  also  theoretical  or  an  ideal.  LAKS  has  gone  so  
far   as   to   maintain   (in   one   of   his   earlier   publications   on   the   subject)   that   the   two   are  
complementary:   Laws   presents   the   laws   for   the   constitution   of  Republic,   originally   defended   in  
LAKS  (1990),  cf.  also  (1991),  (2000),  (2001);  cf.  LISI  (1998),  (2000).  
18  Cf.  Pol.  II  1265b29-­‐‑31.  Aristotle  goes  on  to  criticize  Plato  for  assimilating  the  constitution  little  by  
little  to  the  one  in  Republic  (κατὰ  µμικρὸν  περιάάγει  πάάλιν  πρὸς  τὴν  ἑτέέραν  πολιτείίαν,  1265a3-­‐‑4).  
19   Pol.   1265a4-­‐‑10:   ἔξω   γὰρ   τῆς   τῶν   γυναικῶν   κοινωνίίας   καὶ   τῆς   κτήήσεως,   τὰ   ἄλλα   ταὐτὰ  
ἀποδίίδωσιν  ἀµμφοτέέραις  ταῖς  πολιτείίαις·∙  καὶ  γὰρ  παιδείίαν  τὴν  αὐτήήν,  καὶ  τὸ  τῶν  ἔργων  τῶν  
ἀναγκαίίων  ἀπεχοµμέένους   ζῆν,   καὶ  περὶ   συσσιτίίων  ὡσαύύτως·∙  πλὴν   ἐν   ταύύτῃ  φησὶ   δεῖν   εἶναι  
συσσίίτια   καὶ   γυναικῶν,   καὶ   τὴν   µμὲν   χιλίίων   τῶν   ὅπλα   κεκτηµμέένων,   ταύύτην   δὲ  
πεντακισχιλίίων,  “For  with  the  exception  of  the  community  of  women  and  property,  he  supposes  
everything  to  be  the  same  in  both  states;  there  is  to  be  the  same  education;  the  citizens  of  both  are  
to   live   free   from   servile   occupations,   and   there   are   to   be   common   meals   in   both.   The   only  
difference   is   that   in   the   Laws,   the   common   meals   are   extended   to   women,   and   the   warriors  
number  5000,  but  in  the  Republic  only  1000”  (transl.  BARNES).  
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since   it   considers   this   aspect   irrelevant   for   the   content   of   their   political  
proposals.20      
   A   somewhat   different   unitarian   explanation   holds   that   the  
unphilosophical  character  of  Laws  is  to  be  explained  by  its  intended  audience.  
Laws   was,   according   to   this   reading,   intended   for   a   “popular”   audience,  
consisting  of  non-­‐‑philosophers.21  The  assumption  of  such  a  popular  audience  
would   explain   the   almost   total   lack  of   references   to  philosophy   in  Laws   and  
the  prominence  of  other   techniques  such  as   rhetoric  and  persuasion   (πειθώώ)  
dismissed   elsewhere   in   Plato.22   The   interlocutors   Cleinias   and  Megillus   are,  
according   to   this   view,   a   reflection   of   the   non-­‐‑philosophical   external  
audience.23  This  position  is  also  compatible  with  a  unitarian  account  of  Plato’s  
philosophy:  on  this  account,  the  lesser  prominence  (or  even  absence—this  is  a  
disputed  issue  in  itself)  of  the  Ideas  is  not  necessarily  a  faithful  representation  
of  Plato’s  personal  convictions  at  the  time.  
   As   an   alternative   to   the   ideal/practice   dichotomy   the   view   was   put  
forward   that  Laws   represents  a  “second  best”  constitution—second  best,   that  
                                                                                                              
20  Cf.   for   similar   critique  NIGHTINGALE   (1993),   282:   “In   treating   the  Laws   as   a   treatise,  Aristotle  
initiates   the   interpretative   approach   that   is   adopted  by  most   of   its  modern-­‐‑day  defenders.  This  
approach,   which   proceeds   by   extracting   a   political   and/or   ethical   ‘system’   from   the   rough  
surroundings   of   the   rest   of   the   text,   all   but   ignores   the   fact   that   the  Laws   contains   a   good  deal  
more  than  arguments  and  proposals.”  
21  GÖRGEMANNS   (1960).   See   JAEGER   III   (1945),   213-­‐‑214,   for   the   claim   that  Laws   is   on   the   level   of  
opinion,   not   knowledge.  Cf.   GILL   (2003),   44:   “Plato   seems   to   have   set   himself   the   challenge   of  
trying  to  carry  out  a  philosophical  project  in  terms  that  non-­‐‑philosophers  from  non-­‐‑philosophical  
cultures  could  understand  and  agree  with.”  LISI  (2001b),  12  notes  that  the  origin  of  this  view  can  
be  traced  back  to  STALLBAUM  (1859-­‐‑1860),  X2,  vi-­‐‑xii.  SIMPSON  (2003)  argues  that  Republic  and  Laws  
address  audiences  of  different  ages:  the  former  addresses  the  young,  the  latter  old  men.  
22  GÖRGEMANNS  (1960),  especially  43-­‐‑66,  70-­‐‑110.  
23   For   the   thesis   that   Cleinias   and  Megillus   are   not   philosophers   or   have   trouble   to   follow   the  
argument:  WILAMOWITZ-­‐‑MOELLENDORFF  (1919),  653;  FESTUGIÈRE  (1936),  437;  ZUCKERT  (2009),  66  n.  
34,  73-­‐‑74,  95,  136;  MAYHEW  (2010),  214-­‐‑215.  BOBONICH  (2002)  thinks  that  the  shortcomings  of  the  
interlocutors  are  ethical.  They  think  that  “goods  other  than  virtue  are  much  more  important  than  
virtue   itself”;  he  connects   this  ethical  shortcoming  to   the   failure  of   the  Spartan  and  Cretan   laws  
“to   treat   citizens   as   free  people”   (122).  But  Cri.  52e5-­‐‑53a1,  where   the  Athenian  Laws   claim   that  
Socrates  used  to  express  admiration  for  the  quality  of  the  laws  of  Crete  and  Sparta,  may  warrant  a  
more  positive  evaluation  of  the  background  of  these  interlocutors.  ADKINS  (1960)  asserts  that  the  
Cretans  and  Spartans  were  admired  by  “’upper  class’  and  philosophic  Athenian  opinion”  (294).  
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is,   to  Callipolis.  The   first   to  have  put   forward   this  view  were  ZELLER   (51922)  
and   WILAMOWITZ   (1919).   The   former   argued   in   his   history   of   Greek  
philosophy   that   Laws   depicts   a   constitution   that   had   to   dispense   with  
philosophical  rulers.24  The  latter  explained  this  absence  of  philosopher  rulers  
in  Laws  as  a  sign  of  the  resignation  of  Plato’s  old  age.25  Whereas  Republic  and  
Statesman  avow  that  political  authority  based  on  objective  knowledge  should  
be  unconstrained  by  laws  (the  situation  depicted  in  Republic),  Laws  presents  a  
state  in  which  political  authority  is  subjected  to  law.26  Law  is  codified  reason:  
the  second  best  “rule  of  law”  is  substituted  for  the  “rule  of  philosophy”,  rule  
by  the  reason  of  a  living  ruler.27  Plato’s  change  of  attitude  towards  the  relation  
between   political   authority   and   law   may   have   resulted   from   his   frustrated  
hopes  that  a  rule  by  philosophers  can  be  established,  possibly  after  the  Sicilian  
fiasco.  This  reading  assumes  Laws  to  be  much  more  pessimistic  about  human  
nature  than  Republic,  since  it  supposes  that  Plato  had  seen  himself  compelled  
to  conclude  that  no  human  individual  can  be  the  sovereign  in  a  state.  That  the  
constitution  of  Laws   relinquishes   the   idea  of   the  philosopher   as   the  ultimate  
authority   in   the   state   nevertheless   does   not   mean   that   Plato’s   belief   in  
metaphysics   as   the   basis   for   morality   and   politics   was   compromised;   Plato  
only   adapted   his   idea   about   what   would   be   the   best   constitution,   not  
necessarily  his  belief  in  metaphysical,  absolute  norms  for  morality.      
                                                                                                              
24  ZELLER  (51922),  951:  “Wenn  die  Republik  in  der  Philosophie  die  Grundlage  jedes  vernünftigen  
Staatslebens  erkannt,  und  den  Staat  unter  der  Voraussetzung  philosophischer  Herrscher  rein  von  
der  Idee  aus  entworfen  hatte,  so  wollen  die  Gesetze  zeigen,  in  welchem  Mass  und  durch  welche  
Mittel  der  Staat  seiner  Aufgabe  ohne  diese  Voraussetzung  genügen  könne.”    
25   Its   primary   expounder   is   WILAMOWITZ-­‐‑MOELLENDORFF   (1919);   for   more   adherents   of   this  
interpretation   see   the   literature   cited   in   LISI   (2001b),   n.   8.   Cf.   HENTSCHKE   (1971),   163f.;  
TRAMPEDACH  (1994).  
26  ADKINS  (1960),  297-­‐‑298;  KLOSKO  (1984),  (2006);  SHIELL  (1991);  SCHOFIELD  (1997);  PIERRIS  (1998),  
143-­‐‑145;  WALLACH  (2001);  KRAUT  (2010).  
27  The  rule  of   reason  embodied   in   the  philosophers   is   ideal,  but   law,  as  νοῦ  διανοµμήή,   is   second  
best.   See  ZELLER   (51922),   952;  MORROW   (1960),   chapter  XI;   YUNIS   (1996),   231;  MEYER   (2006),   385  
“law  in  its  very  essence  is  an  expression  of  reason”.  
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   There   is   common   ground   between   the   ideal/practice   and   best/second  
best  explanations:  they  converge  in  assuming  a  consistent  metaphysical  basis  
in   both  Republic   and   Laws   (in   this   sense   they   are   both   unitarian),   and   they  
share   the   idea   that   Laws   presents   a   modified   version   of   Callipolis   (either  
conceived  as  the  ideal,  or  as  the  best  constitution).  Plato  consistently  adhered  
to   his   conviction   that   society   and   human   life   ought   to   be   organized   on   the  
basis  of  a  metaphysical  notion  of  justice  and  τὸ  καλόόν,  and  both  Republic  and  
Laws  offer  ways  to  do  this—it  being  of  secondary  importance  how  knowledge  
thereof   is   imparted   in   society.   Perhaps   it   is   more   accurate   to   say   that   the  
primary   difference   between   the   ideal/practice   and   best/second   best  
interpretative  directions   lies  with   their   respective  assessment  of   the  status  of  
Callipolis  (as  unrealizable  ideal,  or  as  the  best  possible  constitution),  which  in  
turn  has   consequences   for   their   assessment   of   the   human   condition   and   the  
rule  of  law  in  Laws.  
   The  passage  generally  adduced,  both  by  defenders  of  the  ideal/practice  
and   of   the   best/second   best   thesis,   to   support   the   idea   that   Laws’   city   is   an  
adaptation  of  Callipolis  is  Laws  739a1-­‐‑e7.  This  is  one  of  the  source  passages  for  
the  label  “second  best”,  since  in  this  passage  the  constitution  of  Laws  is  said  to  
come   into   being   δευτέέρως,   “in   a   secondary  way”.28  Laws   739a1-­‐‑e7   has   often  
been   read   as   a   kind   of   commentary   on   the   relation   between   Callipolis   and  
Magnesia.29  The  passage  refers  to  a  city,  inhabited  by  gods  or  children  of  gods  
(ἡ  µμὲν  δὴ  τοιαύύτη  πόόλις,  εἴτε  που  θεοὶ  ἢ  παῖδες  θεῶν,  739d6).  Τhis  city  has  
traditionally  been  identified  with  Callipolis  due  to  a  superficial  resemblance:  
in  that  city,  wives,  children  and  possessions  are  all  held  in  common.30    
                                                                                                              
28   In   Laws   739e4   the   Athenian   states   that   the   constitution   they   (the   interlocutors)   have   now  
embarked   upon   (this   is   in   Book   V)   will   if   it   somehow   came   into   being   be   “very   near   to  
immortality   and  unity   in   a   secondary  way”,  ἀθανασίίας   ἐγγύύτατα  καὶ  ἡ  µμίία  δευτέέρως.   In   the  
preamble  on  woundings  it  is  stated,  Laws  875d3-­‐‑4:  τὸ  δεύύτερον  αἱρετέέον,  τάάξιν  τε  καὶ  νόόµμον.  Cf.  
Plt.  297e1-­‐‑6,  where  the  phenomenon  of  law  (νόόµμος)  is  called  δεύύτερον.  
29  For  the  first  time,  it  seems,  by  BERGK  (1883),  48-­‐‑51.  But  see  also  ZELLER  (51922),  952.  
30  Leg.  739c4-­‐‑5:  κοινὰς  µμὲν  γυναῖκας,  κοινοὺς  δὲ  εἶναι  παῖδας,  κοινὰ  δὲ  χρήήµματα  σύύµμπαντα.  
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   Both  LAKS  and  BOBONICH  have  however  convincingly  argued  that  “the  
city  of  gods”,  as  it  is  usually  referred  to,  in  this  passage  is  not  Callipolis,31  for  it  
is  obvious  that  the  hierarchy  of  constitutions  in  Laws  739a1-­‐‑e7  is  defined  by  “a  
model   internal   to   the   Laws   itself”.32   This   internal   ideal   is   cast   in   the   phrase  
“κοινὰ  τὰ  φίίλων”  (739c2-­‐‑3).  A  polis  must  be  as  much  as  possible  a  unity,  a  city  
in  which  τὰ  φύύσει  ἴδια  (eyes,  ears,  hands,  etc.)  are  common  “in  some  way  or  
other”  (ἁµμῇ  γέέ  πῃ,  739c7).    
   The  vagueness  here  is  important:  in  contrast  to  the  constitutional  theory  
of  Republic,  Laws  assumes  that  a  polis  can  be  unified  in  various  ways.33  Unity  (ἡ  
µμίία)   is   a   scale,   on  which   communism   of   families   dispersed   throughout   the  
entire  city  is  the  one  extreme.  Laws’  internal  ideal  thus  suggests  an  egalitarian  
society,  whereas   the   ideal   polis   Callipolis   is   a   class   society.   In   fact,   it   is   this  
very  property  of  Callipolis  (the  order  among  its  three  classes)  that  makes  it  a  
just  polis  in  the  first  place.  The  problem  with  κοινὰ  τὰ  φίίλων  (the  reason  why  
it   is  unattainable   in   its  most  extreme)   is   that  human  nature   is  not  capable  of  
such   a   high   degree   of   commonality.   The   challenge   is   therefore   to   design   a  
constitution  with  the  highest  degree  of  unity  that  is  possible  (εἰς  τὸ  δύύνατον,  
738c6-­‐‑7;   cf.   κατὰ   δύύναµμιν   in   739d3   and   µμίίαν   ὅτι   µμάάλιστα   πόόλιν   in   d3-­‐‑4).  
Unity   differs   in   degrees   and   different   types   of   constitutions   may   exhibit  
relatively   high   degrees   of   unity.   The   constitution   the   interlocutors   are   now  
                                                                                                              
31  See  LAKS  (2000),  272:  “(…)  what  the  Laws  retreats  from  in  the  case  of  communal  institutions  is  
arguably   something   more   extreme   than   anything   we   find   in   the   Republic,   since   the   Laws,   in  
sketching  the  outlines  of  the  ‘first  city’,  specifies  that  this  community  should  extend,  as  much  as  
possible,   to   the   ‘entirety   of   the   constitution’   (739c1f.),   whereas   the   Republic   explicitly   limits  
communism  to   the  guardians  alone.”  See  also   id.,   (2001),  108-­‐‑110.  BOBONICH   (2002),  11-­‐‑12:  “The  
Laws  passage   [739a3-­‐‑740a2]   presents   as   the   ‘first-­‐‑best’   city,   not   that   of   the  Republic,   but   one   in  
which  there  is,  throughout  the  entire  city,  a  community  of  property  and  of  women  and  children.  
(…)  What  the  Laws  represents  as  the  ideal—that  is  to  be  approximated  as  closely  as  possible—is  a  
city   in  which   all   citizens   are   subject   to   the   same   extremely   high   ethical   demands.”  Cf.   PIERRIS  
(1998),  143.  
32  LAKS  (2000),  272.  
33  For  a  study  of  the  unity  of  Callipolis,  see  ARENDS  (1988).  
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designing  may,  when   it   has   come   into   being,   approximate   immortality   and  
constitute  a  unity  “in  a  secondary  way”.34  
   Some  interpreters  have  seen  a  confirmation  of  the  second  best-­‐‑thesis  in  
a   few   derogatory   remarks   about   laws   in   Statesman,35   and   in   Republic’s  
statement   that   “a   virtuous   person   does   not   need   laws”.36   Negative   verdicts  
about   laws   in   other   dialogues   than  Laws  have   sometimes   fostered   the   view  
that   Plato’s   attitude   to   laws   is   negative   in   principle,   which   seems   to   have  
influenced   scholars’   assessment   of   Plato’s   project   in  Laws.   Yet,   claims  made  
about   a   subject   X   in   one   dialogue   cannot   be   sufficient   ground   for   drawing  
definitive   conclusions   about   X   in   another   dialogue.   Laws   develops   its   own  
conception   of   laws   and   lawgiving,   which   need   not   be   liable   to   criticism   of  
laws  voiced  in  other  dialogues.    
  
The  present  study  approaches  the  text  of  Laws  through  a  text-­‐‑immanent  use  of  
the   philological   “principle   of   charity”.37   This   means   that   I   shall   apply   the  
                                                                                                              
34   Leg.   739e3-­‐‑4:   ἣν   [sc.   πολιτείίαν]   δὲ   νῦν   ἡµμεῖς   ἐπικεχειρήήκαµμεν,   εἴη   τε   ἂν   γενοµμέένη   πως  
ἀθανασίίας   ἐγγύύτατα   καὶ   ἡ   µμίία   δευτέέρως.   The   fact   that   the   Athenian   mentions   a   “third  
constitution”  (τρίίτην,  739e5)  confirms  that  he  has  in  mind  an  ordinal  ranking  in  which  different  
constitutions  differ  from  each  other  in  degrees  of  being  a  unity.  
35  Plt.  294a10-­‐‑297e6,  especially  297e1-­‐‑6;  also  300c5-­‐‑302b3;  Leg.  875d3-­‐‑5.  Cf.  Epist.  VII,  337d6.  On  the  
opposition  between  the  living  ruler  and  written  laws  as  second-­‐‑best,  see:  ZELLER  (1839),  28,  39-­‐‑42;  
ADKINS  (1960),  296-­‐‑298;  GUTHRIE  (1978),  178,  186-­‐‑187;  SAUNDERS  (1992),  477;  NIGHTINGALE  (1999),  
113;  KLOSKO  (2006),  211-­‐‑216;  MEYER  (2006),  375-­‐‑380;  BROWN  (2009),  347-­‐‑348.  
36  Resp.  425b7-­‐‑426e7.  See  e.g.  BARKER  (1918),  271  (contra  whom  see  OWEN  [1953]:  “Republic  does  not  
repudiate   any   ‘system   of   law’;   it   contends   only   that   continuous   piecemeal   legislation   and  
litigation   will   be   eliminated   ἐὰν   γε   θεὸς   αὐτοῖς   διδῷ   σωτηρίίαν   τῶν   νόόµμων   ὧν   ἔµμπροσθεν  
διήήλθοµμεν   (425e),   since   the  Guardians  will  know  ὅσα  δεῖ  νοµμοθετήήσασθαι”,   in  n.   3  on  90-­‐‑91);  
GUTHRIE  (1978),  186-­‐‑187;  KLOSKO  (2006),  178-­‐‑179.  
37  See  for  an  explanation  of  the  principle  of  charity  SLUITER  (1998),  especially  14-­‐‑15.  The  principle  
of  charity  is  originally  part  of  a  theory  of  meaning  of  objectivist  philosophers,  particularly  Donald  
DAVIDSON  and  QUINE,  who  has  also  referred  to   it  as   the  principle  of  “rational  accommodation”.  
As   a   theory   of   meaning,   it   relates   utterances   to   other   utterances   (rather   than   a   meaningful  
expression  to  a  discrete  entity)  and  in  trying  to  come  up  with  an  interpretation  that  maximizes  the  
sense   between   them,   it   is   in   that   sense   holistic.   For   the   Davidsonian   principle   of   charity:  
DAVIDSON  (1984)  and  (2001),  especially  chapter  10.  SLUITER  (1998)  sees  ancient  precursors   in  the  
benigna   interpretatio   of   Roman   law   by   Roman   jurists   and   in   Augustine’s   regula   caritatis   as   a  
“hermeneutic  instrument”  (18).  
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principle   of   charity   in   a   specific   way:   I   shall   take   as   my   basic   unit   of  
interpretation   a   single   text   rather   than   a   whole   oeuvre.  My  methodological  
principle  of  charity  isolates  that  single  text,  and  regards  it  as  a  coherent  whole.  
This  assumption  puts   the   interpreter  under  an   initial  obligation   to  maximize  
the   sense  and   internal   coherence  of   the  different   statements   in   the   text.   S/he  
assumes  a  benevolent  attitude  to  the  text,  in  order  to  “bring  out  the  best  in  the  
source   text”   and   he   or   she   prefers   “a   favourable   reading   over   one   that  
attributes  a  mistake  to  the  author”.38    
   This  means  that  I  shall  be  involved  in  an  attempt  to  reconstruct  Plato’s  
ideology   as   he   represents   it.   This   study   is   a   contribution   to   the   history   of  
political  philosophy,   and  we  would  be  diregarding   important   information   if  
we   do   not,   for   analytical   purposes,   accept   what   Plato   claims.39   This  
methodological   principle   thus   attributes   priority   to   internal   consistency  
(consistency   within   Laws)   rather   than   to   consistency   between   the   different  
Platonic   texts,   as   most   exegetes   have   done   so   far.   It   will   be   attempted   to  
develop  a  reading  of  Laws  in  which  the  seemingly  un-­‐‑Platonic  elements,  will,  
somehow,  add  up  to  a  narrative   that   is  coherent  as  a   text.  That   is,   the   text  as  
distinct  from  the  worldview  and  political  principles  that  may  be  deduced  from  
it,  and  that  may,  in  their  own  right,  be  considered  more,  or  less,  coherent.  
   This   Introduction   began   by   listing   some   of   the   most   conspicuous  
peculiarities  in  Laws.  The  minimal  role  of   justice,  the  absence  of  Socrates,  the  
positive   attitude   towards   persuasion,   and   the   formulation   of   laws   without  
reference   to   an   authority—all   of   these   are   surprising   in   the   light   of   earlier  
Platonic   works.   The   present   study   takes   these   peculiarities   as   the   basic  
ingredients   of   its   interpretation   and   attempts   to   offer   a   maximising  
interpretation,   in  which  these  elements  add  up  to  an   internally  coherent  and  
                                                                                                              
38  SLUITER  (1998),  15  on  the  principle  of  charity  in  general.  
39   In   terms   of   RORTY   (1984),   the   approach   of   this   study   attempts   to   draw   a   “historical  
reconstruction”  rather  than  a  “rational  reconstruction”  The  first  aims  to  understand  the  views  of  
ancient  philosophers  in  their  own  terms,  as  do  historians  of  science;  the  latter  treats  philosophers  
“as  contemporaries,  as  colleagues  with  whom  [one]  can  exchange  views”  (ibid.,  49).  
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sensible   text.   Since   I   shall   at   the   same   time   be   arguing   that   the   ancient  
tradition   gives   us   no   reason   to   doubt   Platonic   authorship   (see   the   next  
section),   my   reading   of   Laws   as   a   pragmatic   project   entails   that   Plato’s   last  
work  is  at  odds  with  a  number  of  core  Platonic  doctrines.  This  of  course  raises  
the   question   of   the   place   of   Laws   in   the   Platonic   corpus   as   a   whole.   The  
concluding  chapter  (chapter  seven)  will  suggest  a  possible  way  to  address  the  
discrepancy  between  Laws  and  more  central  works  of  Platonic  philosophy,  by  
viewing   the   work   in   its   broader   intellectual   context.   Yet,   in   any   case,   the  
explanatory  gain  of  an  interpretation  that  succeeds  in  grasping  the  text  as  an  
internally  coherent  whole  outweighs  the  fact  that  the  particular  interpretation  
offered   in   turn   raises,   with   special   urgency,   the   question   of   why   Plato  
embarked  on  such  a  radically  different  project  at  the  end  of  his  life.  
     
Several   interpreters   who   have   approached   Laws   from   a   strictly   philological  
point  of  view  have   concluded   that   the  work   is  not   authentic.  Although   I  do  
not  think  that  the  results  of  the  analysis  offered  here  should  lead  one  to  draw  
such  a  drastic  conclusion,  they  do  converge  with  those  interpreters  in  finding  
significant   shifts   in   the   philosophy   of   Laws   when   compared   to   the   rest   of  
Plato’s  oeuvre.  It  might  seem  paradoxical  that  my  approach,  and  a  number  of  
my  conclusions,  have  more  affinity  with  some  of  those  who  contested  Platonic  
authorship.40   On   second   thoughts,   however,   it   seems   that   the   radicalism   of  
ZELLER   and   MÜLLER   has   an   interpretative   advantage:   it   saves   them   from  
explaining   away   differences   between   Republic   and   Laws.   Moreover,   their  
analysis  of  Laws  on  the  level  of   its  style  and  vocabulary  saves  them  from  the  
mistaken   assumption   that   continuity   in   terminology   (where   it   exists)  
automatically   means   continuity   of   thought—they   acknowledge   that   a   large  
                                                                                                              
40  Particularly   the  work  of  MÜLLER   (1968),  and,   to  a   lesser  extent,  ZELLER   (1839),   to  which   I  will  
refer  at  the  appropriate  places  in  my  argument.  
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part  of  the  Platonic  vocabulary  is  reappropriated  in  Laws,  but  in  the  service  of  
a  different  message.    
   This   study   investigates   to   what   extent   the   terminology   deployed   in  
Laws  is  familiar,  and  how  Plato  uses  his  own  terminology.  The  consequence  of  
all  of  this  is  that  we  have  to  be  very  careful  about  our  use  of  terms  and  always  
make  explicit  (as  I  shall  try  to  do  as  well  whenever  possible)  whether  we  are  
talking  about,  e.g.,  ἀρετήή  or  τέέχνη  as  Plato  uses  these  terms  in  Laws,  or  as  he  
uses  them  elsewhere  in  his  oeuvre.  This  mechanism,  that  is,  Plato’s  using  part  
of  his  own  vocabulary  in  the  service  of  a  message  that  differs  from  the  one  for  
which   this   philosophical   idiom  was   coined   initially,   will   play   an   important  
role  in  the  argument  of  this  study.  Looks  can  be  deceiving:  if  Plato  in  Laws  is  
talking  about,  for  instance,  φρόόνησις,  that  does  not  mean  that  what  he  means  
by  it,  or  what  he  says  about  it,  will  necessarily  be  the  same  as  in,  say,  Republic.  
In  fact,  it  will  be  argued  that  Plato  not  only  reappropriates  familiar  terms  in  a  
new   context;   he   even   seems   to   reappropriate   complete   philosophical  
postulates   from   his   own   philosophy.   The   most   significant   example   of   this  
recycling  of  an  earlier  postulate   is   that  of   the  unity  and  plurality  of   the   four  
virtues.   It   will   be   argued   that   it   is   not   without   significance   that   this   theme  
occurs  only  at  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  Laws  (Books  I-­‐‑II,  and  XII),  and  has  
no  role  in  the  law  code  proper.  
   As  interpreters,  we  therefore  need  to  distinguish  between  the  different  
uses  that  Plato  himself  makes  of  his  own  philosophical  terms.  A  sensibility  to  
the   author’s   own   use   of   his   language   can   help   us,   first,   to   trace   the   new  
outlines  of  the  concepts,  and  second,  to  try  to  make  sense  of  those  results  with  
the   help   of   the   principle   of   charity   explained   above.   We   will   see   that   an  
important   reason   why   Laws   keeps   eluding   our   comprehension   is   that   its  
concepts,  familiar  though  they  may  seem  to  us,  do  not  add  up  to  the  neat  and  
logical,  orderly  ‘system’  from  which  they  were  taken  and  that  they  served  to  
create.   This   aspect   of   Laws   can   be   most   clearly   perceived   when   Laws   is  
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compared   to   the   absolute,   closed   system   of   Republic,   which   is   why   the  
investigation  of  Plato’s  last  work  will  be  preceded  by  a  discussion  of  Republic  
as  well  as  two  other  texts  that  assume  justice  is  part  of  a  metaphysical  order.  
An  approach  that  pays  special  attention  to  the  language  of  Laws  is  less  prone  
to  explain  away  the  differences  between  Republic  and  Laws.    
  
Since  we  will  attempt  to  interpret  Laws  as  a  coherent  and  well-­‐‑structured  text,  
it  is  useful  to  briefly  address  here  the  issue  of  its  supposedly  unfinished  state.  
The  next  section  will  discuss  two  sets  of  ancient  testimonies  that  seem  to  have  
hindered  a  reading  of  Laws  as  a  well-­‐‑structured  and  coherent  composition:  (1)  
reports   that   Plato   died   before   he   could   finish   Laws;   and   (2)   some   negative  
qualifications  of  the  style  of  Laws  in  ancient  literary  criticism.  This  tendency  in  
literary   criticism   in   antiquity   is   in   fact   interesting   in   its   own   right,   since   it  
draws  our  attention  to  the  ancient  reception  of  the  prose  style  of  Laws.    
  
  
1 . 2    The    s ty l e    o f   Laws   
Laws   is   generally   assumed   to   be   Plato’s   last   work.41   Two   ancient   sources  
inform  us  about  the  state  in  which  Plato  left  Laws  at  his  death.  The  first,  which  
is   the   source  modern   scholars   refer   to   (if   at   all)   in   support   of   their   claim   of  
Laws’   unfinishedness,   is   a   report   in   Diogenes   Laertius:   ἔνιοι   τέέ   φασιν   ὅτι  
Φίίλιππος   ὁ   Ὀπούύντιος   τοὺς   νόόµμους   αὐτοῦ   µμετέέγραψεν   ὄντας   ἐν   κηρῷ:  
                                                                                                              
41  Plutarch  believes  that  Plato  wrote  Laws  when  he  was  “older”  than  when  he  wrote  Timaeus:  De  
Is.  et  Os.  c.  48  (=  Moralia  370f):  ἐν  δὲ  τοῖς  Νόόµμοις  ἤδη  πρεσβύύτερος  ὤν,  cf.  TARÁN  (1975),  131,  n.  
549.  See  TARÁN  ibid.,  n.  554  on  pp.  132-­‐‑133  for  reasons  why  it  is  legitimate  to  assume  that  Laws  is  
Plato’s  last  work.  Aristotle,  Pol.  1264b26-­‐‑27,  states  that  Laws  is  a  later  work  than  Republic.  GUTHRIE  
(1978),  322,  feels  that  there  is  “much  in  the  tone  of  the  work  to  suggest  that  [Plato]  wrote  it  after  
the  failure  of  his  last  visit  to  Sicily  in  360”.  Admitting  in  note  3  ibid.  that  this  is  “largely  a  matter  of  
general  impression”,  he  thinks  that  Epist.  III,  316a  “may  indicate  that  his  work  with  Dionysius  II  
on   that  visit  provided   the   ‘prototype’   for   the   ‘preambles’  of   the   laws”.  See  also   the   literature   in  
note  8  above,  on  the  relative  chronology  of  the  dialogues.  
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“some  claim  that  Philip  of  Opus  transscribed  his  [Plato’s]  Laws  as  they  were  in  
wax”.42   The   second   testimony,   less   well-­‐‑known,   is   Proclus’   report   in   the  
Prolegomena   Philosophiae   Platonicae   (Προλεγόόµμενα   τῆς   Πλάάτωνος  
φιλοσοφίίας).   The   anonymous   author   of   the   Prolegomena   reports   Proclus’  
twofold  argument  for  the  spuriousness  of  the  Epinomis.43  The  first,  which  is  of  
importance   for   our   purposes,   runs   as   follows:   πῶς   ὁ   τοὺς   Νόόµμους   µμὴ  
εὐπόόρησας  διορθώώσασθαι  διὰ  τὸ  µμὴ  ἔχειν  χρόόνον  ζωῆς  τὸ  Ἐπινόόµμιον  µμετὰ  
τούύτους   ὂν   εἶχεν   γράάψαι;44   “since   death   prevented   Plato   from   revising   the  
Laws,   he   cannot  possibly   have  written   the  Epinomis  after   it”.45   In   both   cases,  
                                                                                                              
42   Diog.   Laert.   III.37.   About   this   testimonium   TARÁN   (1975),   128-­‐‑133;   MORROW   (1960),   515;  
SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  138-­‐‑142,  who  regards  this  as  the  most  important  testimony  on  this  issue  (with  
reference  to   JAEGER  on  p.  140,  n.  96);  also  BERGK  (1883),  43-­‐‑44;  ZELLER  (51922),  978-­‐‑982.  Cf.  Diog.  
Laert.  III.25.  FRITZ  in  RE  s.v.  Philippos  (2354)  connects  ἀναγραφεὺς  γεγονώώς  in  the  Academicorum  
Index  Herculaneum  MEKLER  (1902)  fr.  13  =  DORANDI  (1991),  III  37  (p.  134)  with  an  ἀστρολόόγος  (=  
Philippus)  being  Plato’s  scribe  and  in  this  function  writing  down  Laws.;  cf.  MORROW  (1960),  515;  
SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  140.  
43  For  Philippus  of  Opus,  a  pupil  of  Plato,  see  MORROW  (1960),  515-­‐‑518  (Excursus  F),  with  a  brief  
overview  of  the  question  of  his  possible  editorial  work  on  Laws.  Philippus  is  listed  in  Suda  as  the  
author  of  Epinomis:  Suidas  418  s.v.  Φιλόόσοφος:  ὃς  τοὺς  Πλάάτωνος  Νόόµμους  διεῖλεν  εἰς  βιβλίία  ιβ’,  
τὸ  γὰρ  ιγ’  αὐτὸς  προσθεῖναι  λέέγεται.  For  the  identification  of  φιλόόσοφος  as  Philippus  of  Opus,  
see  RE  s.v.  Philippos.  TARÁN  (1975),  129-­‐‑130  assumes  that  the  division  of  Laws  into  twelve  books  is  
at  least  as  early  as  the  second  century  A.D.,  but  later  than  the  fourth  century  B.C.E.  and  does  not  go  
back  to  Philippus  or  the  early  Academy.  Also  sceptical  is  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  140;  see  n.  92  ibid.  for  
references  to  scholars  who  have  accepted  Suda’s  report.  
44  TROUILLARD   (Budé)   translates  “Comment  Platon,  dit-­‐‑il,  qui  n’a  pas  pu  corriger   les  Lois,  parce  
qu’il  ne  lui  est  pas  resté  assez  de  temps  à  vivre,  aurait-­‐‑il  pu  écrire  l’Epinomis,  qui  vient  après  les  
Lois?”  (37).  
45  Anon.  Proleg.  X,  25,  6-­‐‑8,  text  and  translation  WESTERINK.  See  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  140  for  the  value  
of  this  testimony.  In  Anon.  Prol.  X,  24,  10-­‐‑16  we  find  the  report:  ἐσχάάτους  δὲ  τοὺς  Νόόµμους  φασὶν  
γεγράάφθαι,   διόότι  ἀδιορθώώτους  αὐτοὺς  κατέέλιπεν  καὶ  συγκεχυµμέένους  µμὴ  εὐπορήήσας  χρόόνου  
διὰ  τὴν  τελευτὴν  πρὸς  τὸ  συνθεῖναι  αὐτούύς·∙  εἰ  δὲ  καὶ  νῦν  δοκοῦσι  συντετάάχθαι  κατὰ  τὸ  δέέον,  
οὐκ   αὐτοῦ   τοῦ  Πλάάτωνος   συνθέέντος   ἀλλάά   τινος  Φιλίίππου  Ὀπουντίίου,   ὃς   διάάδοχος   γέέγονε  
τοῦ   Πλατωνικοῦ   διδασκαλείίου.   “His   last   work   is   supposed   to   be   the   Laws,   which   he   left  
uncorrected  and   in  disorder,  his  death   leaving  him  no   time   to  put   the   finishing   touch   to   it;   if   it  
makes  a  well-­‐‑edited  impression  now,  this  is  not  Plato’s  own  work,  but  that  of  a  certain  Philippus  
of  Opus,  who  became  Plato’s  successor  in  his  school”  (text  and  translation  WESTERINK).  Modern  
scholars  are  sceptic  about  the  truth  of  this  statement.  MORROW  (1960),  assuming  that  the  author  of  
the   Prolegomena   is   Olympiodorus:   “One   suspects   that   Olympiodorus,   apart   from   his  
misinformation   about   Philippus   (he   was   never   διάάδοχος   of   the   Academy),   merely   gives   an  
embellishment  of  what  he  found  in  Proclus”  (516).  I  am  not  sure,  however,  that  the  source  for  this  
statement,  which  is  introduced  by  φασίίν  (X.24,  11),  is  Proclus,  who  is  only  introduced  in  X.25,  6.  
More  convincing  to  me  seems  TARÁN  (1975),  who  suspects  that  Olympiodorus’  remark  “is  in  all  
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the   interpretation   hinges   on   what   seem   to   be   technical   editorial   terms,  
µμεταγράάφειν  (ὄντας  ἐν  κηρῷ46)  in  Diogenes,  and  διόόρθωσις  in  Proclus.    
   There   is   some   dispute   about   the   exact   meaning   of   the   term  
µμεταγράάφειν.47   Yet   although   the   term   is   ambiguous,   it   does   not   necessarily  
entail  any  kind  of  revision.  Moreover,  if  we  indeed  assume  (for  lack  of  a  better  
option)   that  ὄντας  ἐν  κηρῷ  means   that   the   text  was   left  on  wax   tablets,   this  
clause  would  rather  seem  to  explain  the  copying  of  the  text  to  make  it  ready  
for  publication48   than   the  making  of   revisions.  The   term   διόόρθωσις   refers   to  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
likelihood  only  an  inference  based  on  a  conflation  of  Proclus’  first  argument  against  the  Platonic  
authorship   of   the   E[pinomis]   (…),   with   Diogenes   Laertius’   statement   concerning   Philip’s  
editorship   of   the   Laws”   (128;   cf.   SCHÖPSDAU   [1994],   140-­‐‑141);   “Neither   the   state   of   disorder   in  
which  Plato  is  alleged  to  have  left  the  Laws  nor  the  difference  between  it  and  the  state  of  the  work  
after  publication   is   to  be   found   in  Proclus  or   any  other   ancient   source”   (129).   Similarly,  RE   s.v.  
Philippos,   2358-­‐‑2359,   notes   that   the   report   in   Prol.   may   be   a   suspicion   and   is   not   necessarily  
grounded   in   tradition,   and   subsequently   gives   four   reasons   for   supposing   that   Laws   as   it   lies  
before  us  has  essentially  the  form  in  which  Plato  left  it.    
46  BERGK  (1883),  44  n.  1,  argues   that  ἐν  κηρῷ  is  adopted   from  the  visual  arts  and  refers   to  ”den  
Zustand  eines  zum  Abguss  bestimmten  Modells,  in  dem  dieses  bereits  mit  Wachs  überzogen  und  
somit   fertig   ist”;   Plato  has   therefore   left  Laws   “so  gut  wie  vollendet”.   TARÁN   (1975),   130  n.   542  
thinks   that   it   may   be   literally   true   that   at   least   part   of   Laws  was   in   wax,   and   doubts   BERGK’s  
metaphorical   explanation.   SCHÖPSDAU   (1994),   141,   thinks   that   it   is   “schwer   vorstellbar”   that   a  
work  as  voluminous  as  Laws  is  entirely  written  down  on  wax  tablets  (see  ibid.,  n.  97)  for  references  
to   those   who   have   assumed   that   ἐν   κηρῷ   does   mean   on   wax   tablets.   WILAMOWITZ-­‐‑
MOELLENDORFF   (1919),   648  n.   1,   assumes   that   ἐν  κηρῷ  metaphorically  means  “im  Wachs”,   “im  
Konzept”;  see  also  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  141,  with  n.  98  ibid.    
47  See  TARÁN  (1975),  130  n.  543  notes   that  although   the  verb  µμεταγράάφειν  can  mean  “either   ‘to  
transcribe,   to   copy’,   or   ‘to   rewrite,   i.e.   to   correct’,   in   the   present   context   nothing   suggests   that  
Diogenes  meant  the  latter”.  Another  argument  he  brings  forward  is  that  Aristotle  refers  to  Laws  
“as  if  the  work  contained  the  ipsissima  verba  of  Plato”  (ibid.).  For  a  discussion  of  the  meaning  of  
µμεταγράάφειν,   see   also   SCHÖPSDAU   (1994),   141.  Although   according   to   ZELLER   (51922),   979,   n.   2  
µμετέέγραψεν  does  not  mean  “Umarbeitung”,  he   indeed  assumes  that  Plato  had  not  been  able  to  
give  Laws  “die  letzte  Vollendung”  (978)  (on  p.  979,  n.  2,  he  notes  that  the  term  is  used  for  charges  
of  plagiarism).  STALLEY  (1983),  2-­‐‑3  thinks  that,  although  is  not  clear  “whether  Philip’s  contribution  
to  the  Laws  consisted  simply  in  copying  out  what  Plato  had  written  or  whether  he  edited  it  at  all  
extensively”   the   former   is   more   likely,   since   “[t]he   text   contains   errors   and   discrepancies   that  
could  easily  have  been  removed  by  an  editor  had  he  wished  to  do  so.  Their  presence  suggests  that  
Philip  generally  reproduced  Plato’s  words  as  he  found  them”  (129).  Similarly,  in  RE  s.v.  Philippos,  
2359,  we  find  the  argument  that  the  “Unstimmigkeiten”  in  Laws  are  of  such  a  nature  that  they  can  
only  be  ascribed  to  the  author  himself;  cf.  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  141.  
48  Which   is  what  διόόρθωσις  would  normally  mean,   see  MORROW  (1960),   516,  noting   that   this   is  
consistent   with   what   Cicero   says   “was   the   custom   with   regard   to   the   publication   of   Plato’s  
dialogues”,  Cic.  Att.  XIII,  21,  5.  See  also  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  141-­‐‑142,  with  n.  102  on  p.  102.  PFEIFFER  
(1968),   65-­‐‑66,  with   the   references   in  n.   3   ibid.:   “(…)   it   is   a   fair   guess   that   the   first   generation  of  
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the  process  of  correction:  Laws  “was  not  corrected  for  publication  because  of  
lack   of   time.   For   this   Proclus   may   well   have   had   external   evidence;   but  
however  this  may  be,  he  probably  saw  evidence  for  the  lack  of  διόόρθωσις  in  
some   passages   of   the   Laws   itself,   as   do   some   modern   scholars”.49   The  
supposedly   unfinished   state   of   the   work   has   been   believed   to   find  
confirmation   in   the   allegedly   “chaotic”   state   and   style   of   the   text.50   For  
WILAMOWITZ  for  instance,  it  was  the  lack  of  dialectic  exchange  that  was  a  sign  
of  the  unfinished  state  of  the  text,  and  he  was  followed  by  KLOSKO  in  the  first  
edition  of  his  book  (1986).  TARÁN’s  criticism  of  those  who  have  concluded  on  
the   basis   of   “a   few   unusual   expressions”   that   the  whole  work  was   left   in   a  
state  of  disorder   is   just,   though   in  defense  of   the  other   side,  “a   few  unusual  
expressions”   understates   the   case.51   Proving   undeniably   that   a   text   is  
incoherent  appears  to  be  a  bridge  too  far.  The  text-­‐‑internal  reasons  in  support  
of  the  hypothesis  that  Laws  is  unfinished  and  lacks  coherence  seem,  to  say  the  
least,   subjective   and   impressionistic.52   Few   scholars   have   been   able   to   resist  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
[Plato’s]  pupils   tried  to  collect,   to  arrange,  and  to  copy  the  autographs  of   their  master,  and  that  
this  ‘Academy  Edition’  became  the  basis  of  all  the  later  ones”.  See  the  lemma  ‘Publication’  in  Neue  
Pauly  for  what  publication  entailed  in  antiquity.    
49  TARÁN  (1975),  129.  
50  E.g.:  BARKER  (1918),  292:  “The  marks  of  old  age  are  written  large  in  many  features  of  the  Laws”;  
WILAMOWITZ-­‐‑MOELLENDORFF   (1919),   647:   “Was   Platon   nach   seinem   Tode   der   Welt   als   sein  
Vermächtnis   übermachte   (…)   ist   ein   so   wunderliches   Chaos,   daß   viele   sich   gar   nicht   damit  
abfinden   können,   (…)”.   STALLEY   (1983),   3,   lists   “long   rambling   sentences”,   “inconsistencies   of  
detail”,  weak  characterization,  dropping  of  the  dialogue  form  in  Book  V,  and  his  impression  that  
Book   XI   and   the   early   part   of   XII   “read   like   a   connection   of   disconnected   fragments”   as  
“anomalies”  that  are  “most  naturally  explained  on  the  assumption  that  Plato  died  before  he  could  
give  the  Laws  its  final  polish.  Others  may  result  from  a  decline  in  his  literary  powers.  Whichever  
way   one   takes   it,   they   support   the   view   that   the  Laws   is   the   product   of   Plato’s   old   age.”   LAKS  
(2000),  263:  “Certain  features  of   the  Laws,  especially  disorder   in  the   last   two  books,  suggest   that  
Plato  died  before  he  could  put  the  final   touches  on  his  work.”  LISI   (2001b),  11:  “Today  [Laws]   is  
still  considered  an  unfinished  and  unstructured  work,  contradictory  and  written  in  a  heavy  and  
baroque  style.”  TARRANT  (2003),  55:  “Laws   feels  alien  even  after  other  works  that  we  think  of  as  
‘late’,  which  are  more  imaginative,  more  compact,  more  consistently  lively,  and  in  most  respects  
still  look  to  be  the  products  of  the  same  person  who  wrote  the  Phaedrus  and  the  Cratylus.”  
51  TARÁN  (1975),  130.  See  also  131,  n.  547  for  (19th  century)  literature.  
52  It  is  not  always  clear  which  textual  features  are  supposed  to  prove  Laws’  unfinishedness.  ZELLER  
(1839),   99,   gathers   Leg.   769b-­‐‑c   under   “starke   Anakoluthieen”   (but   cf.   MÜLLER   [1968],   121);  
WILAMOWITZ-­‐‑MOELLENDORFF   (1910)   sees   traces  of   illogical   transitions   in  Book  V;  WILAMOWITZ-­‐‑
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the   temptation   of   attributing   what   they   considered   less   successful  
characteristics  of  the  work  to  its  allegedly  unfinished  state  or  Plato’s  advanced  
age   at   the   time   of   composition.   Yet,   neither   of   the   terms   µμεταγράάφειν   and  
διόόρθωσις  warrant  the  conclusion  that  Philip  of  Opus  revised  the  text,  or  that  
Plato   left   it  drafted   in  outline  when  he  died.53  Although   they  do   leave   room  
for   supposing   that   corrections   and/or   adjustments   were   made,   they   do   not  
imply   supplementation   of   the   text.  We  may   therefore,   at   least   as   a  working  
hypothesis,   assume   that   the   dialogue   as   a   composition,   qua   structure,   is  
complete,  and   that  no  parts  are  missing—which  of  course,  does  not   rule  out  
the  possibility  that  some  formulations  have  not  received  their  final  touch.54         
  
In  the  rest  of  this  section  we  will  briefly  look  at  some  evaluations  of  the  style  
of  Laws   in  ancient  literary  criticism.  The  ancient  literary  critics  never  seem  to  
assume   that   Laws   was   unfinished.   Yet   we   do   find   Laws   connected   several  
times  with  a  particular  stylistic  flaw,  that  of  ψυχρόότης.        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
MOELLENDORFF   (1919)   assumes   that   Plato  meant   to   rework   the   text   in   the   form   of   a   dialogue:  
“Offenbar   hat   Plato   einmal   einen   Anlauf   genommen,   das   was   er   in   seinen   Papieren   hatte,   zu  
einem  Dialoge  zu  verarbeiten  (…)”  (648).  KLOSKO  claimed  that  Laws  “shows  signs  of  having  been  
written   in   the  form  of  uninterrupted  discourse  and  then  later,  and  mechanically,  converted   into  
dialogue,   a   process   that   Plato   apparently   failed   to   complete   before   his   death”   ([1986],   17),   but  
abandoned   this   in   the   revised   edition   of   2006.   See   also   VANHOUTTE   (1953),   chapter   II,   15-­‐‑35  
(criticized  by  HENTSCHKE  [1971],  187,  239-­‐‑240).  
53   E.g.:   GUTHRIE   V   (1978),   321-­‐‑322;   STALLEY   (1983),   2,   quoting   Diog.   Laert.   III.37:   “The   natural  
reading  of   this   is   that  when  Plato  died   in  347  BC  he   left   the  Laws   as  a   rough  draft,  presumably  
written  on  wax  tablets.  His  pupil,  Philip,  prepared  the  draft  for  publication.”  Cf.  BOBONICH  (1996),  
250   n.   3:  Diog.   Laert.   III.37   “suggests,   but   does   not   state,   that   [Laws]  was   unfinished   at   Plato’s  
death”.  LAKS  (2000),  263  n.  9:  “It  is  generally  assumed  that  Plato’s  pupil  Philip  of  Opus  edited  the  
text  after  his  death.”  Although  ZELLER  (51922)  acknowledges  that  we  cannot  deduce  with  certainty  
from   Diogenes’   comment   the   extent   of   the   activity   of   the   “Herausgeber”,   he   thinks   that   the  
“Zustand  unserer  Schrift”  (980)  confirms  that  the  “Herausgeber”  made  some  more  or  less  incisive  
changes,  inserted  previously  unplaced  notes  in  the  text,  and  filled  in  gaps  “aus  eigenen  Mitteln”  
(979).  
54  The  reference  to  Laws  in  Isocr.  Phil.  12  (published  346  B.C.E.,  shortly  after  Plato’s  death  in  347)  is  
sometimes  used   to  support   the  argument   that  any  revising  Philippus  may  have  done  had   to  be  
minimal   if  Laws  was  already  published   in  346.   See   the   references   in  RE   s.v.  Philippos,   2359.  Cf.  
TARÁN  (1975),  131,  n.  550,  with  reference  also  to  ZELLER  (51922),  443,  n.  1.  
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   In  (pseudo?)Longinus  On  the  Sublime  (Περὶ  ὕψους),  we  find  the  report  
that  many  critics  “ridicule”   (διασύύρουσι)  him,  because  he  “often  writes  as   if  
he   is   carried   away   by   a   sort   of   Bacchic   frenzy   into   harsh   and   intemperate  
metaphor  and  allegorical  bombast”.55  Longinus  himself   also  criticizes  Plato’s  
language  in  Laws.  In  the  fourth  chapter  of  On  the  Sublime  he  quotes  examples  
successively   from   the   Sicilian   historian   Timaeus,   from   Xenophon   and   from  
Plato’s  Laws  when  illustrating  the  stylistic  flaw  of  “frigidity”,  τὸ  ψυχρόόν.56  The  
stylistic   flaw   ψυχρόότης   or   τὸ   ψυχρόόν   is   discussed   by   a   number   of   ancient  
authors;   apart   from  Longinus,   by  Aristotle   (Rhetoric),  Caecilius   of  Caleacte,57  
Theophrastus   (Περὶ   λέέξεως),   and   Demetrius   (On   Style,   Περὶ   ἑρµμενείίας).58  
Aristotle  in  the  third  Book  of  his  Rhetoric  discusses  four  “stylistic  frigidities”,  
τὰ   ψυχρὰ   κατὰ   τὴν   λέέξιν.59   These   are:   compounds   (τὰ   διπλὰ   ὀνόόµματα,   ἡ  
δίίπλωσις),   foreign  or   obsolete  words   (γλῶτται),   the  use   of   epithets   that   are  
long,   untimely   or   crowded   (ἐν   τοῖς   ἐπιθέέτοις   τὸ   ἢ   µμακροῖς   ἢ   ἀκαίίροις   ἢ  
πυκνοῖς  χρῆσθαι),  and  unsuitable  (ridiculous  or  overly  dignified)  metaphors  
(µμεταφοραὶ  ἀπρεπεῖς).  Apparently,  τὸ  ψυχρόόν  is  the  stylistic  flaw  consisting  
in   a   violation   of   τὸ   µμέέτριον.60   Demetrius   in  On   Style   quotes   Theophrastus’  
                                                                                                              
55   Long.  De   Subl.   32,   7-­‐‑8:   ὥσπερ   ὑπὸ   βακχείίας   τινὸς   τῶν   λόόγων   εἰς   ἀκράάτους   καὶ   ἀπηνεῖς  
µμεταφορὰς   καὶ   εἰς   ἀλληγορικὸν   στόόµμφον   ἐκφερόόµμενον.   The   example   is   the   comparison   of   a  
polis  to  a  mixing  bowl  in  Laws  773c8-­‐‑d4,  of  which  the  critics  say  they  are  truly  the  words  of  some  
drunken  poet:  νήήφοντα  γάάρ,  φασίί,  θεὸν  τὸ  ὕδωρ  λέέγειν,  κόόλασιν  δὲ  τὴν  κρᾶσιν,  ποιητοῦ  τινος  
τῷ  ὄντι  οὐχὶ  νήήφοντόός  ἐστι.  See  WALSDORFF  (1927),  24-­‐‑25.    
56  Long.  De  Subl.  4.16-­‐‑20:  ὁ  τἆλλα  θεῖος  Πλάάτων  τὰς  δέέλτους  θέέλων  εἰπεῖν  ‘γράάψαντες’  φησίίν  
‘ἐν   τοῖς   ἱεροῖς   θήήσουσι   κυπαριττίίνας   µμνήήµμας’.   καὶ   πάάλιν   ‘περὶ   δὲ   τειχῶν,   ὦ  Μέέγιλλε,   ἐγὼ  
ξυµμφεροίίµμην   ἂν   τῇ   Σπάάρτῃ   τὸ   καθεύύδειν   ἐᾶν   ἐν   τῇ   γῇ   κατακείίµμενα   τὰ   τείίχη   καὶ   µμὴ  
ἐπανίίστασθαι’,   “And  what   of   the   otherwise   divine   Plato?   ‘They  will   inscribe   and   store   in   the  
temples’,   he   says,   ‘cypress   memorials’,   meaning   wooden   tablets:   and   again,   ‘As   for   walls,  
Megillus,  I  would  consent  with  Sparta  to  let  the  walls  lie  slumbering  on  the  ground  and  never  rise  
again.”  The  two  examples  are  Laws  741c6-­‐‑7  and  778d3-­‐‑6.  
57  Who  cites  many  examples  of  τὸ  ψυχρόόν  from  Plato’s  Timaeus:  fr.  95  OFENLOCH  =  fr.  23  AUGELLO  
(2006).  
58  All   discussed   in  VAN  HOOK   (1917).   For   translations   of   τὸ  ψυχρόόν:   “froid,   fade”   (WARTELLE);  
“flat,  lifeless,  insipid”  (LSJ).  Alternatively,  “chilling”.  
59  Arist.  Rhet.   III,  1405b35-­‐‑1406b19.  RUSSELL  ad  Long.  De  Subl.  4.16-­‐‑20  considers  Longinus’  use  of  
τὸ  ψυχρόόν  “in  essentials”  its  use  in  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric  and  Demetrius.      
60  VAN  HOOK  (1917),  70:  “In  brief,  then,  according  to  Aristotle,  frigidity  in  prose  is  caused  by  the  
use  of  poetical  diction  and  the  employment  of  extravagantly  figurative  language.”  For  Aristotle,  
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definition   of   τὸ   ψυχρόόν   in   the   latter’s   Περὶ   λέέξεως:   τὸ   ψυχρόόν   ἐστι   τὸ  
ὑπέέρβαλλον   τὴν   οἰκείίαν   ἀπαγγελίίαν,61   “frigidity   is   that  which   transcends  
the  expression  appropriate  to  the  thought”.62  Tὸ  ψυχρόόν  clearly  exceeds  what  
is   considered   appropriateness   of   style.63   A   common   cause   is   the   use   of   too  
much  poeticism  in  prose  (Demetr.  12;  cf.  Arist.  Rhet.  1406a11-­‐‑13:  λευκὸν  γάάλα  
is  common  in  poetry  but  ψυχρόόν  in  prose).  These  literary  discussions  suggest  
that   Laws   contained   some   expressions   that   were   considered   poetic   and  
(inappropriately)   bombastic.   In  modern   times,   THESLEFF   has,   on   the   basis   of  
his  stylistic  analysis  of  the  Platonic  dialogues,   characterized  the  style  of  Laws  
as  the  heavy  “ὄγκος-­‐‑style”.64    
   Besides  On   the   Sublime,   there   is   another   ancient   source   that   associates  
Laws  with   τὸ   ψυχρόόν.   The   2nd   cent.   AD   author   Lucian   uses   the   term   (in   a  
comical  way)  of  Laws.  Zeus  complains  that,  since  the  new  great  sanctuaries  of  
Apollo  in  Delphi,  Asclepius  in  Pergamum,  Bendis  in  Thrace,  Anubis  in  Egypt  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
stylistic  virtue  consists   in   lucidity  of  expression,  which   is  achieved  by  aiming   for   the  due  mean  
(τὸ  µμέέτριον):  e.g.  1405b33-­‐‑34  (due  measure  in  the  use  of  diminutives  and  epithets),  1406a15-­‐‑17  (the  
use  of   epithets),   1416b34-­‐‑36   (the  mean  between   rapidity  and  conciseness   in   epideictic   speeches,  
which  consists  in  τὸ  λέέγειν  ὅσα  δηλώώσει  τὸ  πρᾶγµμα).    
61  See  FHS&G  II   (1992),   fr.   686,  pp.  532-­‐‑533;  quoted   in  Demetr.,  Eloc.,   114.  See  also  COPE   (1970),  
286-­‐‑287.  
62  Transl.  VAN  HOOK  (1917),  71.  
63  The  origin  of   the  metaphor  can  be   found   in  Ar.  Ach.,  11,  138,   see  VAN  HOOK  (1917),  76:  “The  
listener  or  reader  who  is  keyed  up  in  warm  anticipation  of  the  pleasure  and  the  profit  which  are  
to   result   from   an   admirable   literary   production   is   chilled   by   disappointment   (…)   in   a  manner  
comparable   with   the   chagrin   of   Dicaeopolis   in   the  Acharnians   [l.   11],   who,   all   agape   in   eager  
anticipation  of  seeing  a  play  of  Aeschylus,  is  chilled  to  the  heart  by  the  fatal  announcement  of  the  
herald:   “Theognis,   bring   in   your   chorus!”.”   In   Ar.   Th.   170,   we   find   about   Theognis:   ὁ   δ᾿   αὖ  
Θέέογνις  ψυχρὸς  ὢν  ψυχρῶς  ποιεῖ.  See  VAN  HOOK  (1917),  73.  The  term  ψυχρόότης  thus  refers  to  
the  effect  on  the  listener,  which  then  has  come  to  denote  the  stylistic  flaw  itself.  Cf.  RUSSELL  (1981),  
20:  “Many  of   the   terms   that   constitute   the   standard  vocabulary  of   later  Greek  criticism  are   first  
found  so  used   in   [Aristophanes’]  plays.  Psuchros   is   later   the   regular   term   for   failures  caused  by  
misguided  ingenuity  or  grandeur;  (…).”    
64   THESLEFF   (1967),   77-­‐‑80,   classifies   the   style   of   the   late   dialogues   as   the   ὄγκος   style,   which   is  
characterized   by   “(a)   the   tendency   to   expansion   and   weight”,   i.e.   “expansive   and   complicated  
sentence  structure,  including  large  use  of  participles,  genitive  absolute,  etc.;  anaphoric  repetition,  
assonance,   polyptoton   (…),   synonymy,   other   pairs,   and   various   other   accumulative   and  
amplificatory   phenomena,   such   as   pleonasm   and   periphrases;   abstract   nouns   qualified;   lack   of  
article;  heavy  words   (partly   taken   from  other   styles)   such  as   compounds,   extensive  derivatives,  
archaic  words,  and  poetical  words”,  and  “(b)  the  tendency  to  variation”  (79,  italics  in  original).  
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and  Artemis  in  Ephesus  were  erected,  his  own  altars  remain  “more  frigid  than  
the  Laws  of  Plato  or   the  Syllogisms   of  Chrysippus”,   τοιγαροῦν  ψυχροτέέρους  
ἄν   µμου   τοὺς   βωµμοὺς   ἴδοις   τῶν   Πλάάτωνος   νόόµμων   ἢ   τῶν   Χρυσίίππου  
συλλογισµμῶν.65   The   general   point   of   critique   implied   in   the   term  
ψυχροτέέρους   is   again   stylistic.   We   know   from   various   sources   that  
Chrysippus’  dry   and   tedious   style  was  proverbial   in   antiquity.66  One  option  
would  therefore  be  to  assume  that  both  Chrysippus  and  Laws  are  liable  to  the  
same  criticism,  and  that  what  Laws  is  criticized  for  is  equally  the  dryness  and  
dullness  of  its  prose.  Another  possibility  would  be  to  connect  Zeus’  complaint  
to  what  he  have  seen  so  far  about  τὸ  ψυχρόόν.  In  that  case,  we  may  again  think  
about   the  absence  of   the   (pleasant,  heart-­‐‑warming)   effect  which  a   successful  
composition  normally  stirs.67  Zeus  would  then  be  using  the  metaphor  ψυχρόόν  
literally:   in  the  absence  of  sacrifices,  his  altar  remains  cold.68  Like  the  literary  
ψυχρόότης,  ψυχρόόν  refers  to  the  situation  that  results  from  the  failure  a  certain  
effect.  A  consideration  that  may  be  at  play  here  is  that  indeed  the  dialogue  of  
Laws   is   much   less   lively,   dramatic,   and   engaging,   than   dialogues   such   as  
Protagoras,  Gorgias,   and   Symposium.   The   latter   possibility   is   preferable,   both  
because   it   is   in   keeping   with   our   previous   findings   about   τὸ   ψυχρόόν,   and  
because  of  its  normative  dimension.69    
                                                                                                              
65  Lucian,  Icaromenippus  24.        
66  E.g.  DH.  Comp.  4,  with  DE  JONGE  (2008),  108-­‐‑110  and  274-­‐‑280;  Cic.  Orat.  I,  11,  50:  Etenim  videmus  
(…)   ieiune   quosdam   et   exiliter,   ut   eum,   quem   acutissimum   ferunt,   Chrysippum,   disputavisse.   ZELLER  
(51923),  43  (to  whom  WILKINS  in  his  commentary  ad  loc.  refers):  “(…)  die  Alten  klagen  einstimmig  
über  ihre  nachlässige  und  unreine  Sprache,  ihre  trockene  und  doch  oft  unklare  Darstellung,  über  
die  Weitschweifigkeit,   die   endlosen  Wiederholungen,   die   übermässig   vielen  und   langen  Zitate,  
die   allzu   haüfige   Berufung   auf   Etymologien,   Auktoritäten   und   andere  wertlose   Beweismittel.”  
For   further   references   see   ZELLER   ibid.,   44,   n.   1.   Interestingly,   in   the   same   note   he   refers   to   a  
fragment   of   the   work   περὶ   ἀποφατικῶν   as   an   example   of   “geschmackloser   Häufung   und  
Verwendung  dichterischer  Stellen”.  
67  See  note  63  above.  
68  SOMMERBRODT  (1907),  126  ad  ψυχροτέέρους:  “doppelsinnig  von  den  Altären  ohne  Feuer  und  den  
langweiligen  Schriften”.  For  Lucian’s  evaluation  of  Plato,  see  WALSDORFF  (1927),  86-­‐‑88.  
69  Another   reference   to   the   unpopular   style   of  Laws  may   be   implied   in   Plutarch’s  De  Alex.   fort.  
328e.   Here   Plutarch   observes   that   Alexander   the   Great   was   far   more   successful   than   Plato   in  
introducing  his  laws:  Πλάάτων  µμὲν  γὰρ  µμίίαν  γράάψας  πολιτείίαν  οὐδέένα  πέέπεικεν  αὐτῇ  χρῆσθαι  
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1 . 3    Τέέχνη      
The  Platonic  notion  of  τέέχνη  is  of  central  importance  to  our  investigation  into  
the   (absence   of)   authority   and   basis   of   the   laws   in   Laws.   Tέέχνη,   as   the  
analogue  for  virtue,  makes  visible  the  contours  of  a  systematic  worldview  in  
which  moral  action  is  based  upon  objective,  expert  knowledge.  Although  we  
do   find   the   analogies   of   τεχνικόός   and   τέέχνη   in   Plato’s   final   work,   their  
internal  structure  and  logic  appears  to  have  changed.  In  section  1.3.1  we  shall  
briefly  look  into  the  Platonic  notion  of  τέέχνη  and  its  implications  for  the  idea  
of   authority.   This   overview   is   followed   in   section   1.3.2   by   a   discussion   of   a  
different,   “stochastic”   notion   of   τέέχνη   that   has   parallels  with   contemporary  
non-­‐‑Academic  philosophical  trends  (the  Sophists  and  Isocrates),  and  which,  I  
shall  submit,  the  τέέχνη-­‐‑notion  of  Laws  resembles.    
  
1.3.1     Structuring  principles  of  the  τέέχνη-­‐‑analogy  in  Plato  
The  fact  that  Socrates  postulates  an  analogy  between  virtue  (ἀρετήή)  and  τέέχνη  
in  a  number  of  Platonic  dialogues70  makes  τέέχνη  a  very  prominent  notion  in  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
διὰ   τὸ   αὐστηρόόν·∙   (…)   καὶ   τοὺς   µμὲν   Πλάάτωνος   ὀλίίγοι   νόόµμους   ἀναγιγνώώσκοµμεν,   τοῖς   δ᾿  
Ἀλεξάάνδρου   µμυριάάδες   ἀνθρώώπων   ἐχρήήσαντο   καὶ   χρῶνται.   “Plato   wrote   a   book   on   the   One  
Ideal  Constitution,  but  because  of  its  forbidding  character  he  could  not  persuade  anyone  to  adopt  
it;   (…)   Although   few   of   us   read   Plato’s   Laws,   yet   hundreds   of   thousands   have   made   use   of  
Alexander’s  laws,  and  continue  to  use  them”  (transl.  BABBITT).  
70  There  has  been  some  controversy  over  the  question  of  the  exact  notion  of  τέέχνη  (or  ἐπιστήήµμη)  
to  which   ἀρετήή   is   supposed   to   be   analogous:   GOULD   (1955)   argues   against   an   in   his   view   too  
intellectualist  reading  of  the  analogy  that  ἀρετήή  is  a  form  of  “knowing  how”  to  be  moral  rather  
than  “knowing  that”  (knowledge  of  the  nature  of  good  and  evil).  BAMBROUGH  (1956)  criticizes  the  
analogy  for  overassimilating  questions  about  ends  (politics)  to  questions  about  means  (navigation  
or  other  specialisms).  SPRAGUE  (1976)  argues  that  the  philosopher-­‐‑king  possesses  a  second-­‐‑order  
craft  (of  using  the  products  fabricated  by  the  productive  crafts)  directed  by  the  Form  of  the  Good.  
IRWIN   (1977),   (1995)   argues   that   virtue   is   analogous   to   a   productive   τέέχνη—criticized   by  
NUSSBAUM   (1986),   74.  BRUMBAUGH   (1978)   sees   a   “literary  development”  between   the  use  of   the  
analogy  in  the  early  and  in  the  late  dialogues.  Also  KLOSKO  (1981b);  WARREN  (1989).  The  upshot  
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the   Platonic   dialogues.   This   prominence   further   increases   due   to   Socrates’  
claim  in  defiance  of  the  sophists  that  there  exists  a  true  πολιτικὴ  τέέχνη  that  is  
a  form  of  expert  knowledge.71  Although  the  Platonic  notion  of  τέέχνη  has  some  
general  characteristics  in  common  with  its  sophistic  counterpart  (in  aiming  at  
a   goal,   having   its   own   set   task   and   result),   Plato’s   ethical   objectivism   has  
implications  for  the  assumptions,  overtones  and  truth  status  of  τέέχνη  in  Plato.  
The   claim   that  morality   is   analogous   to   a   τέέχνη   renders  plausible   the   claim  
that  it  is  possible  to  make  objective  distinctions  between  good  and  bad,  correct  
and   incorrect.   Characteristic   of   the   Socratic-­‐‑Platonic   technologizing   of  
morality   is   its   so-­‐‑called   “intellectualism”:   ἀρετήή   is   analogous   to   expert  
knowledge.72  Τέέχνη  and  ἐπιστήήµμη  are  often  juxtaposed73  and  in  some  contexts  
practically   identical.74   This   intellectualist   attitude   is   particularly   manifest   in  
the  Gorgias,   where   Socrates   forges   a   conceptual   divide   between   a   series   of  
τέέχναι   and   pseudo-­‐‑τέέχναι:   the   first   are   ἐπιστῆµμαι,   while   experience  
(ἐµμπειρίία)   is   the   basis   of   the   mode   of   proceeding   of   the   pseudo-­‐‑τέέχναι.75  
Sophistry   (σοφιστικήή)   and   cake-­‐‑baking   (ὀψοποιικήή)   are,   for   example,  
dismissed  as   the  deceptive   counterparts—they  are   ἐµμπειρίίαι,   “knacks”76—of  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of  ROOCHNIK  (1996)’s  argument   is,  somewhat  surprisingly,   that  morality  cannot  be  analogous  to  
τέέχνη  in  the  Platonic  dialogues,  see  his  Conclusion.    
71   For   discussions   of   nuances   between   the   different   τέέχναι   in   Plato:   BUMBRAUGH   (1978),  
ROOCHNIK   (1992),   especially   185-­‐‑189,   (1996),   BALANSARD   (2003).   GRAHAM   (1991)   provides   an  
analysis  of  the  τέέχναι  on  the  basis  of  their  distinct  ends.    
72   HEINIMANN   (1961),   105-­‐‑106;   STALLEY   (2007),   118.   On   Socratic-­‐‑Platonic   moral   intellectualism:  
KUBE  (1969),  NEHAMAS  (1986);  LORENZ  (2008).    
73  E.g.  Phlb.  66b9.  
74  E.g.  Plt.  300e7-­‐‑9,  Charm.  165d4-­‐‑166a2,  174d8-­‐‑e7.  Practical  equivalence  is  also  implied  by  the  use  
of   the   adjective   ἄλλος   in   some   contexts:   e.g.  Tht.   146c8-­‐‑d1,   147b7-­‐‑8;  Charm.   165d4-­‐‑6,   174e4.  Cf.  
ἐπιστήήµμων  τέέχνης  Gorg.  448b5-­‐‑6,  c2,  e3,  449a4-­‐‑5,  c9;  [Amat.]  137a9;  Charm.  171c4-­‐‑9.  LYONS  (1963),  
139-­‐‑228,  on  the  Platonic  vocabulary  of  τέέχνη,  ἐπιστήήµμη  and  σοφίία.  
75  For  example:  Gorg.  506d5-­‐‑8:  Ἀλλὰ  µμὲν  δὴ  ἥ  γε  ἀρετὴ  ἑκάάστου,  καὶ  σκεύύους  καὶ  σώώµματος  και  
ψυχῆς  αὖ  καὶ  ζῴου  παντόός,  οὐχ  οὕτως  εἶκῇ  κάάλλιστα  παραγίίγνεται,  ἀλλὰ  τάάξει  καὶ  ὀρθόότητι  
καὶ  τέέχνῃ,  ἥτις  ἑκάάστῳ  ἀποδέέδοται  αὐτῶν,  “But   the  best  way   in  which   the  excellence  of   each  
thing  comes  to  be  present  in  it,  whether  it’s  that  of  an  artifact  or  of  a  body  or  a  soul  as  well,  or  of  
any   animal,   is   not   just   any   old   way,   but   is   due   to   whatever   organization,   correctness,   and  
craftsmanship  is  bestowed  on  each  of  them”  (transl.  ZEYL  in  COOPER,  CW).    
76  In  contrast  to  τέέχνη,  ἐµμπειρίία  “aims  at  the  pleasant  without  taking  into  consideration  the  best”  
(τοῦ   ἡδέέος   στοχάάζεται   ἄνευ   τοῦ   βελτίίστου);   it   is   not   capable   of   rendering   an   account   of   its  
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the   τέέχναι   of   lawgiving   (νοµμοθετικήή)   and   medicine   (ἰατρικήή).77   Such   a  
pseudo-­‐‑τέέχνη  may   to   the   innocent   bystander   seem   identical  with   the   τέέχνη  
itself,  but  it  must  not  be  confused  with  it  at  the  risk  of  moral  corruption.  These  
pseudo-­‐‑τέέχναι  do  not  aim  at  virtue  (ἀρετήή),  but  at  gratification  (χαρίίζεσθαι)  
and   pleasure   (ἡδονήή),   without   making   their   ‘patients’   morally   better.78  
Dismissing   experience   and   expectations   about   an   audience’s   preferences   as  
irrelevant   for   the   true   πολιτικόός   is   part   of   the   extremely   intellectualist  
interpretation  of   the  πολιτικὴ  τέέχνη  we   find   in  many  Platonic   texts.  Within  
such   an   outlook,   a   δηµμιουργόός   is   a   convincing   authority:   the   moral   expert  
knows  the  truth  about  good  and  bad.79    
   The  technical  background  of  this  is,  first  (i),  τέέχνη’s  “strong  conception  
of   knowledge   as   expertise”   combined   with   “a   correspondingly   broad  
conception   of   ignorance   as   embracing   anyone   who   lacks   complete  
understanding”,80  the  logic  being  that  if  a  person  fails  to  successfully  perform  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
procedure  (οὐκ  ἔχει  λόόγον  οὐδέένα),  so  that   it  cannot  say  what  the  cause  of  something  is  (ὥστε  
τὴν  αἰτίίαν  ἑκάάστου  µμὴ  ἔχειν  εἶπειν),  and  therefore  it  is  an  irrational  activity  (ἄλογον  πρᾶγµμα),  
Gorg.  456a1-­‐‑6,  cf.  464c6-­‐‑d2.  For  τέέχνη’s  capacity  to  “give  an  account”  (λόόγον  διδόόναι):  Gorg.  464b-­‐‑
465a5,   cf.   500b-­‐‑501a3.   Tέέχνη   has   an   objective   criterion   and   is   distinct   from   pseudo-­‐‑crafts:  
CHERNISS  (1944),  251  n.  157;  IRWIN  (1977),  71-­‐‑77;  WOODRUFF  (1992);  BALANSARD  (2003),  47-­‐‑51,  141-­‐‑
142,  146-­‐‑7.    
77  That  σοφιστικήή  is   the  counterpart  of  νοµμοθετικήή  is  especially   interesting  in  view  of   the   large  
role  of  πειθώώ  in  Laws’  notion  of  νοµμοθεσίία,  see  chapter  five.  
78  E.g.  Gorg.  462c8-­‐‑9,  501b5-­‐‑503a1.  Tέέχνη  and  ἐµμπειρίία  are  demarcated  in  the  context  of  attacks  on  
rhapsode   and   orator:   Ion   537c1-­‐‑538b6,   539d5-­‐‑541c2;   Gorg.   451a3-­‐‑d6,   455a8-­‐‑456a6   (with   IRWIN  
[1977],  74);  Gorg.  462d10,  463b4,  465a3,  500b4,  500e5  (with  BALANSARD  [2003],  139).  
79  Cf.   IRWIN   (1977),  75:  “A  craftsman   is   recognized  as  an  authority   in  his   field,  as   someone  who  
knows,  and  is  agreed  to  know,  the  right  method  for  producing  a  particular  product.”  The  use  of  
τέέχνη-­‐‑analogy  to  get  the  point  across  that  there  is  a  moral  expert  is  also  clear  in  Crito,  47a13-­‐‑48b2  
(on  this  passage  see  LLOYD  [1966],  390-­‐‑391;  IRWIN  [1977],  71).  If  it  is  accepted  (as  Crito  does)  that  
the   subject   of   the   just   and   unjust   (περὶ   τῶν   δικαίίων   καὶ   ἀδίίκων),   ugly   and   beautiful   (καὶ  
αἰσχρῶν   καὶ   καλῶν)   and   good   and   evil   (καὶ   ἀγαθῶν   καὶ   κακῶν,   47c9-­‐‑10)   is   analogous   to  
gymnastics,  the  conclusion  must  be  that  one  ought  not  to  have  regard  for  what  the  many  say,  but  
solely  for  the  expert  on  justice  and  injustice  (ὁ  ἐπαΐων  περὶ  τῶν  δικαίίων  καὶ  ἀδίίκων,  48d6-­‐‑7)—to  
have  regard  for  this  one  man  and  the  truth  herself  (ὁ  εἷς  καὶ  αὐτὴ  ἡ  ἀλήήθεια);  “εἷς”,  opposed  to  
οἱ   πολλοίί,   suggests   that   it   is   not   based   on   democratic   principles,   with   which   οἱ   πολλοίί   are  
generally  associated.    
80   STALLEY   (2007),   118,   argues   for   the   strong   conception   of   knowledge   in  Gorgias   as   part   of   his  
argument  (against  EUBEN  [1994])  for  Gorgias’  anti-­‐‑democratic  political  stance.  In  Resp.  340e1-­‐‑341a4  
Thrasymachus   calls   Socrates’   black-­‐‑and-­‐‑white   use   of   terms   ἀκριβολογέέοµμαι   (“to   be   precise   in  
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his  τέέχνη,  he  does  possess  the  τέέχνη  in  the  first  place.  And  second  (ii),  the  the  
object  of  knowledge  is  objectively  good:  the  person  who  has  knowledge  of  the  
Idea  of  the  Good  or  justice  will  always  act  correctly,  because  true  knowledge  
is  knowledge  of  the  good  and  therefore  cannot  be  misapplied  or  misused.81    
   The  Platonic  notion  of  τέέχνη  functions  as  a  conceptual  frame  for  virtue.  
This   frame   consists   of   several   elements,  which   can   be   activated   once   one   of  
them  is  agreed  upon  in  the  discussion:    
(1) the  object  of  knowledge   (τὸ  ἀγαθόόν  (αὐτόό),82  εἶδος,83   ἰδέέα84)   (for  
example  the  Idea  of  the  Good  or  Beauty,  τὸ  καλόόν);  
(2) the   “expert   knowledge”   (τέέχνη,85   ἐπιστήήµμη,86   (ἡ)   …–ικήή,87,  
σοφίία88);89   furthermore   a   number   of   verbs   are   characteristically  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
language”).   In  Socrates’   terminology,  no  δηµμιουργόός   ever   fails   (ἁµμαρτάάνει).   In  Resp.   341b4-­‐‑6   it  
has  to  be  determined  what  Thrasymachus  means  by  “ruler”  and  “stronger”  (τὸν  ἄρχοντάά  τε  καὶ  
τὸν  κρείίττονα):  τὸν  ὡς  ἔπος  εἰπεῖν  ἢ  τὸν  ἀκριβεῖ  λόόγῳ.  He  answers:  τὸν  τῷ  ἀκριβεστάάτῳ  (…)  
λόόγῳ  ἄρχοντα  ὄντα.  Cf.  341c5-­‐‑6:  ὁ  τῷ  ἀκριβεῖ  λόόγῳ  ἰατρόός;  342b6-­‐‑7:  σκόόπει  ἐκείίνῳ  τῷ  ἀκριβεῖ  
λόόγῳ.  
81  On  the  (im)possibility  of  misuse  of  a  τέέχνη:  IRWIN  (1977),  76-­‐‑77;  WOODRUFF  (1992),  93-­‐‑96.  
82  E.g.  Resp.  507b4,  532b1,  540a8-­‐‑9.  
83  E.g.  Resp.  435b1-­‐‑2,  445c5-­‐‑6,  511a4.  
84  E.g.  Resp.  505a2:  ἡ  τοῦ  ἀγαθοῦ  ἰδέέα.  
85  E.g.  Gorg.  465a5;  Resp.  341d4,  d8,  342a2-­‐‑b5,  c7-­‐‑8.  
86  E.g.  Resp.  342c10.  
87  In  the  cases  of  the  feminine  adjective  ending  in  –ικήή  the  category  is  “essentially  open”,  LYONS  
(1963),   141;   one   is   not   “supposed   to   supply  mentally   the   lexeme   τέέχνη  whenever   he   reads   or  
hears  a  sentence  containing  ἀστρονοµμικήή,  αὐλητικήή,  etc.  It  is  that  the  form  in  -­‐‑ικήή  may  be  used  
indifferently  with  or  without  τέέχνη  and  in  either  case   it  will  be  picked  up  by  τέέχνη  with  equal  
readiness”   (ibid.,   143).   The   frequency   of   forms   with   the   suffix   –ικήή   increased   rapidly   in   the  
classical   period   under   the   influence   of   the   Sophists   and   made   its   way   into   the   scholarly  
vocabulary   of,   among   others,   Plato,   Aristotle,   Hippocrates,   and   Xenophon’s   Oeconomicus,   see  
DEBRUNNER  (1917)  §392,  197.  On  the  possibility  to  extend  the  class  of  τέέχναι  infinitely,  see  LYONS  
(1963),   141-­‐‑144,   160-­‐‑164.   The   “semantic   motivation”   (163)   is   contained   in   Greek   idiom:   “Plato  
constantly  draws  upon  the  possibility  of  generating  from  sentences  of  the  form  Np  /  ἐπίίστασθαι  
//   Vinf.   other   hyponyms   of   τέέχνη   than   those   that   are   ‘institutionalized’   in   the   society   and   its  
language”   (ibid.,   194-­‐‑195).   In   Gorg.   464b2-­‐‑465d7   for   example,   Socrates   talks,   parallel   to  
γυµμναστικήή  and  ἰατρικήή,  about  κολακευτικήή  and  ὀψοποιικήή;  in  Resp.  we  find  ποιµμενικήή  (345d1,  
d5),  and  µμισθαρνητικήή  (346d3,  d4).  
88  E.g.  Resp.  350d5,  351a3,  354b6;  in  the  just  polis:  428b2,  429a2,  431e10,  433d6,  443e7.  
89  For  an  analysis  of  the  relations  between  the  lexemes  of  τέέχνη  and  ἐπιστήήµμη  (and  ἐπίίστασθαι)  
as  “lexical  subsystems”  of  the  field  of  τέέχνη,  see  LYONS  (1963),  chapter  VII,  especially  159-­‐‑184.      
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deployed   in   technical   contexts   to   denote   the   exercise   of   an  
expertise,  such  as  ἐπίίστασθαι,  ἐπιτηδεύύειν  or  ἐργάάζεσθαι;90  
(3) the   “expert”   (δηµμιουργόός,91   τεχνικόός,   ἐπιστήήµμων,92   ἐπαΐων,93  
ἄρχων94);    
(4) a   “patient”   (θεραπευόόµμενος,95   ἀρχόόµμενος96)   or   beneficiary  
(expressed  in  the  dative)  who  undergoes  the  effects  of  the  expert’s  
activities  and  benefits  from  them;  
(5) the   goal   (the   ἐφ᾿  ᾡ   τέέτακται97)   of   the   expertise,   that  which   it   is  
meant   to   establish:   a   “product”   (ἔργον)98   if   the   subject  matter   is  
immaterial,  or  the  optimal  condition,  to  which  the  expert  “looks”  
(σκοπεῖν,   (ἀπο)βλέέπειν   εἰς   or   πρόός99),   for   instance:   τὸ  
βέέλτιστον,100  τὸ  συµμφέέρον101  (for  instance  health,  ὑγίίεια).  
                                                                                                              
90  See  for  a  more  comprehensive  list,  together  with  examples  LYONS  (1963),  152-­‐‑155.  
91  E.g.  Charm.  173c2,  174e9,  175a7;  Euthyd.  280c4,  291c8,  292d2,  301c3,  312b3;  Gorg.  453a2,  e5,  454a3,  
a5,  455a1,  503e1;  Resp.  340e4-­‐‑5,  346c5-­‐‑6,  c10,  d7.  
92  Ε.g.  Gorg.  449c9,  459b3.  
93  E.g.  Crit.  47b11,  c3,  d2,  48a6.  
94  E.g.  Resp.  342d7,  d10,  e3.  
95  E.g.  Resp.  345e1.  
96  E.g.  Resp.  342d1,  e5,  e9,  345d7,  347d6.  
97  Resp.  346d6.  
98   The   product   of   τέέχνη:   Charm.   163a10-­‐‑d8,   165e3-­‐‑166b6,   cf.   174e8-­‐‑175a7;   Gorg.   503e1-­‐‑4   (with  
εἶδος),  Ion  537c7-­‐‑e1  (one  ἔργον  the  preserve  of  one  τέέχνη);  Resp.  346d3-­‐‑6  (IRWIN  [1977],  75,  76  in  
case   of   ruling   science   (superordinate):   happiness,   see   also   passages   ibid.);   πειθοῦς   δηµμιουργόός  
ἐστιν   ἡ   ῥητορικήή:   Gorg.   453a2;   cf.   Phdr.   260d4-­‐‑8;   Plt.   310e-­‐‑311a:   ἔργον   of   πολιτικὴ   τέέχνη   is  
ὕφασµμα;  cf.  Soph.  265b4-­‐‑266c6;  ἔργον  as  divine  fabrication:  Resp.  530a4-­‐‑8;  Tim.  30b1-­‐‑3,  41a7.    
99  βλέέπειν:  e.g.  Gorg.  507d6-­‐‑7  (ὁ  σκόόπος  …  πρὸς  ὃν  βλέέποντα  δεῖ  ζῆν),  Resp.  342e10  (πρὸς  ἐκεῖνο  
[sc.  τὸ  τῷ  ἀρχοµμέένῳ  σύύµμφερον]  βλέέπων),  343b3  (πρὸς  ἄλλο  τι  βλέέποντας),  345c5-­‐‑6  (οὐ  πρὸς  τὸ  
τῶν  προβάάτων  βέέλτιστον  βλέέποντα).  ἀποβλέέπειν:  e.g.  Resp.  421b7  (εἰς  τὴν  πόόλιν  ὅλην),  466a5-­‐‑
6  (οὐκ  εἰς  ἓν  ἔθνος  ἀποβλέέποντες  ἐν  αὐτῇ  [sc.  πόόλει]);  σκέέπτεσθαι/σκοπεῖν:  e.g.  Resp.  342a7  
(αὐτῇ   [sc.   τῇ   τέέχνῃ]   τὸ   σύύµμφερον   σκέέψεται),   342b2   (τὸ   σύύµμφερον   σκοπεῖν),   342c1-­‐‑2   (οὐκ  …  
ἰατρικὴ   ἰατρικῇ   τὸ   συµμφέέρον  σκοπεῖ   ἀλλὰ  σώώµματι),   342d5-­‐‑6   (οὐδὲ   ἰατρὸς   οὐδεὶς,   καθ᾿   ὅσον  
ἰατρόός,  τὸ  τῷ  ἰατρῷ  συµμφέέρον  σκοπεῖ  οὐδ᾿  ἐπιτάάττει,  ἀλλὰ  τὸ  τῷ  κάάµμνοντι),  342e3-­‐‑5  (οὐκ  …  ὅ  
…  κυβερνήήτης  τε  καὶ  ἄρχων  τὸ  τῷ  κυβερνήήτῃ  συµμφέέρον  σκέέψεταίί  τε  καὶ  προστάάξει,  ἀλλὰ  τὸ  
τῷ  ναύύτῃ  τε  καὶ  ἀρχοµμέένῳ).  
100  E.g.  Gorg.  464c4,  d1,  465a2;  Resp.  345c5-­‐‑6,  d2-­‐‑3,  d7,  347a2.  
101  E.g.  Resp.  342a7,  b1,  c1,  c10,  d5-­‐‑6,  e3-­‐‑4,  e8,  e10,  347d5.  
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These   items  above  sum  up  the  system  in   its  most  complete   form,  but  not  all  
elements   are   always   explicitly   present   in   the   text,   or   even   part   of   the  
respective   τέέχνη.  But   it  may  be  noted   that   it   is  often   the   implications  of   the  
τέέχνη-­‐‑analogy   that   are   investigated   in   the   dialogues,   as   when   the  
interlocutors   in   the  Charmides   inquire   after   the   “product”   of   “self-­‐‑restraint”  
(σωφροσύύνη).  We  may  also  note  that  the  terms  of  the  system  are  often  tailor-­‐‑
made   to   the   interlocutor.   In   the   discussion   with   Thrasymachus   in   Republic  
Book  I   for   instance,  Socrates   initially  claims  that  each  τέέχνη  is  directed  at  τὸ  
σύύµμφερον  (“what  is  in  the  interest  of  X”).  This  is  a  temporary  stand-­‐‑in  for  τὸ  
βέέλτιστον,   inserted  here  because  Thrasymachus,  who   just  defined   justice   as  
“the   interest   of   the   stronger”,   is   only   interested   in   matters   of   benefit.   The  
introduction   of   τέέχνη   in   the   discussion   enables   Socrates   to   exploit   its  
implications  of  correctness  and  work  towards  the  notion  of  a  ‘true  interest’.102  
   If   we  want   to   understand   the   philosophical   effects   of   establishing   an  
analogy   between   morality   and   τέέχνη,   we   should   bear   in   mind   that   in   the  
conceptual  system  of  Platonic  τέέχνη,  expert  knowledge  (the  theory  or  body  of  
knowledge)   and   its   practical   application   are   inseparable.   It   is   an   automatism  
that  knowing  the  good  is  doing  it,  and  the  expert’s  actions  are  always  guided  
by  his  knowledge  (the  locus  classicus  is  Prot.  352b3-­‐‑c7).103  Tέέχνη  is  by  definition  
the   correct   application   of   knowledge.104   From   there   it   follows   that   akrasia,  
acting  against  one’s  knowledge  of  what  is  objectively  best,  is  impossible.105      
                                                                                                              
102  As  soon  as  τέέχνη  is  introduced,  notion  of  correctness  (ὀρθόότης)  come  into  play,  see  e.g.  Resp.  
Book  I.  On  τέέχνη  and  objectivity  IRWIN  (1977),  75.  
103   Cf.   ALLEN   (1960),   257-­‐‑258:   “The   knowledge   which   is   virtue   is   not   merely   an   abstract   or  
theoretical  understanding  of  value,  but  the  capacity  or  practical  ability  to  exhibit  understanding  
in  action.  If  this  is  true,  the  Socratic  Paradox  is  much  less  paradoxical”.  For  a  different  explanation  
of  the  relation  between  knowledge  and  conduct,  see  SANTAS  (1964),  who  attributes  a  pivotal  role  
to  desire  (for  good  things)  in  his  attack  on  the  traditional  view.      
104  Of   course  LLOYD   (1966)   is   correct  when  he  observes   that   the  analogy   in  Crito   48a5ff.   “in  one  
important   respect   (…)   does   not   hold.   In   gymnastics   there   is   general   agreement   about   ends  
(namely  health)  and  the  trainer’s  decisions  relate  to  the  means  towards  those  ends,  not  to  the  ends  
themselves.  But  in  questions  of  right  and  wrong,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ends  themselves  are  often  
in  dispute,  and  the  politician’s  decisions  concern  both  means  and  ends  (both  how  the  ship  of  state  
should   be   sailed,   and   in   which   direction   it   should   point)”   (390,   italics   in   original).   But   the  
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   The   consequence   of   assuming   the   existence   of   the   figure   of   a   moral  
expert   is   that   within   this   framework,   questions   of   method   or   procedure   are  
unproblematic.  Questions  of  means,  procedure,  and  application  do  not  come  
into   focus   because   they   are   the   expert’s   prerogative   and  he  will,   qua   expert,  
not   make   mistakes.106   Tέέχνη   therefore   proves   an   especially   convenient  
concept   for   a   philosopher   who   turns   to   the   realm   of   metaphysics   for   the  
principles   of   politics.   The   fact   that   in   Platonic   philosophy   the   object   of  
knowledge  and  its  product  exist  on  different  ontological  levels  does  not  cause  
any   practical   problems,   because—the   claim   is—these   levels   relate   to   each  
other  as  model  and  product  of  expert  knowledge.  
   A   final   implication   of   the   τέέχνη-­‐‑ἀρετήή   analogy   remains   to   be  
discussed.  This  is  an  implication  on  the  social  rather  than  the  conceptual  level.  
Within  the  logic  of  the  τέέχνη  frame,  ends  have  absolute  priority  over  means.  
Means  are  legitimated  by  their  objectively  good  ends,  in  relation  to  which  all  
other  considerations  are  negligible.  There  are  no  evaluative  criteria  in  addition  
to   the   goodness   of   the   goal   itself,   and   the   true   expert   need   not   justify   or  
motivate   his   procedure—after   all,   he   is   the   expert.   The   expert’s   capacity   to  
“give  an  account”  (λόόγον  διδόόναι)  of  his  procedure  does  not  demonstrate  the  
goodness   of   his   goal,   but   gives   an   account   of   the   means   in   terms   of   their  
capacity  to  attain  the  end.  The  goodness  of  the  goal  itself  is  a  given  within  the  
conceptual   frame   of   τέέχνη.   If   the   expert   therefore   concludes   that   the  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
mismatch  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  persuasive  nature  of  these  analogies:  it  is  Plato’s  claim  that  the  
domains  of  gymnastics  and  morality  are  analogous.    
105   The   Socratic   paradoxes   arise   from   the   analogy   between   ἀρετήή   and   τέέχνη:   akrasia   (acting  
against  what  one  knows  to  be  truly  good)  is  impossible  (knowledge  is  sovereign);  the  other  side  of  
the   coin  being   that  no  one  willfully   commits  a  moral  mistake   (οὐδείίς  ἑκὼν  ἐξαµμαρτάάνει   [Prot.  
345d9-­‐‑e4,  Gorg.  488a3-­‐‑4]—or,  conversely,  the  proposition  that  µμηδέένα  βουλόόµμενον  ἀδικεῖν,  ἀλλ᾿  
ἄκοντας  τοὺς  ἀδικοῦντας  πάάντας  ἀδικεῖν,  Gorg.  509e5-­‐‑7).  For  akrasia  in  Platonic  philosophy,  see  
recently  BOBONICH  &  DESTRÉE  (2007),  with  bibliography.  
106  Cf.  ADAM  ad  Resp.   488d:  “The   true  pilot,   according   to  Plato,   is  one  who  knows  how   to   steer”  
(italics  in  original).  
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realization   of   the   good   (e.g.   the   best   polis)   requires   violence,   that   is   not  
principally  rejected.107    
   Applied   to   the   social   domain,   the   πολιτικὴ   τέέχνη   has   radical  
implications  for  the  question  of  how  far  an  authority  may  go  in  imposing  on  
others   what   is   good.   Even   though   the   dialogues   at   times   admit   that   some  
measures   will   be   harsh   and   unpleasant,   they   do   not   consider   this   in   itself  
reason   to   refrain   from   them.108   Presenting   the   just   polis   as   analogous   to   a  
healthy  bodily  condition  (the  argument  of  Republic)  corroborates  these  radical  
implications;  for  the  option  of  painful  surgery  is  kept  open.109  This  seems  less  
the   case   in   Laws,   where   ideas   about   the   well-­‐‑designed   society   take   into  
account  citizens’  sense  of  well-­‐‑being  (i.e.  feeling  well).110  Laws  spells  out  a  more  
‘conventional’   or   common   sense   notion   of   εὐδαιµμονίία.  Republic   claims   that  
εὐδαιµμονίία  consists  in  fulfilling  one’s  social  role  (πράάττειν  τὰ  αὑτοῦ).  But  the  
social   roles   in   all   cases   seem,   to   put   it   euphemistically,   to   deviate   to   some  
degree   from   what   humans   would   in   general   consider   pleasant—that   is,   in  
Republic   there   is  a   relatively   large  cleft  between  what   it  acknowledges   that  a  
person   intuitively   considers   pleasant   on   the   one   hand,   and   what   Republic  
claims  is  truly  pleasant  on  the  other,  and  for  some  idea  of  which  an  expert  is  
necessary.   Laws’   notion   of   εὐδαιµμονίία   seems   rather   to   tap   into   the   more  
                                                                                                              
107  Made  explicit  in  Statesman  293d4-­‐‑e2,  296c8-­‐‑d4,  308e8-­‐‑309a3.  Cf.  LAKS  (1991),  423.    
108  Cf.  ADKINS  (1960),  296-­‐‑297.  
109  The  fastest  and  easiest  way  to  realize  the  constitution  they  have  been  describing  is  to  send  all  
children   above   10   years   of   age   abroad,   Resp.   540e4-­‐‑541a7.   Both   ἰατρικήή   (and   to   some   extent  
γυµμναστικήή)  are  pre-­‐‑eminently  τέέχναι  that  involve  pains:  Ph.  94c9-­‐‑d6  (ἰατρικήή  and  γυµμναστικήή  
opposed   to  a   ‘gentler’   (πρᾳόότερον)   rule  by  way  of   threats,   exhortations  and   internal  dialogue);  
Resp.   406c10-­‐‑d2   (burning   or   cutting);   Phdr.   248d6   (γυµμναστικήή   is   φιλόόπονος);  Plt.   293a6-­‐‑c4   (in  
political   context).   Ἰατρικήή   is   often   associated  with   purification,   e.g.  Crat.   405a6-­‐‑b4,  Soph.   226e8-­‐‑
227a1,  Tim.  89a8-­‐‑b3.    
110  See  chapter  three,  p.  114;  cf.   the  concern  with  friendliness,  chapter  five,  section  5,  p.  179.  This  
does,  it  should  be  noted,  not  mean  that  there  are  no  harsh  measures  in  Laws.  Some  stipulations  of  
punishments   belong   to   the  most   grim  passages   in  Laws.   But  whereas   in  Laws   punishments   are  
emphatically  treated  as  a  last  remedy,  that  only  become  operative  in  case  the  paideia  has  failed,  in  
Republic   violence   is   part   and  parcel   of   justice   itself:   (i)   the   suppression   of   the  producers   by   the  
military  class  of  the  φύύλακες  is  an  ingredient  of  the  just  society;  (ii)  in  the  surgical  implications  of  
the  doctor-­‐‑analogy  (see  note  109  above).  
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intuitive   notions   of   musical   harmony   and   consonance,   and   to   appeal   more  
heavily   to   the   senses   for   justification   (the   prominence   of  music   as   evidently  
pleasant   is   an   important   part   of   the   argument).111   Laws’   “anthropological”  
approach   to   pleasure   as   something   humanly   recognizable,   and   a   generally  
powerful   motivation,   correlates   with   abandoning   the   idea   of   an   expert  
authority  on  the  correctness  of  emotions.    
  
1.3.2   “Stochastic”  τέέχνη  
The  notion  of  τέέχνη  is  not  a  Platonic  invention.  Already  in  Homer  and  Pindar  
do  we  find  clear  references  to  professionals.  The  earliest  examples  are  the  seer,  
doctor,  carpenter  and  poet.112  The  term  for  professional  is  usually  δηµμιουργόός,  
a  name  that  reflects   the   idea  that   the  expert  possesses   the  sort  of  skill(s)   that  
benefit  the  populace.113  The  τέέχναι  become  a  particularly  prominent  subject  in  
the  sophistic  movement  of   the  5th  century  B.C.E.,114  when  they  are  seen  as  the  
                                                                                                              
111  See  chapter  three,  especially  p.  120ff.    
112  Hom.  Od.   17.383-­‐‑385:   the   seer   (µμάάντις),  healer  of   evils   (ἰητὴρ  κακῶν),  woodworker   (τέέκτων  
δούύρων),  and  the  divine  singer  (θέέσπις  ἀοιδόός);  the  herald  (κῆρυξ)  is  added  in  19.135.  For  other  
early  examples  of  specialists  in  Greek  literature:  HEINIMANN  (1961),  109  and  n.  20  on  pp.  109-­‐‑110.  
Within  the  Platonic  collection  of  τέέχναι,  µμαντικήή  is  somewhat  atypical  because  it  has  its  source  in  
the  divine.  Plato’s  inspired  depiction  of  µμαντικήή  deviates  from  the  more  down-­‐‑to-­‐‑earth  practices  
of   contemporary   µμάάντεις.   In   Athenian   daily   life   the   µμαντικὴ   τέέχνη   consists   in   the   reading   of  
signs,   in  particular   those  of   the   entrails   of   a   sacrificial   animal,   see  VAN  STRATEN   (1995),   156,   cf.  
121-­‐‑122.   The   µμάάντις   is   a   specialist   like   any   other,   with   practical   skills   like   piling   firewood   on  
altars,  as  is  suggested  by  a  remark  in  Ar.  Pax  1026,  where  Trygaios  proudly  draws  attention  to  the  
fact  that  he  has  piled  the  firewood  on  the  altar  µμαντικῶς,  “like  a  true  µμάάντις”.  In  Plato’s  Phaedrus  
(and   in   some   other   authors)   we   find   a   distinction   between   a   rational   µμαντικήή,   that   could   be  
learned  from  the  books,  and  an  inspired  µμαντικήή,  see  HEINIMANN  ibid.,  110  with  n.  108,  and  127-­‐‑
129;  also  ZIEHEN  in  RE  s.v.  Mantis,  1347ff.  
113  Εtymology  “*δήήµμιο-­‐‑ϝεργόός,  in  turn  from  δήήµμια  ἔργα  with  verbal  reinterpretation  of  the  second  
member  after  the  types  ψυχο-­‐‑ποµμπόός;  partly  from  -­‐‑ϝοργόός”,  BEEKES  (2010),  325;  cf.  CHANTRAINE  
(1968),   273:   “On  a   l’habitude  d’interpréter   le  mot  pour   le   sens  d’artisan  «faisant  des   choses  qui  
concernent  l’ensemble  du  peuple»,  ce  qui  convient  à  des  spécialistes  qui  travaillent  pour  autrui”.  
Many  laymen  profit  from  the  skills  of  one  δηµμιουργόός—a  doctor,  for  example:  Prot.  322c6-­‐‑7.  
114   The   notion   of   τέέχνη   in   sophistic   theories   comes  with   a   set   of   assumptions   about   the   goals,  
results,  precise  content,  and  learnability  of  τέέχναι,  HEINIMANN  (1961),  105-­‐‑106  and  117-­‐‑130:  (1)  the  
goal  of  a  τέέχνη  is  to  accomplish  something  beneficial;  (2)  each  τέέχνη  has  its  own  task  and  result;  
(3)  τέέχνη  consists  in  the  know-­‐‑how  of  the  expert,  who  knows  how  to  use  means  for  their  end;  (4)  
as   a   profession,   a   τέέχνη   can   hence   be   learned   and   taught.   On   sophistic   theories   about   the  
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primary   causes   of  man’s   cultural   development   beyond   the   state   of   animals,  
the   most   notably   example   being   the   sophist   Protagoras.115   Τέέχνη   acquires  
various   connotations   of   civilization:   an   orderly,   non-­‐‑threatened   life   in  
opposition   to   φύύσις   (a   state   of   nature),   and   self-­‐‑governed,   more   or   less  
predictable   and   hence   secure   way   of   life   in   opposition   to   τύύχη   (being  
‘governed’   by   whatever   may   befall   one).116   Humankind   is   capable   to  
determine  its  own  mode  of  living.  They  offer  humankind  the  means  to  ensure  
its   own   survival   (σωτηρίία)   by   providing   humans   with   the   basic   needs   for  
subsistence.117  
   We  also  encounter  a  different  type  of  τέέχνη  in  sophistic  circles:  not  an  
opposition   between   τέέχνη   and   τύύχη   or   τέέχνη   and   φύύσις,   but   a   bifurcation  
within  the  notion  of  τέέχνη  itself.  Several  texts  from  the  Hippocratic  corpus  are  
contributions   to   a   polemic   about   the   status   of   medicine   (e.g.   Περὶ   ἀρχαίίης  
ἰητρικῆς  (De  vetera  medicina),  Περὶ  Τέέχνης  (De  arte),  and  Νόόµμος  (Lex)).118    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(in)teachability   of   virtue:   KERFERD   (1981),   ch.   11.   The   idea   that   τέέχνη   confers   a   benefit   is  
omnipresent  in  Plato,  e.g.:  Charm.  165c10-­‐‑d2  (ὠφελίίαν),  Gorg.  502d4-­‐‑504a7  (τὸ  βέέλτιστον),  464c4-­‐‑
5,  501b4  (τὸ  βέέλτιστον),  Resp.  341b-­‐‑342e.  
115  On  sophistic  theorizing  about  the  development  of  human  culture  and  society,  see  KAHN  (1981)  
(sophists  as  ancient  precursors  of   social   contract   theory);  KERFERD   (1981),   chapters  10,   12.  For  a  
reconstruction   of   Protagoras’   ethical   naturalism   in   ethics,   see   BERESFORD   (2013).   On   the   pre-­‐‑
Platonic  notion  of   τέέχνη,   see  HEINIMANN   (1961);  ROOCHNIK   (1996)   chapter   1,  with   literature  on  
τέέχνη,  especially  as  it  applies  to  Plato,  in  n.  1,  p.  18.  On  pre-­‐‑Platonic  notions  of  wisdom,  see  SNELL  
(1924).  
116  E.g.  Pl.  Prot.  321e1-­‐‑2,  322a5-­‐‑8  with  NUSSBAUM  (1986),  chapter  4;  cf.  Aesch.  Prom.  226-­‐‑236,  442-­‐‑
506  and  Soph.  Ant.  332-­‐‑375,  which  passages  are  generally  thought  to  echo  contemporary  sophistic  
thought.   On   the   νόόµμος/φύύσις-­‐‑debate,   see   HEINIMANN   (1945);   ADKINS   (1972),   106-­‐‑112;   KERFERD  
(1981),  chapter  10.  Literature  on  the  τέέχνη/τύύχη  antithesis  can  be  found  in  NUSSBAUM  (1986),  442-­‐‑
443,  n.  2.  
117   HEINIMANN   (1961),   118:   “In   der   Sophistischen   Kulturgeschichte   erscheinen   die   τέέχναι   als  
Mittel,  der  Menschheit  zu  helfen,  ihre  bedrohte  Existenz  zu  retten.  …,  immer  wieder  dienen  die  
τέέχναι  der  σωτηρίία  der  Menschheit,  die  ohne   sie  dem  Untergang  geweiht  wäre.”  Cf.  GRAHAM  
(1991),  10;  O’BRIEN  (1967),  Chapter  2.  Judging  from  the  Protagoras-­‐‑myth  in  Plato’s  Protagoras,  the  
sophist   Protagoras   seems   to   have   gone   further   than   other   sophistic   evolutionary   theories   in  
making   the  preservation   (σωτηρίία)  of  humankind  not  only  depend  upon   the  τέέχναι  providing  
livelihood  (the  σοφίία  περὶ  τὸν  βίίον  (321d4),  for  the  elements  of  which  see  322a3-­‐‑8),  but  also  upon  
basic  notions  of  morality  (the  πολιτικὴ  τέέχνη,  in  the  form  of  αἰδώώς  and  δίίκη).  
118   That   HEINIMANN   (1961),   106-­‐‑107   aligns   himself   with   a   scholarly   tradition   (see   p.   106,   n.   9)  
according  to  which  Plato’s  notion  of  τέέχνη  corresponds  to  that  of  De  Arte  and  VM   is  due  to  his  
‘sophistic’-­‐‑coloured   representation   of   Platonic   τέέχνη,   disowning   its   objective   foundation   and  
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   VM   defends   an   empirical   form   of  medicine   against   a   novel   form   that  
proceeds   on   the   basis   of   an   hypothesis   (ἐξ   ὑποθέέσεως,   XIII).119   From   the  
attempt  to  justify  medicine’s  lack  of  precision  in  VM,120  and  from  the  defence  
of  medicine’s  fallibility  we  may  reconstruct  two  grounds  on  which  the  status  
of  medicine  as  a  τέέχνη  came  to  be  disputed:  (a)  a  lack  of  precision,  and  (b)  the  
fact   that   it  often  fails   to  cure,  or   that  τύύχη  instead  of   the  τέέχνη  has  caused  a  
patient   to   regain   his   health.   By   defending   the   technical   status   of   medicine  
against  these  lines  of  attack,  the  Hippocratic  authors  widen  the  parameters  of  
what  can  still  claim  to  be  a  τέέχνη,  and  “open  the  possibility  of  (…)  a  stochastic  
techne”.121   The   more   precise   τέέχναι   are,   for   example,   mathematics   and   the  
productive   τέέχναι.122   By   contrast,  medicine,   “in  which   a   gap   exists   between  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
assuming  that  Plato  considered  it  teachable.  However,  his  position  is  distinct  from  this  tradition  
in  that  he  ascribes  the  correspondence  not  to  a  direct  influence  of  Plato  by  the  Hippocratics,  but  to  
a  common  third  source.    
119   VM,   especially   caput   I,   XIII-­‐‑XV,   XX.   In   matters   that   are   unclear   (τὰ   ἀφανέέα   τε   καὶ  
ἀπορεόόµμενα),   like   those   things   in   the   sky   or   below   the   earth,   one   is   forced   to   use   a   postulate  
(ὑποθέέσει   χρῆσθαι)   if   one   wanted   to   state   anything   about   these;   but   it   would   not   be   clear  
whether  his  statements  were   true  or  not,  since   there   is  no   test   in  virtue  of  which  one  can  attain  
certainty  (caput  I).  See  also  DEMONT  (2013).  
120   VM,   caput   IX,   XII.   In   caput   IX   we   encounter   the   paradoxical   claim   that   in   medicine   sense  
perception   is   the   sole   measure   of   accuracy   (µμέέτρον   δὲ,   οὐδὲ   σταθµμὸν,   οὐδὲ   ἀριθµμὸν   οὐδέένα  
ἄλλον,  πρὸς  ὃ  ἀναφέέρων  εἴσῃ  τὸ  ἀκριβὲς,  οὐκ  ἂν  εὑροίίης  ἄλλ᾿  ἢ  τοῦ  σώώµματος  τὴν  αἴσθησιν,  
ed.  LITTRÉ).    
121   ROOCHNIK   (1996),   61.   ‘Stochastic’   τέέχνη   is   demarcated   from   other   τέέχναι   by   Alexander   of  
Aphrodisias   and   Philodemus   in   their   discussion   of   rhetoric.   On   Philodemus,   see   HEINIMANN  
(1961),   123   and  ROOCHNIK   (1996),   82-­‐‑83;   on  Alexander   of  Aphrodisias  ROOCHNIK   (1996),   53-­‐‑55.  
HEINIMANN  (1961)  123,  n.  86:  “Zur  Scheidung  zwischen  τέέχναι  στοχαστικαίί,  die   ihre  Ziel  nicht  
immer,  sondern  bloß  meistens   (κατὰ  τὸ  πλεῖστον,  ὡς  ἐπὶ  τὸ  πολύύ)  erreichen,  und  solchen,  die  
immer  Erfolg  haben,  vgl.  Sext.  Math.  1,  72;  Cic.  Div.  1,  24f.”  and  ibid.,  n.  92  
122  In  Philebus  55d1-­‐‑56c11  we  find  a  bifurcation  between  two  types  of  τέέχναι  on  similar  grounds.  
Those   that   make   use   of   number   (arithmetic,   measurement,   weighing)   have   great   accuracy  
(ἀκριβείία,   cf.   ἀκριβεστάάται   τέέχναι,   56c8),   which   makes   them   τεχνικωτέέρα   (56b6):   these   are  
τεκτονικήή,   ναυπηγίία,   οἰκοδοµμίία   and   ξυλουργικήή   in   general,   because   they   use   the   largest  
number  of  measuring  instruments  (56b4-­‐‑c2).  The  other  kind  of  τέέχναι  lack  accuracy  and  “drill  the  
perceptions  by  experience  and  some  practice,  making  in  addition  use  of  the  powers  of  conjecture,  
which   many   call   arts,   and   which   get   their   force   from   care   and   effort”   (τὰς   αἰσθήήσεις  
καταµμελετᾶν   ἐµμπειρίίᾳ   καίί   τινι   τριβῇ,   ταῖς   τῆς   στοχαστικῆς   προσχρωµμέένους   δυνάάµμεσιν   ἃς  
πολλοὶ  τέέχνας  ἐπονοµμάάζουσι,  µμελέέτῃ  καὶ  πόόνῳ  τὴν  ῥωµμὴν  ἀπειργασµμέένας,  55e5-­‐‑56a1).  Music  
is  such  a  τέέχνη  (and  especially  pipe-­‐‑playing,  αὐλητικήή):  it  contains  a  great  deal  of  τὸ  µμὴ  σαφέές  
(uncertainty),  and  little  of  certainty  (τὸ  βέέβαιον).  Other  τέέχναι  of  this  kind  are  ἰατρικήή,  γεωργίία,  
κυβερνητικήή  and  στρατηγικήή.  ROOCHNIK  (1996),  53-­‐‑54.  
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knowledge   and   use”,   cannot   be   very   precise.   The   doctor   has   to   “aim”  
(στοχάάζεσθαι)  at  his  goal.123    
   Characteristic   of   the   stochastic   τέέχνη   is   the   recognition  on   the  part   of  
the   τεχνικόός   that   success   is   never   guaranteed.124   “Für   die   Folgezeit   gehört  
solches  Wissen  um  die  Grenzen  der  Kunst  jedenfalls  zu  den  Kennzeichen  des  
vollkommenen   Arztes.”125   But   the   recognition   of   the   expert’s   fallibility   not  
only   pertains   to   medicine.   Similar   limits   are   formulated   with   respect   to  
rhetoric   in   Isocrates,  Plato’s   rival   as   the  head  of   the  more  popular   rhetorical  
School  at  Athens.  Educating  a  perfect  orator  may  not  always  work  out,  since  
there   are  more   variables   at   play.126   Isocrates’   conception   of   philosophy   puts  
much  more  of  the  burden  of  success  on  the  pupil.  The  µμαθητήής  has  to  practice  
(µμελετᾶν),   gain   experience   (ἐµμπειρίία),   and   have   a   certain   natural   aptitude  
(φύύσις)   in   order   to   become   a   good   orator.   According   to   the   stochastic  
conception  of  τέέχνη  that  prevails  outside  the  Platonic  corpus,  the  capacities  of  
the   authority   figure   are   much   more   limited   and   problematic.   The   whole  
notion  of  authority   is  much  more  problematic  because   it   largely  depends  on  
social   recognition.   The   un-­‐‑Platonic   character   of   Laws   partly   lies   in   the  
                                                                                                              
123  ROOCHNIK  (1996),  107  (he  calls  this  “techne2”).  It  should  be  noted  that  the  focus  of  this  debate  
about   the   status   of   ἰατρικήή   differs   from   the   Platonic   approach   to  medicine.  On   the   basis   of   its  
stochastic   interpretation   elsewhere,   one   might   have   supposed   that   ἰατρικήή   is   unsuitable   for  
Plato’s  purposes.  But  the  Platonic  focus  is  different.  Plato  uses  the  analogy  of  medicine  to  get  the  
claim  across  that  there  exists  such  a  thing  as  the  objectively  and  naturally  best  condition  of  the  soul  
(and  polis),  analogous  to  health  for  the  body.  This  is  idea  is  especially  prominent  in  Republic  and  
Gorgias.  
124  Cf.  HEINIMANN  (1961),  122.    
125  HEINIMANN  (1961),  122.  His  reference  to  Resp.  360e6-­‐‑361a1  in  note  83  ibid.  is  misleading  because  
it  fails  to  take  account  of  the  negative  import  of  that  context:  knowing  what  one’s  craft  is  capable  
of  and  not  (τάά  τε  ἀδύύνατα  ἐν  τῇ  τέέχνῃ  καὶ  τὰ  δυνατὰ  διαισθάάνεται)  is  equated  to  scheming:  the  
steersman  and  doctor  are  called  οἱ  δεινοὶ  δηµμιουργοίί,  and  are  analogues  of  the  unjust  person  (ὁ  
ἄδικος).  The  unjust  person  knows  what  acts  of  injustice  can  credibly  have  a  reputation  for  justice.  
If  something  goes  wrong,  he  can  fix  it  (ἐὰν  ἄρα  πῃ  σφαλῇ,  ἱκανὸς  ἐπανορθοῦσθαι,  361a2;  τὸν  
ἁλισκόόµμενον  δὲ  φαῦλον  ἡγητέέον,  361a4).  The  qualification  of  the  ἄδικος  thus  works  along  the  
same  lines  as  that  of  the  moral  expert.  
126   Isocrates’   notion   of   rhetoric   and  φιλοσοφίία   (ἡ   τῶν   λόόγων  παιδείία)   is   therefore   very  much  
unlike  Plato’s  conception  of  philosophy  as  σοφίία  or  ἐπιστήήµμη.  E.g.  Isocr.  Antid.  180-­‐‑220.    
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substitution  of   such  dissimilar   and   imprecise   factors   such  as   experience   and  
insight  for  expert  knowledge.  
   We  have   lingered  on   the  assumptions   that  underlie   the  analogizing  of  
morality   to  τέέχνη  because   the   fact   that   this  analogy,  and  with   it   the  Socratic  
paradoxes,   is  relinquished,   is  part  of  the  reason  why  Plato  in  his  Laws  seems  
so  unrecognizable.  On   the  one  hand,   the  automatic   link  previously  assumed  
to   exist   between   knowing   the   good   and   acting   in   accordance   with   it   is  
severed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sufficiency  of  expert  knowledge  as  a  ground  
for   action   (the   moral   intellectualism)   is   cast   into   doubt   and   becomes   an  
insufficient  basis  for  action.    
   The  discussion  of  Republic   in   chapter   two  will   attempt   to  demonstrate  
how   the   success   of   Callipolis   (for   Plato)   depends   on   the   assumptions  
operative  in  his  construal  of  τέέχνη  as  expert  knowledge.  The  notion  of  τέέχνη  
as  expert  knowledge  will  serve  as  a  foil  for  my  argument  for  a  recalibration  of  
ἀρετήή  and  τέέχνη  in  the  chapters  on  Laws.  Chapter  three  will  investigate  Laws’  
introduction  of  virtue  in  the  opening  books  and  argue  that  the  τέέχνη/ἀρετήή-­‐‑
analogy   is   relinquished.   Chapter   four   will   scrutinize   the   implications   of   an  
important  defining  analogy  for  Laws’  conception  of  lawgiving,  the  analogy  of  
painting.   Chapter   five   will   explore   the   implications   of   an   analogy   for  
lawgiving   that   frames   lawgiving   not   as   laying   down   laws   but   as   the   direct  
influencing  of  the  citizens:  the  doctor-­‐‑analogy.  Chapter  six  will  argue  that  the  
so-­‐‑called  “nocturnal  council”  possesses  a  τέέχνη  of   the  stochastic   type,  rather  
than  expert  knowledge.    
   It   seems   not   to   be   without   reason   that   Laws   does   not   talk   about   a  
νοµμοθετικὴ  τέέχνη  in  either  of  these  representations  of  lawgiving:  νοµμοθετικὴ  
τέέχνη  would  presumably  have  entailed  connotations  of  ἐπιστήήµμη  that  needed  
to  be  suppressed  in  this  context.127  Rather  than  on  expert  knowledge,  both  the  
                                                                                                              
127  Cf.  the  brief  discussion  of  Plato’s  use  of  his  own  terms  and  his  aims  above,  p.  16.  
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painter-­‐‑analogy  and  the  doctor-­‐‑analogy  are  grounded  in  a  notion  of  expertise  
based  on  experience.    
  
  
1 . 4    The    s t ru c tu re   o f   Laws   
Laws  is  a  notoriously  difficult  text  to  get  a  firm  grasp  on,  due  to  its  length  and  
the  scope  of  its  topics.  The  usual  practice  adopted  by  modern  scholars,  to  cite  
passages  without   taking   into  account   their   immediate  context  and   the  phase  
of   the   argument,   is   less   preferable   for   two   reasons:   first,   it   suggests   that   no  
overall  structure  and  design  is  visible;  second,  it  obscures  from  our  view  Laws’  
own  articulations  of  its  project.128  For  a  discussion  of  the  status  of  the  laws  one  
ought  to  be  aware  of  the  different  stages  of  the  argument,  and  of  how  they  are  
demarcated  from  each  other.  This  section  will  briefly  present  an  overview  of  
Laws,  on  the  basis  of  its  own  indications  about  its  internal  structure.  
   The  discussion  until  702e2  (Books  I-­‐‑III)  forms  the  opening  discussion  of  
the  conversation  as  a  whole.  Within  this  opening  discussion,  there  is  a  minor  
caesura   between   the   discussion   on   paideia   and   virtue   in   Books   I-­‐‑II,   that   is  
explicitly  concluded  at  the  end  of  Book  II,  and  the  historical  discussion  of  the  
reasons   for   the   success   and   fall   of   constitutions   in   Book   III.   For   the   sake   of  
convenience,  I  refer  to  Books  I-­‐‑III  as  the  “opening  discussion”.    
   At   the   end  of  Book   III,  Cleinias   reveals   that  he   is  part   of   a   committee  
that  has  the  task  of  making  a  law  code  for  a  new  colony  on  Crete,  to  be  called  
Magnesia.129   His   commission   is   to   compile   a   law   code   on   the   basis   of   a  
selection  from  local  νόόµμοι  and  νόόµμοι  from  elsewhere.130  Upon  this  revelation,  
                                                                                                              
128  The  artificial  division  of  Laws   into   twelve  books   is   ascribed   to  Philippus  of  Opus,  Suidas   s.v.  
φιλόόσοφος.  Cf.  p.  18,  n.  43  above.    
129  Leg.  702c4-­‐‑d5.  
130  Leg.  702c5-­‐‑8:  ἅµμα  δὲ  καὶ  νόόµμους  τῶν  τε  ἀυτόόθι,  εἴ  τινες  ἡµμᾶς  ἀρέέσκουσιν,  τίίθεσθαι  κελεύύει,  
καὶ   εἴ   τινες   ἑτέέρωθεν,   µμηδὲν   ὑπολογιζοµμέένους   τὸ   ξενικὸν   αὐτῶν,   ἂν   βελτίίους   φαίίνωνται.  
“We  are  bidden  also  to  frame  laws,  choosing  such  as  we  please  either  from  our  own  local  laws  or  
CHAPTER   ONE    39  
the   interlocutors  agree   to   found  a  polis  “in  speech”   ((τῷ)  λόόγῳ,  702d1-­‐‑2,  e1),  
an  exercise  that  will  both  be  a  test  (ἔλεγχος,  702b2)  of  their  conclusions  so  far  
(the  merits   and  demerits   of   lawgivers131),   and   a   potential   framework   for   the  
foundation  of  Magnesia.132  In  the  deliberation  on  society  and  laws  in  the  three  
opening   Books,   the   lawgiving-­‐‑in-­‐‑speech   is   not   yet   within   sight.   But   from  
Cleinias’   revelation   that   he   is   part   of   a   committee   of   lawgivers   for   a  Cretan  
colony  onwards,  the  conversation  is  wholly  directed  to  the  service  of  founding  
this  colony.  It  is  important  to  note  that  this  concerns  a  foundation  in  speech;  for  
that   means   that   they   are   not   (yet)   engaged   in   making   the   law   code   for  
Magnesia.    
   But   the   interlocutors   do   not   immediately   commence   their   lawgiving.  
The  law  code  only  begins  at  771a5,  in  Book  VI.  The  whole  section  from  the  end  
of  Book  III/  beginning  of  Book  IV  till   the  beginning  of  the  lawgiving   in  Book  
VI   is   concerned   with   the   treatment   of   a   number   of   subjects   that   Laws  
apparently   considers   necessary   preliminaries   for   lawgiving.133   The   topics  
discussed  are:  the  geographical  location  and  local  resources  of  the  new  colony  
(Book   IV),   the   need   for   persuasive   preambles   (by  way   of   a   doctor-­‐‑analogy,  
Book  IV),  and  an  overview  of  the  magistrates  of  the  colony  (Book  V,  first  part  
of  VI).  It  should  be  noted  that  this  suggests  that  a  law  code  must  be  attuned  to  
the   location.  The   law  code   in  Laws   is  presented  as   tailor-­‐‑made   to  a  particular,  
historical,   cultural,   and   geographical   context   from   the   beginning:   the  
interlocutors   only   embark   on   their   lawgiving   once   these   topics   have   been  
discussed.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
from  those  of  other  countries,  taking  no  exception  ot  their  alien  character,  provided  only  that  they  
seem  superior”  (transl.  BURY).  
131  That  this  is  the  topic  of  their  investigation  is  made  explicit  at  Leg.  630e7-­‐‑631a2,  637d1-­‐‑3.    
132  Leg.  702d3-­‐‑5.  The  end  of  Laws  suggests  the  transition  to  founding  the  polis  for  real:  Leg.  969c4-­‐‑
d3.  It  is  only  at  that  point  that  the  real  foundation  comes  into  focus.  
133   Cf.   HENTSCHKE   (1971),   253:   “Die   Erörterung   dieser   Fragen   wie   Verfassung,   Besitz-­‐‑   und  
Landverteilung,   Ämter   etc.   ist   so   gestaltet,   daß   sie   als   Vorfragen   zur   konkreten   Gesetzgebung  
behandelt   werden.   Dadurch   ergibt   sich   eine   Straffung   gegenüber   dem   Dahintreiben   vor   der  
Gründung  der  Kolonie”  (italics  in  original).  
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   The  discussion  between  Cleinias’   announcement   and   the  beginning  of  
the   law   code   will   be   designated   as   the   “preliminary   discussion”.   This  
preliminary   discussion   does   not   only   deal   with   a   number   of   apparently  
necessary   topics,  but   is  also   the  place  where   the  Athenian  defines   legislation  
via   two  analogies,   the  doctor-­‐‑analogy   in  Book   IV  and   the  painter-­‐‑analogy   in  
Book   VI.   Both   of   these   introduce   conceptions   of   lawgiving   that   are  
subsequently  put  into  practice  by  the  interlocutors  themselves.    
   The  law  code  itself  begins  halfway  though  Book  VI  and  runs  from  771a5  
to   960b5.   Very   generally   speaking,   the   sequence   of   topics   in   the   law   code  
follows   the   course   of   human   life:   it   begins  with   regulations   about  necessary  
preliminaries   for   marriage134   (a   good   marriage   being   the   prerequisite   for  
procreation)  and  ends  with  regulations  concerning  burials,  estates  and  wills.135  
The   suggestion   is,   at   least,   that   the   topics  occur   in   some  kind  of  order,   as   is  
indicated  by  the  repeated  use  of  the  term  ἑξῆς,  “in  order”.136    
   The   last   law   is   followed  by   the  discussion  of   a  political  organ,   the   so-­‐‑
called   “nocturnal   council”   (νυκτερινὸς   σύύλλογος).   Although   the   late  
introduction  of  so  vital  an  organ  has  sometimes  been  considered  unexpected  
and   unanticipated,   the   reason   for   its   introduction   at   this   stage   is   made  
sufficiently   clear:   for,   as   the   Athenian   remarks,   no   act   of   generation   has  
                                                                                                              
134  See  chapter  four,  p.  159f.  
135  Cf.  LAKS   (2000),  265-­‐‑266:  “In   fact,  no   less   than   three  principles  must  be   taken   into  account   to  
explain  the  fairly  complex  order  of  exposition  followed  in  Books  VII  to  XII:  (1)  the  chronological  
principle  of   the   cycle  of  human   life   and   its  nodal  points—marriage  and  procreation,   education,  
military  service,  political   life,  death  and  funerary  arrangements;   (2)  a  reality  principle  according  
to  which  activities  linked  to  survival  must  be  regulated  (842e3-­‐‑5,  cf.  842d1-­‐‑e1);  (3)  the  principle  of  
penal   regulation,   which   rests   on   a   classification   of   transgressions   in   order   of   their   degree   of  
seriousness  (884a1-­‐‑885a7).”    
136  In  the  context  of  the  law  code:  Leg.  779d6,  780c6,  782d7,  796e4,  804c2,  823d3,  d6,  834b1,  853b1,  
914b1;  cf.  860d3,  900b6  (τὸν  ἑξῆς  λόόγον).  In  the  discussion  of  the  magistrates,   this  suggestion  is  
present  as  well:  755b6,  763e4.  Τhe  idea  of  a  strict  sequence  is  also  present  in  768d4-­‐‑6:  a  complete  
διέέξοδος   must   go   from   the   beginning   through   τὰ   δεύύτερα   καὶ   τὰ   µμέέσα   καὶ   πάάντα   µμέέρη   τὰ  
ἑαυτῆς   ἀπολαβοῦσα   till   the   end   (τέέλος).   It   therefore   seems   somewhat   unfair   to   say   that   “the  
argument  lurches  from  topic  to  topic”  (SAUNDERS,  Intr.  p.  xlii).  Of  course,  this  is  the  natural  form  
of  a  law  code.  But  it  feels  unsatisfactory  because  it  is  embedded  in  a  Platonic  literary  dialogue,  of  
which  one  expects  (on  the  basis  of  familiarity  with  the  Platonic  corpus)  a  more  close  coherence.  
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reached   its   end   before   a   means   has   been   devised   for   its   preservation  
(σωτηρίία).137  The  nocturnal  council  is  by  this  ordering  the  closure  of  the  act  of  
νοµμοθεσίία.  Another  interesting  aspect  about  this  last  section  of  Laws  is  that  it  
exhibits  overt  thematic  parallels  with  the  opening  discussion  of  Books  I  and  II:  
for   instance,   the   theme   of   the   unity   of   ἀρετήή   and   the   four   ἀρεταίί,   that   had  
disappeared   in   the   preliminary   discussion   and   the   law   code   itself,   is  
recapitulated   in   the   final   section   of   the   work,   creating   the   effect   of   a   ring  
composition.  Laws   ends   on   the   idea   that   at   this   point,   the   interlocutors  will  
found  the  city  for  real  and  therefore  harks  back  to  the  end  of  Book  III.  
   In  any  case,  we  can  see  that  the  structure  of  Laws  is  hardly  as  “chaotic”  
and   labyrinthine   as   often   assumed.   To   explore   what   this   structure   tells   us  
about   the   status   of   its   law   code   is   an   important   aim   of   this   study.  
Inconsistencies   between   passages   are   not   necessarily   problematic   in   nature  
when  one   realizes   that   they  are  made   in   the   context   of  different  discussions  
and   stages   of   the   argument;   in   any   case,   inconsistencies   as   such   do   not  
warrant   the   assumption   that   Laws   is   unfinished,   or   the   product   of   a  
philosopher  past  the  prime  of  his  literary  faculties.  I  will  argue  that  precisely  
this   lack   of   consistency   of   passages   taken   out   of   their   context   is   compatible  
with   Laws’   own   approach   to   lawgiving   and   even   part   of   its   make   up.  
Recognizing   the   anatomy   of   Laws   instead   of   assembling   apparently   similar  
passages  from  different  sections  of  the  text,  without  awareness  of  their  context  
and   the   framing   of   the   conversation   as   a   whole,   avoids   lumping   together  
material  that  belongs  to  different  phases  of  the  discussion.    
  
                                                                                                              
137  Leg.   960b5-­‐‑c1:   τῶν  πάάντων   δ᾿   ἑκάάστοτε   τέέλος   οὐ   τὸ   δρᾶσαίί   τι   σχεδὸν   οὐδὲ   τὸ   κτήήσασθαι  
κατοικίίσαι  τ᾿  ἐστίίν,  ἀλλὰ  τῷ  γεννηθέέντι  σωτηρίίαν  ἐξευρόόντα  τελέέως  ἀείί,  τόότ᾿  ἤδη  νοµμίίζειν  
πᾶν  ὅσον  δεῖ  πραχθῆναι  πεπρᾶχθαι,  πρόότερον  δ᾿  ἀτελὲς  εἶναι  τὸ  ὅλον.  “But  in  every  case,  the  
full  end  does  not  consist  in  the  doing,  establishing  or  founding  something:  rather  our  view  should  
be   that   it   is  only  when  we  have  discovered  a  means  of  salvation,  endless  and  complete,   for  our  
creation,  that  we  have  done  all   that  ought  to  be  done:  until   then,  we  must  believe,  the  whole  of  
our  creation  is  incomplete”  (transl.  BURY).  
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1 . 5       P l an   o f    th i s    the s i s   
This   thesis   attempts   to   provide   an   explanation   of   the   legislative   project   of  
Laws   in  the  context  of  Platonic  political  philosophy  as  a  whole.  It  argues  that  
the   anomalies   enumerated   at   the   start   of   this   Introduction—the   absence   of  
δικαιοσύύνη,   of   philosophy,   of   Socrates;   the   Cretan   setting;   the   role   of  
πείίθειν—can  be  explained  when  it  is  recognized  that  Laws  is  oriented  towards  
a   pragmatic   instead   of   an   absolute   norm.   In   fact,   our   evidence   strongly  
suggests  that  it  is  impossible  to  speak  of  a—single—norm  in  the  case  of  Laws,  
because  its  moral  outlook,  its  approach  to  lawgiving  and  its  constitution  lack  
the  coherence  that  such  an  absolute  norm  imposes.  In  Laws  there  is  nothing  so  
clear   and   solid   as   to   be   comparable   with   the   fixed,   metaphysical   norm   in  
Republic  (Republic  is  the  text  that  offers  the  most  elaborate  vision  on  what  this  
absolute  norm  amounts  to,  but  in  fact  this  goes  for  every  other  Platonic  text).  
That   does   not   mean   that   Laws   endorses   a   form   of   moral   relativism,   for   it  
continues  to  rely  on  some  form  of  objectivity  in  morals.  But  this  objectivity  is  
more   similar   to   an   Aristotelian,   biological   naturalism   (social   behaviour   is  
objectively   best   because   it   fosters   the  most   harmonious   and  most   enduring  
societies)   than   it   is   to   Republic’s   metaphysical   absolutism.   The   law   code  
depends  on  the  specific  location  and  is  determined  by  local  circumstances.  At  
the   same   time,   with   this   caveat,   Laws   is   a   leçon   par   l’exemple:   it   offers   a  
workable   model   for   how   lawgivers   could   proceed   to   create   such   a  
harmonious  society.  
   Before  coming  to  an  analysis  of  Laws  along  the  lines  set  out  above,  this  
study  starts  out  with  a  chapter  (chapter  two)  about  three  other  Platonic  texts:  
the  (presumably)  early  Apology  and  Crito,  and  the  middle-­‐‑period  Republic.  The  
reasons   for   analyzing   this   subset   of   texts   have   to   do  with   genre   as   well   as  
theme.  Each  of  these  three  texts  presents  a  scenario   in  which  absolute   justice  
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either  is  (in  the  naturally  best  city  of  the  Republic),  or  ought  to  be  (in  the  less  
than  perfect  setting  of  Apology  and  Crito),  the  motivation  for  action  for  the  just  
individual.   In  all   three   texts,   the  ultimate  norm  for  moral  action   is   justice.   In  
Apology,  we  encounter  a  rhetoric  inspired  by  the  human  wisdom  that  is  aware  
of   the   existence   of   a   higher   knowledge,   authorized   by   an   appeal   to   divine  
authorities.  In  Crito,  Socrates  in  a  different  setting  presents  a  different  sort  of  
account  of  his  behaviour,  one,  however,  that  shares  with  Apology  the  loyalty  to  
a  higher  principle   as   a  motivation   for   action   (or   refraining   from   it).  Republic  
presents   a   constitution   that   encapsulates   the   moral   authority   and   that   is,  
therefore,  just.    
   In  view  of  the  absolutist  nature  of  justice,  one  would  have  expected  that  
a   Platonic   text   on   legislation   would   declare   διακιοσύύνη   of   paramount  
importance.  What  else   than   true   justice  could,  and  should,  be   the  basis   for  a  
set  of  laws  in  Laws?  But  as  noted  at  the  start  of  this  chapter,  δικαιοσύύνη  plays  
only  a  limited  role.  This  and  the  other  peculiarities  in  Laws  will  be  addressed  
in  the  chapters  on  Laws.  How  can  a  Platonic  text  offer  laws  without  attributing  
them  to  a  moral  expert?    
   Chapter   three   investigates   the  construction  of  human  excellence   in   the  
two  opening  Books  of   the  work.   It   argues   that   the   specific  Cretan   context   is  
used   to   advance   the   notion   of   ἀρετήή   as   a   cultural   variable:   in   Creta   and  
Sparta,   ἀρετήή   is   ἀνδρείία.   The   subsequent   introduction   of   the   three   other  
cardinal   virtues   besides  ἀνδρείία   allows   the  Athenian   to   argue   that  ἀνδρείία  
does  not  suffice,  and  to  introduce  the  more  general  notion  of  virtue  as  friendly  
behaviour  and  social  excellence:  virtue  as  the  quality  that  is  necessary  for  the  
preservation  of  society,  represented  by  the  symposia.  Within  the  boundaries  of  
φιλίία,  an   individual   lawgiver  or  polis   is   at   liberty   to  devise  his  own  code  of  
laws.    
   Formulating   a   code   of   laws   is   precisely   what   the   interlocutors  
themselves  proceed  to  do,  inspired  by  a  particular,  Cretan  case.  Chapter  four  
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therefore   investigates   how   the   interlocutors   conceptualize   their   own  
legislative   activity.   The   interlocutors’   lawgiving   is   preceded   by   a   painter-­‐‑
analogy,   that   analogizes   an   act   of   lawgiving   to   creating   a   painting.  Chapter  
four  will   argue   that   the   upshot   of   the   analogy   is   that   lawgiving   necessarily  
takes  time,  and  that  time  and  experience  are  necessary  to  supplement  the  gaps  
left  by  the  original  lawgiver.  This  dynamic  notion  of  lawgiving  is  reflected  in  
the  interlocutors’  own  law  code.  
   Chapter  five  moves  from  the  making  of  laws  for  a  particular  polis  to  the  
yet  smaller  scale  of  the  effect  of  laws  within  that  polis.  It  investigates  how  the  
laws   will   influence   the   envisaged   citizens.   The   paideia   of   the   citizens   is  
effectuated  by  persuasive  preambles,  which  are  introduced  especially  for  this  
purpose,   and   chapter   five  will   investigate   how   persuasion  works   and  what  
notion  of  virtue  Laws’  form  of  persuasion  implies.    
   By  way  of  final  step,  chapter  six  investigates  two  agencies  outside  law  
code—the  nocturnal  council  and  the  lawgiver  in  Laws,  the  Athenian.  Does  the  
nocturnal  council   introduce  the  perspective  of  the  philosopher-­‐‑king  after  all?  
On   the   basis   of   the   striking   and   clear   thematic   parallels   with   the   opening  
discussion   in   Books   I   and   II,   it   will   be   argued   that   the   nocturnal   council   is  
completely  in  line  with  Laws  on  pragmatic,  ethical  naturalist  view  on  politics,  
and   that   its   discussion   is   an   apt   way   of   concluding   the   argument   of   Laws.  
There  remains,  therefore,  the  Athenian  stranger.  What  is  his  qualification,  and  
how  do  we  know  that?    
   It   will   be   argued   that   Laws   does   not   appeal   to   a   higher   principle   to  
justify   its   laws.   It   construes   a   world   completely   alternative   to,   and  
irreconcilable   with,   Republic.   Laws’   composition   suggests   a   worldview   that  
allows  no  place  for  a  conclusive  authority,  and  where,  as  a  consequence,  Plato  
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The  present  chapter  will  discuss  three  Platonic  texts  that  precede  Laws:  Apology  
and  Crito   from  Plato’s   early  period,   and  Republic   from  his  middle  period.1  All  
three   texts   address   questions   of   justice   (τὸ   δίίκαιον,   δικαιοσύύνη),   but   each   of  
them  does  so  in  its  own  way.  Despite  their  differences,  they  are  connected  by  an  
underlying   theme:   exploring   the   consequences   of   the   existence   of   an   absolute  
moral  norm.  Apology  and  Crito  portray  the  dilemmas  that  affect  Socrates.  Both  
texts  are  set  in  the  Athens  of  399  B.C.E.—a  society  which,  in  Socrates’  eyes,  fails  
to   live   up   to   the   norms   of   true   justice.   Conversely,   Socrates’   way   of   life   is  
considered   inappropriate   from   the   perspective   of   conventional   justice,   and  
Apology  and  Crito  stage  the  dramatic   lowest  ebb—from  the  perspective  of   true  
justice—of   that   inevitable   friction.   In   Apology,   Socrates   is   forced   to   defend  
himself  before  the  Athenians  at  large  (section  2.1);  in  Crito,  he  is  faced  with  the  
consequences  of  his  failure  to  convince  them  (section  2.2).    
   The   third   text   that   will   be   discussed   in   this   chapter,   Republic,   is   of   a  
somewhat  different  nature  (section  2.3).  It  involves  the  attempt  to  construct,  in  
its  most  persuasive  form,  a  polis—called  Callipolis—with  justice  as  its  defining  
                                                                                                              
1  For  literature  on  the  presumed  relative  chronology  of  the  Platonic  texts,  see  the  references  on  p.  6,  
n.  8  above.  
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characteristic.  Republic   therefore   adopts   the   same   belief   in   an   absolute   moral  
norm  as  Apology   and  Crito,  but  offers  a  solution   to   the  dilemmas  portrayed   in  
the  earlier  works.  In  the  just  society,  the  problems  affecting  the  just  individual  
in   Apology   (the   truth   about   justice   is   not   convincing)   and   Crito   (the   just  
individual  has   to  submit   to  unjust   laws)  cannot  arise,  and  Socrates  would  not  
have  been  convicted.  
   The   analyses   offered   in   this   chapter   serve   as   a   comparative   framework  
for   the   study   of   Laws   in   the   following   ones.   Assuming   that   Plato,   and   his  
Socrates,  believed  in  an  absolute  notion  of  justice,  the  present  chapter  analyzes  
how  this  absolute  norm  takes  shape  in  each  of  the  three  communicative  settings  
portrayed.  This  will  provide  us  with  an  idea,  or  set  of  ideas,  about  how  justice  
makes   its  appearance   in  what  may,  perhaps  somewhat  prematurely,  be  called  
more   prototypical   Platonic   works.   If   from   there   we   turn   to   Laws   we   stand  
perplexed.   For,   contrary   to   what   one   expects   on   the   basis   of   Plato’s  
philosophical  oeuvre—especially,  but  not  only,  the  three  texts  discussed  in  this  
chapter—justice  (δικαιοσύύνη)  is  not  prominent  at  all  in  Plato’s  last  work.    
   The  study  of  absolute  justice  in  its  three  different  contexts  is  the  first  step  
of   the  argument  developed   in   this   thesis.  Evidently,  each  of   the   three  Platonic  
texts   that   will   be   discussed   here   has   attracted   considerable   scholarly  
controversy   in   its  own  right.  Their   concise  discussion  within   the   scope  of   this  
preliminary  chapter  cannot  in  any  way  pretend  to  do  justice  to  the  debate  in  all  
its   ramifications.   The   discussion   of   the   primary   texts   is   of   limited   scope,   and  
necessarily  remains  somewhat  sketchy.  Even  though  I  believe  that  the  analysis  
of   Apology,   Crito,   and   Republic   in   conjunction,   as   texts   revolving   around   a  
common  dilemma,  may  offer  some  new  insights,  or  at  least  new  possibilities  for  
further  exploration,  the  main  contribution  of  this  chapter  will  be  to  provide  us  
with  a  suitable  foil  for  the  subsequent  study  of  Laws.    
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2 . 1       Apo logy :    So c ra t e s   un jus t ly    a c cused   
2.1.1   An  isolated  Socrates  and  Apology’s  philosophical  rhetoric  
Apology   is  the  only  Platonic  text  that  is  not  a  dialectical  conversation.2  The  text  
reports  a  sustained  defense  speech   (ἀπολογίία)  addressed   to  a  mass  audience,  
the  court  of  Athens.3  This  setting,  the  court,  forces  Socrates  to  adopt  a  mode  of  
discourse  at  variance  with  his  usual,  dialectical  mode  of  speech.4  Yet  although  
Socrates   in   his   speech   formally   conforms   to   the   proper   way   of   addressing   a  
court,   his   speech   is   a   defense   speech   in   a   typically   Socratic   fashion.   The  
argument   and   attitude   displayed   by   the   Socrates   of  Apology   are   hardly   those  
expected  from  someone  in  his  position.  Normally,  the  sole  purpose  of  a  defense  
speech  is  to  secure  acquittal—a  whole  genre  (forensic  oratory)  and  industry  (the  
professional   speech-­‐‑writers,   λογογράάφοι)   had   arisen   for   the   very   sake   of  
securing   success   in   lawsuits.  Hence   the   normal   procedure  would   be   to   try   to  
secure   the   jury’s  benevolence  and  present  oneself   in   the  most   favourable  way  
possible.5      
   Yet   this   is   not   what   Socrates   does   in  Apology—in   fact,   Socrates   makes  
clear   that  winning   the  multitude’s   favour  might  well  be  his   least  concern.  His  
care   is   for   something   else.  Apology   can  be   read   as  what   FEAVER  &  HARE  have  
called  an  “inverted  parody  of  rhetoric”.  First,  he  claims  that  in  this  trial  he  is  not  
                                                                                                              
2  With  the  exception  of  those  Epistulae  that  may  be  genuine.  
3  On  the  question  whether  Apology  is  a  philosophical  work  even  though  not  a  dialogue,  see  SLINGS  
(1994),   36:  Apology   is   “a   philosophical  work,   and   that   implies   that   it   is   concerned  with   the   right  
conduct  of  life,  not  only  in  general,  but  also  with  respect  to  the  special  activity  with  which  the  work  
is  concerned,  namely,  rhetoric”  (cf.  Ch.  1  §  2c).  
4  Apol.   17d1-­‐‑18a3.   In  Apol.   37a5-­‐‑b2,   especially   the   reference   to   Socrates’   own  mode   of   speech   in  
ὀλίίγον  γὰρ  χρόόνον  ἀλλήήλοις  διειλέέγµμεθα,  “there  is  some  irony  present,  and  perhaps  a  hint  that  in  
a  dialectical  discussion  [Socrates]  would  have  convinced  the  putative  jurors”,  STOKES  ad  loc.  For  the  
difficulty  to  persuade  his  audience:  Apol.  38a7-­‐‑8.    
5  Especially  since  jurors  “were  prone  to  decide  a  case  more  on  the  basis  of  a  general  assessment  of  a  
person’s  moral  character  than  on  an  informed  understanding  of  legal  arguments”,  SLINGS  (1994),  90.  
“Possible  scruples  [on  the  part  of  the  jury]  about  doing  this  could  be  dismissed  if  the  moral  offence  
had  been  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  indictment;  in  that  case  a  discussion  of  the  defendant’s  general  
behaviour  could  not  be  considered  ‘irrelevant  to  the  case’  (ἔξω  τοῦ  πράάγµματος)”  (SLINGS  ibid.,  90-­‐‑
91,  see  also  his  note  ad  18a7).  Cf.  FEAVER  &  HARE  (1981),  210,  212.    
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the   defendant   but   the   accuser;   the   real   person   on   trial,   he   suggests,   are   the  
Athenians.6  Second,  Socrates  is  in  fact  accusing  himself.7  He  does  not  attempt  to  
take   the   sting   out   of   the   philosophical   activities   at   which   people   have   taken  
offence.   On   the   contrary,   he   confesses   to   be   guilty   of   the   activities   that   have  
been   the   reason   for   his   prosecution.   To   this   it   may   be   added   that   Socrates’  
speech   is   in   fact   a  grand  attempt   to   isolate  himself   from  his   fellow  Athenians  
and   from   their   conventional   values.   Socrates’   overt   contempt   for   death   as   a  
triviality   in   the   light   of   his   own   concern   for   τὰ   µμέέγιστα   emphasizes   this  
dissociation.8   Taken   together,  Apology’s   inversion   of   the  usual   arguments   of   a  
defense   speech—appealing   to   shared   values   between   city   and   defendant,   the  
previously   impeccable   reputation   of   the   defendant,   the   need   to   spare   the  
defendant’s   life—force   its  audience   to   recalibrate   its  moral  orientation.  Part  of  
Apology’s   purpose   is   to   encourage   its   audience   to   adopt   a   perspective   from  
which  these  positions  (that  the  Athenians  at  large  stand  accused,  that  conviction  
and   the  prospect  of  death  are   in   fact  a   triumph,  and  Socrates’   self-­‐‑accusation)  
lead  to  a  coherent  worldview.    
   Besides   isolating   himself   from   the   conventions   of   his   fellow   citizens,  
Socrates  in  the  exordium  substitutes  his  own  definition  of  rhetoric,  “speaking  the  
truth”,9   for   the   conventional   definition   of   being   δεινὸς   λέέγειν   (“a   formidable  
                                                                                                              
6  FEAVER  &  HARE  (1981),  210.  Apology  is  an  “inverted  parody  of  rhetoric”:  rhetorical  topoi  are  used  to  
effectuate  the  opposite  of  what  rhetoric  aims  to  do  (“success  is  not  winning  the  case  but  telling  the  
truth”,  205),  and  to  give  expression  to  a  “higher  authority”  (209).  
7  FEAVER  &  HARE  (1981),  211:  “What  [Socrates]  is  doing  in  this  section  of  the  speech  [the  reply  to  the  
unnamed  prosecutors]   is  uncovering   the   real   charge,  admitting   that  he   is  guilty  and  claiming   the  
utmost   credit   for   being   so.”   The   real   accusation   he   claims   to   be   facing   is   “just   that   he   is   a  
philosopher.   In   particular,   the   real   reason   for   the   hatred   in   which   he   is   held   is   his   habit   of  
consistently  exposing  powerful  figures  to  the  ridicule  of  the  young  and  rich  group  that  surrounds  
him.  The  Meno  shows  the  connection  between  this  habit  and  the  trial”  (210-­‐‑211).  
8  See  Apol.  30c6-­‐‑d5.  
9  τὸν  τἀληθῆ  λέέγοντα,  17b4-­‐‑5;  ὑµμεῖς  δέέ  µμου  ἀκούύσεσθε  πᾶσαν  τὴν  ἀλήήθειαν,  17b7-­‐‑8;  ῥήήτορος  δὲ  
(ἀρετήή)   τἀληθῆ   λέέγειν,   18a5-­‐‑6.   See   SLINGS   (1994),   32-­‐‑34,   36-­‐‑40,   for   an   explanation   of  Apology’s  
correspondences  with   the   familiar   rhetoric  of   the  orators  and   its  use  of   rhetorical   topoi  within   the  
context   of   this   agenda   of   truth-­‐‑speaking.   Since   truth   cannot   be   taught   but   only   discovered   by  
insight:  “Socratic  speech  as  a  rule  aims  at  suggesting  rather  than  at  asserting  the  truth.  For  truth  is  
discovered  by  insight  (σοφίία,  φρόόνησις),  and  this  cannot  be  siphoned  from  one  mind  into  another  
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speaker”).10   The   λόόγος   he   is   about   to   give   is   the   only   speech   he   can  give;   he  
simply   cannot   defend   himself   in   a   different   way.11   Knowing   the   truth  means  
that   one   is   speaking   the   truth—the   rhetorical   counterpart   of   the   Socratic  
automatism   that   knowing   the   good   is   doing   the   good.12   The   philosophical  
rhetoric   of  Apology,   although   it   is   a   mode   of   speech   determined   by   different  
rules   than   dialectic,   and   although   it   has   different   effects,   thus   shares   with  
dialectic  the  concern  for,  and  belief  in,  truth.13  
   In  Apology  we  witness  a  radical,  and,  in  his  overt  disdain  for  conventional  
norms  and  values,  arrogant,  Socrates.  He  launches  a  deliberate  attempt  to  create  
a  huge  gulf  between  himself  and  his  fellow  Athenians.  How  does  he  justify  his  
claim   to   speak   the   truth?  How  does   the   radical  Socrates  of  Apology   justify  his  
past  activities,  and  motivate  his  present  indifference?  The  next  two  subsections  
will   attempt   to   offer   a   reconstruction   of   the   divine   mission   from   Socrates’  
perspective.    
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
like  water  from  a  full  vessel  into  an  empty  one”  (ibid.,  33,  with  ref.  to  Symp.  175d3-­‐‑7).  This  is  similar  
to   how   Socrates   represents   the   procedure   of   the   god   of   Delphi,   who   inculcated   the   truth   by  
suggestions  (ibid.,  34).  
10  Apol.   17b8-­‐‑c2:   the  claim   that  he  will   speak  εἰκῇ  and  τοῖς  ἐπιτυχοῦσιν  ὀνόόµμασιν   therefore  does  
not  mean  that  he  will  not  give  a  very  sophisticated  speech  and  use  rhetorical  topoi,  but  is  part  of  his  
claim  that  he  will  not  distort   the  truth  (cf.  SLINGS  [1994],  37).  For  the  use  of  rhetorical   idiom,  topoi  
and  structure  of  Apology,  see  SLINGS  (1994),  32,  with  literature.  The  correspondences  with  Gorgias’  
Defense  of  Palamedes  are  especially  striking,  see  FEAVER  &  HARE  (1981),  207-­‐‑209  and  215  n.  11;  also  
REEVE   (1989),   7-­‐‑8.   Socrates’   disclaimers   have   prompted   BRICKHOUSE   &   SMITH   (1989)   to   deny   the  
rhetorical  parallels,  48-­‐‑59.      
11  Cf.   the  notion  of  Socratic  παρρησίία.  On  παρρησίία   in  Apology,   see  VAN  RAALTE   (2004),  296-­‐‑305:  
“Although  in  Plato’s  Apology  of  Socrates  the  term  parrhêsia  does  not  occur,  the  Apology  can  be  seen  as  
one  big  exercise  in  Socratic  parrhêsia”  (296);  Socrates  can  simply  not  hold  his  tongue.  
12  Cf.  SLINGS  (1994),  325,  ad  29a3:  “Socrates  cannot  admit  to  a  separation  of  theory  and  practice,  of  
convictions   and   actions.   When   someone   honestly   acknowledges   the   existence   of   true   gods,  
endowed  with  perfect   insight   (cf.  23a5-­‐‑6),  he  cannot  even  think  of  disobeying  him.”  The   idea   that  
Socrates  has  a  mission  can  only  take  root  because  the  idea  of  having  received  the  order  to  remain  at  
one’s   post   has   just   been  mentioned   in   the   context   of   a  military  mission.   It   is   in   this   context   that  
Socrates   really   speaks   of   having   received   an   “order”   from   the   god.   Parallel   to   Socrates’   current  
position  before  the  court,  the  military  context  also  involves  a  contempt  for  death.  
13  Cf.  SLINGS  (1994),  33:  “Socratic  speech  always  aims  at  truth,  which  is  the  highest  good  (…).”    
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2.1.2   The  oracle  and  ὁ  θεόός:  Socrates’  “mission”  
Socrates  claims  that  the  real  charge  he  faces  is  that  of  his  “old  accusers”:  he  has  
the   “reputation”   (ὄνοµμα)   of   being   “smart”   (σοφόός)   and   he   reportedly  
“educated”  (παιδεύύειν,  διδάάσκειν)  his  younger  fellow  citizens.14  Socrates’  tactic  
is   to   refute   this   charge   by   explaining   the   real   nature   of   his   σοφίία.   His  
explanation   at   the   same   time   denies   the   charge   that   he   educated   his   fellow  
Athenians  (he  could  not  have  done  so,  for  he  denies  to  be  σοφόός  in  that  sense),  
and  reframes  the  activities  that  underlie  his  present  prosecution:  over  the  years,  
he   has   not   been   educating   his   fellow   citizens   but   fighting   for   justice   (τὸ  
δίίκαιον).  Still,  Socrates  goes  even   further   than   that:  not  only  does  he   take   full  
responsibility   for   his   offensive   activities;   he   even   claims   that   these   activities  
were  commanded  by  “the  god”  and   that  he  has  been  entrusted,  solely  among  
his  fellow  Athenians,  with  a  mission  to  “serve  the  god”.    
   Socrates   traces   the   origin   of   his   mission,   i.e.   his   life   of   elenctic  
examination  of  his  fellow  citizens,  to  a  Delphic  oracle.  He  even  refers  to  the  god  
as  his  “witness”  (µμαρτύύς),  as  if  the  Delphic  god  himself  were  giving  testimony  
in  his   favour.15   The  Pythia   reportedly   answered   the   question  whether   anyone  
was   “wiser”   (σοφώώτερος)   than   Socrates   in   the   negative.   Knowing   that   he  
knows   nothing   about   τὰ   µμέέγιστα16   and   that   therefore   the   oracle   cannot   be  
correct,   Socrates   sets   out   on   a   quest   for   someone  who   is   σοφόός.17   This   quest  
                                                                                                              
14  Apol.   19a8-­‐‑20c3.  Apology   26b2-­‐‑6   “reflects   Plato’s   treatment   of   the   corruption   of   the   young   as  de  
facto  the  main  charge”,  SLINGS  (1994),  90,  n.  35.  Cf.  also  ibid.,  51:  “(…)  by  acting  as  he  does,  Socrates  
is  guilty  not  of  breaking  the  law  but  of  going  beyond  the  normal  bounds  within  which  a  reasonable  
and  well-­‐‑behaved  citizen  would  keep  himself”.  Cf.  TAYLOR  (1954),  90:  Socrates  was  condemned  “on  
what  was  really  a  charge  of  incivisme,  disloyalty  to  the  spirit  of  Athenian  life”,  which  appeared  more  
vulnerable  to  threat  in  the  tense  political  climate  at  the  time  of  the  charge  (89-­‐‑115).    
15  Apol.  20e6-­‐‑8:  τῆς  γὰρ  ἐµμῆς,  εἰ  δήή  τίίς  ἐστιν  σοφίία  καὶ  οἵα,  µμάάρτυρα  ὑµμῖν  παρέέξοµμαι  τὸν  θεὸν  ἐν  
τοῖς  Δελφοῖς.  
16   The   ἐπιστήήµμων   or   ἐπιστάάτης   knows   the   human   and   political   virtue,   ἡ   ἀνθρωπίίνη   τε   καὶ  
πολιτικὴ  ἀρετήή,  which  enables  him  to  make  others  καλὸς  κἀγαθόός,  Apol.  20a5-­‐‑b5.  
17   Some   commentators   have   found   Socrates’   doubts   about   the   god’s   veracity   worrying,   either  
because   in   their   eyes   these   doubts   would  make   him   guilty   of   impiety   after   all,   or   because   they  
consider   disbelief   hard   to   reconcile   with   Socrates’   later   recognition   of   the   god’s   authority   and  
obedience.  Therefore,  there  exists  some  controversy  about  the  exact  meaning  of  the  phrase  ἐλέέγξων  
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among  politicians,  poets  and  craftsmen  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  all,  even  the  
craftsmen,   who   on   their   part   do   know   many   fine   things   that   he   does   not  
(πολλὰ   καὶ   καλὰ   ἐπισταµμέένους),   are   liable   to   the   same   error   (ἁµμάάρτηµμα,  
πληµμµμέέλεια):  they  believe  that  they  possess  a  σοφίία  which  they  in  fact  do  not  
have.   From   these   disillusioning   encounters   Socrates   infers   that   there  must   be  
two   kinds   of   σοφίία:   on   the   one   hand,   ἀνθρωπίίνη   σοφίία,   that   is,   not   being  
ignorant  of  one’s  own  ignorance  about  τὰ  µμέέγιστα;  on  the  other  hand,  a  higher,  
divine  σοφίία,  knowledge  about  what  is  truly  good.18  Ἀνθρωπίίνη  σοφίία  is  thus  
an  informed  awareness  of  the  existence  of  truth  and  divine  σοφίία,  yet  without  
possessing   knowledge   of   τὰ   µμέέγιστα   oneself.   By   thus   casting   both   the  
accusation   and   the   oracle   in   terms   of   σοφίία,19   Socrates   can   at   the   same   time  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
τὸ  µμαντεῖον  (Apol.  21c1);  does  it  mean  disprove,  or  merely  interpret?  For  “disprove”  or  “refute”  is  
argued   by   BURNET   ad   21b8   (“tries   to   prove   the   god   a   liar”);   HACKFORTH   (1933),   88-­‐‑104;   TAYLOR  
(1954),   80;   RYLE   (1966),   17;   WEST   (1979),   106;   NEHAMAS   (1986),   305;   TELOH   (1986),   111.   Others,  
emphasizing  the  oracle’s  habitual  answering  in  riddles,  have  argued  for  an  ‘interpretative’  reading:  
GUTHRIE  (1971),  86-­‐‑88  (“What  [Socrates]  set  out  to  refute  was  the  obvious  meaning  of  the  oracle,  its  
words  taken  at  their  face  value,  in  order  to  discover  the  answer  to  its  riddle”,  87);  REEVE  (1989),  21-­‐‑
23  (“Hence  his  strategy  of  refutation  is  interpretative  only”,  23,  contra  WEST  [1979]);  BRICKHOUSE  &  
SMITH  (1989),  96  (“[…]  Socrates’  attempt  to  refute  the  apparent  meaning  of  the  oracle  only  reinforces  
the  view  that  he  sees  piety  as  requiring  that  he  always  make  ‘the  god’s  business’  his  first  priority”,  
contra  NEHAMAS);  STOKES  (1997),  117;  MCPHERRAN  (2002),  129  (“attempting  to  refute  (ἐλέέγξων),  to  
show   false,   the   apparent   meaning   of   the   oracular   pronouncement   taken   at   face   value,   not   (…)   the  
oracle  of  the  god”,  italics  in  original).      
18   The   outcome   of  Apology   shows   us   the   social   implications   of   recognizing   one’s   own   ignorance  
about  τὰ  µμέέγιστα:  it  spares  innocent  lives.  
19  Xenophon  in  his  Apologia  Socratis,  14,  reports  the  oracle  in  a  different  version:  Χαιρεφῶντος  γάάρ  
ποτε  ἐπερωτῶντος  ἐν  Δελφοῖς  περὶ  ἐµμοῦ  πολλῶν  παρόόντων  ἀνεῖλεν  ὁ  Ἀπόόλλων  µμηδέένα  εἶναι  
ἀνθρώώπων   ἐµμοῦ   µμήήτε   ἐλευθεριώώτερον   µμήήτε   δικαιόότερον   µμήήτε   σωφρονέέστερον,   “Once,   when  
Chaerephon  asked  in  Delphi  about  me  in  the  presence  of  many,  Apollo  responded  that  no  human  
being   was   more   free,   more   just,   or   more   moderate   than   I”   (transl.   BARTLETT).   The   difference  
between  Plato’s  version  and  Xenophon’s  has  fuelled  a  discussion  about  the  oracle’s  historical  form.  
Diogenes  Laertius  (II.37-­‐‑38)  supports  Plato’s  version.  SLINGS  (1994)  thinks  (contra  BURNET  ad  21a5)  
“[i]t   is   reasonable   to   assume   that   §   14   of   the   Xenophontic  Apology   is   a   correction   of   the   Platonic  
formulation”  (76).  Yet,  in  §  16  Socrates  asks  the  jury,  echoing  Chaerephon’s  question  to  the  oracle,  
who   they   know   that   is   more   σώώφρων,   ἐλευθεριώώτερος,   δικαιόότερος,   and   includes   σοφόός.   It  
therefore   seems   equally   reasonable   that   Plato   singled   out   σοφίία   for   his   own   purposes,   simply  
omitting   the   other   virtues.   For   literature   on   the   issue:   MCPHERRAN   (2002),   122-­‐‑123,   n.   25;  
BRICKHOUSE  &  SMITH  (1989),  89,  n.  71.  A  list  of  ancient  sources  on  the  oracle  is  given  in  FONTENROSE  
(1978),  245;  see  also  MCPHERRAN  (2002),  115,  n.  5.  For  the  reconstructed  historical  date  of  the  oracle,  
see  REEVE  (1989),  21,  and  the  literature  in  n.  21  ibid.  
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claim  that  he  indeed  is  σοφόός  (which  explains  his  ὄνοµμα)  in  a  way  that  no-­‐‑one  
else  is,  and  at  the  same  time  maintain  his  claim  that  he  has  not  been  educating  
anyone.    
   Realizing  that  he  was  the  only  one  who  had  ἀνθρωπίίνη  σοφίία,  Socrates  
felt   that   he   had   received   a   command   to   enlighten   others   about   their   own  
ignorance  as  well.  This  he  sees  as  “searching  in  accordance  with  the  god”,  and  
“the  service  to  the  god”.20  From  his  perspective,  it  is  a  task  that  has  been  imposed  
upon  him  by  a  higher  norm  over  which  he  has  no  control  and  in  which  he  has  
only   limited   insight.   Truth,   because   it   is   the   Truth,   entails   commitment   and  
requires   to   be   made   known.   The   person   who   learns   the   Truth   feels   that   it  
should   be   made   known.   An   issue   which   has   attracted   quite   some   scholarly  
attention,  is  how  Socrates  could  have  concluded  on  the  basis  of  the  oracle  as  he  
reports   it   in  Apology   that  he  had  a  mission,   and  moreover,   that   this   is  what   it  
consists   in.   Yet   considerations   of  modern   deductive   logic   are   not   the   kind   of  
worries  of  someone  who  believes  (or  at  least  presents  himself  as  believing)  that  
his   activities   have   been   divinely   commanded.21   Here   it   is   important   that   we  
                                                                                                              
20  Apol.  22a4:  ζητοῦντι  κατὰ  τὸν  θεόόν;  23b4-­‐‑7:  ἐγὼ  µμὲν  ἔτι  καὶ  νῦν  περιιὼν  ζητῶ  καὶ  ἐρευνῶ  κατὰ  
τὸν  θεὸν  καὶ  τῶν  ἀστῶν  καὶ  ξέένων  ἄν  τινα  οἴωµμαι  σοφὸν  εἶναι·∙  καὶ  ἐπειδάάν  µμοι  µμὴ  δοκῇ,  τῷ  
θεῷ   βοηθῶν   ἐνδείίκνυµμαι   ὅτι   οὐκ   ἔστι   σοφόός;   23c1:   τὴν   τοῦ   θεοῦ   λατρείίαν;   28e4-­‐‑29a4:   τοῦ   δὲ  
θεοῦ  τάάττοντος  (…)  δεινὸν  τἂν  εἴη,  (…)  ἀπειθῶν  τῇ  µμαντείίᾳ;  29d3-­‐‑4:  πείίσοµμαι  µμᾶλλον  τῷ  θεῷ  ἢ  
ὑµμῖν;   30a5   κελεύύει   ὁ   θεόός;   furthermore   30e3-­‐‑31a1   (Socrates   has   been   placed   by   the   god   on   the  
cumbrous  horse  of  the  polis),  and  33c4-­‐‑7:  προστέέτακται  ὑπὸ  τοῦ  θεοῦ  πράάττειν  καὶ  ἐκ  µμαντείίων  
καὶ   ἐξ   ἐνυπνίίων   καὶ   παντὶ   τρόόπῳ   ᾧπέέρ   τις   ποτε   καὶ   ἄλλη   θείία   µμοῖρα   ἀνθρώώπῳ   καὶ   ὁτιοῦν  
προσέέταξε  πράάττειν.  
21  Many   interpreters  have  considered  Socrates’   interpretation  of   the  oracle  debatable.  This   ignores  
the   fact   that   from   Socrates’   perspective,   his   mission   is   not   his   personal   (and   hence   contestable)  
interpretation  of   the  oracle,   but  what   the  oracle,   truly  and  objectively,  meant.  No   claim   to  having  
received   a   divine   command  would   survive   the   scrutiny   of   logical   consistency.   In   terms   of   strict  
logic,   Socrates’   elenctic   activities   can   of   course   in   no   way   be   deduced   from   the   oracle.   Some  
commentators   have—naturally,   in   vain—tried   to   reconstrue   how   Socrates   could   have   concluded  
from  the  wording  of  the  oracle  that  he  had  a  mission,  see  e.g.  BRICKHOUSE  &  SMITH  (1983),  KRAUT  
(1984),  270-­‐‑274,  BRICKHOUSE  &  SMITH  (1989),  88,  n.  67;  REEVE  (1989),  22-­‐‑28;  STOKES  (1992),  especially  
29-­‐‑42;  MCPHERRAN  (2002);  DOYLE  (2004).  An  overview  of  the  discussion  and  literature  is  given  by  
BRICKHOUSE  &  SMITH  (1983),  657-­‐‑658  nn.  1-­‐‑4;  also  by  MCPHERRAN  (2002),  118-­‐‑120,  nn.  11  and  12.  In  
(2002)  MCPHERRAN   readdressed   the   problem   of   “how   exactly   Socrates   derived   from   the   Pythia’s  
report  a  command  to  do  philosophy”  (120)  by  providing  an  analysis  along  logical  lines.  He  argues  
that  Socrates  had  a  pious  commitment   to  philosophy  prior   to   the  oracle,  which   is   the  reason  why  
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accept  Socrates’  claims;  from  his  point  of  view,  this  is  what  the  oracle  means.  It  
means  that   the  god  is   truly  wise   (τὸ  δὲ  κινδυνεύύει  (…)  τῷ  ὄντι  ὁ  θεὸς  σοφὸς  
εἶναι)   and   that   his   life’s   assignment   is   to   “assist   the   god”   (βοηθῶν   τῷ   θεῷ,  
23b7).22   The   god   thereby   becomes   the   ultimate   authority   for   Socrates’  
announcement  to  speak  the  truth.  His  claim  in  the  exordium  that  his  λόόγος  will  
be  the  whole  truth  (πᾶσα  ἀλήήθεια)  now  appears  not  to  be  his  own  λόόγος,  but  
the  λόόγος  of  the  god.23  It  may  be  worth  noting  that  he  never  makes  explicit  who  
this  god  is.  The  natural   inference,   that   is   left   to  his  audience  to  draw,  is  that  ὁ  
θεόός  is  “the  god  of  Delphi”  (τὸν  θεὸν  τὸν  ἐν  Δελφοῖς,  20e8);  for  that  is  the  only  
god  identified.    
   The  oracle  narrative  underpins  the  claim  that  Socrates’  loyalty  rests  with  
a   different   party   than   the  Athenians,   and   that   there   exist   interests   other   than  
those   which   they   recognize,   even   though,   at   the   same   time,   his   mission  
ultimately  serves  the  interest  of  the  polis.  It  is  from  the  perspective  of  his  belief  
in  a  divine  assignment   that  Socrates’  conviction   feels   to  him   like  a   triumph:   if  
the  jury  will  prohibit  him  to  perform  the  service  of  the  god,  death  is,  under  the  
given  circumstances,  the  best  prospect.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
“he  is  being  used  by  the  god  as  a  paradigm”  (139);  cf.  DOYLE  (2004)  for  a  similar  reading  of  Socrates  
being   used   by   the   god   as   paradigm.   Others   have   argued   that   Socrates   had   already   started   to  
examine  people  prior  to  the  oracle,  and  in  fact  had  (also)  more  rational  motivations;  see  in  particular  
VLASTOS   (1991),   chapter   4,   and   cf.   NUSSBAUM’s   (1985)   ironical   reading   of   the   daimonion.   SLINGS  
(1994),  80-­‐‑81,  is  concerned  with  the  historical  origins  of  Socrates’  philosophical  activity  and  argues  
that,  although  Plato’s  literary  narrative  “creates  the  impression”  that  the  oracle  is  its  starting  point,  
Plato  “never  asserts”  that  it  was  (81,  italics  in  original).  MCPHERRAN  (1996)  addresses  worries  about  
how  “Socrates’  acceptance  of  extrarational  indicators”  can  be  reconciled  with  his  “profound  respect  
for  rational  justification”  (quotations  from  [2002],  119).  SLINGS  (1994)  rightly  notes  that  the  effect  of  
is  cumulative:  “Socrates  corroborates  divine  instructions  or  suggestions  with  motivations  based  on  
his   own   reasoning”   (186,   see   also   81-­‐‑82,   153,   197).   That   Socrates   juxtaposes   reason   and   divinity  
should  not  surprise  us:  for  association  of  reason  to  the  divine,  we  may  compare  numerous  instances  
in  the  Platonic  corpus,  e.g.  Resp.  500d1-­‐‑2,  518d11-­‐‑e2,  590d1-­‐‑4.  Compare  also  the  end  of  Crito,  where,  
after  the  speech  of  Laws,  instead  of  ὁ  θεόός  we  would  have  expected  ὁ  λόόγος.  
22  Apol.  23a5-­‐‑7.      
23  Apol.   20e5-­‐‑6:   οὐ  γὰρ   ἐµμὸν   ἐρῶ  τὸν  λόόγον  ὃν  ἂν  λέέγω,  ἀλλ   εἰς  ἀξιόόχρεων  ὑµμῖν   τὸν  λέέγοντα  
ἀνοίίσω.  
APOLOGY ,   CRITO ,   REPUBL IC   54  
2.1.3   Socrates’  daimonion  
Socrates’  private   conduct   is   yet   another   inversion  of   conventions,   this   time  of  
what  would  logically  be  expected  from  an  Athenian  citizen.  On  the  one  hand,  
Socrates   tests   the   individual   convictions   of   his   fellow   citizens   (thus   making  
himself   in   their  eyes  guilty  of  πολυπραγµμοσύύνη);  on   the  other  hand,  he  does  
not  engage  in  political  affairs  (which  is  incompatible  with  the  Athenian  ideal  of  
active   citizenship).24   It   is   in   the   context   of   his   aloofness   from   politics   that  
Socrates  introduces  another  deity:  his  divine  sign.  He  describes  this  divine  sign  
as  “something  divine  and  supernatural”  (θεῖόόν  τι  καὶ  δαιµμόόνιον)  which  arose  
in   his   childhood   (ἐκ  παιδὸς  ἀρξάάµμενον).  He   goes   on   to   speak   about   it   as   “a  
kind  of  voice”  (φωνήή  τις  γιγνοµμέένη),25  which,  when  it  occurs,  always  dissuades  
him  from  what  he  is  about  to  do  but  never  induces  him  to  something  (ἣ  ὅταν  
γέένηται   ἀεὶ   ἀποτρέέπει   µμε   τοῦτο   ὃ   ἂν   µμέέλλω   πράάττειν,   προτρέέπει   δὲ  
οὔποτε).26  Socrates  never  knows  in  advance  when  it  will  occur,  it  simply  keeps  
him  from  doing  what  he  is  about  to  do.  It   is  this  divine  sign  that  has  opposed  
Socrates’   engaging   in   politics   (ἐναντιοῦται   τὰ   πολιτικὰ   πράάττειν).   We   hear  
why  it  was  a  good  thing  that  it  did  so,  Apol.  31e1-­‐‑32a3:    
οὐ  γὰρ  ἔστιν  ὅστις  ἀνθρώώπων  σωθήήσεται  οὔτε  ὑµμῖν  οὔτε  ἄλλῳ  πλήήθει  
οὐδενὶ   γνησίίως   ἐναντιούύµμενος   καὶ   διακωλύύων   πολλὰ   ἄδικα   καὶ  
                                                                                                              
24  Apol.  31c4-­‐‑7.  Cf.  SLINGS  (1994),  151,  for  the  idea  of  refraining  from  πολυπραγµμοσύύνη,  drawing  on  
Pericles’  Funeral  Oration.  
25  Apol.   31c7-­‐‑d3.   The   daimonion   is   referred   to   in   other   Platonic   texts   as   well   (Phdr.   242b8-­‐‑9;   Tht.  
151a4),   but   always   to   explain   Socrates’   personal   motivation,   never   in   order   to   advance   the  
dialectical   argument.   In  Phdr.   242c1-­‐‑3,   Socrates   reports   that,  when  he  was   just   about   to   cross   the  
river,  his  habitual  divine  sign  happened  to  him:  τὸ  δαιµμόόνιόόν  τε  καὶ  τὸ  εἰωθὸς  σηµμεῖον,  which  ἀεὶ  
δέέ  µμε  ἐπίίσχει  ὃ  ἂν  µμέέλλω  πράάττειν.  Here,   as   in  Apology,   he  describes   it   as   a  voice:   τινα  φωνὴν  
ἔδοξα  αὐτόόθεν  ἀκοῦσαι,  ἥ  µμε  οὐκ  ἐᾷ  ἀπιέέναι  πρὶν  ἂν  ἀφοσιώώσοµμαι,  ὥς  δήή  τι  ἡµμαρτήήκοτα  εἰς  τὸ  
θεῖον,  “I  thought  I  heard  a  voice  coming  from  this  very  spot,  forbidding  me  to  leave  until  I  made  
atonement  for  some  offense  against  the  gods”  (transl.  NEHAMAS  &  WOODRUFF  in  COOPER,  CW).  In  
Tht.  151a2-­‐‑5  the  sign  sometimes  prevents  Socrates  to  associate  with  those  who  have,  after  previous  
association   with   him,   left   his   company   sooner   than   they   ought   to   have,   and   have   returned   to  
wicked   company   (πονηρὰν  συνουσίίαν),   yet   now  wish   to   renew   their   association  with  him:   οὓς,  
ὅταν   πάάλιν   ἔλθωσι   δεόόµμενοι   τῆς   ἐµμῆς   συνουσίίας   καὶ   θαυµμαστὰ   δρῶντες,   ἐνίίοις   µμὲν   τὸ  
γιγνόόµμενόόν  µμοι  δαιµμόόνιον  ἀποκωλύύει  συνεῖναι,  ἐνίίοις  δὲ  ἐᾷ  (…).  
26  Apol.  31d4-­‐‑5;  also  31d6  and  31e3;  cf.  ἀποτρέέπει,  31d1-­‐‑2.  
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παράάνοµμα   ἐν   τῇ   πόόλει   γίίγνεσθαι,   ἀλλ’   ἀναγκαῖόόν   ἐστι   τὸν   τῷ   ὄντι  
µμαχούύµμενον   ὑπὲρ   τοῦ   δικαίίου,   καὶ   εἰ   µμέέλλει   ὀλίίγον   χρόόνον  
σωθήήσεσθαι,  ἰδιωτεύύειν  ἀλλὰ  µμὴ  δηµμοσιεύύειν.  
It   is   impossible   for  any  man   to  be  spared   if  he   truly  opposes  you  or  any  
other   democratic   majority,   and   prevents  many   unjust   and   illegal   things  
from  occurring  in  his  city.  He  who  intends  to  truly  fight  for  what  is  just,  if  
he   is   to   be   spared   even   for   a   little   time,  must   of   necessity   live   a   private  
rather  than  a  public  life.  (Transl.  ALLEN,  adapted)  
Here   the   looming   conflict   between   society   and   true   justice  becomes  apparent.  
The  idea  of   justice  (τὸ  δίίκαιον),  for  which  he  has  been  fighting,  sets  him  apart  
from   the   rest   of   society.27   Once  more   Socrates   emphasizes   that   he   speaks   the  
truth  (λέέγοντι  τἀληθῆ,  31e1):  anyone  who  is  a  champion  of  justice  like  himself  
will   be   forced   to   oppose   the  mass   on  many   occasions,   if   he  wants   to   prevent  
“many   unjust   and   illegal   things”   (πολλὰ   ἄδικα   καὶ   παράάνοµμα,   31e4).28   The  
mass   eliminates  whosoever  dares   to  oppose   its  wishes.29  To  avoid   these   risks,  
which  would  certainly  have  led  to  a  premature  death,  his  alternative  campaign  
for  justice  is  to  practise  dialectics.    
   We  further  hear   that  Socrates’  daimonion   (this   time  called  ἡ  εἰωθυῖάά  µμοι  
µμαντικὴ  ἡ  τοῦ  δαιµμονίίου)  has  always  been  rather  frequent  (πάάνυ  πυκνήή)  and  
obstructed  him  especially  in  quite  trivial  matters  (καὶ  πάάνυ  ἐπὶ  σµμικροῖς).30  But  
in  this  matter,  it  did  not:  it  has  not  obstructed  him  when  he  left  his  house  in  the  
morning,   nor  when   he   appeared   before   the   court,   nor   has   it   opposed   him   in  
some  part  of  his  speech,  on  the  brink  of  a  particular  statement  he  was  about  to  
                                                                                                              
27  Apol.  19a6,  35c2-­‐‑4;  cf.  Crit.  47c9-­‐‑11,  d4-­‐‑5,  47e6-­‐‑48a1,  a7-­‐‑10,  b8-­‐‑9,  c6-­‐‑d5.  
28   Some   commentators   have   denied   that   the   daimonion   is   a  moral   force:   BURNET   ad   40a5;   TAYLOR  
(1954),   46   (“It   had   nothing   to   do  with   right   and  wrong,   and   is   never   appealed   to,   in   any   of   the  
accounts  of   it,  on  points  of  moral  conduct,  but  amounts  to  a  sort  of   ‘uncanny’   flair   for  bad  luck”);  
SLINGS  (1994),  154  (see  for  more  references  n.  7  ibid.);  STOKES  (1997),  8.  Such  evaluations  seem  hard  
to  comprehend  in  the  light  of  statements  of  the  kind  that  the  daimonion  withheld  Socrates  when  on  
the  verge  of  doing  something  wrong  (εἴ  τι  µμέέλλοιµμι  µμὴ  ὀρθῶς  πράάξειν,  40a6).  
29  SLINGS   (1994)  concludes   from  Socrates’  addition  of  παράάνοµμα   (i.e.  Athenian   law)   to  ἄδικα   that  
the  δῆµμος  “was  intolerant  of  any  restriction  on  its  freedom  to  act  as  it  pleased,  even  of  self-­‐‑imposed  
restrictions”   (157);   see   the   references   in   SLINGS   ibid.,   n.   12.   The   readiness   to   recall   even   its   own  
decrees  implicitly  emphasizes  the  fickleness  of  the  δῆµμος.  
30  Apol.  40a4-­‐‑5.  Cf.  40b1:  τὸ  τοῦ  θεοῦ  σηµμεῖον,  “the  sign  of  the  god”.  
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make.31  This  implies  a  discrepancy  between  what  may  seem  important  (but  what  
in  fact  is  not—one’s  life),  and  what,  from  a  conventional  perspective,  may  seem  
trivial,  but  in  fact  is  not.  
   On   comparison,   the   oracle   and   the   daimonion   serve   the   same   rhetorical  
purpose:   they   act   formally   as   the   authorities   to   which   Socrates   attributes   his  
unconventional—just—mode  of  life.  The  daimonion  and  oracle  point  in  the  same  
direction,  but  do  not  have  the  same  amount  of  precision.  Nor  are  their  effects  on  
the   audience   identical.   Whereas   the   daimonion   is   an   internal   and   somewhat  
indeterminate   moral   intuition   on   an   ad   hoc   basis,   the   oracle   is   an   external  
authority  and  a  response  to  a  concrete  case.  The  oracle  and  θεόός  represent  a  less  
ambiguous   and   contestable   source   of   authority   than   the   daimonion:   they   give  
Socrates’   critical   behaviour   an   aura   of   inevitability.   Moreover,   the   fact   that  
Socrates  was  charged  with  a   failure   to  honour   the  gods  may  contribute   to   the  
piquancy   of   Socrates’   appeal   to   the   oracle   and   ὁ   θεόός.   To   the   Athenian  
audience,  an  appeal  to  the  daimonion  would  probably  have  been  less  effective  to  
justify   his   conduct   than   referring   to   the   more   conventional   authority   of   the  
oracle  of  Delphi,  which  moreover  can  be  proved  right  by  critical  examination.32  
The  oracle/θεόός  justifies  the  elenctic  examinations,  and  his  conduct  towards  his  
fellow   citizens.   The   daimonion   is   a   (φωνὴ)   µμαντικήή,   a   voice   of   divine  
                                                                                                              
31  Apol.  40a8-­‐‑b3:  ἐµμοὶ  δὲ  οὔτε  ἐξιόόντι  ἕωθεν  οἴκοθεν  ἠναντιώώθη  τὸ  τοῦ  θεοῦ  σηµμεῖον,  οὔτε  ἡνίίκα  
ἀνέέβαινον   ἐνταυθοῖ   ἐπὶ   τὸ   δικαστήήριον,   οὔτε   ἐν   τῷ   λόόγῳ   οὐδαµμοῦ   µμέέλλοντίί   τι   ἐρεῖν.   In   this  
context,   ἀνέέβαινον   is   not   to   be   interpreted,  with  ALLEN   (1984),   as   “when   I   came   up   here   to   the  
courtroom”,  but  as  “I  appeared  (before  the  court)”  see  SLINGS  (1994)  ad  loc.  
32   I   do   not   see   how   SLINGS   (1994),   154   can   conclude:   “the   ‘sign’   has   nothing   to   do   (…)  with   the  
mission   which   is   entrusted   to   Socrates   by   the   god”.   MCPHERRAN   (1991)   distinguishes   between  
“elenctic   testing”   and   “extrarational   signification”   and   takes   Xenophon   as   an   hypothesis   for   a  
reconciliation   between   these   two   “sources   of   conviction”   (348):   “Xenophon   (…)   suggests   that  
Socrates   thought   that   these  were   two   distinct   avenues   of   inquiry,   each   appropriate   to   somewhat  
disparate   subject   matters   (Mem.   1.1.6-­‐‑9)“.   The   daimonion   is   a   species   of   mantikê:   “reasonable  
prediction  lies  beyond  the  power  of  human  reason”  (354),  MCPHERRAN  refers  to  Apol.  31d  and  Xen.  
Mem.  1.1.6-­‐‑9,  4.3.12:  “how  or  why  it  is  that  the  result  of  his  obedience  will  be  good-­‐‑producing  is,  like  
many  future  events,  opaque  to  reasoned  calculation”  (356).  See  for  literature  on  the  daimonion  ibid.,  
n.  22,  353-­‐‑354.    
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inspiration,  not  an  articulate  proposition:   this   explains  why,   in   contrast   to   the  
oracle,  Socrates  does  not  subject  the  daimonion  to  an  elenctic  procedure.    
   The  accumulation  of  signs—of  the  god  (ὑπὸ  τοῦ  θεοῦ),  from  oracles  (ἐκ  
µμαντείίων33),   from   dreams   (ἐξ   ἐνυπνίίων),   and   especially   their   explicit  
presentation   as   specific   instances   of   the   more   general   category   of   divine  
communication34  (the  way  in  which  θείία  µμοῖρα  may  communicate  its  will  to  a  
human  being35)—is  a  token  of  Socrates’  belief  in  his  divine  mission.  To  someone  
thus   convinced,   the   exact   form   in  which   the   divine   communication  manifests  
itself,  is  of  secondary  importance.          
  
2.1.4     Conclusion  
In   this   section,   we   have   analyzed   how   the   Socrates   of   Apology   in   a   forensic  
context  presents  his  loyalty  to  a  norm  different  from  the  conventional  one.  The  
circumstances  force  him  to  adopt  a  mode  of  speech  unlike  his  habitual  one.  His  
                                                                                                              
33  SCHANZ  ad  loc.  attributes  the  accumulation  of  divine  signals  to  the  strength  of  Socrates’  conviction  
“von   seinem   Beruf”,   but   considers   the   plural   µμαντείίων   a   rhetorical   exaggeration:   “Rhetorisch  
übertreibend   sagt   Sokrates,   dass   alle   nur   denkbaren   Arten   der   Offenbarung   ihm   seinen   Beruf  
vorgezeichnet   haben.”   STOKES   ad   loc.   supposes   that   Plato   “is   here   piling   fiction   on   fiction   in   the  
interests  of  rhetorical  force”.  
34   Apol.   33c6-­‐‑7:   καὶ   παντὶ   τρόόπῳ   ᾧπέέρ   τίίς   ποτε   καὶ   ἄλλη   θείία   µμοῖρα   ἀνθρώώπῳ   καὶ   ὁτιοῦν  
προσέέταξε  πράάττειν.  Some  interpreters  have  considered  Socrates’  appeals  to  divinity  examples  of  
Socratic  irony,  e.g.  NUSSBAUM  (1985);  VLASTOS  (1991),  ch.  4;  more  recently  LEIBOWITZ  (2010).  But  this  
is  of  course  what  Socrates  fears  that  the  jury  will  think  when  he  motivates  why  it  is  not  option  to  live  
a  quiet  life  by  saying  that  he  will  in  that  case  “disobey  the  god”  (τῷ  θεῷ  ἀπείίθειν,  37e6).  As  SLINGS  
(1994)   explains,   this   is   the   view   of   those   who   think   that   Socrates   spoke   about   the   oracle   ὡς  
εἰρωνευόόµμενος  (Apol.  38a1):  “the  jurors  will  not  accept  this  motivation  and  think  it  a  mere  pretext:  
as   they  see   it,  Socrates  had  made   this  choice   [make  philosophy  his  calling]  because   it   suited  him,  
and  he  should  not  now  try  to  avoid  his  rsponsibility  by  invoking  a  divine  command”  (197).  But,  as  I  
argue  here,  Socrates’  reference  to  ὁ  θεόός  serves  the  opposite  goal:  to  claim  full  responsibility  for  his  
philosophical  activities.  
35   STOKES   ad   loc.   notes   that   a   “divine   dispensation,   θείία   µμοῖρα,   does   not   normally   give   orders;  
orders  come  from  a  god  (…[ref.  to  33c5]);  (…)  Pl.  sometimes  uses  the  phrase  ‘divine  dispensation’  to  
denote  the  means  whereby  poets  and  prophets  arrive  at  the  truths  they  utter  without  knowledge.”  
In  the  Meno,  the  course  of  the  argument  points  to  the  conclusion  that  virtue  does  not  come  to  one  by  
nature  or  teaching,  but  by  divine  dispensation,  without  insight,  Men.  99e5-­‐‑100a1:  ἀρετὴ  ἂν  εἴη  οὔτε  
φύύσει  οὔτε  διδακτόόν,  ἀλλὰ  θείίᾳ  µμοῖρᾳ  παραγιγνοµμέένη  ἄνευ  νοῦ  οἷς  ἂν  παραγίίγνεται;  cf.  Men.  
100b2-­‐‑4.  The  phrase  θείία  µμοῖρα  supports  Socrates’  impression  that  his  mission  was  imposed  upon  
him  by  an  agency  beyond  his  control.  On  θείία  µμοῖρα  see  also  chapter  six,  p.  226.  
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interpretation   of   rhetoric   as   “truthful   speech”   aligns   it   with   dialectic’s  
hypothesis   that   there   exists   a  moral   truth.   The   goal   of   this   true   rhetoric   is,   in  
contrast   to   the   usual   forensic   oratory,   completely   detached   from   his   own  
person.  His  own  speech  effectively  isolates  him  from  his  fellow  Athenians  and  
their   misdirected   concerns.   The   Athenian   court   and   citizens   are   not   those   to  
whom  he  is  answerable,  even  though  his  philosophical  ἔλεχγος  has  ultimately  
been   in   the   service   of   the   city.  He   is   only   answerable   to   “the   god”   in  whose  
service  he  has  tried,  as  well  as  he  could  given  the  circumstances,  to  live  his  life.  
This   higher   cause   has   been   imposed   upon   him   via   several   divine   channels.  
Whereas   the  god   is  presented  as   the  origin  of  his  conduct,   the  daimonion   is   its  
legitimation  in  terms  of  Socrates’  own  intuition:  it  has  shown  him  the  only  way  
open   to   him   to   fight   for   justice   in   the   context   of   a   society   with   a   radically  
different  moral  orientation  than  his  own.    
   In  Crito,   the   circumstances   are   very   different.   Socrates   is   not   forced   to  
isolate  himself.  Crito  is  the  second  Platonic  text  on  justice  to  which  we  will  now  
turn.  The  Socrates  we  encounter  there  is  a  convicted  Socrates,  who  has,   in  one  
sense,  triumphed  (because  he  has  secured  for  himself  what  he  saw  as  the  only  
justified  option  under  the  circumstances,  namely  death);  yet,  in  a  different  way,  
it  is  also  a  Socrates  who  has  failed,  since  in  the  end  he  was  unable  to  convince  
his   fellow   citizens   of   the   truth.  Crito   portrays   a   Socrates  who   has   to   face   the  
practical  consequence  of  his  failure  to  unmask  the  political  system  as  unjust.  
  
  
2 . 2       Cr i to :    So c ra t e s   un jus t ly    conv i c t ed   
2.2.1   Introduction:  the  relation  between  Apology  and  Crito  
The   Socrates   of  Crito   displays   a   very   different   attitude   towards   the  Athenian  
court  and  laws  than  the  Socrates  of  Apology.  Whereas  the  latter  announced  that  
he   would   disobey   the   court   were   its   verdict   that   he   should   terminate   his  
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philosophical   activities,   the   former   submits   to   the   court’s   verdict.   Moreover,  
instead  of   asserting   that   his   loyalty   lies   elsewhere,   in  Crito  he   impersonates   a  
speech  by   the  Athenian   laws   insisting  on  his  obligation   to   remain   loyal   to   the  
Athenian  city  and  its  laws,  and  respect  their  integrity.  His  obedience  to  the  very  
same   court   and   society   which   he   defied   in   Apology   raises   problems   of  
consistency:  how  can  one  explain  Socrates’  apparent  change  of  attitude  and  his  
adherence  to  different  authorities?36  Why  does  Plato  have  him  impersonate  the  
Athenian   laws   as   the   authority   to   which   Socrates   owes   obedience—why   does  
Plato   not,   for   instance,   have   Socrates   attribute   his   refusal   to   escape   to   the  
daimonion,  in  which  case  the  inconsistency  would  have  been  avoided?  
   The  present  section  will   investigate  how  Socrates  motivates  his  conduct  
in   Crito   and   present   a   fresh   reading   of   the   Laws’   speech   in   its   dramatic,  
dialogical   context.   Since   inconsistency   is   not   to   be   expected  of   Socrates   in   the  
light   of   what   we   hear   about   him   both   in   Crito   and   elsewhere   (where   he   is  
repeatedly  made  to  emphasize  consistency  in  one’s  attitude  between  words  and  
deeds,  and  between  one’s  deeds  as  a  characteristic  of  the  virtuous  person),  and  
since  we  have  every  reason  to  expect  that  Plato  envisaged  to  present  Socrates’  
attitude   to   his   conviction   as   consistent,   a   reading   that   makes   the   figure   of  
Socrates  in  both  texts  mutually  consistent  is  preferable.    
   The   first   aspect   that   is   worth   noting   is   that   the   composition   and  
communicative  setting  of  Crito  are  more  complex  than  those  of  Apology:  Crito  is  
a   dialogue   between   Socrates   and   his   friend   Crito,   in   which   Socrates  
impersonates  the  Athenian  laws  in  a  speech  that  is  designed  to  persuade  Crito.  
                                                                                                              
36   There   is   an   enormous   amount   of   literature   on   this   issue.   One   explanation   put   forward  
distinguishes  between  the  Athenian  court  on  the  one  hand  and  the   laws  on  the  other,  and  argues  
that  Socrates’  profession  of  disobedience  in  Apology  concerns  only  the  former.  See  e.g.  KRAUT  (1984),  
OBER  (2005),  406.  Cri.  50b2-­‐‑5  and  b7-­‐‑8,  however,  do  not  warrant  such  a  distinction,  as  the  Laws  (and  
therefore  Socrates)  explicity  put  the  δίίκαι  on  equal  footing  with  the  laws.  A  similar  explanation  is  
SLINGS  (1994),  arguing  that  Socrates  in  Apology  merely  refuses  to  agree  to  a  proposed  compromise  
that  is  not  “provided  for  by  the  law  nor  suggested  by  a  legal  authority  acting  within  the  limits  of  its  
competence”  and  does  “not  question  the  state’s  authority,  whether  manifested  in  the  provisions  of  
the  law  or  the  injunctions  of  a  magistrate”  (158).  
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In  Crito,  Socrates  engages  in  dialectic  as  his  usual  mode  of  speech.  The  fact  that  
Socrates  does  not  appeal  to  his  daimonion  here  may  be  understood  as  prompted  
by  the  change  in  setting:  Crito  does  not  have  access  to  Socrates’  personal  divine  
voice,  and  at  the  same  time,  it  is  in  Crito  not  Socrates’  purpose  to  isolate  himself  
from   his   audience.   Within   this   dialectical   framework,   the   authority   of   the  
daimonion  cannot  be  accounted  for.  After  the  speech  of  the  Laws,  Socrates,  in  his  
own  person,  adds  that  the  sound  (αὕτη  ἡ  ἠχήή)  of  these  logoi  “buzzes”  (βοµμβεῖ)  
in  his  ears  and  makes  it  impossible  for  him  to  hear  anything  else—he  is  just  as  
unable   to   ignore   the   arguments   marshalled   by   the   Laws   as   his   daimonion   in  
Apology.37  Instead  of  to  his  daimonion,  Socrates,  within  this  setting,  appeals  to  the  
Laws  of  Athens  as  authority.  How  does  he  motivate  that  appeal?  
   First,   we   should   be   clear   about   the   setting   of   Crito   and   its   differences  
from   the   setting   of   Apology.   As   in   Phaedo,   Socrates   in   Crito   is   engaged   in   a  
discussion  with  people  who  wish  him  well.  In  Phaedo  he  converses  with  a  group  
of  intimates,  in  Crito  with  his  elderly  friend  Crito,  who  in  fact  speaks  on  behalf  
of  all  of  his  φίίλοι.   It   is   therefore  a   friendly  rather   than  a  hostile  audience   that  
Socrates   addresses   in  Crito.  As  good  φίίλοι   ought,   at   least   according   to  public  
expectations,38  Socrates’   friends  have   repeatedly  urged  Socrates   to  accept   their  
offer   to   help   him   escape   from   prison.   His   refusal   to   accept   this   offer  
compromises   their   good   reputation,   since   people   who   do   not   know   what  
happened  will  assume  that  his  friends  have  failed  to  live  up  to  the  expectations  
of   good  φίίλοι,   and   have   valued   the  money   needed   to   bribe   the   guards  more  
than  their  friend;  no  sensible  person  will  actually  believe  that  Socrates  himself  
was  unwilling   to   flee,   and   that   he   ignored   the   actual   arrangements   that  were  
made  to  smuggle  him  out  of  prison  and  the  repeated  injunctions  of  his  friends.39    
                                                                                                              
37  Cri.  54d2-­‐‑6.  
38  On  the  popular  moral  creed  of  “helping  friends,  harming  enemies”  in  classical  Athens,  see  VAN  
BERKEL  [diss.  Leiden  2012],  13,  nn.  69,  71,  73,  with  literature;  DOVER  (1974),  180.  
39  Cri.  44b9-­‐‑c5;  45d8-­‐‑46a2.    
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   The  speech  of  the  Laws  impersonated  in  the  conversation  with  Crito  may  
therefore  be  read  as  an  apology  for  Socrates’   friends.  Socrates  has  to  explain  to  
his  friends  in  the  person  of  Crito  that  to  save  him  does  not,  contrary  to  popular  
morality,  constitute  helping  a  friend.    
  
2.2.2   The  speech  of  the  Laws    
It   is   at   a   critical   point   in   the   dialogue   that   Socrates   brings   in   the   Laws   as  
speakers:  when  Crito  is  unable  to  answer  his  friend  when  Socrates  applies  the  
outcome   of   the   discussion   so   far   to   his   present   dilemma.40   The   Laws’   speech  
consists,  essentially,  of  two  arguments.  The  first  is  the  importance  of  refraining  
from  doing  injustice  (µμὴ  ἀδικεῖν),  including  doing  injustice  by  way  of  requiting  
injustice   (µμὴ   ἀνταδικεῖν).41   The   second   argument   is   rooted   in   the   dialectical  
notion  of  “agreement”  (ὁµμολογίία).42  Both  arguments  are  anticipated  in  the  first,  
dialogic  half  of  Crito.  In  the  first  part  of  the  dialogue,  Crito  has  given  his  assent  
(as  he  often  has   in   the  past43)   to   the  proposition  δεῖ  µμὴ  ἀδικεῖν   (including  µμὴ  
ἀνταδικεῖν),44  and  to  the  proposition  that  it   is   just  to  meet  one’s  commitments  
(or,   conversely,   that   dishonouring   one’s   commitments   is   ἀδικεῖν).45   Since   in  
Crito   it   is   Crito   who   has   to   be   persuaded   (this   is   the   immediate   rhetorical  
                                                                                                              
40  Cri.  49e9-­‐‑50a3:  Ἐκ  τούύτων  δὴ  ἄθρει.  ἀπιόόντες  ἐνθέένδε  ἡµμεῖς  µμὴ  πείίσαντες  τὴν  πόόλιν  πόότερον  
κακῶς   τινας   ποιοῦµμεν,   καὶ   ταῦτα   οὓς   ἥκιστα   δεῖ,   ἢ   οὔ;   καὶ   ἐµμµμέένοµμεν   οἷς   ὡµμολογήήσαµμεν  
δικαίίοις  οὖσιν  ἢ  οὔ;  “See  what   follows   from   this:   if  we   leave  here  without  having  convinced   the  
city,   are   we   harming   those   whom   we   should   least   do   harm   to?   And   are   we   sticking   to   a   just  
agreement,  or  not?”  (transl.  GRUBE,  adapted).  
41  Cri.  50a8-­‐‑51c5.  
42  Cri.  51c6-­‐‑54b2.  
43  Cri.  49a6-­‐‑7.  
44  Cri.  49a4-­‐‑e4.  
45   Cri.   49e5-­‐‑7.   Some   interpreters   have   found   a   notion   of   justice   in   the   speech   of   the   Laws   not  
subscribed  to  by  Socrates.  SCHOFIELD  (2007),  157  sees  a  parallel  between  the  argument  of  the  Laws  
in  Crito   and  Socrates’   argument   in  Republic   to  make   the  philosophers  go  back   into   the   cave:  both  
concern  “how  to  persuade  the  individual  to  do  something  required  by  the  good  of  the  city.  In  each  
case  the  considerations  put  forward  in  favor  are  drawn  not  from  the  deeper  resources  of  Socratic  or  
Platonic  philosophy  but  from  more  popular  discourse”  (158);  cf.  “[t]he  laws  [in  Crito]  appeal  for  the  
most  part  to  Simonidean  justice”  (157).    
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purpose  of   the  Laws’  speech),46   it   is  understandable   that   the  Laws’  arguments  
are   in   line  with   the   outcome   of   the   first   half   of  Crito,   and   therefore  with   the  
central  dogma  of  Socratic  philosophy.      
   The  strategy  of  the  Laws  (and  hence  of  Socrates  to  his  friend  Crito)  is  to  
present  themselves  as  Socrates’  φίίλοι  par  excellence—friends  to  whom  he  owes  
a  previous,  greater  loyalty  than  to  his  human  friends:  they  have  given  him  life,  
an  upbringing,  an  education.47  The  Laws  appeal  to  φιλίία  on  the  macro-­‐‑level,  to  
the   interest   of   the   polis   and   τὸ   κοινόόν:   what   is   at   stake   is   not   the   obligation  
between   friends   to   guarantee   each   other’s   preservation   (σωτηρίία),   but   to  
preserve  and  contribute   to   the  σωτηρίία  of   society,  which   is,   for   every  citizen,  
one’s   greatest   friend.48   The   Laws   refer   to   the   harmful   consequences   for  
themselves,  and  thus  to  the  common  interest,  and  the  fatherland  (πατρίίς49):   to  
disobey  the  δίίκη  of  the  jury  will  be  tantamount  to  overturning  the  entire  polis.50  
                                                                                                              
46  Cri.  48e3-­‐‑5.  
47  Cri.   50d1-­‐‑e4.  He  owes   to   the  Laws  his  γέένεσις   (50d1-­‐‑5);   his   τροφήή  and  παιδείία   (50d5-­‐‑e1).  The  
Laws  conclude:  ἐπειδὴ  δὲ  ἐγέένου  τε  καὶ  ἐξετράάφης  καὶ  ἐπαιδεύύθης,  ἔχοις  ἂν  εἰπεῖν  πρῶτον  µμὲν  
ὡς  οὐχὶ  ἡµμέέτερος  ἦσθα  καὶ  ἔκγονος  καὶ  δοῦλος,  αὐτόός  τε  καὶ  οἱ  σοὶ  πρόόγονοι;  For  one’s  parents  
as  one’s  φίίλοι  par  excellence,  see  VAN  BERKEL  [diss.  Leiden  2012],  108-­‐‑110;  in  Leg.  717b4-­‐‑c6,  children  
must   pay   back   to   their   parents   the   “first   and   greatest   debts”   (τὰ   πρῶτάά   τε   καὶ   µμέέγιστα  
ὀφειλήήµματα)  they  owe  them  for  the  years  of  care  (ἐπιµμελείία)  and  pain  (ὠδῖναι  παλαιαίί)  parents  
have  suffered  for  their  sake.  
48   The   analogy   between   court   and   war   substantiates   the   Laws’   claim   that   one   single   act   of  
disobedience   would   destroy   them.   The   functional   comparison   between   war   (πόόλεµμος)   and   the  
courtroom   (δικαστήήριον)  makes   sense   from   the   Laws’   perspective.  A   courtroom   is   for   laws  what   a  
battlefield  is  for  the  fatherland:  a  situation  in  which  its  preservation  is  at  stake.  For  laws,  becoming  
ἄκυροι  equals  death.  This  analogy  is  often  read  in  the  context  of  the  debate  whether  or  not  the  Laws  
allow   for  disobedience  or  not,   e.g.,  EMLYN-­‐‑JONES  ad   51a7-­‐‑c3   (p.   80),   and  KRAUT   (1984),   21.   Such  a  
reading   obscures   its   function,   witness   EMLYN-­‐‑JONES’   remark   (loc.   cit.)   that   “Plato   here   allows  
Socrates   to   slide   over   obvious   differences   between   obeying   military   orders   on   campaign   and  
obeying  the  decision  of  a  court”.    
49   The   fatherland   (ἡ   πατρίίς)   here   seems   to   be   an   emotionally   grounded   representation   of   the  
common  interest  (τὸ  κοινόόν)  in  terms  of  patriotism.    
50  Cri.  50b1-­‐‑4:  ἢ  δοκεῖ  σοι  οἷόόν  τε  ἔτι  ἐκείίνην  τὴν  πόόλιν  εἶναι  καὶ  µμὴ  ἀνατετράάφθαι,  ἐν  ᾗ  ἂν  αἱ  
γενόόµμεναι   δίίκαι   µμηδὲν   ἰσχύύωσιν   ἀλλὰ   ὑπὸ   ἰδιωτῶν   ἄκυροίί   τε   γίίγνωνται   καὶ   διαφθείίρωνται;  
Some  interpreters  consider  this  an  exaggeration.  KRAUT’s  distinction  between  “vital  and  peripheral  
laws”  ([1984],  124;  cf.  141-­‐‑142)  seems  to  spring  from  such  an  assumption,  but  misses  the  point;  from  
the   Laws’   perspective,   any   act   of   disobedience   would   be   tantamount   to   destruction   (this   is   the  
rationale  of  the  comparison  between  the  court  and  war,  see  note  48  above),  at  least  for  his  part  (τὸ  
σὸν  µμέέρος).  
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The  references   to  Socrates  ὁµμολογίία  to  obey  them  are  part  and  parcel  of   their  
self-­‐‑presentation   as   his   friends.51   Socrates   thus   pledges   loyalty   to   φιλίία   as   a  
principle,  instead  of  to  φιλίία  as  the  bond  between  individuals.  He  declares  his  
loyalty  to  an  interest  greater  than  his  own  life,  the  city  as  a  whole.  The  city  as  a  
whole  was  of  course  also  in  Apology  the  interest  his  mission  ultimately  served.  
By   appealing   to   the   strong   belief   that   one   must   refrain   from   committing  
injustice,  he  can  both  maintain  that  his  conviction  was  unjust  and  legitimize  his  
refusal  to  accept  his  friends’  offer.  
   The  famous  “convince  or  obey”  (ἢ  πείίθειν  ἢ  ποιεῖν  ἃ  ἂν  κελεύύῃ,  51b3-­‐‑4;  
52a2-­‐‑3)   argument   of   the   Laws   is   part   of   the   argument   from  φιλίία.   The   Laws  
offer  Socrates  two  alternatives:  “both  in  war  and  in  court  and  in  all  situations  to  
do  what   the   city   and   the   fatherland   command,   or   to   persuade   her   [πόόλις   or  
πατρίίς]  wherein   the   just   lies   by  nature”   (ᾗ   τὸ   δίίκαιον  πέέφυκε).52   Persuading  
the   Athenian   court   of   what   is   just   is   of   course   precisely   what   Socrates   had  
attempted   to  do   in  Apology   (τὸ   δίίκαιον  would   for   example  have  been   to  give  
him   the   rewards   of   an   Olympic   victor),   but   unsuccessfully   so.53   Apology  
                                                                                                              
51  Drawing  on  the  notion  of  “agreement”,  ὁµμολογίία,  the  Laws  claim  that  Socrates’  famous  refusal  to  
leave  Athens  is  a  token  of  his  loyalty  to  them:  he  approved  of  the  laws  and  of  the  way  they  regulate  
society  (a  ὁµμολογίία  “in  deed”  (ἔργῳ)  to  abide  by  them,  ὡµμολογήήσας  ἡµμῖν  πείίσεσθαι,  51e6).  Cri.  
51d1-­‐‑53a7.   Especially   51e1-­‐‑4:   ὃς   δ᾿   ἂν   ὑµμῶν   παραµμείίνῃ,   ὁρῶν   ὃν   τρόόπον   ἡµμεῖς   τάάς   τε   δίίκας  
δικάάζοµμεν  καὶ  τἆλλα  τὴν  πόόλιν  διοικοῦµμεν,  ἤδη  φαµμὲν  τοῦτον  ὡµμολογηκέέναι  ἔργῳ  ἡµμῖν  ἃ  ἂν  
ἡµμεῖς  κελεύύωµμεν  ποιήήσειν  ταῦτα,  (…).  “But  we  say  that  whoever  of  you  stays  here,  seeing  how  we  
administer   justice   and   how   we   govern   the   state   in   other   respects,   has   thereby   entered   into   an  
agreement  with  us  to  do  what  we  command;  (…)”  (transl.  FOWLER).  Had  he  found  the  laws  not  to  
his  liking,  he  has  had  ample  opportunity  (ἐξουσίία)  to  move  to  any  other  city  of  his  choice,  Cri.  51c9-­‐‑
e1.  It  is  especially  interesting  that  the  Laws  here  are  made  to  mention  Crete  and  Sparta—the  island  
of  Cleinias  and  city  of  Megillus  in  the  Laws  respectively—as  those  cities  Socrates  always  was  saying  
had  good  laws  (ἃς  δὴ  ἑκάάστοτε  φῄς  εὐνοµμεῖσθαι),  Cri.  52e5-­‐‑53a1.  
52  Cri.   51b8-­‐‑c1:  ἀλλὰ  καὶ  ἐν  πολέέµμῳ  καὶ  ἐν  δικαστηρίίῳ  καὶ  πανταχοῦ  ποιητέέον  ἃ  ἂν  κελεύύῃ  ἡ  
πόόλις  καὶ  ἡ  πατρίίς,  ἢ  πείίθειν  αὐτὴν  ᾗ  τὸ  δίίκαιον  πέέφυκε.  Cf.  51c1  and  51e7-­‐‑52a3.    
53  In  Apology  he  attributes  his  failure  to  convince  to  a  lack  of  time:  had  the  law  given  him  more  time  
for  his  defense,  he  would  surely  have  convinced  them,  see  p.  47,  n.  4  above.  The  implication  seems  
to  be  that,  had  he  been  given  the  opportunity  to  engage  with  members  of   the   jury   in  a  dialectical  
conversation,  he  would  have  persuaded  them.  But  under  Athenian  law  this  is  not  possible.  This  is  
yet   another  problem   for   the   just   individual,  who  may  have   to  be   forced   to  defend  himself  under  
circumstances  that  force  him  to  adopt  a  less  than  ideal  defence  strategy.  Apology  is,  by  implication,  
the  best  he  could  do  in  his  situation.  
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therefore   embodies   the   stage   of   πείίθειν.   The   “convince   or   obey”   principle   in  
retrospect   incorporates   the   ἀπολογίία   of   which  Apology   presents   itself   as   the  
reflection:  if  one  cannot  convince  one’s  society  of  what  is  truly  just,  one  has  no  
other   option   than   to   abide   by   that   society’s   sentence.   Having   done   what   he  
could  to  persuade  the  Athenians,  his   failure   to  unmask  the  political  system  as  
incorrect   commits  him   to   submission   to   the   laws—at   least   insofar   as   the   laws  
and   court  do  not  demand   something  of   him   that   he   considers   to   be   an   act   of  
injustice.54   In   a  non-­‐‑ideal   society,   being   compelled   to   submit   to  unjust   laws   is  
simply  the  risk  that  the  just  individual  faces.55    
   That  Socrates,  as  related  by  the  Laws,  claims  that  he  has  to  obey  the  laws  
does  not  mean  that   the  Laws   themselves  are   just—as   in  his  case,   it   is  possible  
that   the   laws   treat   one   unjustly.   Yet   obeying   the   (human)   laws   here   is   just.  
Whereas   in   Apology   Socrates   was   led   by   an   absolute   authority,   in   Crito   he  
submits  to  an  authority  he  strictly  disputes.  Obeying  the  laws  is  what  is  just  in  
the  absence  of  being  able  to  appeal  to  the  authority  invested  in  a  true  notion  of  
justice.  To  be  sure,  Socrates  does  not  explicitly  state  why  one  ought  to  obey  the  
laws,   now   that   he   has   failed   to   persuade   politics   into   a   better   course.   He  
                                                                                                              
54  Any  reading  of  Crito  ought   to  accommodate   the   fact   that  Socrates  himself  presents   the  Laws  as  
authoritative   and   is   persuaded.   WHITE   (1996)   argues   that   neither   the   Laws   nor   dialectic   has  
authority  (see  in  Crito;  the  only  authority  is,  paradoxically,  the  recognition  that  “our  own  desires  for  
certainty   in   argument,   for   authority   in   the   laws—or   in   reason,   or   in   persuasion—are   self-­‐‑
misleading”  (127).  There  is  only  the  situation  of  the  text  of  Crito  itself,  as  “a  set  of  pieces  that  do  not  
fit   together”  (125)  that  “offers  us  a  mode  of  thought  that   is   inherently  inconclusive  and  puzzling”  
(127).  This  reading  seems  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  persuasive  purpose  of  the  Laws’  speech.  
55  At  the  end  of  their  speech,  the  Laws  themselves  claim  that  Socrates  has  in  fact  not  been  treated  
unjustly  by   them,  but  by  human  agents,   i.e.   the  plaintiffs  and   judges:  Cri.   54b8-­‐‑c1:  ἀλλὰ  νῦν  µμὲν  
ἠδικηµμέένος  ἄπει,  ἐὰν  ἀπίίῃς,  οὐχ  ὑφ᾿  ἡµμῶν  τῶν  νόόµμων  ἀλλὰ  ὑπ᾿  ἀνθρώώπων.  That  Socrates  at  this  
point   in   the   speech   holds   the   Athenians   rather   than   the   laws   themselves   responsible   for   his  
conviction  is  in  line  with  the  Laws’  ‘self’-­‐‑presentation  as  Socrates’  φίίλοι.  The  Laws  suggest  that  they  
were  applied   in  an  unjust  way.  At  Cri.  54b4-­‐‑5,   the  Laws  urge  Socrates   to  obey  him,  “so   that  when  
you  have  come  to  Hades  you  will  have  all  these  things  to  say  in  your  defense  to  those  that  govern  
over  there”  (ἵνα  εἰς  Ἅιδου  ἐλθὼν  ἔχῃς  πάάντα  ταῦτα  ἀπολογήήσασθαι  τοῖς  ἐκεῖ  ἄρχουσιν).  Here  
again,   in   the   Underworld   the   truth   is   convincing   (recall   τοὺς   ὡς   ἀληθῶς   δικαστάάς   in   the  
Underworld,  Apol.  41a2).  The  Laws’  reference  to  the  laws  in  the  Underworld  (οἱ  ἡµμέέτεροι  ἀδελφοὶ  
οἱ   ἐν   Ἅιδου   νόόµμοι,   54c5-­‐‑6)   implies   that   these   laws   represent   a   different   justice   than   the   Laws  
themselves.  The  Underworld-­‐‑scenario  therefore  confirms  that  submitting  to  the  verdict  falls  in  with  
the  broader  (large-­‐‑scale)  justice  scenario.  In  that  final  tribunal,  he  will  be  acquitted.  
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presents  himself  as  being  under  a  moral  obligation  of  the  kind  that  a  child  has  
to  his  parents,  and  someone  who  has  made  an  agreement  to  that  agreement.  He  
feels   morally   compelled   to   submit   to   the   laws   as   long   as   he   has   not  
convincingly   unmasked   the   political   system   as   unjust.   This   sense   of   moral  
obligation   he   frames   in   terms   of  φιλίία,   in   order   to  meet  Crito’s   bidding.   The  
Laws’  arguments  are  a  reaction  to  Crito’s  arguments  in  the  sphere  of  φιλίία  (that  
Socrates’   choice   compromises   their   reputation   as   φίίλοι).   This   is   his   way   of  
defending  himself  vis  à  vis  his  friends,  thereby  indicating  that  his  primary  social  
attachments  are  not  a  matter  of  personal  relationships,  but  of  general  principles.  
In  Apology,  by  contrast,  Socrates  emphasized  that  he  had  no  choice  but  to  act  as  
he  did;  he  had  a  divine  mission.  Crito  stages  a  different  problem  that  confronts  
the   truly   just   individual   in   a   non-­‐‑ideal   society.   If   one   has   not   been   able   to  
persuade  society  of  true  justice,  one  has  to  submit  to  the  laws,  even  though  they  
may   be   unjust.56   In   this   argumentative   strategy,   the   notion   of   true   justice  
remains  out  of  sight.    
  
2.2.3   Conclusion  
The   speech   of   the   Laws   is,   as   we   have   seen,   embedded   in   a   conversation  
between  Socrates  and  his  friend  Crito.  As  this  is  a  conversation  between  friends,  
Socrates   is   addressing   someone   who   wishes   him   well;   it   is   not   a   speech  
addressed  to  enemies.  The  speech  of  the  Laws  can  thus  be  read  as  an  apology  
for  Socrates’  friends,  in  reaction  to  Crito’s  arguments  in  the  sphere  of  φιλίία.  In  
this  speech,  Socrates  explains  to  his  φίίλοι  represented  by  Crito  why  freeing  him  
from  prison  and  helping  him  escape  (as  friends  would  do),  would  not  actually  
                                                                                                              
56   On  Crito’s   arguments   for   legal   obligation,   see   e.g.  WOOZLEY   (1979),   especially   5,   23-­‐‑26,   76-­‐‑110;  
KRAUT   (1984);  WHITE   (1996);  BROWN   (2006).  On   the   issue  whether   the  Socrates  of  Crito   allows   for  
disobedience,  see  KRAUT  (1984),  60-­‐‑65,  73-­‐‑76,  125-­‐‑126,  146.  He  think  that  “persuade  or  obey”  means  
that  “one  may  disobey,  as  long  as  one  persuades”  (60).  Yet  there  is  only  one  case  in  which  Socrates  
admits  that  one  must  disobey  the  laws:  if  they  force  one  to  do  something  one  believes  to  be  unjust,  
like  ceasing  to  philosophize.  On  civil  disobedience  in  antiquity,  DAUBE  (1972).  
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help  him.   It   is  not   so   that  he  does  not   share   their   concerns—there   is  a  greater  
interest   at   stake.   Socrates   has   the   Laws   introduce   the   idea   of   solidarity   and  
φιλίία  in  a  more  principled  sense:  not  the  preservation  of  the  individual,  and  the  
bonds  between   individuals,  but   the  preservation  of   society,  and   the   loyalty  of  
the  individual  to  the  community  as  a  whole.  He  appeals  to  a  large-­‐‑scale  φιλίία  
on  the  level  of  the  πόόλις.57  Both  the  Socrates  of  Apology  and  the  Socrates  of  Crito  
ultimately   act   in   the   interest   of   the   city.   The   discrepancy   between   Socrates’  
allegiance   to   different   authorities   in   Apology   and   Crito   is   therefore   to   be  
explained  by  the  difference  in  their  communicative  setting.    
   The  dilemma   cast   in   the  principle   “convince   or   obey”   also  points   to   its  
solution:  creating  a  polis  with  truly  just  laws.  In  such  a  society,  one  will  never  be  
forced  to  subject  to  unjust  laws.  At  the  same  time,  to  not  obey  the  laws  is  acting  
unjustly,  because  the  laws  are  just.  The  dilemmas  that  the  just  individual  faces  
in  Apology  and  Crito  could  not  arise  in  the  ideally  just  society.  This  ideal  society  
is  the  just  polis  of  Republic,  to  which  we  will  now  turn.    
    
  
2 . 3       Repub l i c :    t he    ju s t   po l i s      
2.3.1   Introduction:  the  solution  to  the  dilemma  
Republic   does   not   address   problems   that   the   just   individual   in   a   non-­‐‑ideal  
society  has   to   face.   Instead,   it  pitches  Socrates’   ideal  of  “the  true  city”,  or  “the  
just   city”   (ἡ   ἀληθίίνη   πόόλις,58   ἡ   δίίκαια   πόόλις59),   Callipolis,   against   other  
                                                                                                              
57   Socrates’   arguments   here   may   reflect   a   notion   of   citizenship   that   is   a   precursor   of   Aristotle’s  
notion  of  πολιτικὴ  φιλίία.  
58  Resp.  372e6.  
59  Resp.  434c7-­‐‑10:  χρηµματιστικοῦ,  ἐπικουρικοῦ,  φυλακικοῦ  γέένους  οἰκειοπραγίία,  ἑκάάστου  τούύτων  
τὸ  αὑτοῦ  πράάττοντος  ἐν  πόόλει,  τοὐναντίίον  ἐκείίνου  δικαιοσύύνη  τ᾿  ἂν  εἴη  καὶ  τὴν  πόόλιν  δικαίίαν  
παρέέχοι;  “For   the  money-­‐‑making,  auxiliary,  and  guardian  classes  each   to  do   its  own  work   in   the  
city,   is   the   opposite.   That’s   justice,   isn’t   it,   and  makes   the   city   just?”  Resp.   435b4-­‐‑7:   ἀλλὰ  µμέέντοι  
πόόλις   γε   ἔδοξεν   εἶναι   δικαίία   ὅτι   ἐν   αὐτῇ   τριττὰ   γέένη   φύύσεων   ἐνόόντα   τὸ   αὑτῶν   ἕκαστον  
ἔπραττεν,  σώώφρων  δὲ  αὖ  καὶ  ἀνδρείία  καὶ  σοφὴ  διὰ  τῶν  αὐτῶν  τούύτων  γενῶν  ἄλλ᾿  ἄττα  πάάθη  
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‘ideals’,  most  importantly  that  of  Thrasymachus.  In  terms  of  my  analysis,  there  
is  more  overlap  between  Republic  and  Apology  than  between  Republic  and  Crito.  
In   both   Republic   and   Apology   we   encounter   individuals   through   whom   we  
acquire   an   idea   about   a   higher   notion   of   justice—the   philosopher-­‐‑kings   and  
Socrates   respectively—whereas   in  Crito,   that   notion   of   justice   largely   remains  
out   of   sight.   In   Apology,   the   account   we   hear   is   from   Socrates   himself;   in  
Republic,   the   philosopher-­‐‑king   is   a   hypothesis  within   a   dialectical   framework:  
this   is  what   the  moral   expert  would   look   like   within   the   context   of   the  most  
convincing  account  of  a  just  society.  The  present  section  will  be  concerned  with  
the  question  of  what  Republic  reveals  about  the  absolute  norm  lying  beyond  the  
human  domain.    
  
2.3.2   Republic’s  analytical  toolbox:  ζῷον,  ἰατρικὴ  τέέχνη  
One  of   the  notions   that   has   a   strong  bearing  on   the   conceptual   framework  of  
Republic   is   that   of   ζῷον   (“living   being”,   “animal”,   or,   in   more   technical  
philosophical   discourse,   “organic   whole”).   The   just   polis   as   a   class   society   is  
likened   to  a  ζῷον   in  order   to   illustrate  and  elucidate  some  of   its   fundamental  
characteristics.  In  order  to  understand  the  implications  of  this  representation  of  
the  just  polis,  and  to  be  able  to  compare  its  representation  to  the  society  depicted  
in  the  Laws,  we  shall  first  turn  to  a  brief  analysis  of  the  term  ζῷον  as  an  analytic,  
technical  term.    
   The   usual   renderings,   “living   being”   or   “animal”,   do   not   convey   the  
conceptual  significance  of  ζῷον  as  a  technical  notion  in  philosophical  discourse.  
As  a  technical,  analytic  term,  ζῷον  is  the  third  element  in  the  triad  ἕν—ὅλον—
ζῷον,   each   of   which   denotes   a   different   form   of   unity,   with   increasing  
complexity.  What  determines  this  most  complex  notion  of  unity  is  not  so  much  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
τε  καὶ  ἕξεις.  “But  a  city  was  thought  to  be  just  when  each  of  the  three  natural  classes  within  it  did  
its  own  work,   and   it  was   thought   to  be  moderate,   courageous,   and  wise  because  of   certain  other  
conditions  and  states  of  theirs”  (both  translations  GRUBE,  rev.  REEVE  in  COOPER,  CW).  
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the   idea   of   completeness   (unity   in   the   sense   that   no  part   is  missing,  which   is  
already  expressed  by  the  term  ὅλον60),  but   the   internal  and  functional  order  of  
its  parts:  an  organic  whole  stands  or  falls  with  the  functional  order  of  all  of   its  
constituent  parts.  From  the  analogy  of  the  just  polis  to  ζῷον  follows  that  the  just  
polis  is  a  unity  in  all  three  senses:  it  is  (1)  one  (µμίία  πόόλις);61  it  is  (2)  a  complete  
whole  (ὅλη  πόόλις);  and  it  is  (3)  an  organic  whole,  i.e.,  a  whole  in  which  all  parts  
have   their   natural   function   (ζῷον).62   The   unity   of   the   just   polis   is   therefore   a  
unity  with   an   internal   hierarchy   (τάάξις   referring   to   the   order   in   its   respect   of  
being  a  (vertical)  hierarchy,  κόόσµμος  to  its  being  self-­‐‑contained  as  a  whole).63  It  is  
not   a  unity  because   its   individual   citizens  have  more  or   less  uniform  ways  of  
life  (this  aspect  also  plays  a  role,  but  only  within  the  class  of  the  φύύλακες64),  but  
it  is  a  unity  due  to  the  internal  order  of  its  classes.65  
   It  is  this  notion  of  the  correct  cooperation  of  the  parts  in  the  just  polis  that  
is  presented  as   the  essence  of   justice   (δικαιοσύύνη).   In   this  organic,   just  whole,  
every  part  (and  person)  is  δίίκαιος:  being  just  consists  in  performing  one’s  own  
                                                                                                              
60   In  Arist.  Met.   1023b26-­‐‑27  we   find   the   following  definition  of   ὅλον:   ὅλον  λέέγεται   οὗ   τε  µμηθὲν  
ἄπεστι  µμέέρος  ἐξ  ὧν  λέέγεται  ὅλον  φύύσει,  “We  call  a  whole  (…)  that  from  which  is  absent  none  of  
the  parts  of  which  it  is  said  to  be  naturally  a  whole”  (transl.  BARNES);  cf.  1016b12-­‐‑16:  a  whole  (ὅλον)  
is  called  “one”  in  virtue  of  the  unity  of  its  substance  (ἡ  οὐσίία  µμίία).    
61  Callipolis  as  µμίία  πόόλις,  e.g.:  422d8,  423c4,  d5-­‐‑6,  462a9-­‐‑b2.  
62   The   triad   ἕν—ὅλον—ζῷον,   notions   of   unity   that   are   logically   in   line   with   one   another   with  
increasing  complexity,  is  Stoic.  A  ζῷον  is  a  unity  of  such  a  kind  that  what  can  be  predicated  of  the  
whole  can  also  be  predicated  of  each  of  its  constituent  parts.  This  is  of  course  precisely  what  is  the  
case  with   the  virtue  of   justice   in  Republic:   the  whole   is   δίίκαιον,   and   so   is   each  of   the   classes.  For  
ζῷον   as   an   organic  whole,   of  which   the   parts  must   fit   both   each   other   and   the  whole:  Pl.   Phdr.  
264c2-­‐‑5,  with  YUNIS   (2011)   ad   loc.:   “(…)   the   parts   that  must   be   properly   disposed   are   not   formal  
elements   such   as   introduction,   narrative,   and   conclusion,   which   [Socrates]   disparages   (266d7-­‐‑c4,  
267d2-­‐‑4),   but   the   steps   of   the   argument   that   move   the   listener   from   his   initial   position   to   the  
position  which  the  speaker  ultimately  wants  him  to  hold.”  
63   κόόσµμος:  Resp.   443d4,   506a9   (polis)   and   500c4   (soul);   τάάξις   is  mostly   used   in   the   sphere   of   the  
individual,  to  refer  to  the  order  of  his  soul  parts:  462c12,  618b3.  
64  Resp.  451d4ff.,  461e5,  462b4,  c11.  
65  The  idea  that  a  polis  consists  of  classes  is  an  everyday  given  and  therefore  much  easier  to  accept  
than  the  idea  that  the  soul  has  parts.  The  interlocutors  aim  to  discover  δικαιοσύύνη  by  searching  for  
it  in  an  entity  that  possesses  it  on  larger  scale,  on  the  level  of  the  πόόλις,  Resp.  368c5-­‐‑369a4;  cf.  Resp.  
441d4-­‐‑5.  It  is  therefore  via  the  polis  that  the  parts  of  the  soul  are  introduced.    
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social   function   (suum   cuique,   τὰ   αὑτοῦ   πράάττειν66).   τὰ   αὑτοῦ   is   determined,  
and   imposed   upon   the   individual,   by  what   the  whole   is   by   nature.   Part   and  
whole   are   mutually   dependent   upon   each   other.   Each   part   depends   on   the  
whole   for   its   identity;   conversely,   the  whole   can  only   function   (be  a  whole)   if  
each  part  performs  its  proper  function.  The  notion  of  ζῷον  thus  implies  a  norm  
for   the   internal  organization:   this   is  how  a  constitution   ought   to  be,   since  only  
this  constitution  is  just;  this  normative  aspect  is  inherent  in  the  notion  of  ζῷον.67  
   The  τέέχνη  that  produces  the  ζῷον,  i.e.  the  polis  in  its  natural  condition,  is  
medicine  (ἡ  ἰατρικὴ  τέέχνη).  For  it  is  distinctive  about  medicine  that  the  status  
of   its   ἔργον,   when   it   concerns   the   functioning   of   a   ζῷον,   is   the   optimal  
condition   (τὸ   βέέλτιστον):68   “health”   (ὑγίίεια).   In   Republic,   medicine   is   the  
analogon   for   the   kind   of   activities   that   will   establish   justice   in   a   polis  
(corresponding   to   health   in   a   σῶµμα).   This   objectively   best   condition   is,   by  
definition,   the   natural   condition.   Αnalogously,   the   product   of   the   political  
expertise   is   δικαιοσύύνη,   the   objectively   best   condition   for   the   polis.69   The  
analogy  of  medicine  is  part  of  the  same  picture  as  the  ζῷον:  it  is  the  condition  
that  is  best  by  nature  (φύύσει),  given  the  nature  of  the  body  and  its  parts.    
   Medicine   invests   the   responsibility   for,   and   knowledge   of,   the   natural  
condition   in   an   authority   (a   doctor).70   Subjective   perception   (feeling   well)   is,  
according   to   the   system  of  Republic,   and  particularly  according   to   the  analogy  
that  associates  rule  with  ἰατρικήή,  declared  subservient  to  the  εὐδαιµμονίία  of  the  
whole.  To   the  extent   that  ἡδονήή   features   in   this  discussion,   it   is  a   true  ἡδονήή,  
                                                                                                              
66  Resp.  433a8;  cf.  434a1:  ἡ  τοῦ  οἰκείίου  τε  καὶ  ἑαυτοῦ  ἕξις  τε  καὶ  πρᾶξις.  
67  This  notion  of  justice  is  developed  on  the  scale  of  the  polis  and  subsequently  propelled  back  on  the  
individual,   creating   a   kind   of   boomerang-­‐‑effect:  Resp.   591e1,   τὴν   ἐν   αὑτῷ   πολιτείίαν   (about   the  
soul).  
68  Dependent  on  the  context,  τὸ  βέέλτιστον  can  be  understood  in  different  ways:  epistemologically  
(ἡ   ἀληθινὴ  πόόλις,   τὸ   ἀληθέέστατον,   484c7),   ethically   (ἡ   δίίκαια  πόόλις);   or   in   terms   of   utility   (τὸ  
σύύµμφερον).  
69  Resp.  444d3-­‐‑10  ὑγίίεια  for  the  body  is  what  δικαιοσύύνη  is   for   the  soul;  cf.  444d12-­‐‑e1:  Ἀρετὴ  µμὲν  
ἄρα,  ὡς  ἔοικεν,  ὑγίίειάά  τέέ  τις  ἂν  εἴη  καὶ  κάάλλος  καὶ  εὐεξίία  ψυχῆς,  κακίία  δὲ  νόόσος  τε  καὶ  αἶσχος  
καὶ  ἀσθέένεια.  Cf.  591b3-­‐‑4:  τὴν  βελτίίστην  φύύσιν.    
70  Cf.  Prot.  322c6-­‐‑7:  one  expert  (δηµμιουργόός),  for  example  a  doctor,  suffices  for  many  laymen.  
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the  pleasure  deriving  from  the  activity  designated  as  just.71  But  Plato  is  careful  
to   design   his   system   so   that   the   real   interest   of   each   of   the   three   classes  
coincides   with   its   social   function.   The   analogy   of   ἰατρικήή   does   raise   the  
question  what  this  implies  about  how  far  the  expert  ruler  may  go  in  imposing  
the  good  upon  society.  Ἰατρικήή,  at  least  in  principle,  leaves  open  the  possibility  
of  harsh  measures,  defendable  in  terms  of  the  absolute  good.72  
   This  brings  us   to  another   important   implication  of   the  medical  analogy.  
The   ζῷον-­‐‑analogy   implies   that   the   just   polis   is   a   polis   in   its   most   natural  
condition,  that   is,  a  healthy  city.  One  might  have  expected  that  medicine  is  not  
the   most   obvious   candidate   to   serve   as   an   analogy   for   political   expertise   in  
Republic.   Medicine   is,   intuitively   at   least,   concerned   with   administering  
remedies.   Notably   in   Gorgias,   ἰατρικήή   is   on   a   par   with   “corrective”  
δικαιοσύύνη,73  while   the   regulative   τέέχναι   are  γυµμναστικήή   (for   the  body)   and  
νοµμοθετικήή   (!)   for   the   soul.74   Yet   in   Republic   these   more   intuitive,   everyday  
connotations   give   way   to   medicine’s   inextricable   association   with   health  
(ὑγίίεια).  Medicine  becomes  regulative:  it  establishes  and  maintains  the  naturally  
good  condition  of  the  polis  (for  instance  by  the  eugenetic  mechanisms  that  serve  
                                                                                                              
71  Resp.  419a1-­‐‑421c6;  586d4-­‐‑587a6  (with  ADAM  ad  586d).    
72  Cf.  chapter  one,  p.  31,  and  chapter  five,  p.  181.  On  the  question  of  whether  Republic  warrants  the  
use  of  violence,  KLOSKO  (2006),  187-­‐‑191,  205.  
73   In   the  analogical   scheme  of   the  Gorgias,   δικαιοσύύνη   is  a  “Fremdkörper”,   and  δικαστικήή  would  
have  been  the  more  regular  variant  (δικαστικήή  is  in  fact  the  reading  of  manuscript  F),  VAN  RAALTE  
(1991),  315,  n.  40.  VAN  RAALTE  ibid.  argues  that  δικαστικήή  is  disqualified  because  of  its  association  
with  (imperfect)  Athenian  jurisdiction  (cf.  DODDS  ad  loc.,  228),  and  because  δικαιοσύύνη  is  precisely  
what  Socrates’  wants  to  substitute  for  ῥητορικήή  as  the  counterpart  of  ἰατρικήή.    
74   Gorg.   463e5-­‐‑466a3,   with   DODDS’   note   ad   loc.,   226-­‐‑227.   The   Gorgias   makes   γυµμναστικήή   the  
regulative,  ἰατρικήή  the  corrective  τέέχνη  for  the  human  body.  DODDS  ad  loc.  explains  that  the  reason  
why  medicine   is  corrective  may  be  prompted  by  the  fact   that   the  historical  Gorgias  “claimed  that  
rhetoric  was  to  the  mind  what  medicine  was  to  the  body  (Hel.  14)”,  and  ῥητορικήή   is   the  spurious  
τέέχνη  used  to  evade  punishment,  i.e.  is  the  ‘τέέχνη’  for  a  soul  that  has  fallen  ill.  It  seems  a  reasonable  
supposition   that   Plato   did   not   use   the   analogy   of   γυµμναστικήή   in   Republic   because   γυµμναστικήή  
would  have  brought  us   in   the  domain  of   training,  with  suggestions   that  virtue  can  be  attained  by  
exercise,  in  a  gradual  process,  taught,  etc.  Training  would  however  have  brought  us  in  the  sphere  of  
the  Laws:  γυµμναστικήή,  practiced  in  the  Spartan  and  Cretan  syssitia  (see  chapter  three,  section  3.2.3,  
and  especially  p.  108,  p.  113),  presents  the  good  condition  as  something  that  can  be  brought  about,  
rather  than,  absolutely,  as  the  natural  condition  that  is  a  given.  That  is  why  in  Callipolis  even  bodily  
quality  (eugenetics)  becomes  the  product  of  φάάρµμακα,  not  γυµμναστικήή  (see  note  75  below).  
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to   keep   the   classes   pure).75   This   regulative   understanding   of   ἰατρικήή,   as  
opposed  to  its  corrective  interpretation  in  Gorgias,  is  derived  from  its  analogon  in  
the   political   domain,   the   ἄρχειν   of   a   city.   A   clear   indication   of   medicine’s  
regulative   interpretation   in   Republic   is   the   conspicuous   omission   of   punitive  
mechanisms   from   Callipolis.   In   terms   of   the   ζῷον-­‐‑analogy,   this   is   perfectly  
understandable:  in  a  just  polis,  paideia  does  not  fail.  Hence  in  the  best  condition  
(health),  there  is  no  need  for  punishment.  
  
2.3.3   The  εὐδαιµμονίία  of  the  whole  polis  as  the  natural  norm  
The  ζῷον  as  an  analogy  for  society  raises  the  question  of  the  relation  between  
the  whole   and   its   parts.   To   frame   a   class   society   as   an   organic  whole   has   an  
important   implication:   the   interest   of   the   whole   takes   precedence   over,   and  
determines,  the  interest  of  its  constituent  parts.76  In  the  case  of  a  (real)  ζῷον—an  
animal—of  which  the  parts  lack  independent  existence,  that  is  evident.77  But  in  
the  case  of  a  society  consisting  of  individuals,  one  may  think  that  this  analogy  
can  have  disturbing  consequences.  The  εὐδαιµμονίία  of  each  class  is  determined  
by  the  εὐδαιµμονίία  of  the  whole.78      
                                                                                                              
75   The   term   φάάρµμακα   does   not   signify   “remedies”,   but   “drugs”,   i.e.,   means   to   bring   a   certain  
condition  about.  The  herd  of  citizens  must  be  of  top-­‐‑quality  (τὸ  ποίίµμνιον  ὅτι  ἀκρόότατον  εἶναι,  Resp.  
459e1):   which   requires   many   drugs   (φαρµμάάκοις   πολλοῖς   χρῆσθαι,   namely   the   artifical   ways   of  
setting  up  marriages  and  procreation  of  the  elite),  and  an  even  more  courageous  doctor  than  if  no  
drugs  would  have  been  necessary  (ἀνδρειοτέέρου  δεῖ  τοῦ  ἰατροῦ),  Resp.  459c3-­‐‑7.    
76   See   on   the   primitive   “city   of   pigs”   in  Resp.   369b4-­‐‑372e7,   373b1-­‐‑2:   TAYLOR   (1999),   289-­‐‑290   (the  
philosophic  legislator’s  “aim  in  setting  up  the  ideal  city  is  continuous  with  the  aim  of  the  creators  of  
the  primitive  city,  viz.  the  maximization  of  eudaimonia  for  the  citizens”,  290);  further  HEMMENWAY  
(1999);  MCKEEN  (2004).  It  is  called  ἡ  ἀληθινὴ  πόόλις  (372e6),  ἡ  ὑγιεινὴ  [πόόλις]  (373b1-­‐‑2).  
77  Another  problematic  consequence  (from  our  modern  perspective)  is  that  conceiving  of  the  polis  as  
a  ζῷον  prevents  the  individual  as  such  from  coming  into  focus.  Individuals  are  only  considered  in  
terms   of   their   class,   and   as   such   are   interchangeable;   Republic   does   not   imply   that   there   exist  
relevant  differences  among  the  members  of  each  class.  Cf.  TAYLOR  (1999),  288.  
78  Cf.  NEU  (1971),  248:  “The  state’s  interest   is  the  individual’s  interest—but  his  real  one.”  Therefore  
Plato  does  not,   as  ANNAS   contends,   “undeniably   subordinate   individual   interests   to   the   common  
good”  ([1981],  179).  TAYLOR  (1999)  surprisingly  argues  (with  VLASTOS  [1977])  that  of  the  three  kinds  
of   totalitarianism   (282-­‐‑283),   Callipolis   is   a   totalitarian   community   of   the   “paternalistic”   kind   (see  
especially  295-­‐‑296)   instead  of   in  the     second  sense  (“an  organic  social  unity”,  283).  His  conclusory  
statement  that  “at  least  in  intention  [Plato]  subordinates  the  perfectly  organized  state  to  the  happy  
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   Plato   does   not   shy   away   from   recognizing   and   addressing   directly   the  
problematic   nature   of   this   aspect   of   the   just   polis.   Indeed,   he   has   Socrates’  
interlocutors  twice  make  explicit  reservations  about  precisely  this  aspect  of  the  
just   society:   the   (lack   of)   εὐδαιµμονίία   of   the   three   classes   on   their   own.   The  
interventions   of   the   interlocutors   force   the   figure   of   Socrates   to   offer   a  
justification  of  the  social  order  that  is  thereby  represented  as  going  even  beyond  
his  original  intentions.  It  is  in  the  context  of  these  interruptions,  if  anywhere  in  
Republic,   that  we  may  get  a  glimpse  of   the  kind  of  norm  that  determines  why  
this  particular  social  order  constitutes  the  just  society.    
  
The  guards   and  producers   
Doubts   about   the   kind   of   life   that   the   well-­‐‑being   of   the   whole   imposes   are  
raised  for   the  first   time  at   the  beginning  of  Book  IV,  where   the  ways  of   life  of  
guards   and  producers   are  discussed   at   greater   length.  Adeimantus   asks  what  
Socrates   would   have   to   say   in   his   defence   in   case   someone   objected   to   his  
description   of   the   guards’   way   of   life   that   this   would   not   make   these   men  
particularly  happy;79   they  are   in   truth   the   rulers  of   the  city,  but  do  not  derive  
any  good  from  it.80  Socrates  replies  that  in  establishing  their  state,  they  did  not  
aim  to  make  one  of  its  classes  happy  on  their  own,  but  the  polis  as  a  whole  (ὅλη  
ἡ  πόόλις,  420b7-­‐‑8).  For  their  governing  principle  in  founding  their  polis  was  that  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
community”  (296)  de  facto  subordinates  justice  to  εὐδαιµμονίία  and  hence  defies  Republic’s  thesis  that  
the   perfectly   organized   polis   is   the   only   εὐδαίίµμων   community.   POPPER   (2006),   81-­‐‑83,   on   these  
Republic-­‐‑passages  as  evicence  of  “political  holism”.  See  KAMTEKAR  (2001)  for  an  attempt  to  reconcile  
Socrates’  definition  of  social  justice  as  doing  one’s  own  (one’s  social  duty)  with  the  idea  that  justice  
is   concerned  with   the   allocation   or   distribution   of   benefits   via  what   she   calls   Plato’s   “happiness  
principle”.  
79  Resp.  419a1-­‐‑4:  Καὶ  ὁ  Ἀδείίµμαντος  ὑπολαβώών,  Τίί  οὖν,  ἔφη,  ὦ  Σώώκρατες,  ἀπολογήήσῃ,  ἐάάν  τίίς  σε  
φῇ  µμὴ  πάάνυ  τι   εὐδαίίµμονας  ποιεῖν   τούύτους  τοὺς  ἄνδρας,  καὶ   ταῦτα  δι’   ἑαυτούύς,  ὧν  ἔστι  µμὲν  ἡ  
πόόλις   τῇ   ἀληθείίᾳ,   οἱ   δὲ   µμηδὲν   ἀπολαύύουσιν   ἀγαθὸν   τῆς   πόόλεως,   (…);   “And   Adeimantus  
interrupted:  How  would  you  defend  yourself,  Socrates,  he  said,  if  someone  told  you  that  you  aren’t  
making  these  men  very  happy  and  that  it’s  their  own  fault?  The  city  really  belongs  to  them,  yet  they  
derive  no  good  from  it”  (transl.  GRUBE,  rev.  REEVE  in  COOPER,  CW).  
80   ADAM   ad   loc.:   “Adimantus’   objection   is   the   dying   echo   of   the   view   already   advocated   by  
Thrasymachus,  that  a  ruler  should  rule  for  his  own  profit”  (at  342c7-­‐‑9,  343b1-­‐‑d1).  
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justice  was  most  likely  to  be  found  in  such  a  state  (ᾠήήθηµμεν  γὰρ  ἐν  τῇ  τοιαύύτῃ  
µμάάλιστα  ἂν   εὑρεῖν   δικαιοσύύνην,   420b8-­‐‑9).81   This   is  why  Callipolis   is   the   just  
polis  in  its  most  appealing  form.  
   He  goes  on  to  liken  their  project  of  founding  a  just  polis  to  a  painter  who  
is   painting   a   statue   of   a  man   (ἀνδριάάς,   see   420c5ff.).   The   objection   voiced   by  
Adeimantus   would   be   like   charging   him   with   not   using   the   most   beautiful  
colour   for   the  most  beautiful  part  of   the  body,   the   eyes.82  Against   that   charge  
they  could  reasonably  defend  themselves  by  saying  that,  had  they  used  purple  
for   the   eyes   instead   of   black,   the   eyes   would   not   appear   as   eyes   (µμηδὲ  
ὀφθαλµμοὺς  φαίίνεσθαι,   420d3-­‐‑4).   It   is   only   by   assigning   to   each  part  what   is  
appropriate  to  it  that  the  whole  becomes  beautiful  (εἰ  τὰ  προσήήκοντα  ἑκάάστοις  
ἀποδιδόόντες  τὸ  ὅλον  καλὸν  ποιοῦµμεν,  420d4-­‐‑5).83  Thus,  what  is  καλόόν  is  what  
is  appropriate,  and  what   is  appropriate   is  the  natural  condition.  Eyes  ought   to  
be  black  (not  purple)  because  they  are  eyes,  and  they  are  eyes  because  they  are  
that  particular  part  of  a  man.  Similarly  (the  thought  runs),  the  social  role  of  each  
class   is   determined   by  what   each   part   is,  which   in   turn   is   determined   by   the  
whole  of  which  the  part  is  a  part.  This  explains  why  the  whole  polis  cannot  be  
made  εὐδαίίµμων  simply  by  leaving  it  up  to  each  class  to  decide  what  will  make  
them   most   happy,   not   hampered   by   other   considerations:   in   that   case,   the  
guards  would  be  anything  but  guards,   the   farmer  would  not  be  a   farmer,  nor  
the  potter  a  potter.84  The  identity  of  the  polis  as  a  whole  (what  a  polis  truly  is)  is  
                                                                                                              
81  Resp.  420b5-­‐‑9:  οὐ  µμὴν  πρὸς  τοῦτο  βλέέποντες  τὴν  πόόλιν  οἰκίίζοµμεν,  ὅπως  ἕν  τι  ἡµμῖν  ἔθνος  ἔσται  
διαφερόόντως   εὔδαιµμον,   ἀλλ᾿   ὅπως   ὅτι   µμάάλιστα   ὅλη   ἡ   πόόλις.   ᾠήήθηµμεν   γὰρ   ἐν   τῇ   τοιαύύτῃ  
µμάάλιστα  ἂν  εὑρεῖν  δικαιοσύύνην  (…).  POPPER  (2006)  has  claimed  on  the  basis  of  this  passage  (ch.  5,  
n.  35,  p.  264)  that  the  polis  of  Republic  is  of  the  extreme  totalitarian  kind  (the  first  kind  of  three  kinds  
of  totalitarian  states  in  TAYLOR  (1999),  where  the  interest  of  the  state  is  distinct  from  the  individuals  
who  compose  it).  See  for  another  refutation  of  POPPER’s  claim  TAYLOR  (1999),  284-­‐‑289.  
82  Resp.  420c5-­‐‑d5.      
83   This   is   why   it   is   misleading   to   call   the   just   polis   “ideal”:   it   is   the   natural   and   therefore   best  
condition  of   a  polis;   only   from   the  perspective  of  Apology  and  Crito   could  Callipolis  be   said   to  be  
“ideal”.  
84   Resp.   420e1-­‐‑421a3:   καὶ   δὴ   καὶ   νῦν   µμὴ   ἀνάάγκαζε   ἡµμᾶς   τοιαύύτην   εὐδαιµμονίίαν   τοῖς   φύύλαξι  
προσάάπτειν,   ἣ   ἐκείίνους   πᾶν   µμᾶλλον   ἀπεργάάσεται   ἢ   φύύλακας.   ἐπιστάάµμεθα   γὰρ   καὶ   τοὺς  
γεωργοὺς  ξυστίίδας  ἀµμφιέέσαντες  καὶ  χρυσὸν  περιθέέντες  πρὸς  ἡδονὴν  ἐργάάζεσθαι  κελεύύειν  τὴν  
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what   determines   the   roles   of   its   parts.   In   the   analogy,   this   is   the   form   of   the  
statue   (what   the   statue   is   or   represents),  which  determines  which   colours   the  
painter  has  to  use.  The  norm  is   the  model   for   the  colour  painter:   it   is   the  man  
himself.  
  
The  phi losophers   
The   relation   between   the   εὐδαιµμονίία   of   one   class   and   the   εὐδαιµμονίία   of   the  
whole  is  subjected  to  critical  scrutiny  a  second  time  in  Book  VII.  At  this  point,  
the  class  of  the  philosophers  has  been  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  guards.  At  
the  end  of  the  cave  simile,  the  poignant  demand  that  the  philosophers  descend  
back  into  the  cave  prompts  Glaucon  to  raise  (again)  the  question  whether  they  
(i.e.,   the   interlocutors)  will  not  be   treating   them  unjustly  by  giving   them  a   life  
that   is  worse   than   possible   (ἔπειτ᾿,   ἔφη,  ἀδικήήσοµμεν  αὐτούύς,   καὶ  ποιήήσοµμεν  
χεῖρον   ζῆν,   δυνατὸν   αὐτοῖς   ὂν   ἀµμεῖνον;   519d8-­‐‑9).85   Socrates   replies,   519e1-­‐‑
520a4:    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
γῆν,   καὶ   τοὺς   κεραµμέέας   κατακλίίναντες   ἐπὶ   δεξιὰ   πρὸς   τὸ   πῦρ   διαπίίνοντάάς   τε   καὶ  
εὐωχουµμέένους,   τὸν   τροχὸν   παραθεµμέένους,   ὅσον   ἂν   ἐπιθυµμῶσι   κεραµμεύύειν,   καὶ   τοὺς   ἄλλους  
πάάντας   τοιούύτῳ  τρόόπῳ  µμακαρίίους  ποιεῖν,   ἵνα  δὴ  ὅλη  ἡ  πόόλις   εὐδαιµμονῇ.  ἀλλ᾿  ἡµμᾶς  µμὴ  οὕτω  
νουθέέτει·∙  ὡς,  ἄν  σοι  πειθώώµμεθα,  οὔτε  ὁ  γεωργὸς  γεωργὸς  ἔσται  οὔτε  ὁ  κεραµμεὺς  κεραµμεὺς  οὔτε  
ἄλλος  οὐδεὶς  οὐδὲν  ἔχων  σχῆµμα  ἐξ  ὧν  πόόλις  γίίγνεται.  ”Similarly,  you  mustn’t   force  us   to  give  
our  guardians   the  kind  of  happiness   that  would  make   them  something  other   than  guardians.  We  
know  how  to  clothe  the  farmers  in  purple  robes,  festoon  them  with  gold  jewelry,  and  tell  them  to  
work   the   lan  whenever   they   please.  We   know   how   to   settle   our   potters   on   couches   by   the   fire,  
feasting   and   passing   the  wine   around,  with   their  wheel   beside   them   for  whenever   they  want   to  
make  pots.  And  we  can  make  all  the  others  happy  in  the  same  way,  so  that  the  whole  city  is  happy.  
Don’t  urge  us  to  do  this,  however,  for  if  we  do,  a  farmer  wouldn’t  be  a  farmer,  nor  a  potter  a  potter,  
and  none  of  the  others  would  keep  to  the  patterns  of  work  that  give  rise  to  a  city”  (transl.  GRUBE,  
rev.  REEVE  in  COOPER,  CW) 
85  This  worry  has  been  shared  by  some  modern  commentators,  either  because  they  consider  ruling  
contrary  to  the  philosophers’  own  interest  (so  ANNAS  [1981],  267-­‐‑269),  or  because  they  think  Plato  
fails   to   justify   why   the   philosophers   themselves   consider   it   in   their   interest   to   rule   (so   ADKINS  
[1960],   290-­‐‑292;   SCHOFIELD   [2007],   152).   ANNAS’   way   out   (and   cf.   SEDLEY   [2007],   277   n.   32   for  
commentators   holding   similar   views),   that   the   Good   is   an   “impersonal   Good”,   and   that   the  
philosophers  learn  to  conceive  of  their  “personal  loss”  of  happiness  ([1981],  268)  in  an  impersonal  
way  misinterprets   the  fact   that   the  philosophers  have  an  evident   interest   in  ruling:   the  absence  of  
“punishment”   for   not   ruling   (ζηµμίία   ἐὰν   µμὴ   ἀρχῇ,   347a5,   cf.   b6-­‐‑c3   in   Book   I),   the   “punishment”  
being  rule  by  an  inferior.  SEDLEY  (2007)  has  shown  that  Book  I  “showcases”  (272)  the  developments  
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Ἐπελάάθου,  ἦν  δ’  ἐγώώ,  πάάλιν,  ὦ  φίίλε,  ὅτι  νόόµμῳ  οὐ  τοῦτο  µμέέλει,  ὅπως  ἕν  
τι  γέένος  ἐν  πόόλει  διαφερόόντως  εὖ  πράάξει,  ἀλλ’  ἐν  ὅλῃ  τῇ  πόόλει  τοῦτο  
µμηχανᾶται   ἐγγενέέσθαι,   συναρµμόόττων   τοὺς   πολίίτας   πειθοῖ   τε   καὶ  
ἀνάάγκῃ,   ποιῶν   µμεταδιδόόναι   ἀλλήήλοις   τῆς   ὠφελίίας   ἣν   ἂν   ἕκαστοι   τὸ  
κοινὸν  δυνατοὶ  ὦσιν  ὠφελεῖν  καὶ  αὐτὸς  ἐµμποιῶν  τοιούύτους  ἄνδρας  ἐν  
τῇ   πόόλει,   οὐχ   ἵνα   ἀφιῇ   τρέέπεσθαι   ὅπῃ   ἕκαστος   βούύλεται,   ἀλλ’   ἵνα  
καταχρῆται  αὐτὸς  αὐτοῖς  ἐπὶ  τὸν  σύύνδεσµμον  τῆς  πόόλεως.  
“You  are   forgetting  again   that   it   isn’t   the   law’s  concern   to  make  any  one  
class  in  the  city  outstandingly  happy  but  to  contrive  to  spread  happiness  
throughout  the  city  by  bringing  the  citizens  into  harmony  with  each  other  
through  persuasion  or  compulsion  and  by  making   them  share  with  each  
other   the  benefits   that   each   class   can   confer   on   the   community.  The   law  
produces   such   people   in   the   city,   not   in   order   to   allow   them   to   turn   in  
whatever   direction   they  want,   but   to  make   use   of   them   to   bind   the   city  
together.”  (Transl.  GRUBE,  rev.  REEVE  in  COOPER,  CW)  
This  is  the  same  kind  objection  as  the  one  raised  at  the  beginning  of  Book  IV,  to  
which   Socrates   refers   in   his   answer   (ἐπελάάθου,   πάάλιν,   519e1).   Here,   in  
answering  to  the  objection  raised  in  the  case  of  the  philosophers,  his  strategy  is  
a  different  one.  Indeed,  the  objection  in  this  case  can  rest  on  firmer  ground.  For,  
in   the   case   of   the   guards   and   producers,   Socrates’   claim  was   that   the   life   he  
described  for  them  was  truly  the  most  εὐδαίίµμων  life  possible,  even  though  one  
may   have   assumed   otherwise   (and   Adeimantus   voices   this   reasonable  
objection).   But   in   the   case   of   the   philosophers,   Socrates   has   in   fact   himself  
admitted  (and  this  is  corroborated  by  the  purport  of  the  cave  simile)  that  the  life  
of  pure  philosophy  (θεωρίία)  is  more  εὐδαίίµμων  for  the  philosophers  than  ruling  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
and  terminology  of  compulsion  common  in  the  later  Books;  see  also  LYCOS  (1987),  110:  “Socrates  is  
not,  of  course,  arguing  that  the  only  thing  which  motivates  practitioners  of  a  craft  is  to  benefit  the  
‘object’   of   their   craft.   He   is   concerned   to   establish   whether,   and   how,   the   knowledge   which  
constitutes   a   craft   introduces   the   idea   of   an   interest   that   is   specific   to   the   craft.   The   question   is  
whether   any   such   ‘knowledge-­‐‑interest’   can   be   a   self-­‐‑interest.”   Moreover,   any   worries   about   the  
absence  of  a  positive  reward  for  the  philosophers  (such  as  χρήήµματα  or  τιµμήή)  should  be  alleviated  by  
the  Socratic-­‐‑Platonic  consideration  that  it  is  typical  of  the  ἀγαθόός  not  to  be  paid  for  the  exercise  of  
his  πολιτικὴ  τέέχνη,   something  which  demarcates  him   from  the  sophist,   see,  e.g.,  Gorg.   520c2-­‐‑e10;  
for  sophists  receiving  wages:  Gorg.  519c5-­‐‑d4;  Prot.  328b1-­‐‑c2,  349a2-­‐‑4;  Soph.  219-­‐‑223;  Meno  90d3-­‐‑95e.  
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the  city.  In  other  words,  for  them,  there  is  a  life  possible  that  is  more  εὐδαίίµμων  
than  the  life  demanded  by  the  εὐδαιµμονίία  of  the  whole  polis.86    
   In   answering   this   objection   Socrates   does   not   put   forward   another  
analogy,   but   appeals   to   “law”   (νόόµμος).87   Law   “attends   to”   (µμέέλει)   the  
εὐδαιµμονίία   of   the   city   as   a   whole,   not   to   that   of   one   of   its   classes.88   The  
terminology  employed  here  (µμέέλει)  is  reminiscent  of  that  used  in  the  context  of  
τέέχνη.89   The   focus   on   the  polis   as   a  whole,   of   course,   does   not   imply   that   the  
individual   classes   are   not   εὐδαίίµμων.   The   philosophers   are   here   emphatically  
viewed  as  part  of   the  polis,  as  a  class  submitted   to   this   law.90  Nόόµμος   therefore  
                                                                                                              
86  Cf.  ADKINS   (1960),  291:  “To  philosophize   is  an  absolute  good.  The  philosophers  would  be  more  
eudaimon  if  they  remained  aloof  from  politics:  accordingly,  Plato  can  offer  no  real  reason  why  they  
should  go  back.  Admittedly   the  city  would  be  better  governed,  and  hence  more   eudaimon,   if   they  
went   back;   but   Plato   cannot   explain  why,   if   one’s   own   eudaimonia   is   the   end   of   life,   one   should  
prefer   the  city’s—or  anyone  else’s—eudaimonia   to  one’s  own.”  ADKINS  here   ignores  (ibid.,  290-­‐‑291)  
Socrates’   first   answer   in   Resp.   519e1-­‐‑520a4   and   jumps   straight   to   Socrates’   second   response,   in  
520b5-­‐‑c1.  He   raises   the   question   (ibid.,   291-­‐‑292)  why   Plato   did   not   assert   that   the   life   combining  
ruling  and  philosophy  was  most  eudaimon.  There  are  two  considerations  of  interest.  The  first  is  an  
important  aspect  upon  which  the  system  hinges:  “Plato  presents  this  as  an  advantage  of  his  system:  
since  the  philosophers  have  a  better   life  to  return  to  ‘outside  the  cave’  of  the  affairs  of  this  world,  
they  will  not  be  tempted  to  set  any  value  on  political  power  as  an  end  in  itself,  and  hence  will  be  
just   and  disinterested   rulers”   (290).  The   second  consideration  has   to  do  with  Plato’s  background:  
“Such  an  assertion  would  of  course  be  a  solution;  but  to  suppose  that  it  is  a  solution  open  to  Plato  is  
to  forget   the  nature  of   the  movement  of  which  both  Thrasymachus  and  Plato  form  a  part.   It   is  an  
intellectual,  not  a  moral,  movement,  and  the  intellect  must  always  take  precedence”  (292).  It  may  be  
worth  adding  that  the  conception  of  the  philosopher  as  moral  expert  (practitioner  of  a  τέέχνη)  does  
not  allow  for  such  a  strict  separation  between  the  two  activities,  cf.  chapter  one,  p.  30.  Cf.  SILVERMAN  
(2010):   “the   Aristotelian   separation   of   theoretical   reason   from   practical   reason   and   the   flight  
interpretation  seems  totally  belied  by  what  philosophers  actually  do  in  the  Republic”.    
87  Cf.  Resp.  590e1-­‐‑591a3:  Δηλοῖ  δέέ  γε,  ἦν  δ᾿  ἐγώώ,  καὶ  ὁ  νόόµμος  ὅτι  τοιοῦτον  βούύλεται,  πᾶσι  τοῖς  ἐν  τῇ  
πόόλει  σύύµμµμαχος  ὤν,   (…).  τοιοῦτον  refers  back  to  the   imposition  of  rule  by  a  divine  and  sensible  
element  (from  ὡς  ἄµμεινον  ὂν  παντὶ  ὑπὸ  θείίου  καὶ  φρονίίµμου  ἄρχεσθαι,  590d3-­‐‑4).  
88  In  Resp.  420bb6-­‐‑8,  e6-­‐‑7,  421b7-­‐‑8  (εἰς  τὴν  πόόλιν  ὅλην  βλέέποντες),  519e3,  and  576d9-­‐‑e1,  the  well-­‐‑
being  of  one  of  its  classes  is  opposed  to  the  well-­‐‑being  of  the  whole.    
89  Cf.  Resp.  345d1-­‐‑3:  τῇ  δὲ  ποιµμενικῇ  οὐ  δήήπου  ἄλλου  του  µμέέλει  ἢ  ἐφ᾿  ᾧ  τέέτακται,  ὅπως  τούύτῳ  τὸ  
βέέλτιστον  ἐκποριεῖ·∙  “Shepherding  is  concerned  only  to  provide  what  is  best  for  that  which  it  is  set  
over”  (transl.  GRUBE,  rev.  REEVE).    
90  This  νόόµμος  is  therefore  not  on  a  par  with  the  polis-­‐‑internal  νόόµμοι  that  govern  the  life  of  the  class  of  
the  guards,  mentioned  in  e.g.  Resp.  380c5-­‐‑6  (on  poets);  453d1,  456c2,  457b8,  c8,  465a1,  471b9-­‐‑10  (on  
family   life),  534d8-­‐‑10   (on  the  place  of  dialectic   in   the  philosophers’  education)  and  by   implication  
the   laws   that  will  be   laid  down  by   the   final   authority   in   the   city,   the  philosophers.  On   these,   see  
LANE   (2013),   110-­‐‑112;  ROSSETTI   (2013),   356.  More  often   than  νόόµμος   the   term  τύύπος   is  used:  LANE  
(2013),  109;  on  the  τύύποι  περὶ  θεολογίίας,  BORDT  (2003),  especially  70-­‐‑73.  
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introduces   a   perspective   on   the   polis   from   the   outside.   The   philosopher   is   in   a  
sense  outside  the  polis  (as  depicted  in  the  cave  simile);  yet  as  the  ruler,  he  is  also  
part  of  it.  This  νόόµμος  emphatically  views  the  philosopher  in  his  capacity  as  part  
of  the  whole.  
     Conceptualizing   the   just   society’s   order   as   imposed   upon   it   by   νόόµμος,  
however,  does  beg  the  question  what  sort  of  law  this  is,  and  who  made  it—it  is  
a   question   that   this   passage   poses,   yet  Republic   as   such   does   not   provide   an  
explicit  answer  to  it.91  Within  the  system  of  Republic,  its  analogy  of  the  just  polis  
to  ζῷον,  justice  to  ὑγίίεια,  and  ruling  to  ἰατρικήή,  the  most  reasonable  hypothesis  
would  be   to   think  of   this   as   a   ‘law  of  nature’   (νόόµμος   τῆς  φύύσεως),   since   it   is  
nature  that  determines  the  constitution  of  a  ζῷον.92  Recalling  the  analogy  of  the  
statue   discussed   above,   the   nature   of   the   statue   (what   a   man   really   is)  
determines  what  colours  are  appropriate  for  each  part.  The  νόόµμος  can  thus  be  
seen  as  a   law  inherent   in  what  a  polis   is  by  nature:   that   law,   like   the  man  that  
serves  as  a  model  for  the  statue,  determines  the  function  (or,  in  the  case  of  the  
statue,  the  colour)  of  the  parts.  Δικαιοσύύνη  designates  the  internal  structure  of  
the   best   society;   νόόµμος   represents   this   as   necessitated   by   a   higher   norm.   The  
                                                                                                              
91  This  is  not  a  law  made  by  the  interlocutors-­‐‑as-­‐‑founders  of  Callipolis,  contra  LANE  (2013),  111  (and  
113),  and  SEDLEY  (2007),  280,  n.  37.  They  suggest  that  the  fact  that  the  philosophers  are  required  to  
rule  by  “law”  is  because  in  the  context  of  Book  VII  the  interlocutors  call  themselves  legislators,  say  
that  “we”  shall  compel  the  philosophers  to  rule.  For  the  role  of  lawgivers  and  laws  in  Republic,  see  
ANNAS  (2010);  LANE  (2013),  with  further  references  p.  105,  n.  4.  For  the  interlocutors  as  lawgivers,  
see  ibid.,  109,  110-­‐‑111,  and  their  relation  to  the  philosopher-­‐‑rulers  ibid.,  112-­‐‑113.  
92  The  likening  of  the  parts  of  the  just  soul  to  a  ἁρµμονίία  points  to  the  same  conclusion,  Resp.  443d3-­‐‑
e2:   (…)   καὶ   συναρµμόόσαντα   τρίία   ὄντα,   ὥσπερ   ὅρους   τρεῖς   ἁρµμονίίας   ἀτεχνῶς,   νεάάτης   τε   καὶ  
ὑπάάτης   καὶ   µμέέσης,   καὶ   εἰ   ἄλλα   ἄττα   µμεταξὺ   τυγχάάνει   ὄντα,   πάάντα   ταῦτα   συνδήήσαντα   καὶ  
παντάάπασιν   ἕνα   γενόόµμενον   ἐκ   πολλῶν,   σώώφρονα   καὶ   ἡρµμοσµμέένον,   (…),   “(...)   [the   just   man]  
harmonizes   the   three   parts   of   himself   like   three   limiting   notes   in   a  musical   scale—high,   low,   an  
middle.  He  binds   together   those  parts  and  any  others   there  may  be   in  between,  and  from  having  
been  many  things  he  becomes  entirely  one,  moderate  and  harmonious”  (transl.  GRUBE,  rev.  REEVE  in  
COOPER,  CW).  These  are  the  “immovable  notes”  (WEST  [1992],  162,  also  219-­‐‑222):  if  the  intervals  are  
altered,   the   ἁρµμονίία   will   no   longer   be   a   ἁρµμονίία:   the   proportions   between   the   three   notes  
designated  as  ὅροι  determined  by  nature  (irrespective  of  the  pitch  of  the  system  as  a  whole,  and  the  
genus,  which  is  determined  by  the  shifts  in  position  of  the  notes  inside  the  tetrachord).  Nεάάτη  and  
ὑπάάτη   form   the   boundaries   of   an   octave   (2:1).   The   note   µμέέση   lies   between   these   two   boundary  
notes,   the   interval   between   νεάάτη   and   µμέέση   being   a   fifth   (3:2),   the   interval   between   ὑπάάτη   and  
µμέέση  being  a  fourth  (4:3).    
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particular   νόόµμος   mentioned   in   this   passage   is   thus   co-­‐‑extensive   with  
δικαιοσύύνη.    
   Philosophy  without   ruling   is   excluded  by   the   conditions   of   the   system:  
because   the   rule   of   philosophy   is   the   necessary   precondition   for   realizing   τὸ  
βέέλτιστον.   Ruling   is   in   the   philosopher’s   interest,   because   the   philosopher  
cannot  exist  outside  Callipolis.93  The  fact  that  the  philosophers  are  several  times  
said  to  be  “compelled”  to  rule,94  indicates  that  this  is  conceptualized  as  a  norm  
that  is  imposed  upon  them  from  the  outside.  
  
2.3.4     The  philosopher-­‐‑kings:  inside  and  outside  the  polis  
The   ζῷον-­‐‑analogy   makes   the   well-­‐‑being   of   the   polis   as   a   whole   the   cardinal  
interest.   That   this   may   seem   to   compromise   the   interest   of   the   classes   taken  
individually   ignores   that   the   true   interest   of   the   classes   is   simply   and   solely  
realized   in   the   just   polis.   We   have   already   seen   in   the   previous   section   that,  
when  this  point  explicitly  enters  the  discussion,  Republic  refers  to  the  idea  of  a  
natural  norm  for   the  good  of  a  polis.  But   the  question   remains,  of   course,  how  
this  claim  to  the  natural  good  of  a  polis   is   justified:  why  are  we  to  believe  that  
this  is  the  natural  form  for  a  human  society?  The  philosopher-­‐‑king  has  a  double  
occupation:  he  contemplates  the  Ideas  (θεωρίία)  and  he  has  a  social  role:  to  rule  
the   polis   (ἄρχειν).95   As   its   rulers,   they   are   part   of   the   whole,   and   as  
                                                                                                              
93   This   is   anticipated   in   Book   I,   where   the   ruler,   if   he   rules,   receives   as   a   reward   “absence   of  
punishment”  (οὐ  ζηµμίία).  The  “punishment”  for  not  ruling  is  to  be  ruled  by  inferior  rulers,  which  de  
facto  means   that  neither   the  philosopher  nor  Callipolis   could  exist.  Therefore,  ἀνάάκγη  and  ζηµμίία  
are  juxtaposed.  
94  Which  some  scholars  have  assumed  means   that   ruling   is  not   in   the  philosophers’  own   interest.  
See  e.g.  ADKINS  (1960),  290;  WHITE  (1986);  BROWN  (2000);  SEDLEY  (2007),  272-­‐‑281.    
95  By  taking  turns:  Resp.  540a9-­‐‑b5:  (…)  καὶ  πόόλιν  καὶ  ἰδιώώτας  καὶ  ἑαυτοὺς  κοσµμεῖν  τὸν  ἐπίίλοιπον  
βίίον  ἐν  µμέέρει  ἑκάάστους,  τὸ  µμὲν  πολὺ  πρὸς  φιλοσοφίίᾳ  διατρίίβοντας,  ὅταν  δὲ  τὸ  µμέέρος  ἥκῃ,  πρὸς  
πολιτικοῖς   ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας   καὶ   ἄρχοντας   ἑκάάστους   τῆς   πόόλεως   ἕνεκα,   οὐχ   ὡς   καλόόν   τι  
ἀλλ’  ὡς  ἀναγκαῖον  πράάττοντας,  (…).  Cf.  520d7-­‐‑9:  the  philosophers  will  ἐν  µμέέρει  descend  back  into  
the  cave.  According  to  Aristotle,  this  alternation  (τὸ  ἀνὰ  µμέέρος,  τάάξις)  of  rulers  results  in  law,  Pol.  
1287a14-­‐‑18.  I  do  not  think  that  Republic  endorses  such  a  fundamental  distinction  between  theoretical  
and   practical   wisdom   as   we   find   in   Aristotle.   Nor   is   there   sufficient   evidence   for   a   “flight  
interpretation”   (the   extreme   idea   that   the   philosophers   eschew   the   ruling   part   of   their   task,   as  
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philosophers,  they  can  see  from  the  outside,  as  it  were,  the  whole  of  which  they  
themselves   are   part.   The   double   role   of   the   philosophers   puts   them   in   an  
ambiguous  position:  from  the  internal  perspective,  they  are  the  ἄρχοντες  of  the  
polis;   from   the   external   perspective,   they   are   at   the   same   time   ἀρχόόµμενοι.  
Callipolis   as   an   operational   constitution   thus   contains   a   circularity,   since   the  
ἐπιστήήµμων  is  at  the  same  time  the  external  legitimation  for  the  ἔργον  and  part  of  
the  ἔργον   itself.96  That   they  have  knowledge  of   this  norm  does  not  mean   that  
they  are  not  subject  to  it;  it  merely  means  that  they  understand  why  their  social  
function  is  necessary.97  The  just  polis  stands  or  falls  with  their  government  of  it.  
The   philosopher-­‐‑king   outside   the   polis   resembles   a   painter,   who   “looks   at”  
(ἀποβλέέπει)  τὸ  φύύσει  δίίκαιον  καὶ  καλὸν  καὶ  σῶφρον  καὶ  πάάντα  τὰ  τοιαῦτα  
and  paints  a   just  polis  on  a  clean  pinax.98  The  natural  condition  of  the  polis  (i.e.,  
the   just   polis)   is   claimed   to   be   an   imitation   of   its  model   (παράάδειγµμα).99   The  
philosopher  differs   from  other   lawgivers  because  he  works  on   a   tabula   rasa:100  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
defended  by,  e.g.,  KRAUT  [2003]).  See  on  these  issues,  and  a  comparison  with  Aristotle,  SILVERMAN  
(2010).  
96   The   same   concern   is   addressed   in   Book   I:   the   introduction   of   the   additional   µμισθαρνητικὴ   or  
µμισθητικὴ  τέέχνη,  the  τέέχνη  of  producing  wages  (Resp.  346b1ff.),  when  the  notion  of  the  ruler’s  self-­‐‑
interest   has   been   discarded   already   in   the   discussion   with   Thrasymachus,   shows   that   it   is   not  
entirely  unproblematic  whether  or  how  the  δηµμιουργόός  benefits   from  his  τέέχνη  himself,  and  can  
thus  be  seen  to  anticipate  the  famous  reservation  of  Resp.  519d8-­‐‑9.  Likewise,  the  substitution  of  τὸ  
σύύµμφερον  for  τὸ  βέέλτιστον  or  τὸ  ἀγαθόόν  as  the  object  of  the  τέέχναι  in  Book  I  raises  the  question  
whose  benefit  it  is  and  makes  it  possible  to  contruct  the  notion  of  a  common  interest.    
97   Cf.   ἀνάάγκη   as   that   which   motivates   the   philosophers   to   rule:   Resp.   347c1-­‐‑d6,   519e4,   520e1-­‐‑3,  
521b7,  539e4,  540a4-­‐‑b5.  See  SEDLEY  (2007),  276-­‐‑281.  
98  This  is  a  polis  in  which,  in  contrast  to  the  Athens  of  Crito,  the  laws  are  based  on  τὸ  φύύσει  δίίκαιον,  
cf.  ᾗ  τὸ  δίίκαιον  πέέφυκε,  and  Socrates  by   implication  would  not  have  been  convicted.  These   laws  
are   not   the   product   of   human   agreement,   but   made   after   the   image   of   metaphysical,   absolute  
standards.  
99  Resp.  500d11-­‐‑501c4;  cf.  472c4-­‐‑d10:  the  παράάδειγµμα  is  the  good  polis  in  speech  that  the  interlocutors  
are   founding   (οὐ   καὶ   ἡµμεῖς  …   παράάδειγµμα   ἐποιοῦµμεν   λόόγῳ   ἀγαθῆς   πόόλεως;   472d9-­‐‑10),   not   a  
Form  (see  BURNYEAT  (1999),  298,   in  disagreement  with  the  commentators  in  note  5   ibid.).  Here  the  
παράάδειγµμα   is   the   ἔργον,   not   the   model.   It   is   compared   to   the   most   beautiful   possible   human  
being,  but  it  is  still  a  human  being:  again,  there  is  a  pre-­‐‑conceived  notion  operative  of  what  a  polis  
truly  is.    
100  The  designers  of  the  polis  who  use  a  divine  paradeigma  “take  a  polis  and  the  characters  of  human  
beings  like  a  pinax”  (λάάβοντες  …  ὥσπερ  πίίνακα  πόόλιν  τε  καὶ  ἤθη  ἀνθρώώπων):  first  they  clean  it,  
which   is   not   easy   to   do   (πρῶτον   µμὲν   καθαρὰν   ποιήήσειαν   ἄν,   ὃ   οὐ   πάάνυ   ῥᾴδιον),   501a2-­‐‑7.   A  
possible   purification   is   proposed   in   540e4-­‐‑541a7:   sending   all   citizens   over   the   age   of   ten   to   the  
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where  a  divine  paradeigma  (τὸ  θεῖον  παράάδειγµμα,  500e2;  τὸ  φύύσει  δίίκαιον  καὶ  
καλὸν  καὶ  σῶφρον,  501b2)  exists,  there  is  no  need  to  draw  on  existing  laws  or  
customs,  or  to  adopt  a  more  dynamic,  cooperative  procedure  of  lawgiving.  The  
Good   is  an  object  of  knowledge,  but,   it   seems,  not  a  matter  of  discussion.  The  
philosophers  are  not  represented  as  talking  about  the  Good,  but  as  looking  at  it.  
The   Good   (τὸ   καλόόν)   exists   a   priori:   it   is   there   to   be   known   by   every  
philosopher.101   The   painter-­‐‑analogy   portrays   the   philosopher   as   standing  
outside,  instead  of  being  part  of,  the  whole.    
   Republic  explains  the  σοφίία  of  the  philosopher-­‐‑king  (what  Apology  called  
divine   σοφίία)   in   psychological   terms:   the   dominance   of   the   λογιστικόόν   over  
the   soul   as   a  whole.  He  has   a   “divine   ruling  principle”   (ἔχοντος   ἐν  αὐτῷ   τὸ  
θεῖον   ἄρχον,   592d1)  within   himself.   Little   is   said   about   how   he   comes   to   be  
qualified,   or   where   his   qualification   comes   from.   His   qualification   can   be  
discussed   in   virtue   of   the   city-­‐‑soul-­‐‑analogy.  Whereas   the   qualifications   of   the  
philosopher-­‐‑class   are   explicitly   stipulated   in   the   context   of   the   description   of  
their  education  (i.e.   the  philosophers  qualified   in   the  context  of   the  city),  what  
qualifies  the  individual  philosopher  is  that  the  parts  of  his  soul  are  in  the  correct  
order;   in   terms   of   the   myth   of   the   metals,   he   has   the   right   kind   of   soul.   In  
Callipolis   it   is   by   and   large   a   matter   of   genetic   reproduction:   in   most   cases,  
couples  will  produce  children  of   the  same  soul-­‐‑type  as   they  are   themselves.   It  
is,  however,  possible  that  a  silver  child  will  be  born  from  golden  parents,  or  vice  
versa,   or,   more   general,   that   a   couple   from   one   class   will   beget   a   soul   that  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
countryside  (εἰς  τοὺς  ἀγρούύς),  and  taking  the  children  “out  of  the  characters  of  today”  (ἐκτὸς  τῶν  
νῦν   ἠθῶν)   to   raise   them   in   the   ways   of   life   and   laws   stipulated   by   the   philosophers   (ἐν   τοῖς  
σφετέέροις  τρόόποις  καὶ  νόόµμοις),  i.e.  those  which  the  interlocutors  have  expounded.  Contra  MORROW  
(1960),  580  and  ANNAS  (2010),  72,  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  in  the  orginal  position  between  
the  project  of  Republic  and  Laws.  Cf.  chapter  four,  p.  136.  
101  The  combination  of  a  noun  (τὸ  ἀγαθόόν,  τὸ  καλόόν)   in  conjunction  with  αὐτόό  is  a  characteristic  
way  of  referring  to  the  absolute  Good,  see  Resp.  507a3:  τὸν  τόόκον  καὶ  ἔκγονον  αὐτοῦ  τοῦ  ἀγαθοῦ;  
532b1:  αὐτὸ  ὃ  ἔστον  ἀγαθόόν;  534c4:  αὐτὸ  τὸ  ἀγαθόόν;  540a8-­‐‑9:  τὸ  ἀγαθὸν  αὐτόό.  Sometimes  simply  
τὸ  ἀγαθόόν:  509b7.  Also:  517c1:  ἡ  τοῦ  ἀγαθοῦ  ἰδέέα;  526e1:  τὴν  τοῦ  ἀγαθοῦ  ἰδέέαν.  
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belongs  to  another  class.102  In  such  cases,  the  rulers  have  to  transfer  the  soul  of  
the   child   to   its   appropriate   class.103   This   implies   that,   in   the   ideal   city,   soul  
quality  is  not  exclusively  a  matter  of  the  type  of  soul  of  the  parents.  
  
2.3.5   Conclusion    
In  this  section  we  have  examined  Republic,  the  last  of  the  three  Platonic  texts  on  
justice  discussed.  Republic  differs  from  Apology  and  Crito  in  outlining  a  truly  just  
polis.  We  have  attempted  to  get  a  clearer  view  of  what  it  is  that  determines  the  
identity  of  the  just  polis  and  what  is  claimed  to  be  the  qualification  of  the  moral  
expert   in   this   setting.   In   the   first   subsection,  we   looked   at   the   implications   of  
Republic’s  strategy  to  analogize  the   just  polis   to  a  ζῷον,   justice  (δικαιοσύύνη)  to  
its   internal   best   condition   (ὑγίίεια),   and   the   rule   of   this  whole   to   the   ἰατρικὴ  
τέέχνη.   In   the   second   subsection,   we   have   focused   on   the   most   fundamental  
objection   to   this   system,   and   examined   Socrates’   argument   in   justification   of  
that  system.  It  appeared  that  in  the  final  instance,  all  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  
objectively   good   status   of   the   just   polis   is   natural   objectivity,   grounded   in  
nature,  φύύσις.  This  of  course  agrees  with  the  polis’  representation  as  a  ζῷον.  In  
the  third  subsection,  we  have  investigated  how  this  natural  norm  is  imparted  in  
the  best  society.  The  philosopher-­‐‑king  knows  the  interest  of  the  whole  in  virtue  
of  his  knowledge  of  the  Good.  He  therefore  imposes  this  on  society,  and,  as  part  
of   that   society,   upon   himself.   The   just   city   is   therefore   a   closed   system:   the  
philosophers   know   the  good  of   the  whole   of  which   they   themselves   are  part.  
Finally,  Republic  makes   ἀρετήή   clearly   dependent   upon   the   natural   quality   of  
one’s  soul;  this  is  yet  another  way  in  which  it  appeals  to  φύύσις.  
  
  
                                                                                                              
102  Resp.  415b1-­‐‑3:  ἔστι  δ᾿  ὅτε  ἐκ  χρυσοῦ  γεννηθείίη  ἂν  ἀργυροῦν  καὶ  ἐξ  ἀργυροῦ  χρυσοῦν  ἔκγονον  
καὶ  τἆλλα  πάάντα  οὕτως  ἐξ  ἀλλήήλων.  
103  Resp.  415a7-­‐‑c7.  
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2 . 4    Conc lud ing    r emarks      
In  this  chapter,  we  have  examined  three  Platonic  texts  on  justice.  Each  of  these  
three   texts   portrays   individuals   who   are   loyal   to   a   higher   principle   that   is  
imposed  upon   them   from   the  outside.  We  have  explored  how   the  notion  of   a  
norm  beyond  the  human  domain  takes  shape  in  each  of  these  texts,  and  how  its  
shaping  is  influenced  by  the  respective  communicative  situations.    
   Apology  portrays   how   Socrates  motivates   his   conduct   before   the   hostile  
audience   of   his   jury   by   appealing   to   divine   authority.  Crito,   by   contrast,   is   a  
discussion  in  a  much  more  friendly  setting.  Socrates  defends  his  refusal  to  save  
himself   when   he   has   the   chance   before   the   friend   who   offers   him   this  
opportunity  by  stressing  his  prevailing  loyalty  to  the  community  of  which  they  
are  both  part.  That  he  pledges  allegiance  to  different  authorities  in  Apology  and  
Crito   is   the   direct   consequence   of   the   different   communicative   settings   and  
rhetorical  purposes  of  the  two  speeches:  the  apology  to  his  enemies  and  to  his  
friends.   Republic,   finally,   develops   a   hypothesis   of   the   just   polis   in   its   most  
persuasive  form,  and  a  vignette  of  the  moral  expert  in  this  setting.  The  absolute  
norm   outside   the   human   domain   that   determines  what   justice   is,   is   a   natural  
norm,  φύύσις.  The  system  of  Republic   is   internally  sustainable  because  it  makes  
the   individual(s)  who  possesses  knowledge  of   the  norm  themselves   the   rulers  
of  the  polis  upon  which,  as  a  whole,  this  natural  law  is  imposed.  
  
  





SETTING  THE  SCENE:  






After   an   examination   of   the   absolute  moral   norm   in   its   different   contexts  we  
now   turn   to   Laws,   the   primary   focus   of   this   study.   The   present   chapter  
concentrates  on  the  opening  discussion  of  Books  I  and  II,  that  is,  the  part  of  the  
dialogue   in  which   the   interlocutors   are   not   yet   addressing   a   concrete   case   of  
legislation.  After  what  we  have  seen  in  chapter  two,  the  opening  scene  of  Laws  
is   in   many   ways   bewildering.   This   chapter   will   attempt   to   elucidate   what  
creates   this   effect.   Understanding   the   structure   of   the   conversation   is   key   to  
understanding  the  underlying  argument.  I  shall  therefore  comment  on  specific  
topics  in  the  order  in  which  they  appear  in  the  dialogue,  in  order  to  grasp  how  
Plato  constructs  his  argument.  How  does  Plato  set  the  scene?  What  is  at  stake  in  
Books  I  and  II?    
   It   should   be   noted   at   the   outset   that   Books   I   and   II   differ   considerably  
from  what   follows.1   The   familiar   Platonic   theme   of   the   unity   and  plurality   of  
                                                                                                              
1  Cf.  ΤECUȘAN  (1990):  “What  to  my  judgement  is  most  surprising  about  the  first  two  books  is  the  fact  
that   there   is  a   total  gap  between  these  and  the  following  ones:  no  place  could  be  found  in  Plato’s  
City  for  the  symposion  as  it  is  described  here  (246).  See  ZELLER  (1839),  59-­‐‑60  on  the  internal  cohesion  
of  books   I-­‐‑II.  BRUNS   (1880)   considers   the  combination  of  wine  and  music   reason   to   reject   the   two  
first  books,  see  n.  19,  ΤECUȘAN  (1990),  246.  RUTHERFORD  (1995),  305  suspects  “that  some  connecting  
material  [between  I-­‐‑II  and  the  rest]  had  still  to  be  written,  for  a  promised  discussion  of  gymnastics  
is  lacking”.  Cf.  GIGON  (1954),  229-­‐‑230;  MURRAY  (2013),  111.  
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ἀρετήή,  prominent   in  Books   I  and   II,   is  absent   from   the   rest  of   the  work.2  This  
chapter   will   pay   special   attention   to   the   treatment   of   this   complex   theme   in  
Laws.  How  does  Plato  use  the  notion  of  ἀρετήή  and  the  ἀρεταίί?  Does  his  use  of  
these   terms  differ   from  his  use  of   them   in  other  Platonic  works,  and   if   so,  are  
these  differences  in  conceptual  structure  of  ἀρετήή  or  do  they  merely  result  from  
a   difference   in   communicative   setting?   I   shall   argue   that   the   specific   way   in  
which  the  unity  versus  plurality  of  ἀρετήή  is  discussed  in  the  dialogue  serves  to  
construct  a  new  conceptual  framework  for  morality.  The  theme  of  the  unity  and  
plurality  of  virtue  does  not  reflect  an  absolute  moral  norm,  but  a  norm  of  a  very  
different  kind.       
  
  
3 . 1    Se t t ing    the    s c ene    I :    sys s i t ia    and   Spa r t an   ἀνδρε ίία   
We  are  on  the  island  of  Crete.  Three  elderly  men  are  on  their  way  from  Cnossos  
to   the   cave   of   Minos   (625b1-­‐‑2),   Crete’s   mythical   king   and   lawgiver.3   Laws   is  
therefore   the   only   Platonic   text   that   is   not   set   at   Athens.   The   setting,   an  
amazingly   hot   day,   prompting   the   elderly   interlocutors   to   take   lots   of   rests  
(ἀνάάπαυλαι)  on  the  way,  suggests  a  leisurely  atmosphere.4  The  three  men  start  
a  conversation  about  laws  and  lawgivers.  Where  do  the  νόόµμοι  come  from?  Is  it  
a  god  or  a  man  who  has  laid  down  our  laws?5    
   The  interlocutors  come  from  different  places  in  the  Greek  world.  There  is  
an   Athenian,6   who   remains   anonymous   and   takes   the   leading   role   in   the  
                                                                                                              
2  With   the  exception  of   the  very  end  of  Book  XII.  For   the  parallels  between   the  closing  section  of  
Laws  and  Books  I-­‐‑II,  see  chapter  six.  
3  See  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994)  ad  loc.  for  Minos’  as  lawgiver  and  his  connection  with  Zeus.  
4  The  road  from  Cnossos  to  the  cave  of  Zeus  is  “sufficient”  (ἱκανήή)  for  a  topic  of  such  length  as  the  
current  state  of  constitutions  and  laws,  and  will  provide  ample  opportunity  for  taking  rests  under  
high  trees,  which  is  necessary  at  their  age,  Leg.  625b1-­‐‑c2;  cf.  722c6-­‐‑d2.    
5  Leg.  624a1-­‐‑2  (the  Athenian  is  speaking):  Θεὸς  ἤ  τις  ἀνθρώώπων  ὑµμῖν,  ὦ  ξέένοι,  εἴληφε  τὴν  αἰτίίαν  
τῆς  τῶν  νόόµμων  διαθέέσεως;  
6  Leg.  626d3-­‐‑5,  634c9,  642b2.  
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conversation.  Socrates   is  absent.7  The  Athenian’s   interlocutors  are  a  Cnossian,8  
Cleinias,  and  a  Spartan,9  Megillus.10  Cleinias  and  Megillus  come  from  different  
cities,   but   both   Cnossus   and   Sparta   belong   to   the   same   (Dorian)   sphere   of  
influence.  Cretan  and  Spartan  customs  and  constitutions  are  therefore  in  broad  
outlines  treated  as  identical.    
   The  opening  books  thus  portray  a  confrontation  between  representatives  
of  two  different  Greek  cultural  traditions.  From  the  start,  the  discussion  and  the  
relation   between   the   interlocutors   reflects   these   cultural   differences.   The  
Athenian   inquires   with   his   Dorian   interlocutors   about   the   purpose   of   the—
characteristically   Dorian—institutions   of   the   gymnasia   and   syssitia.11   Cleinias  
begins  his  explanation  by  pointing  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  Cretan  landscape.  
Crete  is  not,  like  Thessaly  for  instance,  a  plain.  Its  surface  is  uneven  and  hence  
more  suited  to  the  exercise  of  running  by  foot  than  to  riding  on  horseback.  This  
circumstance  forces  the  Cretans  to  wear  light  armour  such  as  arrows  and  bows.  
Everything   is   equipped   for   the   purpose   of  war,   and  Cleinias   supposes   that   it  
was  for  that  purpose  that  their  lawgiver  has  laid  down  his  laws.12    
   Cleinias  here  gives  his  interpretation  (ὥς  γ᾿  ἐµμοὶ  φαίίνεται,  625e1)  of  the  
intention   of   the   original   lawgiver.13   The   interlocutors   cannot   ask   the   original  
                                                                                                              
7  For  the  relation  between  the  anonymous  Athenian  and  Socrates,  see  chapter  six,  p.  224.  
8  See  Leg.  625a1,  629c3,  633d7.      
9  See  Leg.  624a4-­‐‑5,  626c4-­‐‑5,  635e5,  637b7;  cf.  636e7-­‐‑637b6.  
10  Both  of  these  interlocutors  come  from  cities  that  were  in  the  Greek  world  widely  known  for  the  
superior   quality   of   their   laws   (εὐνοµμίία).   See  Leg.   631b3-­‐‑4.   For  Crete’s   reputation   of   εὐνοµμίία,   see  
WILLETTS   (1977),   170;   on   εὐνοµμίία   in  Sparta,   FINLEY   (1975)   in  CHRIST   (1986),   331.   Socrates   in  Crito  
52e5-­‐‑6  cites  Crete  and  Sparta  as  the  two  examples  of  εὐνοµμίία.    
11  Leg.   625c6-­‐‑8:  κατὰ  τίί  τὰ  συσσίίτιάά  τε  ὑµμῖν  συντέέταχεν  ὁ  νόόµμος  καὶ  τὰ  γυµμνάάσια  καὶ  τὴν  τῶν  
ὅπλων   ἕξιν;   For   the   Cretan   syssitia,   including   parallels   with   the   Spartan   syssitia,   see   WILLETTS  
(1955),  16,  21-­‐‑22,  25-­‐‑27  (Aristotle’s  comparison  of  the  Cretan  and  Spartan  syssitia),  139-­‐‑140,  156-­‐‑158  
(the  literary  evidence),  193,  243;  cf.  id.  (1969),  106-­‐‑107;  (1977),  184.  For  the  Spartan  syssitia:  KIECHLE  
(1963),   especially   203-­‐‑220.   For   the  Dorian   cultural   background   and   the   constitution   of   Sparta   see  
KIECHLE   (1963);   for   a   number   of   influential   contributions   on   Sparta,   see   the   essays   collected   in  
CHRIST  (1986)  (and  also  his  Introduction).  
12  Leg.  625d7-­‐‑e2:  ταῦτ᾿  οὖν  πρὸς  τὸν  πόόλεµμον  ἡµμῖν  ἅπαντα  ἐξήήρτυται,  καὶ  πάάνθ᾿  ὁ  νοµμοθέέτης,  
ὥς  γ᾿  ἐµμοὶ  φαίίνεται,  πρὸς  τοῦτο  βλέέπων  συνετάάττετο·∙  Cf.  626a5-­‐‑b4.  
13   The   Athenian   later   corrects   Cleinias’   initial   interpretation,   Leg.   628c9-­‐‑629a3.   Cf.   630d2-­‐‑d7   and  
632d1-­‐‑7:  it  was  the  interlocutors’  mistake  to  come  up  with  ἀνδρείία  as  the  purpose  of  the  Cretan  and  
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lawgiver  about  his   intention,  and  therefore  the  purpose  of   the   lawgiver  has  to  
be  interpreted  through  an  examination  of  his  laws.  This  is  especially  the  case  for  
the   ancient   law   codes   of   Crete   and   Sparta,   since   these   were   reportedly   laid  
down  by  Zeus  (via  Minos)  and  Apollo  (via  Lycurgus)  respectively.14  Minos  and  
Lycurgus  cannot  be  consulted  about  the  “intention”  or  “purpose”  (διάάνοια15)  of  
their  laws.  Right  from  the  beginning  of  Laws,  it  is  assumed  that  a  law  code  has  a  
certain   goal   or   purpose,   and   that,   in   the   absence   of   the   lawgiver   or   another  
entity   that   knows   that   purpose,16   it   has   to   be   interpreted.   Soon,   it   becomes  
apparent   that   the   Athenian   in   fact   has   a   special   talent   for   reconstructing   a  
lawgiver’s   intention   on   the   basis   of   his   laws—the   interlocutors,   who   have  
themselves   been   raised   under   these   laws,17   marvel   at   the   insight   of   their  
companion  and  say  that  he  speaks  like  a  “diviner”  (µμάάντις).18    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Spartan   laws,  not   that  of   the   lawgivers:   it   is   a  mistake   in   interpretation.  This  mistake  prompts   the  
interlocutors   to   go   back   to   the   beginning   of   their   investigation,   632d9-­‐‑e7.   See   below,   p.   86,   and  
chapter   six,   p.   227,   for   the   role   of   the   Athenian   as   a   gifted   interpreter   of   law   codes,   repeatedly  
praised  by  his  interlocutors  for  his  insight  in  the  intention  of  the  original  lawgiver.    
14  Leg.  625a4-­‐‑b3,  632d2-­‐‑4.  The  insistence  on  a  divine  source  for  legislation  is  an  important  part  of  a  
kind   of   principle   of   charity   involved   in   the   interpretation   of   ancient   law   codes.   The   governing  
interpretative  assumption  is  that  a  sensible  lawgiver  must  have  laid  down  his  laws  for  the  purpose  
of   the   highest   good:   Ἆρα   οὖν   οὐ   τοῦ   ἀρίίστου   ἕνεκα   πάάντα   ἂν   τὰ   νόόµμιµμα   τιθείίη   πᾶς   [sc.  
νοµμοθέέτης,   c4];   (628c6-­‐‑7).   This   highest   good   is   peace,   εἰρήήνη   (628c10).   Therefore   it   can   be   safely  
assumed  that  the  good  lawgiver  makes  his  laws  with  an  eye  to  virtue  as  a  whole,  not  with  an  eye  to  
only   a   part   of   virtue   (630d4-­‐‑e4).   Both   assumptions   a   fortiori   apply   to   divine   lawgivers.   If   the  
interpreters’  explanation  is  inconsistent  with  one  or  both  of  these  assumptions  (as  is  Cleinias’  initial  
interpretation  of  the  Cretan  law  code  as  being  framed  for  war  and  ἀνδρείία),  they  have  to  reassess  
their  interpretation.  For  the  Lycurgean  laws,  see  the  references  in  the  index  in  KIECHLE  (1963);  see  
also  the  famous  essay  of  SCHILLER  (1790)  (=  CHRIST  [1986],  73-­‐‑86).  
15  Leg.  635a1;  cf.  the  phrase  (ἀπο)βλέέπων  εἰς  or  πρόός  or  with  object  that  expresses  the  purpose  (e.g.  
625e1-­‐‑2,  626a7,  628a9-­‐‑10,  630e1-­‐‑3);  also  γνώώµμῃ  λαβεῖν  (951b3).  
16  Such  as  the  nocturnal  council,  see  chapter  six,  section  6.1.  Keeping  alive  the  γνώώµμη  underlying  a  
law  code  is  one  of  the  aspects  of  τοὺς  νόόµμους  διαφυλάάττειν  (Leg.  951b3-­‐‑4),  and  is  one  the  functions  
of  the  νοµμοφύύλακες  and  the  nocturnal  council.  Keeping  alive  the  ‘spirit’  of  the  laws  contributes  to  
the  σωτηρίία  of  polis  and  laws.  
17   “Das  Aufwachsen   in  einer   solchen  Ordnung  macht   sie  zu  kompetenten  Gesprächspartnern,  die  
über   ihre   eigene   Staatsordnung   am   besten   Auskunft   geben   können   (vgl.   den   Hinweis   auf   die  
Gewöhnung  als  Voraussetzung  zum  Verständnis  einer  Gesetzgebung  632d6)”,  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  
155,  ad  625a5.  
18  Leg.  634e7.  For  the  µμάάντις-­‐‑like  interpretative  skills  of  the  Athenian,  see  chapter  six,  p.  227.  
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   Cleinias   relates   the  purpose  of   the  Cretan   laws   to  a  general  view  of   the  
condition  humaine.19  The  great  ἄνοια  of   the  masses,  he   claims,   consists   in   their  
failure   to   realize   that   every   polis   is   always   in   a   continuous   state   of  war  with  
other   poleis.20   If   war   requires   syssitia,   and   a   clear   division   of   roles   between  
ἄρχοντες  and  ἀρχόόµμενοι,   then   that  must  also  be   the  order  of   the  day  during  
peace  (εἰρήήνη)21—which  is,  he  adds,  only  a  word  (ὄνοµμα);  in  reality  there  is  no  
peace.22  The  goal  of  the  Cretan  polity  is  to  be  victorious  over  the  other  cities  in  
this  state  of  war  (πολέέµμῳ  νικᾶν  τὰς  ἄλλας  πόόλεις,  626c2).    
   The  discussion  of  the  syssitia  and  gymnasia  paves  the  way  for  the  idea  that  
the   Cretan   notion   of   ἀρετήή   is   ἀνδρείία,   “courage”,   although   at   this   stage   the  
identification  of  ἀρετήή  as  ἀνδρείία  is  still  implicit.  Now  ἀνδρείία  is  of  course  one  
of   the   four   cardinal  Socratic-­‐‑Platonic  virtues,   so  we  seem   to   find  ourselves  on  
familiar   ground   here.   Yet   it   should   be   noted   that,   through   the   discussion   of  
Cretan  customs,  ἀνδρείία  is  introduced  specifically  as  the  Cretan  notion  of  ἀρετήή.  
The  line  of  approach  to  ἀρετήή  is  emphatically  contextual  (“what  is  excellence  in  
Crete   if   we   look   at   the   Cretan   laws?”).   Ἀρετήή   thereby   emerges   as   a   cultural  
variable.  This  cultural  approach  to  virtue  can  only  be  introduced  because  of  the  
association  of  syssitia  and  gymnasia  with  a  particular  Greek  culture.    
   The   very   first   phase   of   the   opening   discussion   thus   introduces   two  
important  premises.  The  first  is  that  conceptions  of  ἀρετήή  vary  across  different  
poleis,   and   that   different   civilizations   cultivate   different   ideas   about   which  
human   qualities   are   most   worthy   of   praise.   The   second   is   that   therefore,   a  
person’s   notion   of   ἀρετήή   is   inevitably   determined   by   his   or   her   cultural  
                                                                                                              
19   Leg.   625e2-­‐‑5   (Cleinias   is   speaking):   ἐπεὶ   καὶ   τὰ   συσσίίτια   κινδυνεύύει   συναγαγεῖν,   ὁρῶν   ὡς  
πάάντες  ὁπόόταν  στρατεύύωνται,   τόόθ᾿  ὑπ᾿  αὐτοῦ  τοῦ  πράάγµματος  ἀναγκάάζονται  φυλακῆς  αὑτῶν  
ἕνεκα  συσσιτεῖν   τοῦτον   τὸν  χρόόνον,   “Probably   this  was  his   reason   also   for   instituting   common  
meals:  he  [the  Cretan  lawgiver]  saw  how  soldiers,  all  the  time  they  are  on  campaign,  are  obliged  by  
force  of  circumstances  to  mess  in  common,  for  the  sake  of  their  own  security”  (transl.  BURY).  
20  Leg.  625e5-­‐‑7.  
21  Leg.  625e7-­‐‑626a2:  εἰ  δὴ  πολέέµμου  γε  ὄντος  φυλακῆς  ἕνεκα  δεῖ  συσσιτεῖν  καὶ  τινας  ἄρχοντας  καὶ  
ἀρχόόµμενους  διακεκοσµμηµμέένους  εἶναι  φύύλακας  αὐτῶν,  τοῦτο  καὶ  ἐν  εἰρήήνῃ  δραστέέον.  
22  Leg.  626a2-­‐‑5.  
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upbringing.  This   is   exemplified  by  Cleinias  and  Megillus,  who  are   convinced,  
even  in  the  face  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  that  their  own  customs  are  superior  
to   those   of   other   cities   (as   we   will   see   below).   The   sheer   length   and  
repetitiveness23   of   the  discussion   in  Books   I   and   II   suggests   that   such   cultural  
ideas  are  certainly  not  (always)  easy  to  modify.    
   Now  that  Cleinias  has  put  forward  his  full  explanation  of  the  Cretan  laws  
against  the  background  of  his  assessment  of  the  human  condition  as  immersed  
in  a  continuous  state  of  war,  the  Athenian  starts  to  explore  its  implications.  His  
argument   moves   from   large   scale   to   small   scale   (polis,   village,   family,  
individual).  Does  the  continuous  state  of  war  between  poleis  also  pertain  to  the  
individual—i.e.,  is  not  each  person  also  his  own  enemy?  Cleinias  affirms  that  the  
victory  over  oneself  (τὸ  νικᾶν  αὐτὸν  αὑτόόν,  626e2)  is  in  fact  the  most  brilliant  
victory  of  all.24   If  a  person   is  “stronger   than  himself”   (κρείίττων  αὑτοῦ,  626e7)  
he   triumphs;   if   he   is   “weaker   tham   himself”   (ἥττων   αὑτοῦ,   626e7)   he   is  
conquered.  The  perspective  on  war  has  now  shifted:  the  war  implied  here  is  not  
a  war  against  others,  but  an  internal  war,  against  oneself.    
   Having  agreed  that  the  individual  can  be  either  stronger  or  weaker  than  
himself,   the   Athenian   reverses   the   argument,25   extrapolating   from   the  
conclusion   about   the   individual   to   the   larger   scale:   a   household,   village,   and  
polis  can  also  be  either  κρείίττων  or  ἥττων  ἑαυτοῦ.26  He  adduces  the  example  of  
                                                                                                              
23  See  below,  n.  130  on  p.  116.  The  fact  that  some  issues  repeatedly  occur  in  Books  I-­‐‑II   is  therefore  
not  to  be  taken  as  a  sign  that  Plato  was  an  old  man  when  he  wrote  Laws,  that  Laws  is  not  finished,  or  
that   a   clumsy   editor   has   reorganised   the   material.   It   is   the   result   of   the   fact   that   the   Athenian  
attempts   to  persuade  Cleinais   and  Megillus  of   something   to  which   they   find   it  difficult   to   assent  
because  of  their  cultural  upbringing.  Books  I  and  II:  the  Athenian  attempts  to  show  the  relativity  of  
cultural   customs   to   two  people   from  particular   cultural  backgrounds,  who   find   it  hard   to  believe  
that  any  other  laws  could  be  better  than  their  own.  That  the  discussion  returns  several  times  to  the  
same  question  is  the  result  of  their  incredulity  when  confronted  with  the  Athenian’s  defense  of  an  
institution  that  is  considered  the  apex  of  immorality:  the  symposion.  
24  Leg.  626e2-­‐‑5.  
25  Leg.  626e6:  Πάάλιν  τοίίνυν  τὸν  λόόγον  ἀναστρέέψωµμεν,  (…).  
26   In   the   sense   that,   as  Cleinias   explains,  when  a   city   is   κρείίττων  ἑαυτῆς,   “the  better  people”   (οἱ  
ἀµμείίνονες)  have  conquered  “the  mass  and  the  inferior  people”  (τὸ  πλῆθος  καὶ  τοὺς  χείίρους).  If  it  
was   the  other  way  around   (the  χείίρονες  who  besieged   the  ἀµμείίνονες),   the   city  would  be  ἥττων  
ἑαυτῆς   (627a6-­‐‑10).  The  Athenian   for   the  moment   leaves  aside   the  definitional  problem,  which  he  
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an   internal   family   feud   between   brothers,   some   better   and   some   worse.  
Confronted  with  three  ways  of  settling  the  dispute,  Cleinias  and  Megillus  agree  
that  the  best  judge  is  the  one  who  reconciles  the  brothers  by  laying  down  laws  
and   restoring   φιλίία.27   In   this   case,   however,   it   has   to   be   concluded   that   the  
lawgiver   lays   down  his   laws  with   an   eye   to   the   opposite   of  war.28  What,   then,  
about  the  person  responsible  for  harmonising  a  polis?  Will  he  not  order  life  with  
an   eye   to   the   internal   war   (στάάσις)   instead   of   to   the   outside   war?29   Cleinias  
agrees   (Πῶς  δ᾿  οὔ;).  From  this   it   follows   that  not  war,  but  peace   (εἰρήήνη)  and  
mutual   goodwill   (φιλοφροσύύνη)   are   the   greatest   good   (τόό   …   ἄριστον)   for  
human  beings.30  It  is  established  that  a  politician  will  never  be  a  politician  in  the  
real   sense   (οὔτ᾿  ἄν  ποτε  πολιτικὸς  γέένοιτο  ὀρθῶς)   if   he   only  directs   his   eye  
towards   the  external  war   (πρὸς  τὰ  ἔξωθεν  πολεµμικὰ  ἀποβλέέπων  µμόόνον  καὶ  
πρῶτον);   similarly,   a   lawgiver   will   never   be   a   lawgiver   in   the   strict   sense  
(νοµμοθέέτης  ἀκριβήής),  unless  his   laws   for  war  are  made   for   the   sake  of  peace  
instead  of  his  peace  laws  for  the  sake  of  war.31  Cleinias’  initial  interpretation,  of  
the  Cretan  laws  as  aiming  at  war  and  ἀρετήή  as  ἀνδρείία,  is  refuted.  Moreover,  
the  claim  that  laws  are  made  for  the  sake  of  peace  appears  to  be  a  general  claim  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
says  would  require  a  long  discussion  in  its  own  right,  of  whether  τὸ  χεῖρον  can  ever  be  “stronger  
than  the  better  part”,  κρεῖττον  τοῦ  ἀµμείίνονος  (627b1-­‐‑2).    
27  This  is  the  upshot  of  the  alternatives  put  to  Cleinias  in  Leg.  627b1-­‐‑628a7.  In  case  of  a  family  feud  
between  just  and  unjust  brothers,  who  is  the  best  δικαστήής?  Is  that  (1)  the  judge  who  eliminated  the  
κακοίί  and  ordered  the  βελτίίονες  to  rule  themselves;  (2)  the  judge  who  made  the  χρηστοίί  rule  and,  
allowing  the  χείίρονες  to  live,  made  them  subject  to  the  rulers  willingly;  or  (3)  the   judge  who  will  
destroy  none,  but  reconciled  them  for  the  rest  of  their  lives  and  laid  down  laws  so  as  to  ensure  that  
they  would  be  friends  towards  each  other  ([δικάάστης]  ὅστις  (…)  διαλλάάξας  δὲ  εἰς  τὸν  ἐπίίλοιπον  
χρόόνον,  νόόµμους  αὐτοῖς  θεὶς  πρὸς  ἀλλήήλους  παραφυλάάττειν  δύύναιτο  ὥστε  εἶναι  φίίλους,  628a1-­‐‑
3).  Also  628a9-­‐‑b4.  
28  Leg.  628a6-­‐‑7.  
29  Leg.  628a9-­‐‑b4.  
30  Leg.  628c9-­‐‑11.  
31   Leg.   628d4-­‐‑e1.   Note   the   difference   between   the   use   of   the   πολιτικόός   ὀρθῶς   and   νοµμοθέέτης  
ἀκριβήής,  compared  to  Republic  Book  I.  By  contrast,  in  Laws  Book  I,  a  lawgiver  in  the  narrow  sense  is  
the  lawgiver  who  legislates  with  the  correct  goal  in  mind,  peace;  whereas  in  Republic,  the  doctor  in  
the   true   sense   is   the   expert  doctor,  who  qua  doctor,  does  not  make  mistakes   (he   is  ἀβλαβήής).   See  
chapter  one,  p.  27.  
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and  to  hold  true  of  societies  in  general:  a  genuine,  sensible  lawgiver  will  aim  for  
internal  harmony.    
   All  of  this  bears  implications  for  the  nature  of  ἀρετήή.  First,  the  Athenian  
seems   to   be  moving   away   from  a   culturally   specific   notion  of  ἀρετήή.   Second,  
the  substitution  of  peace  for  war  opens  the  way  for  ἀρετήή  to  be  reinterpreted  in  
light  of   this  new   insight.  With  an  appeal   to   the  poet  Theognis,32   the  Athenian  
introduces   into   the  discussion   the   idea   that   the  warrior  who   is   firm   in  στάάσις  
(internal  war),  is  far  superior  to  the  warrior  in  a  foreign  war,  who  is  praised  by  
the   Spartan   poet   Tyrtaeus.   The   reason   is   that   the   good   warrior   in   στάάσις  
possesses,   besides   ἀνδρείία,   the   virtues   of   δικαιοσύύνη,   σωφροσύύνη   and  
φρόόνησις,  as  well,  whereas  Tyrtaeus  praises  ἀνδρείία  by  itself.  The  introduction  
of   these   three   virtues   besides   ἀνδρείία   is   good   Socratic-­‐‑Platonic   practice:  
together  ἀνδρείία,  δικαιοσύύνη,  σωφροσύύνη  and  φρόόνησις  are  the  four  cardinal  
virtues.33  We  can  therefore  easily  accept,  or  at  least  are  expected  to  easily  accept,  
the  Athenian’s  claim  that  the  στάάσις-­‐‑warrior  is  superior.  
   The  implication  of  the  Athenian’s  introduction  of  the  three  other  ἀρεταίί  
besides  ἀνδρείία  is  that  ἀνδρείία  is  only  a  “part”  of  virtue  (µμόόριον).34  Crete  and  
                                                                                                              
32  Leg.  630a4-­‐‑6.  
33  In  Book  I,  Leg.  630d9-­‐‑631b1,  the  Athenian  talks  about  the  εἴδη  of  virtue,  and  about  ἀνδρείία  as  one  
µμόόριον;  cf.  631c5-­‐‑d6,  632d9-­‐‑e3  and  633a7-­‐‑9.  In  631b3-­‐‑d6,  he  distinguishes  the  virtues  as  θεῖα  ἀγαθάά  
from   the   ἀνθρώώπινα   ἀγαθάά,   and   ranks   them   hierarchically,   ἀνδρείία   being   the   lowest   virtue,  
φρόόνησις  and  νοῦς  the  highest,  or  ἡγέέµμων  of  all  the  virtues.  MÜLLER  (1968),  16-­‐‑17,  notes  that  the  
systematisation  of   the   four  virtues   in   a  hierarchy   is   an   innovation  of  Laws,   but   that   it   “[wird]   an  
keiner  Stelle  des  Gedankengangs  irgendeine  Bedeutung  gewinnen”  (17).  The  unity  and  plurality  of  
the   four   virtues   is   never  mentioned   in   the   preambles,  where   one  might   have   expected   it.   For   an  
explanation  of  the  logic  behind  the  unity  of  virtue  (especially   in  Laches,  Charmides  and  Protagoras),  
see   RADEMAKER   (2005),   295-­‐‑299;   see   also   further   bibliographical   references   in   n.   1   on   295,   and  
STALLEY  (1983),  56-­‐‑58.  As  RADEMAKER  explains,  “if  the  quality  of  σωφροσύύνη  overlaps  with  that  of  
ἀνδρείία   in   one   of   its  manifestations,   it   should   follow   that   the   qualities   overlap   throughout   their  
manifestations:   for   it   is   a   ’Socratic’   axiom   that   it   is  one-­‐‑and-­‐‑the-­‐‑same   state   of   soul   that   explains   all  
different   types   of   behaviour   that   are   called   by   the   same   virtue   term”   (ibid.,   297).   The   question   is  
therefore,  how,  in  the  absence  of  a  theory  of  soul  parts,  the  conceptual  unity  of  virtue  is  upheld  in  
Laws.  
34  Leg.  630e1.  A  standard  sympotic  song,  and  the  one  most  frequently  invoked  in  Plato’s  work,  is  the  
skolion  on  the  “four  best  things”.  These  four  things  were  usually  a  selection  of  such  things  as  health,  
wealth,   beauty   or   physical   prowess,   or   living   one’s   life   among   friends.   See   ΤECUȘAN   (1990),   240,  
with   references   to  ancient   sources   for   this  kind  of   skolion.  When  Plato   invokes   the  motive  of   four  
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Sparta   are   criticized   for   cultivating   only   a   part   of   virtue,   and   that   the   “least  
worthy”  (τὸ  φαυλόότατον  [µμόόριον]35)  or  “smallest”  (τὸ  σµμικρόότατον  [µμόόριον]36)  
part.  To  refer  to  one  of  the  four  cardinal  ἀρεταίί  as  a  part  of  virtue,  and  to  speak  
of   different   “forms”   (εἴδη37)   of   virtue   is   a   familiar   way,   in   fact,   Socrates’  
characteristic  way  (recall  for  instance  Protagoras),  of  speaking  about  the  relation  
between   the   four   virtues.   In   this   argument,   considering   ἀνδρείία   as   a   part   of  
virtue  now  opens  conceptual  room  in  the  discussion  for  the  introduction  of  the  
notion   of   “the   greatest   virtue”,   ἡ   µμεγίίστη   ἀρετήή,38   or   “complete   virtue”,   ἡ  
(συµμ)πᾶσα  ἀρετήή.39    
   This  complete  virtue   is  human  excellence   in  times  of  peace:   the  friendly  
behaviour   that   enables   human   beings   to   live   together   in   a   society   without  
internal  conflict.  It  has  already  been  established  that  internal  harmony,  peace,  is  
τὸ  ἄριστον  for  a  society.  The  distinction  between  a  “part”  of  ἀρετήή  (ἀνδρείία)  
and   ἡ   πᾶσα   ἀρετήή   is   thus   used   to   widen   the   scope   of   ἀρετήή   beyond   its  
culturally   specific   interpretation   and   introduce   a   notion   of   human   excellence  
characteristic  of  humankind  in  general.  This  more  comprehensive  notion  of  ἀρετήή  
is  the  quality  that  enables  people  to  avoid  στάάσις:  φιλίία.    
   The   re-­‐‑introduction   in   Laws   of   the   Socratic-­‐‑Platonic   axiom   of   the  
simultaneous  unity  and  plurality  of   the  ἀρεταίί  may  at   first   remind  one  of   the  
solution   of   this   problem   in   the   form   offered   in   Protagoras,   that   ἀρετήή   is  
analogous  to  ἐπιστήήµμη.40  Yet  in  Laws  Book  I,  the  unity  of  the  virtues  is  used  to  
set  up  a  general  notion  of  human  virtue  as  a  biological  quality,  characteristic  of  
humankind,   who   therefore   emerges   as   a   distinctly   social   species.   This   social  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
sympotic  goods,  “his  basic  attitude  to  these  sympotic  values  is  to  set  them  in  contrast  to  real  virtue”,  
ibid.  
35  Leg.  630e2.  
36  Leg.  631a5.  
37  Leg.  630e3,  632e2.  
38  Leg.  630c3-­‐‑4.  
39  Leg.  630b3,  e2-­‐‑3.  
40  See  KAHN  (1996),  chapter  8,  especially  216-­‐‑224  (with  reference  to  the  recurrence  of  this  theme  in  
Laws  XII  on  p.  219).  Ἀρετήή  as  ἐπιστήήµμη  in  turn  presupposes  a  metaphysical  basis,  for  ἐπιστήήµμη  has  
an  object  (the  Idea  of  the  Good).  
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virtue  is  the  same  for  all  human  societies  and  thus  proceeds  beyond  culturally  
specific   interpretations   of   ἀρετήή.   The   familiar   Platonic   terminology   of   virtue  
and   its   parts   here   serves   a  non-­‐‑metaphysically   determined   concept   of   human  
excellence:   that   of   a   unificatory   notion   of   ἀρετήή   over   and   above   regional  
interpretations.  The  notion  of  a  “part”  of  virtue,  in  this  case  ἀνδρείία,  has  served  
to   introduce   a   regional   variant   of   ἀρετήή.   But   these   regional   differences   are  
eclipsed  when  a  more  general  perspective,  detached  from  regional  differences,  
on  human  society  and  human  civilization  as  a  whole  is  assumed.    
  
  
3 . 2    Se t t ing    the    s c ene    I I :    sys s i t ia   and    sympos ia      
3.2.1   The  weak  spot  of  Spartan  law    
Returning  to  the  Cretan  and  Spartan  point  of  departure,  the  Athenian  proposes  
to   define   courage.   Is   ἀνδρείία   simply   a   battle   against   one’s   fears   and   pains—
here  he  substitutes  the  Socratic-­‐‑Platonic  interpretation  of  ἀνδρείία  as  control  of  
one’s  fears  for  the  Spartan  conception  of  ἀνδρείία  as  courage  in  the  face  of  the  
enemy—or   is   it   also   the   διαµμάάχη   against   pleasures   and   hard-­‐‑to-­‐‑resist  
temptations?41   Megillus,   who   now   joins   in,   answers   that   ἀνδρείία   is   a   battle  
against   all   of   them.   But   surely,   the  Athenian   asks,   Zeus   and  Apollo   have   not  
codified   a   “lame   courage”   (χωλὴν   τὴν   ἀνδρείίαν   νενοµμοθετήήκατον,   634a2)?  
That  Spartan  and  Cretan  institutions  train  the  capacity  to  resist  fear  is  granted.  
But  can  Cleinias  and  Megillus  name  practices  in  their  cities  that  bring  citizens  in  
contact  with  ἡδοναίί,   so   as   to   force   and  persuade   them  by  means   of   praise   to  
                                                                                                              
41   Leg.   633c8-­‐‑d3   (the   Athenian   is   speaking):   τὴν   ἀνδρείίαν,   δέέ,   φέέρε,   τίί   θῶµμεν;   πόότερον   ἁπλῶς  
οὕτως   εἶναι   πρὸς   φόόβους   καὶ   λύύπας   διαµμάάχην   µμόόνον,   ἢ   καὶ   πρὸς   πόόθους   τε   καὶ   ἡδονὰς   καίί  
τινας   δεινὰς   θωπείίας   κολακικάάς,   αἳ   καὶ   τῶν   σεµμνῶν   οἰοµμέένων   εἶναι   τοὺς   θυµμοὺς   ποιοῦσιν  
κηρίίνους.    
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keep   them   under   control   (ἠνάάγκαζε   καὶ   ἔπειθεν   τιµμαῖς   ὥστε   κρατεῖν  
αὐτῶν)?42    
   Megillus   now   confirms   that,   although   he   was   able   to   come   up   with  
Spartan   laws   that   counteract   pains,43   he   cannot   do   the   same   for   pleasures.  
Spartan   law   is,   then,   fundamentally   inadequate   because   it   fails   to   enable   a  
person  to  achieve  what  the  interlocutors  designated  the  most  difficult  victory  of  
all,   the   victory   over   oneself.44   The  underlying   implication   is   that   resistance   to  
pleasures   needs   to   be   practised.45   The   train   of   thought   concerning   learning   to  
master  pleasures  entirely  follows  the  logic  of  the  Spartan  syssitia  and  gymnasia,  
which  are  instituted  for  practising  to  master  fears.  
   The  Athenian  now  moves  the  discussion  beyond  the  Spartan  and  Cretan  
laws,   and   goes   on   to   discuss,   after   courage,   the   control   over   pleasures,   the  
virtue   of   “self-­‐‑control”   (σωφροσύύνη,   635e6).   No   institution   is   entirely  
undisputable  (εἶναι  …  ἀναµμφισβητήήτως,  636a4-­‐‑5).  It  is  as  with  a  human  body:  
the   same   regimen   is   often   harmful   and   beneficial   at   the   same   time.46   The  
gymnasia  and  syssitia  are  no  exception:  they  may  be  beneficial  for  poleis  in  many  
respects,  but  there  are  also  serious  drawbacks  involved.  In  the  case  of   internal  
                                                                                                              
42  Leg.  634a6-­‐‑b6.  
43  In  the  exchange  between  him  and  the  Athenian  in  Leg.  633a4-­‐‑c7.  These  are:  (1)  the  συσσίίτια;  (2)  
the  γυµμνάάσια;  (3)  θήήρα;  (4)  κρυπτείία;  (5)  γυµμνοπαιδίίαι.  
44  Leg.  634a6-­‐‑c5.  
45   Leg.   635c3-­‐‑d1:   ταὐτὸν   δὴ   τοῦτ᾿,   οἶµμαι,   καὶ   πρὸς   τὸ   ἡδονὰς   ἔδει   διανοεῖσθαι   τὸν   αὐτὸν  
νοµμοθέέτην,  λέέγοντα  αὐτὸν  πρὸς  ἑαυτὸν  ὡς  ἡµμῖν  ἐκ  νέέων  εἰ  ἄπειροι   τῶν  µμεγίίστων  ἡδονῶν  οἱ  
πολῖται   γενήήσονται,   καὶ   ἀµμελέέτητοι   γιγνόόµμενοι   ἐν   ταῖς   ἡδοναῖς   καρτερεῖν   καὶ   µμηδὲν   τῶν  
αἰσχρῶν  ἀναγκάάζεσθαι  ποιεῖν,  ἕνεκα  τῆς  γλυκυθυµμίίας  τῆς  πρὸς  τὰς  ἡδονὰς  ταὖτὸν  πείίσονται  
τοῖς  ἡττωµμέένοις  τῶν  φόόβων·∙  “Now  I  presume  that  this  same  lawgiver  should  have  held  the  same  
view  about  pleasures  as  well,   and   should  have  argued  with  himself   that,   if   our   citizens  grow  up  
from   their   youth  unpractised   in   the  greatest  pleasures,   the   consequence  must  be   that,  when   they  
find   themselves   amongst   pleasures   without   being   trained   in   the   duty   of   resisting   them   and   of  
refusing   to   commit   any   disgraceful   act,   because   of   the   natural   attraction   of   pleasures,   they   will  
suffer   the   same   fate   as   those  who   are  worsted   by   their   fears   (…)”,   (transl.   BURY).   For   a  different  
view,  see  BELFIORE  (1986):  “Plato’s  new  view  that  antirational  emotion  is  valuable  in  itself  depends  
on   a   new   view   that   sôphrosynê   involves   constant   strife   (…).   Accordingly,   sôphrosynê   is   treated  
idealistically  as  the  complete  absence  of  anti-­‐‑rational  emotion”  (428).  
46  Leg.  636a6-­‐‑b1.  
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unrest   (στάάσεις),   gymnasia   and   syssitia   have   harmful   effects.47   They   can   be   a  
danger  for  internal  social  harmony—precisely  that  which  was  claimed  to  be  the  
greatest   human   good.   In   other   words,   the   Athenian   invites   his   Dorian  
interlocutors  to  reassess  the  strong  and  weak  points  of  their  native  institutions  
in  the  light  of  the  newly  established  conclusions  of  their  current  discussion.  
   Yet   for   those  who  have   lived   their  whole   life   in   a   certain   tradition   it   is  
hard   to   accept   that   other   laws  and   customs  might  be   as  good,   or   even  better,  
than   their   own.   Megillus   objects   that,   even   though   the   Athenian’s   reasoning  
seems   somehow   correct   and   he   finds   himself   unable   to   come   up   with   a  
counterargument,  he  is  still  convinced  that  the  Spartan  lawgiver  was  right,  and  
that  the  Spartan  avoidance  of  pleasures  (τὸ  τὰς  ἡδονὰς  φεύύγειν,  636e6)   is   the  
only   correct   way   of   dealing   with   them.48   Instead   of   trying   to   refute   the  
Athenian’s  argument,  he  points  to  the  benefit  of  the  laws  that  order  abstention  
from  pleasures:  they  save  people  from  the  particularly  intolerable  institution  of  
the   symposia.49   Spartan   law   has   completely   banished   from   its   territory   the  
symposion,  where  men  as  a  rule  fall  victim  to  the  most  overwhelming  pleasures,  
incivilities,   and  a   complete   lack  of   sense.50  Every  person   raised  under  Spartan  
                                                                                                              
47  Leg.   636b1-­‐‑3:   ἐπεὶ  καὶ  τὰ  γυµμνάάσια  ταῦτα  καὶ  τὰ  συσσίίτια  πολλὰ  µμὲν  ἄλλα  νῦν  ὠφελεῖ  τὰς  
πόόλεις,  πρὸς  δὲ  τὰς  στάάσεις  χαλεπάά.  See  WILLETTS  (1955),  154.  
48  Leg.   636e4-­‐‑637a2   (Megillus):  Λέέγεται  µμὲν  ταῦτα,  ὦ  ξέένε,  καλῶς  πως·∙  οὐ  µμὴν  ἀλλ᾿  ἀφασίία  γ᾿  
ἡµμᾶς   λαµμβάάνει   τίί   ποτε   χρὴ   λέέγειν   πρὸς   ταῦτα,   ὅµμως   δ᾿   ἔµμοιγε   ὀρθῶς   δοκεῖ   τὸ   τὰς   ἡδονὰς  
φεύύγειν  διακελεύύεσθαι  τόόν  γε  ἐν  Λακεδαίίµμονι  νοµμοθέέτην,  περὶ  δὲ  τῶν  ἐν  Κνωσῷ  νόόµμων  ὅδε,  ἂν  
ἐθέέλῃ,  βοηθήήσει.  τὰ  δ᾿  ἐν  Σπάάρτῃ  κάάλλιστ᾿  ἀνθρώώπων  δοκεῖ  µμοι  κεῖσθαι  τὰ  περὶ  τὰς  ἡδονὰς·∙  
“What  you  say,  Stranger,  is  excellent,  I  suppose;  none  the  less  I  am  at  a  loss  to  know  what  reply  I  
should  make   to   it.   Still,   in  my   opinion,   the   Lacedaemonian   lawgiver  was   right   in   ordaining   the  
avoidance   of   pleasures,  while   as   to   the   laws   of   Cnosus—our   friend   Clinias,   if   he   thinks   fit,   will  
defend  them.  The  rules  about  pleasures  in  Sparta  seem  to  me  the  best  in  the  world”  (transl.  BURY).  
On   people’s   partiality   when   it   comes   to   judging   customs   other   than   their   own,   see   also   the  
Athenian’s   comments   in   637b7-­‐‑d1   and  638c2-­‐‑639a8,   and  his   comparison  with  goat-­‐‑keeping  at   the  
end  (for  which  see  below,  p.  96).  
49   It   is   thus   the   Spartan  Megillus,   not   the  Athenian,  who   is  made   to   bring   up   the   subject   of   the  
symposia.  
50  Leg.  636e8-­‐‑637a7  (Megillus):  τὰ  δ᾿  ἐν  Σπάάρτῃ  κάάλλιστ᾿  ἀνθρώώπων  δοκεῖ  µμοι  κεῖσθαι  τὰ  περὶ  τὰς  
ἡδονὰς·∙  οὗ  γὰρ  µμάάλιστ’  ἄνθρωποι  καὶ  µμεγίίσταις  προσπίίπτουσιν  ἡδοναῖς  καὶ  ὕβρεσι  καὶ  ἀνοίίᾳ  
πάάσῃ,  τοῦτ’  ἐξέέβαλεν  ὁ  νόόµμος  ἡµμῶν  ἐκ  τῆς  χώώρας  συµμπάάσης,  καὶ  οὔτ’  ἂν  ἐπ’  ἀγρῶν  ἴδοις,  οὔτ’  
ἐν  ἄστεσιν  ὅσων  Σπαρτιάάταις  µμέέλει,  συµμπόόσια  οὐδ’  ὁπόόσα  τούύτοις  συνεπόόµμενα  πάάσας  ἡδονὰς  
κινεῖ  κατὰ  δύύναµμιν,  (…).  “The  rules  about  pleasures  at  Sparta  seem  to  me  the  best  in  the  world.  For  
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law   would   inflict   on   the   spot   the   most   severe   punishment   upon   a   drunken  
partygoer  who  crosses  his  path.51      
   The   Athenian   now   tries   a   different   argument   on   Megillus:   instead   of  
repeating  his  point  that  no  institution  is  entirely  beyond  criticism,  he  notes  that  
wine  is  not  unequivocally  considered  destructive  by  all  societies.  Moreover,  an  
Athenian  (in  whose  city  drinking  is,  obviously,  allowed)  might  meet  a  Spartan’s  
criticism   of   wine   by   criticizing   the   ἄνεσις,   “liberty”,   of   Spartan   women   in  
turn.52  Since  Megillus  is  particularly  sensitive  to  criticism  of  his  city’s  laws,  the  
Athenian   immediately   tries   to   alleviate   it   by   pointing   to   the   stock   phrase  
brought  up  when  citizens   from  different   cultural  backgrounds  marvel   at   each  
other’s  customs.  There  is  one  excuse  (µμίία  ἀπόόκρισις  ἀπολύύεσθαι  δοκεῖ  τοῦ  µμὴ  
κακῶς  ἔχειν  ἀλλ᾿  ὀρθῶς,  637c4-­‐‑5):  to  appeal  to  “law”,  νόόµμος.  Το  the  perplexed  
stranger  one  may  say:  “Don’t  be  surprised,  stranger;  it  is  our  law,  and  probably  
in   your   country   there   exists   a   different   law   about   these   same   issues”   (Μὴ  
θαύύµμαζε,  ὦ   ξέένε·∙   νόόµμος   ἔσθ᾿   ἡµμῖν   οὗτος,   ἴσως   δ᾿   ὑµμῖν  περὶ   αὐτῶν   τούύτων  
ἕτερος,  637c6-­‐‑d1).    
   Yet   when   Megillus   once   more,   this   time   quite   aggressively,   insists   on  
Spartan  superiority—in  war,  and,  hence,  cultural—over  those  who  are  allowed  
to  consume  wine,53  the  conversation  reaches  an  impasse.  The  Athenian  remains  
good-­‐‑humoured  and  is  able  to  win  Megillus  over.54  It  is  a  fact  that  people  tend  
to  condemn  a  custom  they  have  only  heard  bad  things  about.  The  example  the  
Athenian  puts  forward  is  the  rather  harmless  one  of  goat-­‐‑keeping:  what  if  one  
person   praised   the   rearing   of   goats,   and   claimed   that   a   goat   was   a   fine  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
our  law  banished  entirely  from  the  land  that  institution  which  gives  the  most  occasion  for  men  to  
fall  into  excessive  pleasures  and  riotings  and  follies  of  every  description;  neither  in  the  country  nor  
in   the   cities   controlled  by   Spartiates   is   a  drinking-­‐‑club   to   be   seen  nor   any  of   the  practices  which  
belong  to  such  and  foster  to  the  utmost  all  kinds  of  pleasure”  (transl.  BURY).  
51  Leg.  637a7-­‐‑b1  (Megillus):  οὐδ᾿  ἔστιν  ὅστις  ἂν  ἀπαντῶν  κωµμάάζοντίί  τινι  µμετὰ  µμέέθης  οὐκ  ἂν  τὴν  
µμεγίίστην  δίίκην  εὐθὺς  ἐπιθείίη  (…).  
52  See  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  ad  loc.  
53  Leg.  638a1-­‐‑2.  
54  Leg.  638c2-­‐‑e6.  
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possession,  whereas  another  person,  who  had  only  seen  goats  when  they  were  
unherded  and  herded  badly,  would  be  critical   (πᾶν  θρέέµμµμα  ἄναρχον  ἢ  µμετὰ  
κακῶν   ἀρχόόντων   ἰδὼν   οὕτω   µμέέµμφοιτο,   639a5-­‐‑6;   cf.   639c3-­‐‑5)—would   such  
criticism   be   reasonable?55   The   implication   is   not   spelled   out,   but   obvious:  
someone  who  had   seen  goats   being  herded  by   a   good  herdsman  would  have  
been  more  positive  about  goats.      
   There  follows  a  brief  dicussion  of  what  makes  a  good  ἄρχων.  Although  a  
dialectical   definition   of   a   good   ἄρχων   is   hardly   unique   in   Plato   (recall,   for  
example,  Book  I  of  Republic),  it  soon  becomes  apparent  that  the  good  ἄρχων  is  
not   defined   as   the   person  who   possesses   the   relevant   τέέχνη.   In   fact,   to   be   in  
possession  of   the  relevant  τέέχνη   is  not  sufficient,  and  only  part  of   the  ἄρχων’s  
qualification.  A  helmsman  who  only  has  the  τέέχνη  of  steersmanship  (ἐὰν  τὴν  
ναυτικὴν   ἔχῃ   ἐπιστήήµμην   µμόόνον,   639a9-­‐‑b1),   but   is   at   the   same   time   seasick  
(ναυτιᾷ)  is  not  a  ruler  of  much  use  (χρηστὸς  ἄρχων).56  Likewise,  a  general  who  
possesses   the   πολεµμικὴ   τέέχνη   but   is   a   coward   amid   dangers,   and   seasick  
because  of  drunkenness  of  fear  (ὑπὸ  µμέέθης  τοῦ  φόόβου  ναυτιᾷ),  is  not  a  capable  
military   leader.57   A   useful   leader,   able   to   cope   with   his   function   (χρηστὸς  
ἄρχων,   ἱκανὸς  ἄρχειν)  needs  an  additional  quality  apart   from  his  τέέχνη.  The  
two  analogies  are  not  explicit  about  what  sort  of  capacity   this   is.  What  sort  of  
quality  is  immunity  to  seasickness  at  sea  or  to  “seasickness”  (cowardice)  on  the  
battlefield?   An   additional   difficulty   is   that   the   two   examples   may   not   be  
entirely  analogous.  Perhaps  the  example  of  the  general,  against  the  background  
of   the   discussion   of   ἀνδρείία,   implies   that   one   can   practise   to   overcome  
fearfulness.  On  the  other  hand,  being  prone  to  seasickness  at  sea  is  more  likely  a  
matter  of  natural  disposition.  What  can  be  established  with  security  is  that  the  
common  denominator  of   the  two  examples   is  a  kind  of  “firmness”—not  being  
put  off  by  the  inherent  risks  of  the  profession.  
                                                                                                              
55  Leg.  639a2-­‐‑7.  
56  Leg.  639a9-­‐‑b2.  
57  Leg.  639b5-­‐‑7.  
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   We  return  to  the  theme  of  the  symposia.  The  Athenian,   it  now  turns  out,  
has  in  fact  a  long-­‐‑standing  interest  in  these  congregations.  Still,  even  though  he  
has   seen   many   symposia   at   many   different   places,   and   has,   “so   to   say,  
questioned”  (ὡς  ἔπος  εἰπεῖν  διηρώώτηκα,  i.e.,  “participated  in”58)  all  of  them,  he  
concedes  that  he  has  never  seen  a  symposion  that  was  regulated  correctly.  From  
the  recent  analogon  of  goat-­‐‑keeping  it  followed  that  a  group  (κοινωνίία)  can  only  
be   beneficial   under   the   guidance   of   a   capable   leader.   The   commander   of   an  
army   in   a   hostile   encounter   had   to   be   absolutely   fearless   and   undisturbed  
(µμηδὲν   τὸ   παράάπαν   δεδιόότα   µμηδὲ   θορυβούύµμενον,   640b2-­‐‑3).   By   analogy,   the  
same  obtains  for  the  leader  of  the  friendly  ὁµμιλίία,  the  symposion,  which  is,  due  
to   the  participants’   increasing  drunkenness,  hardly  without  disturbance.59  The  
task   of   the   symposiarch   is   to   watch   over   the   existing   φιλίία   between   the  
members,   and   endeavour   to   increase   it.60   This   requires   the   ἄρχων   of   a  
symposion,  the  symposiarch,  to  be  “imperturbable”  (ἀθόόρυβος).61  In  addition,  he  
must   be   “sober”   (νῆφος),62   “sensible”   (φρόόνιµμος)63   or   “clever”   (σοφόός),64   and  
not   too  young.65  Naturally,   a  drunken   steersman  or  any  other  drunken   leader  
will  upset  everything  under  his  command.66  But   to  condemn  an   institution  on  
                                                                                                              
58  For  a  different  reading  see  ENGLAND  ad  loc.,  who  takes  ὡς  ἔπος  εἶπεῖν  with  πάάσας.  
59  Leg.  640b6-­‐‑c2.  
60  The  symposiarch  (the  term  itself  is  not  used  in  Laws)  is  φύύλαξ  τῆς  τε  ὑπαρχούύσης  φιλίίας  αὐτοῖς,  
καὶ   ἔτι   πλείίονος   ἐπιµμελητὴς   ὅπως   ἔσται   διὰ   τὴν   τόότε   συνουσίίαν   (640c10-­‐‑d2).   The   successful  
symposion   is   thus   claimed   to   continue   to   augment   the   φιλίία   between   its   participants   even  
afterwards:   the   description   of   the   symposiarch   manifests   a   distinction   between   the   existing  
friendship  at  the  time  of  the  symposion  (τῆς  ὑπαρχούύσης  φιλίίας),  and  the  expectation  of  increasing  
φιλίία  in  the  future  (ἔτι  πλείίονος  …  ὅπως  ἔσται),  which  will  have  been  caused  “by  that  gathering  
then”,  διὰ  τὴν  τόότε  συνουσίίαν  (τόότε  signals  that  this  is  spoken  in  retrospect).  ENGLAND’s  objections  
ad  loc.  to  the  position  of  τε  in  640c10  are  therefore  misguided.  
61   Leg.   640c6.   The   requirement   “Sich-­‐‑nicht-­‐‑aus-­‐‑der-­‐‑Fassung-­‐‑bringen-­‐‑lassen   (µμὴ   θορυβεῖσθαι)”  
(640b6),  SCHÖPSDAU  ad  640b6-­‐‑8  for  the  symposiarch  is  clearly  pragmatic  in  nature:  the  symposiarch  
must  be  proof  against  the  rising  emotions  and  not  get  carried  away.  See  on  the  characteristics  of  the  
symposiarch  also  ΤECUȘAN  (1990),  251-­‐‑253.  
62  Leg.  640d4.  Cf.  671d5-­‐‑e3.  
63  Leg.  640c9-­‐‑10.  
64  Leg.  640d4.  
65  Leg.  640d6  (by  implication).  
66  Leg.  641e5-­‐‑642a2.  
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the  basis  of   its  very  worst   functioning,  as  Megillus  has  done,   is  a  clear  sign  of  
ἄγνοια.67   The  Athenian  has   now  at   least   succeeded   in   opening   the  way   for   a  
discussion  of  the  symposion,  which  Megillus  previously  stubbornly  resisted.  
       
3.2.2   Illustrating  the  need  for  paideia:  the  “puppet”  
But  if  a  symposion  can  be  beneficial,  what  is  the  benefit  of  drunkennes?  Cleinias  
can  see  the  good  syssitia  do  us:  if  an  army  fights  under  good  leadership,  it  will  
win  victory   in  war,   a   not   inconsiderable   good.  But   if   the  Athenian   is   right   to  
assert   that   a   symposion,   at   least   when   under   the   guidance   of   a   competent  
symposiarch,  has   favourable   effects,  what   important  good   results  derive   from  
such  a  well-­‐‑supervised  symposion,  for  individuals  and  for  the  polis  (συµμποσίίου  
δὲ  ὀρθῶς  παιδαγωγηθέέντος  τίί  µμέέγα  [sc.  ἀγαθὸν]  ἰδιώώταις  ἢ  τῇ  πόόλει  γίίγνοιτ᾿  
ἄν;  641b1-­‐‑2;  cf.  641a4-­‐‑5)?  The  Athenian  corrects  Cleinias’  question:  naturally,  if  
one  inquires  after  the  benefit  for  the  city  of  one  symposion  by  itself  that  benefit  
will  be   little   indeed  (εἴποιµμεν  ἂν  ὡς  ἑνὸς  µμὲν  βραχύύ  τι  τῇ  πόόλει  γίίγνοιτ᾿  ἂν  
ὄφελος,  641b5-­‐‑6).  But  if  Cleinias  means  to  ask  a  more  general  question  of  what  
great  benefit  education  bestows  upon  the  city  (εἰ  δ᾿  ὅλως  ἐρωτᾷς  παιδείίαν  τῶν  
παιδευθέέντων,   641b6-­‐‑7),   that   question   is   not   difficult   to   answer:   those   who  
have   been   well   educated   become   virtuous   people   (παιδευθέέντες   µμὲν   εὖ  
γίίγνοιντ᾿   ἂν   ἄνδρες   ἀγαθοίί,   641b8).68   Here   begins   the   argument   that  
determines   the   rest   of   the  discussion  until   the   end  of  Book   II:  whether  or  not  
symposia  are  beneficial  for  παιδείία.    
   The  Athenain  first  presents  a  general  idea  of  what  he  has  in  mind  when  
he  uses  the  term  παιδείία.  Τhose  who  aim  to  become  professionals  in  anything  
                                                                                                              
67  Leg.  640d9-­‐‑e5.  
68   Interestingly,  when  Cleinias  asks   the  Athenian  whether  he  can  assert  whether   this  claim  is   true  
(641d4-­‐‑5),   the  Athenian  responds  by  a  disclaimer:  Tὸ  µμὲν  ἀληθέές,  ὦ  ξέένε,  διισχυρίίζεσθαι  ταῦτα  
οὕτως  ἔχειν,  πολλῶν  ἀµμφισβητούύντων,  θεοῦ·∙  εἰ  δ᾿  ὅπῃ  ἐµμοὶ  φαίίνεται  δεῖ  λέέγειν,  οὐδεὶς  φθόόνος,  
”The  truth  of  my  statement,  which  is  disputed  by  many,  it  is  for  God  to  assert;  but  I  am  quite  ready  
to  give,  if  required,  my  own  opinion,  now  that  we  have,  in  fact,  embarked  on  a  discussion  of  laws  
and  constitutions”  (transl.  BURY)  (641d6-­‐‑8).  The  goal  of  the  discussion  is  not  to  map  out  the  truth.  
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must  practice   it   from  childhood   (τοῦτο  αὐτὸ  ἐκ  παίίδων  εὐθὺς  µμελετᾶν  δεῖν,  
643b5).69  This  holds  true  for  all  professions,  but  the  Athenian  wants  to  reserve  
the   term  παιδείία   for  παιδείία   in  excellence   (πρὸς  ἀρετὴν  …  παιδείίαν,  643e4).  
From  the  outset,  παιδείία  is  interpreted  as  practising  or  training  (consistent  with  
the   Spartan   idea   that   ἀνδρείία   must   be   trained,   which   was   the   point   of  
departure   in   the   discussion).  Παιδείία   is   a   teleological   process.70   The   virtuous  
(ἀγαθοίί)  are  those  able  to  control  themselves,  which,  in  turn,  is  consistent  with  
the  earlier  definition  of  virtue  as  being  κρείίττων  ἑαυτοῦ.71  This  capacity  must  
be  practised  by  controlled  exposure.    
   The  Athenian   illustrates  his  claim  about   the  need   for  education  with  an  
εἰκώών  (644c1ff.).  This  is  the  εἰκώών  of  the  “puppet”  (θαῦµμα),72  and  we  do  well  to  
                                                                                                              
69  See  Leg.  643b4-­‐‑d3.  
70  Leg.   643c6-­‐‑d3:   (…)  καὶ  πειρᾶσθαι  διὰ  τῶν  παιδιῶν  ἐκεῖσε  τρέέπειν  τὰς  ἡδονὰς  καὶ   ἐπιθυµμίίας  
τῶν  παίίδων,  οἷ  ἀφικοµμέένους  αὐτοὺς  δεῖ  τέέλος  ἔχειν.  κεφάάλαιον  δὴ  παιδείίας  λέέγοµμεν  τὴν  ὀρθὴν  
τροφήήν,  ἣ  τοῦ  παίίζοντος  τὴν  ψυχὴν  εἰς  ἔρωτα  µμάάλιστα  ἄξει  τούύτου  ὃ  δεήήσει  γενόόµμενον  ἄνδρ’  
αὐτὸν   τέέλειον   εἶναι   τῆς   τοῦ   πράάγµματος   ἀρετῆς·∙   “So,   by   means   of   their   games,   we   should  
endeavour  to  turn  the  tastes  and  desires  of  the  children  in  the  direction  of  that  object  which  forms  
their  ultimate  goal.  First  and  foremost,  education,  we  say,  consists  in  that  right  nurture  which  most  
strongly   draws   the   soul   of   the   child  when   at   play   to   a   love   for   that   pursuit   of  which,  when   he  
becomes  a  man,  he  must  possess  a  perfect  mastery”  (transl.  BURY).  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994)  ad  loc.:  notes  
that  τέέλος  ἔχειν  can  be  interpreted  equally  as  “erwachsen  sein”,  but  also,  in  virtue  of  τέέλειον  εἶναι,  
“Vollendung,   vollkommene   Beherrschung”.   In  Laws,   old   age   (being  πρεσβύύτερος)   is   particularly  
associated  with  complete  virtue,  see  below,  p.  116  and  n.  134  ibid.     
71  Leg.   644b6-­‐‑7   (the  Athenian   is   speaking):   Καὶ   µμὴν   πάάλαι   γε   συνεχωρήήσαµμεν  ὡς  ἀγαθῶν   µμὲν  
ὄντων  τῶν  δυναµμέένων  ἄρχειν  αὑτῶν,  κακῶν  δὲ  τῶν  µμήή.  Cf.  626e2-­‐‑5,  where  τὸ  νικᾶν  αὐτὸν  αὑτόόν  
is  the  closing  piece  of  a  quantitative  series  (from  polis  to  individual).  
72  The  accounts  of  the  puppet  analogy  in  the  scholarly  literature  vary.  Many  exegetes  have  defended  
a  pessimistic  reading  of   the  puppet   image,  arguing  that   it   represents   the   indiviual  as  being  at   the  
mercy  of  irrational  forces,  or  lacking  autonomy:  e.g.  GÖRGEMANNS  (1960),  120  n.  2  and  160f.;  RANKIN  
(1962),   131;  KLOSKO   (2006),   219-­‐‑221:   the  puppet   analogy   is   an   extension  of  Plato’s   “lack  of  hope”  
regarding  the  philosopher-­‐‑king  on  the  psychological  level;  NIGHTINGALE  (1999a)  thinks  it  “suggests  
a   lack  of  complete  autonomy”   (104);  RUSSELL   (2005)   thinks   that   the  analogy  “paints  a  notoriously  
alarming   picture   of   human   agency   and   motivation”   (226);   LAKS   (2005),   45-­‐‑47   connects   his  
pessimistic   reading   of   the   puppet   with   Laws   allegedly   second-­‐‑best   polis.   Other   interpreters   have  
defended  an  optimistic  reading  of  the  puppet  analogy.  According  to  ADKINS  (1960)  “(…)  Plato  does  
not   assert   that   the  gods  pull   the   strings  and   that  man  must  needs   follow  where   they   lead,   in   the  
sense  that  each  individual  action  is  determined  from  above.  The  sole  relation  of  the  ‘strings’  to  the  
gods   seems   to   be   that   the   gods   have   planted   them   in   us,   and   we   can   do   nothing   about   their  
presence.  In  that  sense  men  are  at  the  mercy  of  the  strings,  but  in  no  other”  (302);  STALLEY  (1983):  
“[t]he  puppet,  oddly  enough,  has  a  certain  freedom:  it  can  choose  which  of  the  three  strings  to  co-­‐‑
operate  with.  If  we  take  this  seriously  it  suggests  that  the  choosing  self  is  distinct  both  from  reason  
SETT ING   THE   SCENE  100  
keep   in   mind   that   what   has   become   known   as   the   “puppet   analogy”   is   an  
elucidation  of  the  need  for  paideia  understood  as  training.73       
   Each   individual   person,   although   one   (ἕνα,   644c4),   has   within   himself  
two  “unsensible  and  opposite  counsellors”  (συµμβούύλω  ἐναντίίω  τε  καὶ  ἄφρονε,  
644c6-­‐‑7),   namely   “pleasure”   (ἡδονήή),   and   “pain”   (λύύπη).   The   Athenian  
continues  (644c9-­‐‑d3):  
ΑΘ.   Πρὸς   δὲ   τούύτοιν   ἀµμφοῖν   αὖ   δόόξας   µμελλόόντων,   οἷν   κοινὸν   µμὲν  
ὄνοµμα  ἐλπίίς,   ἴδιον  δέέ,  φόόβος  µμὲν  ἡ  πρὸ  λύύπης  ἐλπίίς,  θάάρρος  δὲ  ἡ  πρὸ  
τοῦ  ἐναντίίου·∙  ἐπὶ  δὲ  πᾶσι  τούύτοις  λογισµμὸς  ὅτι  ποτ’  αὐτῶν  ἄµμεινον  ἢ  
χεῖρον,  (…).  
ATH.  (…)  that,  in  addition,  each  man  possesses  opinions  about  how  these  
two   will   occur   in   the   future,74   which   go   by   the   general   name   of  
‘expectations’;   and  of   these,   that  which  anticipates  pain  bears   the   special  
name   of   ‘fear’,   and   that   which   anticipates   pleasure   the   special   name   of  
‘confidence’;   and   in   addition   to   all   these   there   is   ‘calculation’,   deciding  
which  of  them  is  good,  which  bad;  (…).  (Transl.  BURY,  adapted)  
Besides  ἡδονήή  and  λύύπη,  we  also  have  beliefs  about  future  λύύπαι  and  ἡδοναίί,  
with  the  common  name  “expectation”  (ἐλπίίς):  on  the  one  hand,  the  expectation  
of  ἡδονήή,   called  θάάρρος   (“confidence”);  on   the  other  hand,   the  expectation  of  
λύύπη,  called  φόόβος  (“fear”).  In  addition  to  all  of  these  (ἐπὶ  δὲ  πᾶσι  τούύτοις),  we  
have  “calculation”  (λογισµμόός).    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
and  from  the  passions,  (…)”  (61);  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994)  “statt  resignatives  Symbol  hilfloser  Abhängigkeit  
des   Menschen   von   der   Gottheit   zu   sein,   ist   die   Marionette   gerade   umgekehrt   ein   Bild   für   die  
hilfreiche   Lenkung   durch  die  Gottheit”   (235,   italics   in   original);   BOBONICH   (2002)   “we   can  pull   our  
own  wires”  (266);  LAURENT  (2006):  “c’est  l’homme  lui-­‐‑même  qui,  par  les  décisions  de  l’âme,  accepte  
ou  refuse   les   tractions  reçues  de   l’extérieur…”  (461).  My  own  reading  supports   the  more  positive  
assessment  of  the  εἰκώών.  For  a  relatively  neutral  reading,  see  FREDE  (2010),  116-­‐‑120.  
73   See   also   the   end   of   the   εἰκώών   (645c1-­‐‑4):   ἐναργεστέέρου   δ᾿   αὐτοῦ   γενοµμέένου   καὶ   παιδείία   καὶ  
τἆλλα   ἐπιτηδεύύµματα   ἴσως   ἔσται   µμᾶλλον   καταφανῆ,   καὶ   δὴ   καὶ   τὸ   περὶ   τῆς   ἐν   τοῖς   οἴνοις  
διατριβῆς,  κτλ.  “A  further  result  will  be  a  clearer  distinction  between  virtue  and  vice;  the  light  cast  
on  that  problem  will  perhaps  in  turn  help  to  clarify  the  subject  of  education  and  the  various  other  
practices,  particularly  the  business  of  drinking  parties”  (transl.  SAUNDERS).  
74  In  644c9,  πρόός  should  not  be  construed  with  τούύτοιν  ἀµμφοῖν  (“besides  these  two”;  so  SCHÖPSDAU  
[1994],   236,   ad   644d1),   but   in   an   absolute   sense   (“in   addition”).   This   reading   is   confirmed  by  αὖ,  
which  would  otherwise  have  been  redundant:  it  signals  a  distinction  between  ἡδονήή  and  λύύπη  on  
the   one   hand,   and,   on   the   other   hand   δόόξαι   of   τούύτοιν   ἀµμφοῖν   [λύύπη   and   ἡδονήή],   φόόβος   and  
θάάρρος.   This   also   seems   to   have   been   the   reading   of   STEPHANUS   (who   proposed   to   read  
µμελλόόντοιν)  and  AST  (see  ENGLAND  ad  loc.).  
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   In   virtue   of   these   different   sorts   of  motivations  within   one   person,   the  
Athenian   likens   an   individual  human  being   to   a   “puppet,  …   the  divine   [one]  
among  the  living  animals”  (θαῦµμα  …  τῶν  ζῴων  θεῖον,  644d7-­‐‑8).  The  puppet  is  
an  image  of  “each  one  of  us”  (ἕκαστον  ἡµμῶν,  644d8).75  In  this  puppet,  there  are  
three   forces:   θάάρρος,   φόόβος,76   and   λογισµμόός.   These   three   forces   are   called  
“affections”   (πάάθη)77   and   are   claimed   to   resemble   “cords”   or   “strings”   (οἷον  
νεῦρα   ἢ   σµμήήρινθοίί   τινες),   that,   being   opposed   to   each   other,   drag   human  
beings  along  and  draw  them  in  opposite  directions,  towards  opposite  activities  
(σπῶσίίν  τε  ἡµμᾶς  καὶ  ἀλλήήλαις  ἀνθέέλκουσιν  ἐναντίίαι  οὖσαι78  ἐπ᾿  ἐναντίίαις  
πράάξεις,  644e2-­‐‑3).79    
                                                                                                              
75  BOBONICH  (2002)  thinks  that,  since  the  puppet  illustrates  the  phrase  “being  stronger  (or  weaker)  
than  oneself”,  it  illustrates  “what  goes  on  in  a  person  during  akratic  conflict”  (262);  ANNAS  (1999):  
the  puppet  is  “the  person  who  just  drifts  and  yields  unthinkingly  to  the  pulls  of  pleasure  and  pain  
who  is  like  a  puppet…”  (143).  BELFIORE  (1986)  rightly  thinks  that  “all  of  the  benefits  of  drunkenness  
are  intended  for  older  people”  and  that  therefore,  the  puppet  “is  most  naturally  taken  to  represent  
an  older  person”  (425,  cf.  n.  15,  ibid.).  Cf.  ΤECUȘAN  (1990),  247;  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  231.  RANKIN  (1962)  
however   thinks   that   the   puppet   “is   associated  with   childhood”   (131).  Cf.   SCHÖPSDAU   (1994):   the  
analogy  “symboliert  die  Seele  des  erwachsenen  Menschen”  (231).    
76  Cf.  Arist.  EN  II,  1105b21-­‐‑22:  λέέγω  δὲ  πάάθη  µμὲν  ἐπιθυµμίίαν  ὀργὴν  φόόβον  θάάρσος  φθόόνον  χαρὰν  
φιλίίαν  µμῖσος  πόόθον  ζῆλον  ἔλεον,  ὅλως  οἷς  ἕπεται  ἡδονὴ  ἢ  λύύπη,  “By  passions  I  mean  appetite,  
anger,  fear,  confidence,  envy,  joy,  love,  hatred,  longing,  emulation,  pity,  and  in  general  the  feelings  
that  are  accompanied  by  pleasure  or  pain”  (transl.  BARNES).    
77  BOBONICH  (2002),  540  n.  77,  raises  the  question  of  why  λογισµμόός  is  called  one  of  the  πάάθη,  and  
argues  that  πάάθος  in  Plato  is  often  used  in  the  sense  of  ‘state’  rather  than  ‘affection’.  
78  The  cords  are  “opposite”  because  they  pull  a  person  in  opposite  directions,  i.e.,  pleasure  and  pain  
are  opposed  to  each  other,  not  to  reason,  like  BOBONICH  (2002),  264,  541  n.  85,  and  SASSI  (2008),  131,  
138,   claim.   I   do   not   see   evidence   in   this   passage   for   SASSI’s   (2008)   claim   that   “a   primary   aim   of  
legislation  is  the  repression  of  the  whole  plane  of  emotions”  (138-­‐‑147,  italics  in  original).  
79  The  cords  have  often  been  interpreted  as  another  depiction  of  soul  parts,  e.g.  by  SAUNDERS  (1962),  
SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  231;  WOERTHER  (2008),  95-­‐‑97;  SASSI  (2008),  130;  IRWIN  (2010),  99-­‐‑100.  BOBONICH  
(2002),  261-­‐‑263  and  Chapter  4,  has  correctly  argued   (on   the  basis  of  arguments  different   from  my  
own)   that   the  puppet-­‐‑image  does  not   involve   a   tripartite   soul   (cf.   FREDE   [2010],   118):   none  of   the  
emotions  or  beliefs  “is  described  as  a  part  or  as  agent-­‐‑like  and  no  affection  is  the  sort  of  thing  that  
could  have  beliefs  or  desires”  (261).  He  is  criticized  by  GERSON  (2003)  and  KAHN  (2004),  who  argues  
that   the  peculiarities  of  Laws’  psychology  can  be  adequately  explained  by   its  different   context,   so  
that   there   is   no   need   to   postulate   a   change   in   Plato’s   thinking   about   the   soul,   which   he   thinks  
unlikely  since  Timaeus  upholds   the   tripartite  conception  of   the  soul.  SASSI   (2008)  argues   that  Laws  
“downgrades”   θυµμόός   and   that   the   “regulatory   force   of   law   is   intended   precisely   to   fill   the   gap  
between   the   rational   and   the   irrational   that   is   opened   up   by   the   reduced   motivational   role   of  
thumos”  (138);  for  a  similar  association  between  θυµμόός  and  law:  SAUNDERS  (1962).  The  question  of  
whether   the   later   dialogues   support   a   tripartite   or   bipartite   soul   is   a   vexed   issue   in   itself.   For  
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   The  λογισµμόός  weighs  up  the  strong  and  weak  points  of  the  δόόξαι  about  
the   future.   The   term   λογισµμόός,   “calculation”,   computatio,   implies   that   this  
involves  some  sort  of  rationality.  The  λογισµμόός  reasons  out  how  far  one  must  
go  in  ἡδονήή  and  λύύπη  and  helps  one  to  choose,  or  enables  one  to  make  better  
choices—it  is  therefore  not  a  standard  or  criterion,  but  an  instrument  or  faculty  
for  making  practical  decisions.80           
   In   the  εἰκώών,   the  λογισµμόός   is  a  “golden”   (χρυσῆ)  cord.  By  contrast,   the  
cords   of  θάάρρος   and  φόόβος   are   “hard   and   iron”   (σκληρὰς  καὶ   σιδηρᾶς)   and  
stronger   than   λογισµμόός,   which   is,   because   it   is   golden,   “weak”   (µμαλακήή).81  
Since  λογισµμόός  is  elegant82  and  “gentle”  (πρᾷος)  instead  of  “violent”  (βίίαιος),83  
it   needs   the   guidance   of   assistants   (δεῖσθαι   ὑπηρετῶν   αὐτοῦ   τὴν   ἀγωγήήν,  
645a6-­‐‑7).   The  weakness   of   λογισµμόός   and   the   strength   of   the   other   two   cords  
explain  both  why  helpers  are  necessary  and  why  self-­‐‑restraint—in  terms  of  the  
puppet   εἰκώών,   following   the   cord   of   λογισµμόός—needs   to   be   practised.   The  
implicit   question   is,   then,  how.   Since   the   εἰκώών   illustrates   the   need   for  paideia  
and  the  symposia  in  particular  (645c1-­‐‑4),  the  outcome  hinted  at  is  that  a  suitable  
environment  for  practising  are  the  symposia.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
literature  on  tripartition,  also  on  tripartition  in  dialogues  later  than  Republic,  see  CAIRNS  (1993),  381,  
n.  111.  For  a  bipartite  soul  in  Laws  argue  REES  (1957),  SAUNDERS  (1962),  but  “the  bipartite  analysis  
can  never  exclude  the  tripartite”  (37,  italics  in  original)  and  cf.  SASSI  (2008),  especially  133-­‐‑138,  with  
reference  to  Arist.  Magn.  Mor.  1182a23ff.  (a  division  between  λόόγον  ἔχον  and  ἄλογον  elements  of  
the  soul),  and  DA  432a26.  
80  Cf.   FREDE   (2010),  who   rightly   notes   that   there   is   “no   hint   of   a   higher  metaphysical   task   of   the  
calculative  faculty  in  the  Laws”  (118).  However,  she  considers  this  to  be  one  of  the  “omissions”  of  
the  puppet-­‐‑image,  the  omissions  suggesting  that  the  puppet-­‐‑image  “serves  only  a  limited  purpose  
and  may  not  fully  disclose  Plato’s  psychology  in  the  Laws”  (ibid.).  
81  FREDE  (2010),  117,  argues  that  this  opposition  does  not  mean  that  calculation  has  less  power  than  
the  other  two  strings,  but  that  the  “hardness”  of  the  latter  “signifies  only  their  inflexibility”,  while  
reasoning  does  not  exert  force.  Such  a  reading,  however,  seems  unlikely  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  
puppet-­‐‑analogy  is  meant  to  illustrate  the  need  for  paideia  and  the  training  of  λόόγος  in  the  context  of  
the  symposia.  Λογισµμόός  needs  helpers  precisely  because  it  is  weaker  than  the  other  two  cords.  
82  Leg.  645a5-­‐‑6:  ἅτε  γὰρ  τοῦ  λογισµμοῦ  καλοῦ  µμὲν  ὄντος;  cf.  645a4:  τῇ  καλλίίστῃ  ἀγωγῇ.  
83   This   opposition   is   reflected   in   the   terminology   used   to   frame   the   difference   between   law   as  
persuasive   preamble   and   simple   law:   Leg.   720a5-­‐‑6:   τὸν   πρᾳόότατον   …   τρόόπον,   opposed   to   βίία  
(722b6,  c2).        
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   Λογισµμόός   is   given   the   name   of   “law”,   νόόµμος,  when   it   has   become   the  
shared   conviction   of   a   polis   (λογισµμόός   (…)   ὃς   γενόόµμενος   δόόγµμα   πόόλεως  
κοινὸν  νόόµμος  ἐπωνόόµμασται,  644d2-­‐‑3).84  The  assistants  of   the  λογισµμόός  of   the  
individual   citizen   are   the   laws:85   The   laws   educate   the   individual   citizen   in  
accordance  with  the  λογισµμόός  laid  down  in  the  laws.  The  weak  λογισµμόός  of  the  
individual  citizen  is  trained  and  shaped  by  the  λογισµμόός  codified  in  the  laws.86  
The   characterizations   of   the   λογισµμόός   as   “friendly”   (πρᾷος)   and   each   of   the  
other   cords   as   “violent”   (βίίαιος)   contain   hints   about   the   sort   of   behaviour  
associated   with   λογισµμόός.   The   golden   cord   of   λογισµμόός   prompts   behaviour  
that   is   courteous,   reasonable,   and   according   to   law;   behaviour   motivated   by  
either  θάάρρος  or  φόόβος  may  be  a  transgression  of  the  social  norms.  The  puppet  
εἰκώών   elucidates   what   the   Athenian   has   in   mind   with   the   phrase   “being  
stronger  and  weaker  than  oneself”  (τὸ  κρείίττω  ἑαυτοῦ  καὶ  ἥττω  εἶναι,  645b2-­‐‑
3).    
   The  εἰκώών  is  somewhat  complex  because  λογισµμόός  features   in   it  at   two  
levels.  The   first   level   is   the   individual:   the  λογισµμόός   is  one  of   the   three   cords  
that   are   by   nature   present   in   each   individual   person   (which   seems   to   be   the  
                                                                                                              
84  Leg.  644d2-­‐‑3  λογισµμὸς  (…)  ὃς  γενόόµμενος  δόόγµμα  πόόλεως  κοινὸν  νόόµμος  ἐπωνόόµμασται  (see  also  
above);   644e6-­‐‑645a2:   ταύύτην  δ᾿   εἶναι   τὴν  τοῦ  λογισµμοῦ  ἀγωγὴν  χρυσῆν  καὶ   ἱεράάν,   τῆς  πόόλεως  
κοινὸν   νόόµμον   ἐπικαλουµμέένην;   645a4-­‐‑5:   δεῖν   δὴ   τῇ   καλλίίστῃ   ἀγωγῇ   τῇ   τοῦ   νόόµμου   ἀεὶ  
συλλαµμβάάνειν.  
85  Much   in   the  way  described  by  Protagoras   in  Plato’s   eponymous  dialogue.  As   soon  as   children  
quit   school,   their   paideia   is   taken   over   by   the   polis   and   the   laws,   Prot.   326c6-­‐‑d1:   ἐπειδὰν   δὲ   ἐκ  
διδασκάάλων  ἀπαλλαγῶσιν,  ἡ  πόόλις  αὖ  τούύς  τε  νόόµμους  ἀναγκάάζει  µμανθάάνειν  καὶ  κατὰ  τούύτους  
ζῆν  κατὰ  παράάδειγµμα,  ἵνα  µμὴ  αὐτοὶ  ἐφ’  αὑτῶν  εἰκῇ  πράάττωσιν,  κτλ.  “And  when  they  [the  sons  of  
the  richest  citizens]  quit  school,  the  city  in  turn  compels   them  to  learn  the  laws  and  to  model  their  
lives  on  them.  They  are  not  to  act  as  they  please”  (transl.  LOMBARDO  &  BELL  in  COOPER,  CW).  
86  ENGLAND  ad  645a6  sees  in  δεῖσθαι  ὑπηρετῶν  αὐτοῦ  τὴν  ἀγωγήήν  a  resemblance  with  Resp.  441e3-­‐‑
5.   But   the   claim   that   τὸ   θυµμοειδέές   is   ὑπήήκοος   and   σύύµμµμαχος   to   the   λογιστικόόν   matches   the  
charioteer-­‐‑analogy   in   the  Phaedrus.   The   gentle   pull   of   λογισµμόός   does   not   receive   assistance   from  
another  soul-­‐‑part.  GÖRGEMANNS  (1960)  disputes  that  besides  λογισµμόός  and  the  pleasure  and  pain  
there  is  “eine  weitere  selbständige  Kraft”;  he  thinks  rather  that  one  must  help  others  to  follow  the  
law;  by  the  ὑπηρεταίί  thus  is  meant,  according  to  him,  “die  staatlichen  Erziehung”  (121).  
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reason  why  a  human  is  a  divine  ζῷον).87  The  εἰκώών  pertains  to  human  beings  in  
general:   all   human   beings   possess   (a   rudimentary)   λογισµμόός,   even   though  
becoming   capable   of   being   κρείίττων   ἑαυτοῦ   requires   further   education.   The  
second   level   is   the  polis.   In   the  polis,  λογισµμόός   is   the   law.  Τhe   transition   from  
individual   to   political   λογισµμόός   (λογισµμὸς  …,   ὃς   γενόόµμενος   δόόγµμα   πόόλεως  
κοινὸν  νόόµμος  ἐπωνόόµμασται)  suggests  that  νόόµμος  in  practice  is  the  λογισµμόός  of  
one  individual,  the  lawgiver.88  Ηis  personal  λογισµμόός  has  become  law.      
   Due   to   this   ambiguous   use   of   the   term   λογισµμόός,   any   special  
qualification  someone  may  need  in  order  to  become  a  lawgiver  remains  out  of  
sight.89  The  education  of  a  person’s  λογισµμόός  by  the  νόόµμος  of  the  city  when  this  
νόόµμος   is   itself   also  a  λογισµμόός  entails   a   circularity.90  The  εἰκώών   is   compatible  
with   the   existence   of   differences   between   individual   law   codes.   At   the   same  
time,   it   embeds   those   differences  within   a   unifying   conception   of   the   human  
being  as  a—potentially—rational  ζῷον.    
                                                                                                              
87   Leg.   644d8.   The   fact   that   human   beings   are   called   a   θεῖον   θαῦµμα  may   be   connected  with   the  
assertion  at  654e3-­‐‑5  (see  below,  p.  120,  and  n.  147  on  p.  120),  that  only  human  beings  have  a  sense  of  
τάάξις.    
88  The  λογισµμόός  that  has  become  law  is  not  a  kind  of  aggregated  λογισµμόός,  cf.  FREDE  (2010),  117.  It  
is  the  λογισµμόός  of  an  individual  lawgiver.  This  is  conformed  by  645b6-­‐‑7.  A  polis  institutes  as  νόόµμος  
the  λόόγος  which  it  has  received  either  from  a  god  or  from  someone  with  insight  in  it  (ἢ  παρὰ  θεῶν  
τινος  ἢ  παρὰ  τούύτου  τοῦ  γνόόντος,  6456b).  Cf.  FREDE  (2010),  117-­‐‑118,  although  she  holds  that  “it  is  
emphasized  that  laws  should  come  from  a  god  or  from  someone  with  superior  understanding”  (ibid.,  
my  italics).  This  is,  however,  a  factual  statement.  The  point  is  that  the  νόόµμος  in  a  polis—according  to  
this   εἰκώών—is   λόόγος   (for   the   distinction   between   λόόγος   and   λογισµμόός,   see   SCHÖPSDAU   [1994],  
below,   n.   89).   The   alternatives   (ἢ  …   ἢ  …)   leave   in   the  middle  who   exactly   lays   down   the   laws,  
creating  considerable  vagueness  concerning  the  original  lawgiver;  whose  λόόγος  it  is,  is  of  secondary  
importance  and  perhaps  cannot  be  settled  in  a  definitive  way.  
89  Cf.   SCHÖPSDAU’s  note   (1994),   233-­‐‑234  and  237-­‐‑238  ad   644e4-­‐‑5  on   the   relation  between  λογισµμόός  
and  λόόγος.  “Dieser  ins  Gesetz  eingegangene  und  von  ihm  [sc.  Logismos]  verkündete  ὀρθὸς  λόόγος  
weist  umgekehrt  dem  λογίίζεσθαι  des  Individuums  in  der  konkreten  Situation  die  Richtung”  (234).  
According   to  NIGHTINGALE   (1999a),   the   parallel   between   soul   and   city   is   “blurred”,   since   644e4-­‐‑
645a8  says  that  laws  “provide  the  rational  deliberation  for  both  city  and  soul”  (104).  NIGHTINGALE’s  
interpretation  of  ἐπικαλουµμέένην  (645a2)  as  “to  call  in  as  a  helper  or  ally”  (104,  n.  13)  reverses  the  
primacy:   in   her   reading,   the   λογισµμόός   of   the   individual   citizen   summons   as   its   helper   the   law,  
whereas  the  content  of  the  λογισµμόός  of  the  individual  is  determined  by  the  law.  
90  Cf.  SCHILLER  (1790)  about  Sparta:  “Der  wichtigste  Teil  seiner  [Lycurgus’]  Gesetzgebung  war  daher  
die  Erziehung,  und  durch  diese  schloß  er  gleichsam  den  Kreis,   in  welchem  der  spartanische  Staat  
sich  um  sich  selbst  bewegen  sollte.  Die  Erziehung  war  ein  wichtiges  Werk  des  Staats,  und  der  Staat  
ein  fortdauerndes  Werk  dieser  Erziehung”  (in  CHRIST  [1986],  77).  
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   The  puppet-­‐‑analogy  reflects  an  essentially  optimistic  attitude  towards  the  
human  capacity  for  excellence:  λογισµμόός  is  innate  in  every  person  by  nature;  it  
is  implied  that  paideia  in  principle  enables  every  person  to  become  ἀγαθόός.  
       
     
3.2.3   Symposia  and  syssitia    
The   puppet-­‐‑εἰκώών   has   offered   a   psychological   diagnosis   of   the   human   being  
that   illustrated   the  need   for  paideia.  Returning   to   the   topic  of   the   symposia,   the  
Athenian  asks  his  interlocutors  what  would  happen  to  such  a  puppet  under  the  
influence   of   wine.91   Obviously,   wine   would   intensify   its   pleasures,   pains,  
agitations   and   lusts.   By   contrast,   the   puppet’s   rational   elements,   such   as  
perceptions   (αἰσθήήσεις),   memories   (µμνῆµμαι),   opinions   (δόόξαι)   and   insights  
(φρονήήσεις)  would  altogether  disappear,  bringing   the  adult  back   to  a   state  of  
childhood,   in   which   reason   is   far   less   prominent.92   So,   what   could   be   the  
Athenian’s  reason  for  insisting  on  the  ὠφελίία  of  symposia,  if  these  lead  to  bodily  
as  well  as  spiritual  depravity?93    
   But  the  effects  of  training  or  taking  medicine  are,  the  Athenian  explains,  
only   initially   hard   to   bear.   It   is   only   during   the   few   days   after   drinking   the  
medicine,  or  immediately  after  beginning  an  intensive  training  that  people  find  
themselves  in  an  almost  intolerable  condition.94  Those  who  take  medicines  or  go  
to  the  gymnasia  for  a  work-­‐‑out  do  so  for  the  sake  of  a  benefit  (ὠφελίία)  that  will  
                                                                                                              
91  Leg.  645d1-­‐‑2.  
92  Cf.  below,  p.  119.  
93  Leg.  646b4-­‐‑c1.  
94  Leg.  646c3-­‐‑7  (the  Athenian):  Τίί  οὖν;  τοὺς  εἰς  τὰ  ἰατρεῖα  αὐτοὺς  βαδίίζοντας  ἐπὶ  φαρµμακοποσίίᾳ  
ἀγνοεῖν   οἰόόµμεθα   ὅτι   µμετ’   ὀλίίγον   ὕστερον   καὶ   ἐπὶ   πολλὰς   ἡµμέέρας   ἕξουσιν   τοιοῦτον   τὸ   σῶµμα,  
οἷον   εἰ   διὰ   τέέλους   ἔχειν   µμέέλλοιεν,   ζῆν   οὐκ   ἂν   δέέξαιντο;   ἢ   τοὺς   ἐπὶ   τὰ   γυµμνάάσια   καὶ   πόόνους  
ἰόόντας   οὐκ   ἴσµμεν   ὡς   ἀσθενεῖς   εἰς   τὸ   παραχρῆµμα   γίίγνονται;   “Well   then,   do   we   suppose   that  
persons   who   go   of   themselves   to   dispensaries   to   drink   medicines   are   not   aware   that   soon  
afterwards,   and   for  many  days   to   come,   they  will   find   themselves   in   a   bodily   condition   such   as  
would  make  life  intolerable  if  it  were  to  last  forever?  And  we  know,  do  we  not,  that  men  who  go  to  
the  gymnasia  for  hard  training  commence  by  becoming  weaker?”  (transl.  BURY).  
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result   from   it   in   the   long   run.95   The   same   pertains   to   the   symposion.96   Yet  
Cleinias—once   again—says   that   he   would   be   surprised   if   indeed   they   could  
discern  such  a  benefit  in  symposia.97    
   The  Athenian  now  embarks  on  a  somewhat  complex  argument,  drawing  
a  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  fear  (δύύο  φόόβων  εἴδη,  646e4).  These  kinds  of  
fear   are   each   other’s   opposites.   Τhe   first   kind   is   the   fear   that   bad   things  will  
happen  (φοβούύµμεθα  µμέέν  που  τὰ  κακάά,  προσδοκῶντες  γενήήσεσθαι,  646e7-­‐‑8).  
This   is   essentially   the  kind  of   fear   that   training   in  ἀνδρείία  aims   to  overcome,  
cowardice.  The  second  kind  of   fear   is   the   fear  of  being   thought  disrespectable  
(ἡγούύµμενοι  δοξάάζεσθαι  κακοίί,  646e10-­‐‑11).  This  is  social  fear,  the  fear  of  a  bad  
reputation,  which  is  called  “embarrassment”,  αἰσχύύνη  (647a2).    
   This  social  fear  is  of  special  interest  to  the  lawgiver.98  Any  lawgiver  who  
is   worth   anything   (πᾶς   [νοµμοθέέτης]   οὗ   καὶ   σµμικρὸν   ὄφελος—there   is  
absolutely  no  mention  of  an  expert  lawgiver)  should  have  the  highest  regard  for  
this   fear   and   call   it   αἰδώώς,   “self-­‐‑restraint”.99   The   opposite   of   αἰδώώς   is   θάάρρος  
(“confidence”),   which   should   be   called   ἀναίίδεια   (“shamelessness”;   cf.  
ἀναισχυντίία)   and   be   declared   the   gravest   fault,   both   in   private   and   public  
dealings.   Aἰδώώς,   says   the   Athenian,   “saves”   (σῴζει)   us   in   many   respects.  
Among  these  is  war.  For  victory  in  war  is  not  only  motivated  by  θάάρρος  in  the  
                                                                                                              
95  Leg.  646c9-­‐‑10.  
96  Leg.  646d5-­‐‑6.  
97  Leg.  646e1-­‐‑2:  Ὀρθῶς  λέέγεις,  θαυµμάάζοιµμι  δ᾿  ἂν  εἴ  τι  δυναίίµμεθα  τοιοῦτον  ἐν  αὐτῷ  καταµμαθεῖν.  
98  Leg.  646e10-­‐‑647a2,  647b7,  671d2.  
99  Leg.  647a10,  649c2,  671d2,  672d8;  cf.  699c4-­‐‑6,  where  αἰδώώς  is  the  “fear”  inspired  by  the  traditional  
laws   (ὁ   φόόβος   (…)   ὁ   (…)   ἐκ   τῶν   νόόµμων   τῶν   ἔµμπροσθεν   γεγονώώς).   For   a   study   of   αἰδώώς   from  
Homer  to  the  classical  period,  see  CAIRNS  (1993);  on  αἰδώώς  in  Laws  ibid.,  373-­‐‑378:  “Aidôs/aischunê  are  
here  persistently  related   to   fear  of   the  external  sanction  of  disgrace,  but   the  creation  of  a  sense  of  
aidôs  which   can  withstand   the   influence   of   alcohol   also   suggests   the   acquisition   of   an   instinctive  
disposition   towards  self-­‐‑control;   (…)”.  Therefore,  αἰδώώς   in  Laws  “appears   in   thoroughly  traditional  
guise”   (374-­‐‑375,   my   italics).   ROWE   (2007)   argues   that   there   is   a   relevant   distinction   between   the  
αἰδώώς  τις  of  the  Athenians  at  Marathon  and  Salamis  (discussed  in  the  historical  overview  of  Leg.  III)  
and  the  αἰδώώς  the  Athenian  wants  to  produce  in  the  citizens;  see  especially  99-­‐‑100.  For  central  place  
of  self-­‐‑control  in  Laws:  CAMPBELL  (1981);  STALLEY  (1983),  54-­‐‑56  defends  the  thesis  of  BARKER  (cited  
in   the   edition   of   [1960],   343),   that   σωφροσύύνη   is   as   fundamental   to   Laws   as   δικαιοσύύνη   is   to  
Republic.  
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face  of   the  enemy   (θάάρρος  here  being  a   stand-­‐‑in   for  ἀνδρείία),  but  also  by   the  
fear  to  be  a  coward  in  the  eyes  of  one’s  friends.100  The  upshot  is  that  each  person  
must  therefore  be  both  ἄφοβος  and  φόόβερος.101    
   The  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  fear  (as  object  and  subject)  and  two  
kinds   of   virtues   (θάάρρος102   or   ἀνδρείία,   and   αἰδώώς)   adumbrates   the   parallel  
between   the   syssition   (a   training   in   ἀνδρείία)   and   the   symposion   (a   training   in  
αἰδώώς).103  But  this  argument  does  more  than  establish  a  parallel.  In  introducing  
the  virtue  of  αἰδώώς,   the  Athenian  holds  on   to   the   idiom  of   the  Spartan-­‐‑Cretan  
perspective,   which   conceives   of   virtue   (ἀνδρείία)   in   terms   of   φόόβος   and  
θάάρρος.  Therefore,  αἰδώώς   is   introduced  under   the  denominator  of   “fear”.  But  
once   αἰδώώς   has   been   introduced   besides   ἀνδρείία/θάάρρος,   the   perspective   on  
these  Spartan-­‐‑Cretan  military  values  changes:  θάάρρος  is  cast  in  a  negative  light,  
                                                                                                              
100  Leg.  647b3-­‐‑7  (Athenian):  Οὐκοῦν  τάά  τ᾿  ἄλλα  πολλὰ  καὶ  µμεγάάλα  ὁ  φόόβος  ἡµμᾶς  οὗτος  σῴζει,  καὶ  
τὴν  ἐν  τῷ  πολέέµμῳ  νίίκην  καὶ  σωτηρίίαν  ἓν  πρὸς  ἓν  οὐδὲν  οὕτως  σφόόφρα  ἡµμῖν  ἀπεργάάζεται;  δύύο  
γὰρ  οὖν  ἐστὸν  τὰ  τὴν  νίίκην  ἀπεργαζόόµμενα,  θάάρρος  µμὲν  πολεµμίίων,  φίίλων  δὲ  φόόβος  αἰσχύύνης  
πέέρι   κακῆς.   “And  does   not   this   fear,   besides   saving  us   in  many  other   important   respects,   prove  
more  effective  than  anything  else  in  ensuring  for  us  victory  in  war  and  security?  For  victory  is,   in  
fact,  ensured  by  two  things,  of  which  the  one  is  confidence  towards  enemies,  the  other,  fear  of  the  
shame  of  cowardice  in  the  eyes  of  friends”  (transl.  BURY).  
101  Leg.  647b9-­‐‑c1.  
102  For  θάάρρος  used  more  or  less  synonymously  to  ἀνδρείία:  Leg.  647b6.  
103  That  αἰδώώς  can  be  trained  is  the  result  of  the  juxtaposition  between  the  symposion  and  training  for  
war   implicit   in   the  whole  passage,  but   see  especially  Leg.   635c3-­‐‑d6;  also  647c8-­‐‑d7:  ΑΘ.  Τίί  δ᾿  ὅταν  
ἐπιχειρῶµμέέν   τινα  φοβερὸν  ποιεῖν   µμετὰ   δίίκης;   ἆρ’   οὐκ  ἀναισχυντίίᾳ   συµμβάάλλοντας  αὐτὸν   καὶ  
προσγυµμνάάζοντας   νικᾶν   δεῖ   ποιεῖν   διαµμαχόόµμενον   αὑτοῦ   ταῖς   ἡδοναῖς;   ἢ   τῇ   µμὲν   δειλίίᾳ   τῇ   ἐν  
αὑτῷ  προσµμαχόόµμενον  καὶ  νικῶντα  αὐτὴν  δεῖ  τέέλεον  οὕτω  γίίγνεσθαι  πρὸς  ἀνδρείίαν,  ἄπειρος  δὲ  
δήήπου  καὶ  ἀγύύµμναστος  ὢν  τῶν  τοιούύτων  ἀγώώνων  ὁστισοῦν  οὐδ’  ἂν  ἥµμισυς  ἑαυτοῦ  γέένοιτο  πρὸς  
ἀρετήήν,   σώώφρων   δὲ   ἄρα   τελέέως   ἔσται   µμὴ   πολλαῖς   ἡδοναῖς   καὶ   ἐπιθυµμίίαις   προτρεπούύσαις  
ἀναισχυντεῖν  καὶ  ἀδικεῖν  διαµμεµμαχηµμέένος  καὶ  νενικηκὼς  µμετὰ  λόόγου  καὶ  ἔργου  καὶ  τέέχνης  ἔν  
τε  παιδιαῖς  καὶ  ἐν  σπουδαῖς,  ἀλλ’  ἀπαθὴς  ὢν  πάάντων  τῶν  τοιούύτων;  ΚΛ.  Οὔκουν  τόόν  γ᾿  εἰκόότα  
λόόγον  ἂν  ἔχοι.  ATH.:  “And  how  about  the  opposite  case,  when  we  attempt  with  the  aid  of  justice  to  
make  a  man  fearful?  Is  it  not  by  pitting  him  against  shamelessness  and  exercising  him  against  it  that  
we  must  make  him  victorious  in  the  fight  against  his  own  pleasures?  Or  shall  we  say  that,  whereas  
in   the   case  of   courage   it   is   only  by   fighting  and   conquering  his   innate   cowardice   that   a  man   can  
become  perfect,  and  no  one  unversed  and  unpractised   in  contests  of   this  sort  can  attain  even  half  
the  excellence  of  which  he   is   capable,—in   the  case  of   temperance,  on   the  other  hand,  a  man  may  
attain   perfection   without   a   stubborn   fight   against   hordes   of   pleasures   and   lusts   which   entice  
towards  shamelessness  and  wrong-­‐‑doing,  and  without  conquering  them  by  the  aid  of  speech  and  
act   and   skill,   alike   in   play   and   at   work,—and,   in   fact,   without   undergoing   any   of   these  
experiences?”  CL.:  ”It  would  not  be  reasonable  to  suppose  so”  (transl.  BURY).    
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assuming   connotations   of   audacity.104   In   this   argument,   αἰδώώς   can   replace  
θάάρρος   as   the   central   virtue,   as   θάάρρος   elicits   charges   of   overconfidence.  
Furthermore,  as  we  saw  above,  victory  in  war  is  attributed  to  a  dual  cause:  not  
only   to  confidence   in   the   face  of   the  enemy,   to  which  a  Cleinais  and  Megillus  
would   readily   admit,   but   also   to   fear  of   a  bad   reputation   in   the   eyes  of   one’s  
φίίλοι.  The  ambiguity  inherent  in  θάάρρος  forces  the  interlocutors  to  reassess  the  
value  of  ἀνδρείία—one  may  go  to  excess  in  being  courageous,  and  therefore,  as  
a  virtue,  ἀνδρείία  does  not  suffice.  By  contrast,  the  virtue  of  αἰδώώς  is  not  liable  
to   less   favourable   interpretations—one   cannot   excess   in   αἰδώώς.   Self-­‐‑restraint  
motivated   by   the   fear   of   the   rebuke   of   others   thus   substitutes  ἀνδρείία   as   the  
core  virtue.105  The  symposion  as  a  training  for  virtue  replaces  the  syssition.    
   The   fact   that   in   the   context   of   the   symposion   αἰδώώς   emerges   as   the   key  
virtue   is   startling   in   a   work   of   Plato,   because   αἰδώώς   eclipses   an   “increasing  
discrimination  between  mere  concern  for  others’  opinions  and  concern  for  those  
of  the  truly  noble”106  of  the  kind  that  we  find  in  texts  such  as  Apology  and  Crito,  
                                                                                                              
104  Leg.  647a10.  
105   CAIRNS   (1993)   argues   that   αἰδώώς   and   related   terms   have   an   “intimate   relationship   with  
conventional  values   and   social  disapproval”;   they  are   associated  with   fear  of  punishment   (which  
however  does  not  mean  that  αἰδώώς  “is  envisaged  solely  as  a  response  to  external  sanctions”  (355).  
See   also   above,   n.   99,   for   CAIRNS’   remark   that   in  Laws   αἰδώώς   appears   in   “thoroughly   traditional  
guise”.   Laws   700a-­‐‑701b   is   one   of   the   “earliest   expressions   of   aidôs   in   the   state   which   stress   the  
external   sanctions   of   punishment   and   popular   opinion   and   advocate   deference   to   human   and  
institutional  authority”  (ibid.,  376).  This  is  baffling  in  a  Platonic  work.  I  submit  that  conceptually,  the  
role   of   αἰδώώς   in   Laws   is   similar   to   its   role   in   Protagoras’   ethics   (to   the   extent   that   it   can   be  
reconstructed;  see  for  a  particularly  successful  attempt  BERESFORD  [2013]):  αἰδώώς  “is  necessary  for  
the  existence  of  the  social  and  political  community”  (ibid.,  358).  Both  the  Protagoras-­‐‑myth  and  Laws  
deem   αἰδώώς   essential   for   the   σωτηρίία   of   society.   We   may   also   note   the   following   striking  
correspondences   between   the   purport   of   the   Protagoras-­‐‑myth   and   Laws:   (1)   Protagoras’   logos   in  
Plato’s   eponymous  dialogue  presents  αἰδώώς   as   the  product   of   education,  while   also   allowing   for  
“varying  degrees  of  innate  capacity”  (the  αὐληταίί-­‐‑analogy  in  Prot.  327c-­‐‑d;  cf.  Prot.  B  3  DK),  CAIRNS  
ibid.,  356-­‐‑357,  with  note  40.  (2)  This  education  assumes  “that  citizens  internalize  the  values  imparted  
in   the  process  of   education”   (358),  which   is  precisely   the   thought  we  encounter   in   the   symposion-­‐‑  
and   χορείία-­‐‑episode,   see   below,   p.   116ff.   (section   3.3).   (3)   The   fact   that   “the   acquisition   of   those  
qualities  which   allow  men   to   live   together   successfully   is   assumed   to   be   desirable”   assumes   the  
view  that  it  is  “better  for  human  beings  to  live  in  civilized  communities”  (ibid.,  358,  n.  45).  Cf.  ibid.,  
376,  n.  97.    
106  CAIRNS  (1993),  378.    
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but   also  Phaedrus   and   Symposium.107  We   do   find   in   Laws   an   insistence   on   the  
superiority  of  the  opinion  of  “the  most  reasonable  and  most  senior  people”,  οἱ  
ἐπιεικέέστατοι   καὶ   πρεσβύύτατοι   (659d3).   But   these   are   authorities  within   the  
context  of  the  polis.  Senior  citizens  possess  authority  because  they  are  the  people  
who   are   most   experienced   in   the   polis’   own   laws   and   have   had   the   most  
extensive  paideia,   not  because   they  possess  objective   ἐπιστήήµμη  of  moral   truth.  
They   are   internal   authorities,   fundamentally   different   from   the   kind   of  
authority   of   the   philosopher-­‐‑kings,   whose   double   function,   as   we   saw,   gives  
them  a  position  outside  the  just  polis.108  
   The   symposion   as   the   context   for   training   virtue   replaces   the   syssition.  
Even  though  the  symposion  still  involves  a  certain  risk  that  things  may  get  out  of  
hand,   in  contrast   to  war  it   is  a  relatively  safe  environment  for   testing  people’s  
virtue.   Wine   as   a   “touchstone”   (βάάσανος)   for   people’s   moral   quality   is  
unrivalled  in  cheapness,  safety  and  speed  (τόό  τε  τῆς  εὐτελείίας  καὶ  ἀσφαλείίας  
καὶ  τάάχους  διαφέέρειν  πρὸς  τὰς  ἄλλας  βασάάνους,  650b3-­‐‑4).109  The  symposion  is  
a   form   of   play   (παιδιάά),   and   preferable   for   that   very   reason:   it   stimulates   a  
better  kind  of  virtue  than  ἀνδρείία  in  a  safer  environment  than  war.110  The  fact  
that  on   the  dramatic   level   the  Athenian’s   recommendation  of   the   symposion   is  
triggered  by  Megillus’  claim  that  the  Spartan  expulsion  of  the  symposion  proves  
                                                                                                              
107  We  may  recall  that  in  Crito  Socrates  denies  that  αἰσχύύνη  and  popular  opinion  (δόόξα)  are  relevant  
motivations   for   action   compared   to   what   is   truly   just   to   do   (44c6-­‐‑8),   and   refuses   even   to   be  
persuaded  by  the  arguments  of  his  friends.  Chapter  two  has  offered  a  reading  of  the  Laws’  speech  
in  Crito  as  Socrates’  apology   for  his  choice   to  his  φίίλοι   in  a  speech   that  does  endorse   the  value  of  
φιλίία  and  solidarity,  but  professes  a  different  priority  in  his  loyalty.  This  higher  φιλίία  transcends  
the  loyalty  to  his  human  friends.  In  Gorgias,  αἰσχύύνη  disqualifies  an  interlocutor  in  dialectic,  482e6-­‐‑
483a1,  487a5-­‐‑2,  494c5;  ἀναισχυντίία  is,  philosophically  speaking,  desirable.    
108  See  chapter  two,  section  2.3.4.  
109   Cf.   ἐν   οἴνῳ   βασάάνου   καὶ   παιδιᾶς   (649d9);   the   symposion   allows   “insight   in   the   natures   and  
conditions  of  the  souls”,  τὸ  γνῶναι  τὰς  φύύσεις  τε  καὶ  ἕξεις  τῶν  ψυχῶν  (650b6);  cf.  τὸ  κατιδεῖν  πῶς  
ἔχοµμεν  τὰς  φύύσεις  (652a2-­‐‑3).  “To  the  connoisseur,  the  parallelism  with  dialectics  is  striking:  in  the  
same  way  as  dialectics  is  a  test  for  the  truth  of  a  statement  (…),  the  consumption  of  wine  is  a  test  for  
the  quality  of  the  soul  itself”,  VAN  RAALTE  (2004),  306.    
110  It  is  more  dangerous  to  expose  a  person  with  a  bad  and  fierce  soul  to  money  transactions,  or  to  
entrust   to   a   person   subdued   by   sexual   pleasures   his   own   daughters,   sons   and  wife,  Leg.   649e2-­‐‑
650a5.  The  symposion  as  a  test  is  relatively  harmless  and  therefore  a  form  of  παιδιάά  (649d6,  650a6-­‐‑7).  
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the   superiority   of   Spartan   law   contributes   to   the   playful   character   of   the  
argument.  
   An  overt  defence  of  symposia  and  even  of  drunkenness   (µμέέθη)   is  hardly  
what   one   would   have   expected   of   Plato.111   In   the   light   of   the   unremitting  
condemnation,   most   notably   in   Republic,   of   music   and   poetry   that   portray  
characters   overcome   by   their   emotions,   it   seems   perplexing   that   wine   is  
recommended  as  a  φάάρµμακον  to  augment  one’s  emotions  is  perplexing.112  The  
whole  symposion-­‐‑episode  seems  to  be  Plato  speaking  in  a  lighter  vein.113      
   The  discussion  in  Book  I  took  its  cue  from  the  interpretation  of  the  Cretan  
syssitia   and   gymnasia.   The   symposion   has,   however,   replaced   the   syssition.   The  
symposion   acts   as   a   model   or   scenario   from   which   the   norms   for   virtue   and  
society  can  be  deduced,  and  as  such  it  demonstrates  also  why  virtue  is  such  as  
it  is,  and  why  these  are  the  norms.  What,  then,  are  these  norms?    
   The  symposion  is  a  social  “gathering”  or  “community”  (ὁµμιλίία,  κοινωνίία,  
συνουσίία114)  of  “friends”  (φίίλοι).115  In  this  context,  therefore,  virtue  is  friendly,  
                                                                                                              
111  BELFIORE  (1986),  421,  424;  ΤECUȘAN  (1990),  239-­‐‑244,  shows  that  outside  Laws,  symposia  in  Plato  are  
often  adduced  in  a  negative  way  since  they  have  a  “tendency  to  corrupt”  (239),  have  a  link  with  the  
lowest  soul-­‐‑part  (241,  244)  and  are  a  source  of  pleasure  for  ordinary  people,  fundamentally  at  odds  
with   the  paidia  of   the  philosopher   (239-­‐‑241).  The   symposion   as  a   social  gathering   is   to  give  way   to  
dialectic  synousia  in  Prot.  347c-­‐‑e  (242).  In  Plato,  Socrates  is  portrayed  as  constantly  “stopping  at  the  
frontier  of  actual  symposia,  which  do  not  belong  to  the  Sokratic—or  to  the  Platonic-­‐‑Sokratic—world”  
(243).   “But   it   was   with   the   first   two   books   of   the   Laws   that   the   real   change   in   Plato’s   attitude  
towards   symposia   occurred;   and   it   was   most   spectacular.   These   books   strive   at   a   complete  
restoration  of  the  sympotic  custom”  (244);  cf.  246  and  n.  19  ibid.  
112  See  Socrates’  condemnation  of  Homer  as  representing  Achilles  and  Priam  overcome  with  grief,  
or  the  gods  overcome  with  sexual  desires  in  Republic  (388a5-­‐‑390c8).  Such  stories  contribute  nothing  
to  the  σωφροσύύνη  of  the  young  (390a4).  
113  GUTHRIE  (1978)  writes  that  “the  lengthy  and  humourless  disquisitions  in  the  first  two  books  on  
the  moral  and  educational  advantages  of  drinking-­‐‑parties”  have  for  a  long  time  been  an  obstacle  to  
his   going   through   the   whole   work   (382;   see   also   328-­‐‑329).   In   n.   2   ibid.   he   records   the   contrary  
opinion  of  SAUNDERS:  “My  friend  Dr  T.J.  Saunders  and  I  have  agreed  to  differ  on  this  point,  and  I  
must   record  his  contrary  conviction   that   the  Laws   is   full  of  humour,  and   that   the   long  sermon  on  
drinking-­‐‑parties  is  written  with  tongue  in  cheek.”  Cf.  RUTHERFORD  (1995),  306,  and  n.  100  ibid.  
114   The   symposion   as   a   social   gathering:   µμίίαν   τινὰ   συνουσίίαν   (639d3);   σύύνoδοι   and   κοινωνίία  
(640a4);   [ὁµμιλίία]   φίίλων   δ᾿   ἐν   εἰρήήνῃ   πρὸς   φίίλους   κοινωνησόόντων   φιλοφροσύύνης   (640b7-­‐‑8);  
συνουσίία  (…)  µμετὰ  µμέέθης  (640c1-­‐‑2);  περίί  γε  συνουσίίας  (640c9);  διὰ  τὴν  τόότε  συνουσίίαν  (640d2);  
τὴν  ἐν  τοῖς  οἴνοις  κοινὴν  διατριβήήν   (641c8-­‐‑d1);   ἐν  τῇ  κατ’  ὀρθὸν  χρείίᾳ  τῆς  ἐν  οἴνῳ  συνουσίίας  
(652a4-­‐‑5);  πᾶσαν  τὴν  συνουσίίαν  (672a1).  The  goal  of  symposia  ought  to  be  to  cement  its  participants  
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non-­‐‑aggressive   behaviour:   the   sort   of   behaviour   conducive   to   the   cohesion  
between  the  symposiasts.  Moreover,  the  distinction  between  the  symposion  as  a  
kind   of   ὁµμιλίία   on   the   one   hand   and   the   hostile   ὁµμιλίία   of  war   (πόόλεµμος),   of  
which   the  goal   is  mutual  destruction  on   the  other,   indicates   that  virtue   is  not  
solely   understood   in   terms   of   behaviour,   but   also   in   terms   of   intentions.   The  
attitude   underlying   friendly   behaviour   is   “benevolence”   (φιλοφροσύύνη,  
φιλίία).116    
   The   symposion   allows   φιλίία   and   φιλοφροσύύνη   to   emerge   as   the  
conditions  upon  which  depends  the  preservation  of  the  group  as  a  whole:  social  
behaviour   is   normative   because   its   alternative   compromises   the   continued  
existence  of  the  community.117  The  norm  for  morality  is  thus  a  pragmatic  norm:  
social   stability,   the   preservation   of   the   group.   The   symposion   is   a   revealing  
model,   because   the   differences   between   good   and   bad   behaviour,   and   its  
implications,   are  much  more  pronounced  here   than   they   are   in   a   real   society.  
The   wine   adds   a   certain   intensity:   if   all   goes   well,   there   is   no   ground   more  
fertile   for   the   coming   into   existence   or   the   strengthening   of   φιλίία   than   the  
symposion;   but   if   something   goes   wrong,   things  much  more   easily   get   out   of  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
to  each  other  instead  of  setting  them  on  bad  terms,  as  is  now  their  effect:  µμᾶλλον  φίίλοι  ἢ  πρόότερον  
ἀπαλλάάττοιντο  ἀλλήήλων,  ἀλλ᾿  οὐχ᾿  ὥσπερ  τὰ  νῦν  ἐχθροίί  (671e5-­‐‑672a3;  cf.  638c2-­‐‑e3).  “Pflege  der  
Freundschaft  galt  seit   je  als  Zweck  des  Symposions”,  SCHÖPSDAU  ad  640b6-­‐‑8,  with  references.  The  
term  συνουσίία  is  in  the  Platonic  corpus  often  used  for  a  social  gathering  for  the  purpose  of  finding  
the  truth,  or  more  specifically  of  a  teacher  and  pupil,  e.g.  Prot.  337b3,  338c7;  cf.  Epist.  VII.  341c6.    
115  Φιλίία  is  explicitly  stipulated  to  be  the  goal  (σκοπόός)  of  lawgiving  in  Laws  Book  III,  Leg.  693b4,  c3,  
c7,   e1,   694b6,   on   a   par  with   ἐλευθερίία   and  φρόόνησις.   The   purport   of   the   historical   overview   in  
Book   III   is   that   solidarity   is   the  key   to   the  σωτηρίία  of   any   society.   In   line  with   this   emphasis  on  
friendship   is  Laws’   repeated  emphasis  on  “friendliness”   (πρᾳόότης;   εὐµμέένεια)  as  a  key  element  of  
virtue:  the  discourse  of  the  law  and  lawgiver  ought  to  be  of  a  friendly  kind;  see  below,  chapter  five,  
section  5.1,  p.  179.  
116  Leg.  640b8,  cf.  628c11.  
117  Laws’  depiction  of  virtue  as  αἰδώώς  is  reminiscent  of  Protagoras’  notion  of  morality  as  the  gift  of  
Zeus  to  humankind:  αἰδώώς  and  δίίκη.  See  BERESFORD  (2013),  especially  149-­‐‑158,  for  a  reading  of  the  
Protagoras-­‐‑myth  in  Plato’s  Protagoras  along  the  lines  of  ethical  naturalism.  Ethical  naturalism  may  
be   seen   as   a   “middle   way”   between   transcendental   realism   (of   Plato)   and   the   conventionalism  
associated  with   the   sophists,   VAN  OPHUIJSEN   (2013),   2.  Laws   seems   to   credit   society’s   survival   to  
human’s  capacity   to  be  rational,   like   the  Protagoras’  myth,  which  “implies   that  our   intelligence   is  
something  that  we  have  because  it  is  a  mechanism  of  survival.  We  think  in  order  to  live”,  BERESFORD  
(2013),  147  (italics  in  original).  
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hand  due  to  the  participants’  amplified  reactions  as  a  result  of  their  inebriation.  
The   same   pragmatic,   inclusive   norm  was   in   fact   implicit   in   the   interlocutors’  
preference  of  the  arbiter  who  reconciles  the  different  parties  in  a  family  feud.118  
The  symposion  as  a  scenario  implies  a  much  more  dynamic,  and  much  less  clear-­‐‑
cut  notion  of  both   the  moral  norm   itself   (roughly  “that  which   is   conducive   to  
the  σωτηρίία  of  the  community”—speaking  of  “the  norm”  may  even  suggest  too  
much  uniformity  here,  where  no  single  system  exists)  and  of  virtue  conceived  
of—generally—as  awareness  of  this  social  norm,  compared  to  an  absolute  norm  
of  justice.    
   This  brings  us   to   the   conception  of  ἀρετήή   that   can  be  derived   from   the  
symposion.   Τhe   discussion   of   the   symposion   creates   the   notion   of   ἀρετήή   as   a  
universally   human   quality   that   exists   apart   from   its   more   specific   cultural  
interpretations.  Ἀρετήή,  conceived  of  as  αἰδώώς,  is  social  excellence.  The  scenario  
of   the  symposion  provides  a  scenario  for  ἡ  πᾶσα  ἀρετήή,  which  was  previously  
introduced   in   a   less   tangible  way,   as   the   sum   of   the   four   ἀρεταίί   (see   section  
3.1),   apart   from   its   strong   association  with   εἰρήήνη.   The   symposion   frames   this  
universally   human   ἀρετήή   in   terms   of   the   fear   of   social   disgrace   (αἰδώώς   or  
αἰσχύύνη)  in  the  eyes  of  one’s  φίίλοι.  Φιλίία  is  necessary  if  these  social  sentiments  
are   to   acquire   sufficient   compelling   power   to   constrain   people’s   behaviour.  
Some   amount   of   freedom   is   necessary   if   virtue   is   self-­‐‑control:   there   has   to   be  
sufficient   freedom   to   enable   people   to   restrain   themselves.119   This   of   course  
entails  a  continuous  risk  that  people  fail  to  control  themselves120—parallel  to  the  
symposion  as  a  scale  model  for  society  at  large.    
   The   notion   of   ἀρετήή   as   a   quality   necessary   for   a   harmonious   society   is  
highly  dynamic.   In   the   symposion  ἀρετήή   is   a   kind  of   behaviour,   a   friendly   and  
communicative   attitude.   It   is,   in  other  words,  quite  unlike   the   static  notion  of  
                                                                                                              
118  Leg.  627d11-­‐‑628a5;  see  for  this  passage  above,  p.  89,  n.  26.  
119  Freedom  (ἐλευθερίία)  as  the  purpose  of  νοµμοθεσίία:  Leg.  693c7-­‐‑8,  d8,  694b6,  701d8.  
120  At  the  same  time,  as  we  saw  above,  as  a  test  of  the  quality  of  people’s  dispositions  the  symposion  
is  a  relatively  safe  environment  compared  to  war  or  innumerable  other  possibilities  one  could  think  
of  (650a5).  
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justice  in  Republic,  where  each  person  πράάττει  τὰ  αὑτοῦ,  and  where,  moreover,  
virtue   consists   in   the   correct   hierarchy   of   the   parts   of   one’s   soul.121  Laws   also  
suggests   a   much   more   communicative   society   than   Republic:   people   have   to  
coexist  peacefully,   and  virtue   is   the  quality   that   enables   them   to  do   so.122  The  
awareness   of   the   norm   is   not   expert   knowledge,   but   σωφροσύύνη,   a   vaguer  
“sense  of”  what   consitutes  good,   social,  behaviour.123  Moreover,  ἀρετήή  can  be  
acquired  by  training.  
   In   addition,   the   symposion   presupposes   a   much   more   common   sense  
conception   of  well-­‐‑being   than  Republic,   in  which   text   it   is   assumed   that  most  
                                                                                                              
121  All  of  this  does  indeed  seem  to  imply  a  “change  in  standards”  for  the  virtues  of  the  kind  noted  by  
ADKINS  (1960).  He  argues  that  Republic  stipulates  that  the  rulers  are  to  be  the  “aristoi  in  philosophy  
and   in   respect   of   war”,   entailing   that   courage   and   wisdom   will   be   “the   most   highly   regarded  
qualities”  (294),  whereas  Laws  values  the  cooperative  virtues  and  law-­‐‑abidingness.  
122   Thus,   the   puppet-­‐‑analogy   resembles   the   theory   of   Protagoras   in   Protagoras,   in   entailing   that  
morality   is   partly   an   innate   disposition,  which   does   not   develop   automatically,   but  which   needs  
further   instruction   and   training,   by   all   sorts   of   paideutic   mechanisms   (including   laws).   See  
BERESFORD  (2013),  151-­‐‑152,  and  the  very  close  correspondence  with  his  reconstruction  of  Protagoras’  
moral  theory  to  that  of  Aristotle’s  analysis  of  virtue  in  Nicomachean  Ethics,  that  “virtues  are  neither  
purely   natural   nor   purely   cultural,   but   that   ‘nature   primes   us   to   receive   them,   and   habituation  
perfects   them’”   (BERESFORD   [2013],   151)   in   EN   1103a25-­‐‑26:   οὔτ᾿   ἄρα   φύύσει   οὔτε   παρὰ   φύύσιν  
ἐγγίίνονται  αἱ  ἀρεταίί,  ἀλλὰ  πεφυκόόσι  µμὲν  ἡµμῖν  δέέξασθαι  αὐτάάς,  τελειουµμέένοις  δὲ  διὰ  τοῦ  ἔθους.    
123  See  Leg.  648d1-­‐‑e7  for  σωφροσύύνη  as  self-­‐‑training  in  private  or  in  the  company  of  others:  ΑΘ.  (…)  
καὶ   εἴτε   τις   ἄρα   µμόόνος   ἐν   ἐρηµμίίᾳ,   τὸ   τῆς   αἰσχύύνης   ἐπίίπροσθεν   ποιούύµμενος,   πρὶν   εὖ   σχεῖν  
ἡγούύµμενος   ὁρᾶσθαι   µμὴ   δεῖν,   οὕτω   πρὸς   τοὺς   φόόβους   γυµμνάάζοιτο,   πῶµμα   µμόόνον   ἀντὶ   µμυρίίων  
πραγµμάάτων   παρασκευαζόόµμενος,   ὀρθῶς   ἄν   τι   πράάττοι,   εἴτε   τις   ἑαυτῷ   πιστεύύων   φύύσει   καὶ  
µμελέέτῃ   καλῶς   παρεσκευάάσθαι,   µμηδὲν   ὀκνοῖ   µμετὰ   συµμποτῶν   πλειόόνων   γυµμναζόόµμενος  
ἐπιδείίκνυσθαι  τὴν  ἐν  τῇ  τοῦ  πώώµματος  ἀναγκαίίᾳ  διαφορᾷ  δύύναµμιν  ὑπερθέέων  καὶ  κρατῶν,  ὥστε  
ὑπ’  ἀσχηµμοσύύνης  µμηδὲ  ἓν  σφάάλλεσθαι  µμέέγα  µμηδ’  ἀλλοιοῦσθαι  δι’  ἀρετήήν,  πρὸς  δὲ  τὴν  ἐσχάάτην  
πόόσιν   ἀπαλλάάττοιτο   πρὶν   ἀφικνεῖσθαι,   τὴν   πάάντων   ἧτταν   φοβούύµμενος   ἀνθρώώπων   τοῦ  
πώώµματος.   ΚΛ.   Ναίί·∙   σωφρονοῖ   γὰρ   <ἄν>,   ὦ   ξέένε,   καὶ   ὁ   τοιοῦτος   οὕτω   πράάττων.   ATH.   “(…)  
Suppose,  then,  that  a  man,  actuated  by  a  feeling  of  shame  and  loth  to  show  himself  in  public  before  
he  was   in   the   best   of   condition,   should   remain   alone   by   himself   while   undergoing   this   training  
against   fears   and   relying   on   the   potion   alone   for   his   solitary   equipment,   instead   of   endless  
exercises,—he   would   be   acting   quite   rightly:   so   too   would   he   who,   trusting   in   himself   that   by  
nature  and  practice  he  is  already  well  equipped,  should  have  no  hesitation  in  training  in  company  
with  a  number  of  drinking  companions  and  showing  off  how  for  speed  and  strength  he  is  superior  
to  the  potency  of  the  draughts  he  is  obliged  to  drink,  with  the  result  that  because  of  his  excellence  
he  neither  commits  any  grave  impropriety  nor  loses  his  head,  and  who,  before  they  came  to  the  last  
round,  should  quit  the  company,  through  fear  of  the  defeat  inflicted  on  all  men  by  the  wine-­‐‑cup.  CL.  
Yes,  Stranger,  this  man  too  would  be  acting  temperately”  (transl.  BURY).    
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people  are   ignorant  of  what   truly  affords   them  most  pleasure.124  Well-­‐‑being   is  
not   defined   by   a   higher   norm   that   is   imperceptible   for   large   sections   of   the  
citizenry.  It  is  what  human  beings,  qua  human  beings,  find  pleasant:  peace  and  
harmony.        
   Another   characteristic   of   the   social   notion   of   virtue   constructed   in   the  
context   of   the   symposion   is   that   is   distinctly   uniform   in   kind.   There   is   no  
suggestion  that  some  people  are  more  prone  to  act  on  the  basis  of  pleasures,  or  
that   some   people   are   better   capable   of   being   κρείίττων   ἑαυτοῦ   than   others—
contrast  Republic,  where  different  people  of  different  classes  have  different  kinds  
of   ἀρετήή,   and   virtue   depends   on   one’s   social   function.125   The   symposion   tests  
people’s  moral  quality,  but   this   test  presupposes   individual  differences   rather  
than  differences  between  kinds  of  people  (as  Callipolis  does).  Correspondingly,  
the   kind   of   social   order   that   incorporates   this   uniform   notion   of   ἀρετήή   is  
relatively   egalitarian.   The   symposion   may   imply   a   division   of   roles,   such   as  
speaking   and  drinking   in   turns,   but   such   a   division   is   not   based   on  different  
qualities   and   serves   a   solely   practical   purpose:   to   avoid   irregularities.  
Distinctions   are   possible,   but   these  would   seem   to   be   quantitative   (person  A  
being  more  friendly  than  person  B)  rather  than  qualitative.126      
   Laws  combines  a  definition  of  ἀρετήή  in  terms  of  conduct  with  an  attempt  
to  penetrate  beyond  the  surface  of  mere  behaviour  and  define  ἀρετήή  in  terms  of  
a   person’s   “character”   (ἕξις,   τρόόπος,   or   ἦθος,   roughly   “disposition”127).   This  
suggests   an   attempt   on   Plato’s   part   to   understand   virtue   in   terms   of   a  more  
                                                                                                              
124  Cf.  chapter  one,  p.  32.  
125  But  see  below,  section  3.3,  where  the  relevant  differences  are  differences  in  age.  Children  acquire  
the  capacity  for  physical  self-­‐‑restraint;  moral  self-­‐‑restraint  follows  later,  p.  119.  
126  This  supposition  seems   to   find  some  support   in   the   fact   that  drunkenness   (µμέέθη)  has  different  
stages   (647e2-­‐‑648a3;   649a9-­‐‑e2;   cf.   ENGLAND   ad   647e1),   thus   presenting   the   symposiast   with  
increasing  demands  on  his  ability  to  restrain  himself.  The  qualities  required  of  the  symposiarch  do  
not  seem  to  indicate  a  difference  in  kind  between  the  symposiarch  and  the  symposiasts,  see  above,  
p.   97f.   Sobriety   and   seniority   are   not   a  matter   of   privilege.   In   addition,   the   required   qualities   of  
being  φρόόνιµμος,  “wise”,  and  ἀθόόρυβος,  “imperturbable”,  do  not  so  much  seem  to  aim  to  single  out  
a  special  kind  of  person,  as  to  rule  out  people  of  whom  it  is  obvious  that  they  are  unsuitable.    
127  The  nuances  between  these  terms  would  merit  further  research.  
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permanent  feature  of  one’s  personality,  an  attempt  which  is  consistent  with  his  
location  of  ἀρετήή  on  the  level  of  the  soul  rather  than  on  the  level  of  behaviour  
in  other  works.128  In  Laws,  the  notion  of  “character”  assumes  the  place  that  the  
more  technical  conception  of  the  soul  as  consisting  of  parts  has  in  other  Platonic  
texts.    
   Finally,  the  symposion  implies  that,  in  principle,  every  human  being  is,  by  
virtue  of  being  human,  qualified  not  only  to  become  (more)  virtuous,  but  also  to  
assess  other  people’s  moral  quality  (even  though  one  does  need  an  ἄρχων,  see  
below).   It   suggests   that   virtue   can   be   identified   and   examined   by  means   of   a  
practical  test,  the  results  of  which  are  visible  to  all.  All  of  these  characteristics  of  
virtue  as  sociability  entail  a  much  more  optimistic  view  of  the  human  capacity  
for  virtue   than  a  conception  of  virtue  as   the  prerogative  of   that  rare  bird—the  
moral  expert.129  
   The  scenario  of  the  symposion  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility  that  there  
exist   differences   in   natural   aptness.   But   it   does   not   assume   insurmountable  
inequalities  between  people,  as  does  a  theory  of  different  soul-­‐‑types.  Now  that,  
in  Book   I,   the  difference  between  a  part  of  virtue  and   the  whole  of  virtue  has  
served   to   introduce   the   notion   of   human   excellence   as   φιλίία   alongside   its  
specific  cultural  interpretations,  in  Book  II  the  Platonic  terminology  of  the  four  
virtues   is   reintroduced   to   analyse   the   process   of   paideia,   training   in   virtue,   in  
                                                                                                              
128  Laws   thus  shares  the  Socratic-­‐‑Platonic  practice  to  “locate  virtue  at  the  ‘background’   level  of  the  
‘state   of   the   soul’   that   ‘explains’   virtuous   behaviour,   rather   than   on   the   ‘foreground’   level   of   the  
virtuous  behaviour  itself”,  RADEMAKER  (2005),  296.  The  term  ψυχήή  is  used  in  a  less  technical  sense  
in  Laws  than  in  those  texts  in  the  Platonic  corpus  that  assume  a  tripartite  (or  bipartite)  soul.  Ψυχήή  in  
Laws  does  not  denote  an  entity  consisting  of  parts,  analogous  to  a  ζῷον,  but  a  more  or   less  stable  
(although  not  completely  unchangeable)  bearer  of  a  particular  ἕξις  or  ἦθος.   
129   For   a   different   view,   see   ΤECUȘAN   (1990),   who   compares   Laws   I-­‐‑II   to   Protagoras   347c-­‐‑3   and  
concludes   that   Plato’s   attitude   towards   the   symposion   in   Laws   reflects   a   “change   towards   the  
irrational”   and   considers   the   symposion   as   an   expression   of   Plato’s   increased   pessimism;   the  
Athenian  had  “no  such  radiant  confidence  in  man’s  rationality”  (260).  See  also  MURRAY  (2013):  “The  
change   that   comes   about   in   the   Laws   is   not   a   change   in   the   definition   of   pleasure   but   part   of   a  
fundamental  reassessment  of  human  nature  and  the  realisation  that  human  beings  are  so  imperfect  
that  they  cannot  be  controlled  through  persuasion  alone:  they  must  also  be  trained  in  the  proper  use  
of  their  desires”  (111).  
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terms   of   different   phases.   In   this  way,   the  different   virtues   become   related   to  
age  groups,  and  different  stages  of  paideia.  It  is  to  this  analysis  of  paideia  that  we  
will  now  turn.    
  
  
3 . 3    Se t t ing    the    s c ene    I I I :    χορε ίία    and   phases   o f   pa ide ia   
In   order   to   investigate   whether   revealing   people’s   φύύσεις   is   the   only   use  
(ἀγαθόόν)  of  the  rightly  conducted  symposion  or  whether  it  also  offers  some  kind  
of  benefit   (τι  µμέέγεθος  ὠφελίίας)130   the   interlocutors  now   return   to   “the   correct  
education”,   ἡ   ὀρθὴ   παιδείία,  which   the   Athenian   briefly  mentioned   before.131  
He  now  guesses  (τοπάάζω)  that  the  symposion  is  the  “salvation”  (σωτηρίία)  of  the  
correct   education.132   In   order   to   explain   this   guess,   the   Athenian   proceeds   to  
define  what  he  means  by  “the  correct  education”  (ἡ  ὀρθὴ  παιδείία).  
   We   have   already   seen   that   paideia   is   a   teleological   process.133   The  
Athenian   now   distinguishes   two   phases   of   that   process.   Although   the  whole  
process  right  until  the  end—when  a  person  is  “complete”  and  possesses  correct  
opinions  and  φρόόνησις134—can  be  called  paideia,  here  he  wants   to  reserve   that  
term  for  the  earliest  phase.135  Children’s  first  perception  (τῶν  παίίδων  παιδικὴν  
                                                                                                              
130  Leg.  652a1-­‐‑5.  The  discussion  indeed  is  somewhat  repetitive,  as  the  Athenian  remarks  in  659c9-­‐‑d3.  
131  In  Leg.  643b4-­‐‑644b4.  See  above,  p.  99.  The  Athenian  claims  that  it  does,  at  least,  that  is  what  the  
λόόγος  apparently  wants   to  make  clear   (ὡς  ὁ  λόόγος  ἔοικεν  βούύλεσθαι  σηµμαίίνειν,  652a5-­‐‑6).  They  
must   hear   how   it   does   (ὅπῃ   δὲ   καὶ   ὅπως),   and  pay   attention   that   they   are   not   entangled   by   the  
λόόγος  (µμήή  πῃ  παραποδισθῶµμεν  αὐτοῦ,  652b1).  
132   Leg.   653a1-­‐‑3:   τούύτου   [sc.   of   ὀρθὴ   παιδείία]   γάάρ,   ὥς   γε   ἐγὼ   τοπάάζω   τὰ   νῦν,   ἔστιν   ἐν   τῷ  
ἐπιτηδεύύµματι  τούύτῳ  καλῶς  κατορθουµμέένῳ  σωτηρίία.  
133  Leg.  643b4-­‐‑d3;  see  above,  p.  99.  
134  Leg.  653a7-­‐‑b1:   (…)  φρόόνησιν  δὲ  καὶ  ἀληθεῖς  δόόξας  βεβαίίους  εὐτυχὲς  ὅτῳ  καὶ  πρὸς  τὸ  γῆρας  
παρεγέένετο·∙  τέέλεος  δ’  οὖν  ἔστ’  ἄνθρωπος  ταῦτα  καὶ  τὰ  ἐν  τούύτοις  πάάντα  κεκτηµμέένος  ἀγαθάά.  
“But   insight,   and  unshakable   true  opinions  are   an  enormous   felicity   for   the  person  who  acquires  
them,   even   if   they   come   to   him   towards   old   age.  A  man  who   possesses   them,   and   all   the   good  
things  they  entail,  is  complete”  (transl.  MLB).  
135   This   passage   is   difficult   to   access   because   of   its   dense   language   (see   for   a   discussion   of   the  
difficulties   SCHÖPSDAU   [1994],   256-­‐‑257).  According   to   the   reading  defended  here,   the  Athenian   is  
concerned  here  with  a  definitional  question.  In  653a1  he  has  announced  that  he  will  define  what  he  
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…  πρώώτην   αἴσθησιν,   653a5-­‐‑6),   consists   of   ἡδονήή   and   λύύπη.   These   pleasures  
and   pains   have   to   be   conditioned:   children   have   to   be   taught   right   from   the  
beginning   to  hate  what  must  be  detested  and   to   like  what  must  be  welcomed  
(µμισεῖν   µμὲν   ἃ   χρὴ   µμισεῖν   εὐθὺς   ἐξ   ἀρχῆς   µμέέχρι   τέέλους,   στέέργειν   δὲ   ἃ  
στέέργειν,  653c1-­‐‑2).  Correct  pleasures  and  pains  will  accord  with  reason  (λόόγος)  
once   that   is   present.   The   term   ἀρετήή   is   used   for   the   correct   perception   in  
children,   the  more  primitive   counterpart  of  φρόόνησις  and  βέέβαιοι  δόόξαι.  The  
Athenian   wants   to   reserve   the   term   παιδείία   for   this   early   phase   of   ἀρετήή  
(παιδείίαν  δὴ  λέέγω  τὴν  παραγιγνοµμέένην  πρῶτον  παισὶν  ἀρετήήν,  653b1-­‐‑2;  cf.  
653c2-­‐‑4).  The  earliest  paideia  is  the  conditioning  of  a  person’s  pleasure  and  pain.    
   The   conditioning   of   pleasures   and   pains   is   distinguished   from   a   later  
phase   of   paideia,   in   which   a   person   has   acquired   λόόγος.136   Λόόγος   is   a  
precondition   (albeit  not  a   sufficient  one)   for  “firm,   true  convictions”   (ἀληθεῖς  
δόόξας  βέέβαιoι)  and  “insight”  (φρόόνησις).137  The  ἡδοναίί  and  λύύπαι  are  to  be  in  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
means   by   “the   correct   education”,   ἡ   ὀρθὴ   παιδείία.   His   definition   follows   in   653a5-­‐‑c4.   First,   the  
Athenian  distinguishes  different  uses  of  the  term  ἀρετήή:  this  can  be  used  for  the  virtue  in  children  
(παιδικὴ   αἴσθησις)   and   for   the   virtue   of   senior   people   (φρόόνησις   and   firm   δόόξαι).   Having  
distinguished  between  these  parts  of  virtue,  the  Athenian  wants  to  confine  the  use  of  παιδείία  to  the  
ἀρετήή  of  children,  that  is  to  say,  to  correctness  in  affections  that  precedes  the  presence  of  λόόγος.  It  is  
with  this  demarcation  of  that  the  Athenian  is  concerned  in  Leg.  653b6-­‐‑c4:  (…)  τὸ  δὲ  περὶ  τὰς  ἡδονὰς  
καὶ  λύύπας  τεθραµμµμέένον  αὐτῆς  [sc.  ἀρετῆς]  ὀρθῶς  ὥστε  µμισεῖν  µμὲν  ἃ  χρὴ  µμισεῖν  εὐθὺς  ἐξ  ἀρχῆς  
µμέέχρι   τέέλους,   στέέργειν   δὲ   ἃ   χρὴ   στέέργειν,   τοῦτ’   αὐτὸ   ἀποτεµμὼν   τῷ   λόόγῳ   καὶ   παιδείίαν  
προσαγορεύύων,  κατάά  γε  τὴν  ἐµμὴν  ὀρθῶς  ἂν  προσαγορεύύοις.  “But  that  part  of  it  [sc.  ἀρετήή]  that  is  
nurtured  correctly  and  has  to  do  with  pleasures  and  pains,  so  that  we  hate  what  we  ought  to  hate  
right   from   the  beginning   till   the   end,   and   love  what  we  ought   to   love—when  you   isolate   that   in  
speech  and  call  it  ‘education’,  you  will,  in  my  opinion,  give  it  its  correct  name”  (transl.  MLB).  This  is  
in  fact  a  repetition  of  653b1-­‐‑2,  παιδείίαν  δὴ  λέέγω  τὴν  παραγιγνοµμέένην  πρῶτον  παισὶν  ἀρετήήν.  For  
the  interpretation  of  αὐτῆς  in  653b7  as  referring  to  ἀρετήή,  cf.  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  257,  ad  653b6:  for  
reason  of  the  correlation  between  σύύµμπασα  µμέέν  and  τὸ  δὲ  …  αὐτῆς  “[scheint  es]  am  sinnvollsten,  
den  Genitiv  αὐτῆς  als  partitivus  auf  die  Tugend  zu  beziehen”.  
136  Leg.  653b2-­‐‑4:  ἡδονὴ  δὴ  καὶ  φιλίία  καὶ  λύύπη  καὶ  µμῖσος  ἂν  ὀρθῶς  ἐν  ψυχαῖς  ἐγγίίγνωνται  µμήήπω  
δυναµμέένων   λόόγῳ   λαµμβάάνειν,   λαβόόντων   δὲ   τὸν   λόόγον,   συµμφωνήήσωσι   τῷ   λόόγῳ   (…).   “When  
pleasure   and   affection,   pain   and   hatred  well   up   correctly   in   the   souls   of   those   who   are   not   yet  
capable   of   grasping   these  with   reason,   and   then,  when   they   have   come   to   possess   reason,   these  
[affections]  will  accord  with  reason  (…)”  (transl.  MLB).  Cf.  645b4-­‐‑5:  τὸν  µμὲν  λόόγον  ἀληθῆ  λαβόόντα  
ἐν  ἑαυτῷ  περὶ  τῶν  ἕλξεων  τούύτων.    
137   In  653a8  φρόόνησις  and  ἀληθεῖς,  βέέβαιοι  δόόξαι  are  said  to  be  εὐτυχὲς  ὅτῳ  καὶ  πρὸς  τὸ  γῆρας  
παρεγέένετο,  “a  fortunate  thing  for  the  person  to  whom  they  come,  even  if  that  is  in  old  age”.  Most  
translators   to   me   seem   to   have   interpreted   this   phrase   in   an   unduly   negative   way,   making   the  
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συµμφωνίία   with   the   λόόγος,   which   a   person   only   acquires   later.138   Notably,  
ἀρετήή   as   συµμφωνίία139   is   a   concordance   between   two   elements;   virtue   is   not  
described  in  terms  of  a  whole  or  a  unity.140  Complete  virtue  as  it  is  defined  here  
is  much  more   dynamic   than   the   static   conception   of   ἀρετήή   as   a   hierarchy   of  
soul-­‐‑parts.    
   In   this   passage   at   the   beginning   of   Book   II   the   two   kinds   of   virtue  
discussed  are  virtue  in  children  and  virtue  in  senior  people.  This  distinction  is  
resumed  towards  the  end  of  Book  XII,  where  the  ἀρετήή  of  animals  and  children,  
that  does  not   involve  λόόγος,   is   labeled  ἀνδρείία,  apparently   the   term  reserved  
for  an  elementary   form  of   self-­‐‑restraint.141  Τhe  differences  between   the  ἀρεταίί  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
acquisition   of   φρόόνησις   dependent   on   luck,   e.g.   BURY:   “…but   as   to   wisdom   and   settled   true  
opinions,  a  man  is  lucky  if  they  come  to  him  even  in  old  age”;  ENGLAND  ad  653a7:  “about  wisdom—
and   fixed   right   opinions—I   say   that   it   is   lucky   for   a  man   if   he   acquires   it   as   he   is   getting   old”;  
SAUNDERS:   “But   for   a  man   to   acquire   good   judgment,   and  unshakable   correct   opinions,   however  
late  in  life,  is  a  matter  of  good  luck”;  SCHÖPSDAU:  “so  ist  es  ein  Glücksfall,  wenn  sie  [Einsicht  und  
festgegründete  wahre  Meinungen]  jemandem  auch  nur  im  hohen  Alter  zuteil  werden”;  BRISSON  &  
PRADEAU:   “c’est   une   chance  pour   quelqu’un  d’y  parvenir,  même   lorsqu’il   approcha   la   vieillesse”  
(contrast   PANGLE:   “he   is   a   fortunate   person   to   whom   it   comes   even   in   old   age”).   Eὐτυχες,  
however,  is   “good   luck”   but   “a   fortunate   thing”;  we   should,   I   think,   be   hesitant   to   attribute   the  
acquisition   of   the   highest   virtue   to   “good   luck”—there   is   no   evidence   for   such   a   claim.   Rather,  
whereas   the   acquisition   of   correct   αἴσθησις   normally   occurs   in   childhood,   the   acquisition   of  
φρόόνησις   normally   occurs   in   old   age.  Cf.   Cicero’s   paraphrase   in  De   Fin.   5.21   §   58:  Praeclare   enim  
Plato:  “Beatum  cui  etiam  in  senectute  contigerit  ut  sapientiam  verasque  opiniones  adsequi  possit!”    
138  For  the  gerontocratic  nature  of  Laws’  society:  see  CAMPBELL  (1981),  429;  SAMARAS  (2010),  172,  n.  3;  
BARTELS   (2012).   BOBONICH   (2002)   argues   that   “the   low   level   perception   of   order   in   harmony  
involves  conceptualizing  it  in  accordance  with  concepts  drawn  from  reason”  (360,  my  italics).  
139   “The   ancient   writers   attach   great   importance   to   the   distinction   between   ‘concordant’   and  
‘discordant’   intervals   (symphôna,  diaphôna)”,  WEST   (1992)  160.  Concordant   intervals  are   the   fourth,  
the   fifth,  and   the  octave,  or   larger   intervals,  consting  of  octave  +   fouth,  etc.  Cf.  BARKER   (2000),  90.  
Virtue   as   concordance  συµμφωνίία   is   completely  different   from   a   harmony   between   soul-­‐‑parts;   cf.  
MÜLLER   (1968):  “Das  Wissen  vom  transzendenten  Guten  beherrschte  und  durchwirkte   (…)   in  der  
P[oliteia]   die   Tugend.   Wo   ist   es   bei   dem   Verfall   des   Tugendsystems   geblieben?   Unter   den  
Unklarheiten,   die   uns   befremdeten,   war   dies   die   erstaunlichste,   daß   φρόόνησις   einer   συµμφωνίία  
gleichgesetzt  wurde  und  ihren  Bezugspunkt  zu  verlieren  schien”  (21).  
140  Cf.   Isocr.  Panath.   30-­‐‑32:   paideia   consists   in   the   inner   nature   of   a  man   and   the   harmony   of   his  
character.    
141   Leg.   963e1-­‐‑8   (the   Athenian   is   speaking):   Ἐρώώτησόόν   µμε   τίί   ποτε   ἓν   προσαγορεύύοντες   ἀρετὴν  
ἀµμφόότερα,   δύύο   πάάλιν   αὐτὰ  προσείίποµμεν,   τὸ   µμὲν   ἀνδρείίαν,   τὸ   δὲ   φρόόνησιν.   ἐρῶ   γάάρ   σοι   τὴν  
αἰτίίαν,   ὅτι   τὸ   µμέέν   ἐστιν   περὶ   φόόβον,   οὗ   καὶ   τὰ   θηρίία   µμετέέχει,   τῆς   ἀνδρείίας,   καὶ   τάά   γε   τῶν  
παίίδων   ἤθη   τῶν   πάάνυ   νέέων·∙   ἄνευ   γὰρ   λόόγου   καὶ   φύύσει   γίίγνεται   ἀνδρείία   ψυχήή,   ἄνευ   δὲ   αὖ  
λόόγου   ψυχὴ   φρόόνιµμόός   τε   καὶ   νοῦν   ἔχουσα   οὔτ᾿   ἐγέένετο   πώώποτε   οὔτ᾿   ἔστιν   οὐδ᾿   αὖθίίς   ποτε  
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are,   in   the   case   of   human  beings,   associated  with   age.142   The   earliest  phase  of  
ἀρετήή,   without   λόόγος,   is   ἀνδρείία;   the   final   stage,   for   which   λόόγος   is  
prerequisite,   is   φρόόνησις.143   The   terminology   of   the   four   Socratic-­‐‑Platonic  
virtues  become  associated  with  different  age  categories.  They  are  made  to  apply  
to   different   stages   in   the   education   of   an   individual.   By   identifying   only   the  
most  extreme  elements  of  this  process,  Plato  does  not  have  to  indicate  a  certain  
point  at  which  λόόγος  manifests  itself  in  an  individual,  and  can  forgo  having  to  
be  more  specific  about  the  manifestation  of  a  person’s  rational  capacity.      
   What   exactly  does   this   earliest  paideia,   the   conditioning  of  pleasure   and  
pain  in  children,  entail?  In  order  to  explain  how  this  works,  the  Athenian  first  
gives  a  biological  sketch  of  young  animals  in  general,  and  subsequently  isolates  
the  human  species.  All  young  creatures   (τὸ  νέέον  ἅπαν,  653d7)  have  a  natural  
inclination   to  make  uncontrolled  sounds  and  movements.144  They   lack  physical  
self-­‐‑restraint   (τοῖς   τε   σώώµμασι   καὶ   ταῖς   φωναῖς   ἡσυχίίαν   ἄγειν   οὐ   δύύνασθαι,  
653d7-­‐‑8).  They  are  always  leaping  and  jumping—as  if  engaging  in  some  sort  of  
chorus-­‐‑dance   (οἷον  ὀρχούύµμενα,  653e2)—and  producing  all  kinds  of   sounds.145  
Unique   to   human   children   among   the   ζῷα146   is   their   capacity   to   perceive   the  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
γενήήσεται,  ὡς  ὄντος  ἑτέέρου.  “Do  you  ask  me  this  question—why,  when  calling  both  the  two  by  the  
single  name  of  ‘virtue’,  did  we  again  speak  of  them  as  two—courage  and  wisdom?  Then  I  shall  tell  
you  the  reason,—which  is,  that  the  one  of  them  has  to  do  with  fear,  namely  courage,  in  which  beasts  
also  share,  and   the  characters  of  very  young  children;   for  a  courageous  soul  comes   into  existence  
naturally   and  without   reasoning,   but  without   reasoning   there  never  yet   came   into   existence,   and  
there  does  not  nor  ever  will  exist,  a  soul  that  is  wise  and  rational,  it  being  a  distinct  kind”  (transl.  
BURY).  See  also  below,  chapter  six,  p.  217.    
142  For  age-­‐‑distinctions  as  characteristic  of  Spartan  paideia,  see  NILSSON  (1912)  (in  CHRIST  [1986],  205-­‐‑
225);  for  the  age-­‐‑distinctions  in  the  social  and  educational  practices  in  Crete,  see  WILLETTS  (1955),  17.    
143  This  would  entail  that  ἀνδρείία  is  the  most  universal  and  a-­‐‑cultural  ἀρετήή  (all  human  beings  have  
an  innate  sense  of  order),  whereas  φρόόνησις  is  the  ἀρετήή  that  is  the  most  cultural-­‐‑specific,  since  it  is  
the  result  of  the  education  in  the  norms  and  values  of  a  specific  polis.  
144  Leg.  653d7-­‐‑e5;  cf.  673c9-­‐‑d5.  
145  Leg.  653d7-­‐‑e5;  cf.  664e3-­‐‑665a3.  
146  Cf.  Leg.  653d7-­‐‑654a5;  664e3-­‐‑665a6;  673c9-­‐‑d5.  Α  possible  association  for  the  reader  of  Laws  familiar  
with  Plato’s  earlier  work  might  be  the  Protagoras-­‐‑myth  in  Plato’s  Protagoras.  Other   living  animals  
(τὰ  …  ἄλλα  ζῷα,  321c4)  are  called  ἄλογα   (321c1)  and  man  by   implication  has  λόόγος   (see   for  an  
explanation   of   this   ‘anachronistic’   ascription   of   λόόγος   to   the   human   race  NUSSBAUM   (1986),   100-­‐‑
106).  Leg.  653c9-­‐‑d1  is  also  reminiscent  of  the  Protagoras-­‐‑myth.  
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difference   between   order   (τάάξις)   and   disorder,   “rhythm”   being   the   name   for  
order  in  movement  and  “harmony”  for  order  in  the  domain  of  the  voice.147  The  
education  of  children  therefore  consists  in  teaching  them  to  feel  ἡδονήή  for  what  
ought  to  be  enjoyed,  and  λύύπη  for  what  ought  to  be  detested:  to  like  order  (i.e.,  
music)  and  to  dislike  disorder.148  To  this  end,  they  have  to  join  in  χορείία,  which  
consists  of  both  singing  (orderly  movement  of  the  voice)  and  dancing  (orderly  
movement  of  the  body).  Children’s  willingness   to  participate   in  χορείία  has  its  
source   in   pleasure,   an   idea   given   support   by   an   etymological   link   between  
χορόός  (“chorus”)  and  χαράά  (“joy”).149    
   Plato  seems  especially  to  have  welcomed  people’s  intuitive  association  of  
music   with   pleasure.   Music   is   a   phenomenon   of   which   the   essence   is   order  
(τάάξις),   combining   rhythm   and   harmony.150   This   order   is   a   natural   order151  
                                                                                                              
147  Leg.   653e3-­‐‑5:   τὰ  µμὲν  οὖν  ἄλλα  ζῷα  οὐκ  ἔχειν  αἴσθησιν   τῶν  ἐν   ταῖς  κινήήσεσιν   τάάξεων  οὐδὲ  
ἀταξιῶν,   οἷς   δὴ   ῥυθµμὸς   ὄνοµμα   καὶ   ἁρµμονίία·∙   “All   the   other   animals   do   not   have   the   ability   to  
perceive  the  various  kinds  of  order  in  movements,  nor  the  various  kinds  of  disorder,  [order]  which  
have   the  name   rhythm  and  harmony”   (transl.  MLB).  Order   in  movement   is   “rhythm”   (τῇ  …  τῆς  
κινήήσεως  τάάξει  ῥυθµμὸς  ὄνοµμα  εἴη,  664e8-­‐‑665e1);  order  in  the  voice,  a  mix  of  high  and  low  pitched  
sounds,   is   known   as   ”harmony”   (τῇ   …   τῆς   φωνῆς   [sc.   τάάξει],   τοῦ   τε   ὀξέέος   ἅµμα   καὶ   βαρέέος  
συγκεραννυµμέένων,  ἁρµμονίία  ὄνοµμα  προσαγορεύύοιτο,  665a1-­‐‑3).    
148  The  background  here  may  be  Plato’s  worries  about  the  rise  of  the  ‘New  Music’,  see  Leg.  700a7-­‐‑
701b;   similar   worries   seem   to   underly   the   discussion   of   musical   education   in   Arist.   Pol.   VIII,  
1339a11ff.  On  the  New  Music,  see  recently  PÖHLMANN  (2011)  and  CSAPO  (2011).  
149  Leg.   653e5-­‐‑654a5:  ἡµμῖν  δὲ  οὓς  εἴποµμεν  τοὺς  θεοὺς  συγχορευτὰς  δεδόόσθαι,   τούύτους  εἶναι  καὶ  
τοὺς  δεδωκόότας  τὴν  ἔνρυθµμόόν  τε  καὶ  ἐναρµμόόνιον  αἴσθησιν  µμεθ᾿  ἡδονῆς,  ᾗ  δὴ  κινεῖν  τε  ἡµμᾶς  καὶ  
χορηγεῖν  ἡµμῶν  τούύτους,  ᾠδαῖς  τε  καὶ  ὀρχήήσεσιν  ἀλλήήλοις  συνείίροντας,  χορούύς  τε  ὠνοµμακέέναι  
παρὰ  τὸ  τῆς  χαρᾶς  ἔµμφυτον  ὄνοµμα.  “(…)  to  us  men  the  very  gods,  who  were  given,  as  we  said,  to  
be   our   fellows   in   dance   [i.e.   the   Muses,   Apollo,   and   Dionysus],   have   granted   the   pleasurable  
perception  of  rhythm  and  harmony,  whereby  they  cause  us  to  move  and  lead  our  choirs,  linking  us  
one  with  another  by  means  of  songs  and  dances;  and  to  the  choir  they  have  given  its  name  from  the  
‘cheer’   implanted  therein”  (transl.  BURY).  Cf.  657c3-­‐‑6.  See  PRAUSCELLO  (2011),  139  with  references,  
for  the  observation  that  the  motif  of  joy  “has  very  deep  roots  in  the  cultic  language  of  choral  lyric”.  
150  The  Philebus  (23c4-­‐‑27c1)  presents  an  ontology  of  orderly  phenomena  (with  τάάξις),  one  of  which  is  
music.  The  ontology  distinguishes  four  ultimate  genera,  27b7-­‐‑c1:  (1)  the  ἄπειρον,  (2)  the  πέέρας,  (3)  
ἐκ  τούύτων  …  µμεικτὴ  καὶ  γεγενηµμέένη  οὐσίία,  and  (4)  ἡ  …  τῆς  µμείίξεως  αἰτίία  καὶ  γενέέσεως.  Good,  
orderly  phenomena  such  as  health  (25e8),  music  (26a4),  the  seasons  (26b1),  beauty,  bodily  strength  
and   all   fine   qualities   in   souls   (26b6-­‐‑7),   certain   (‘pure’)   pleasures,   and   the   mixed   life   (27d7-­‐‑10),  
belong   to   the   third,  mixed  kind.  As  COOPER   (1999),   150  notes,   “Socrates   seems   to   imply   (…)   that  
their  being  the  good  things  they  are  is  a  consequence  of  their  being  constituted  by  a  combination  of  
peras  and  apeiron.”  The  four  apeira  of  music  are  high  (ὀξύύ),  low  (βαρύύ),  fast  (ταχύύ)  and  slow  (βραδύύ)  
(26a2-­‐‑4,  cf.  17c11-­‐‑d6),  see  for  a   further  explanation  COOPER  (1999),  151.  To  generate  music,  πέέρας,  
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which  can  be  perceived  by  every  human  being.  The  implicit  assumption  seems  
to  be  that  every  human  being  can  perceive  that  one  interval  is  concordant  while  
another   is  discordant;  αἴσθησις   is  a  naturally  present  capacity   for  virtue.152   In  
this  way,  musical  or  virtuous  behaviour  is  suggested  to  be  naturally  correct  for  
human  beings  qua  human  beings.153  Thus,  χορείία,  which  combines  singing  and  
dancing,   becomes   the   cultivation   of   an   already   present   natural   sensitivity   for  
and   liking   of   order   in   movement   (τάάξις   as   ῥυθµμόός)   and   sound   (τάάξις   as  
ἁρµμονίία).154   The   perspective   is   individual   and   generic   at   the   same   time:   the  
egalitarian  tendency  inherent  in  defining  a  way  of  life  that  is  best  for  a  human  
being  qua  human  being  seems  to  adumbrate  Aristotle’s  idea  of  humans  as  a  “by  
nature  a  social  animal”  (φύύσει  ζῷον  πολιτικόόν).155  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
“determinant”,   i.e.   numerical   ratios   and   proportions,   in   short,   number   must   be   imposed   on   the  
indeterminacy:   σύύµμµμετρα   δὲ   καὶ   σύύµμφωνα   ἐνθεῖσα   ἀριθµμὸν   ἀπεργάάζεται   (25e1-­‐‑2,   cf.   25a6-­‐‑b2).  
This   passage   groups   distinct   phenomena   together   under   the   common   denominator   of   order   and  
claims  a  physical  basis  for  their  order.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  theory  of  the  mixed  life  (a  mixture  of  
pleasure  and  pain,  cf.  Leg.  732d8-­‐‑734e2)  and  of  the  mixed  constitution  (a  mixture  between  extreme  
monarchy  and  extreme  democracy  Leg.  693d2-­‐‑702a1)  is  construed  along  these  same  lines.  
151   BARKER   (2007):   “(…)   it   is   axiomatic   for   all   the   theoretical   writers  whose   views   can   be   clearly  
pinned  down  that  there  is  an  objective  and  discernible  line  of  demarcation,  independent  of  human  
whim,  decision  or  ingenuity,  between  musically  well-­‐‑ordered  relations  and  transformations  on  the  
one  hand,  and  on  the  other  the  indeterminate  chaos  of  the  non-­‐‑musical.  The  distinction  is  not  one  of  
convention  or  taste,  but  is  somehow  fixed  in  the  order  of  things,  awaiting  discovery,  (…)”  (10,  see  
also  317-­‐‑318,  324).    
152   Education   in  Laws   is   often—justly—described   as   a   form   of   habituation,   according   a   relatively  
(compared   to   Republic)   prominent   role   to   pleasure,   e.g.   STALLEY   (1983),   45-­‐‑58;   BELFIORE   (1986)  
(“[u]nlike  the  Republic,  (…)  the  Laws  stresses  the  importance  in  education  of  the  elements  in  the  soul  
opposed  to  reason”,  427);  CAIRNS  (1993),  377  (with  further  references  in  n.  102);  CARONE  (2003)  (both  
virtue  and  pleasure  are  necessary  and  sufficient  for  happiness);  KLOSKO  (2006),  221-­‐‑225;  WOERTHER  
(2008),  95-­‐‑98  (focusing  on  the  prominence  of  musical  education  in  life-­‐‑long  paideia).  For  pleasure  in  
Republic,  see  COOPER  (1984),  GOSLING  &  TAYLOR  (19832),  97-­‐‑128.  
153   PELOSI   (2010)   sees   a   parallel   between  Laws   and  Timaeus’   conception   of   the   virtuous   soul:   “the  
wholly   human   instinct   to   grasp   that  which   is  musical   has   to   do  with   the  musical   origins   of   the  
rational  human  soul,  described  in  the  Timaeus  (below,  pp.  189-­‐‑95)”  (65).  
154  MORROW  (1960),  304,  n.  27,  speculates  whether  the  λόόγος  (“theory”)  mentioned  in  653d6  that  also  
includes  material  from  664e-­‐‑665a  and  672cd  and  673cd,  is  Plato’s  own  teaching  or  that  of  a  musical  
theorist   such  as  Damon,  who   is   referred   to  by  both  Plato  and  Aristotle.  He  concludes  “The   same  
theory  of  human  nature,  without  the  mythology,  seems  to  underlie  Aristotle’s  doctrine  of  rhythm  
and  harmony   (Pol.   1340a2ff;   cf.   Prob.   920b29ff;  Poet.   1448b20ff.).”   Indeed,  Laws’   implied   theory   of  
human  nature  seems  to  have  more  common  ground  with  Aristotle  than  with  Plato’s  own  Republic.  
155  Arist.  Pol.  1253a3.    
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3 . 4    The    sympos ia    and    the    th i rd    cho rus   
3.4.1   Χορείία  and  the  three  choruses  
The   physical   conditioning   (learning   to   control   one’s   σῶµμα   and   φωνήή)   of  
children   happens   through   a   practice   that   is   in   line   with,   and   “socializes”,156  
these   two   elements,   movement   and   voice.   This   is   χορείία,   the   singing   and  
dancing   in   choruses.   The   gods   have   given   human   beings   “the   rhythmic   and  
harmonic   perception   accompanied   by   pleasure”   (τὴν   ἔνρυθµμόόν   τε   καὶ  
ἐναρµμόόνιον   αἴσθησιν   µμεθ᾿   ἡδονῆς,   654a2-­‐‑3),   and   are   their   fellow   dancers.  
Human   being’s   basic   sense   of   music   can   be   cultivated   by   χορείία.157   Three  
(groups  of)  gods  are  connected  with  the  choreutic  festivals:   the  Muses,  Apollo  
and  Dionysus.158    
   A   little   later,   it   turns   out   that   the   Athenian   envisages   that   not   only  
children,  but  all  citizens,  right  up  until  the  age  of  60,  will  participate  in  χορείία.  
                                                                                                              
156   A   similar   labelling   of   social   behaviour   as   ‘musical’   can   be   found   in   Protagoras   (324d6ff.):   a  
training   in   rhythm  and  harmonia   is  an  education   in  political  virtue.  Acquaintance  with   fine  music  
makes  people  more  “gentle”  (ἡµμερώώτεροι  326b3,  i.e.  not  ὥσπερ  θήήριον  ἀλογίίστως,  324b1),  which  is  
juxtaposed   to  more  “well-­‐‑rhythmed”   (εὐρυθµμόότεροι)  and  “more  harmonious”   (εὐαρµμοστόότεροι),  
326b3.   Using   one’s   voice   and   body   in   a   way   that   is   aesthetically   attractive   (‘gracious’)   makes   it  
suitable  for  life  in  the  polis:  these  people  become  useful  citizens,  i.e.  people  who  will  speak  and  act  in  
the  interest  of  society  (χρήήσιµμοι  …  εἰς  τὸ  λέέγειν  τε  καὶ  πράάττειν,  326b4).  By  implication,  the  norm  
in   both   domains   (music   and   politics)   is   thought   of   as   identical:   only   the   use   of   the   voice   and  
behaviour  that  qualifies  as  musical  is  social  behaviour:  the  σωτηρίία  of  the  polis  is  made  dependent  
on  ‘musical’  behaviour.  
157   ΤECUȘAN   (1990):   “The   idea   of   πρώώτη   παιδείία   (654a6),   which   one   would   get   while   young   by  
attending  to  the  Muses’  chorus  first,  then  to  Apollo’s  (…)  hints  at  the  fact  that  Plato  in  the  end  came  
to  think  of  the  symposion  as  a  kind  of  δευτέέρα  παιδείία,  both  more  significant  and  higher  than  the  
first  one—given  that  age  on  the  one  hand,  and  reason,  knowledge,  and  understanding  on  the  other,  
depend  on  each  other  closely  (653a)”  (248).  TAYLOR  (1926)  notes  a  parallel  between  Laws  teaching  of  
the  young  to  “‘feel  pleasure  and  pain’  rightly  (653b)”  and  Aristotle;  “‘rightly’  means  ‘in  accord  with  
the  rightly  uttered  discourse  of  the  law’  (659d,  πρὸς  τὸν  ὑπὸ  τοῦ  νόόµμου  λόόγον  ὀρθὸν  εἰρηµμέένον),  a  
sentence  which   seems   to   be   the   source   from  which   the   expression   ὀρθὸς  λόόγος   has   got   into   the  
Ethics  of  Aristotle”  (469).    
158  Leg.  653d3-­‐‑4.  
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Paideia  therefore  covers  the  entire  human  life  up  until  this  age,  which  prompts  
the  Athenian’s   statement   that   the  whole  of   chorus-­‐‑dancing   (ὅλη  …  χορείία)   is  
the   whole   of   education   (ὅλη   παίίδευσις).159   For   this   purpose,   he   divides   all  
citizens  until  60  in  three  choruses.  Each  chorus  is  dedicated  to  one  of  the  three  
gods   that  were   said   to  be  people’s   fellow  dancers   in  χορείία.160  There  are   four  
age  groups  in  total:    
(1) the  chorus  of  the  Muses,  consisting  of  children;    
(2) the  chorus  of  Apollo,  consisting  of  the  citizens  between  the  ages  of  
18  and  30;      
(3) the  chorus  of  Dionysus,  consisting  of  those  between  30  and  60;161    
(4) a  fourth  group  of  µμυθολόόγοι;  these  are  above  60  and  too  old  to  sing  
and  dance.162  
There   are   strict   drinking   rules   for   each   of   the   choruses.163   The   first   chorus,  
composed   of   children,   is   to   abstain   from   drinking   wine   entirely:   there   is   no  
                                                                                                              
159  Leg.   672e5-­‐‑673a1.   The   interlocutors   agree   to   consider   ὁ  ἀπαίίδευτος   as  ἀχόόρευτος,   and   τὸν  …  
πεπαυδευµμέένον  ἱκανῶς  as  κεχορευκόότα  (654a9-­‐‑b1).  Cf.  MORGAN  (2013):  “Life  in  Magnesia  is  one  
vast  choral  performance  orchestrated  by  the  lawgiver”.  See  on  χορείία  in  Laws  recently  PRAUSCELLO  
(2011),   ROCCONI   (2012),   CALAME   (2013),   MURRAY   (2013),   KURKE   (2013),   KOWALZIG   (2013)   and  
PEPONI  (2013).  
160  A  chorus  usually  consisted  of  χορευταίί  of  the  same  age  group.  For  a  possible  historical  Spartan  
model   (described   by   Plutarch)   for   these   three   choruses   and   the   chorus   of   elders,   see   MORROW  
(1960),  317-­‐‑318.  
161  Leg.   664c4-­‐‑d2.   Those   above   60   are   unable   to   still   sing   and   dance,   but  will   tell   inspired   stories  
about  the  same  characters  [presumably  as  those  represented  in  the  choruses]  τοὺς  δὲ  µμετὰ  ταῦτα  
(…)  µμυθολόόγους  περὶ  τῶν  αὐτῶν  ἠθῶν  διὰ  θείίας  φήήµμης,  664d2-­‐‑4.  On  the  interpretation  of  φέέρειν  
ᾠδάάς  in  the  parenthesis:  PRAUSCELLO  (2011),  who  thinks  it  is  “a  reference  to  the  “my-­‐‑knees-­‐‑cannot-­‐‑
bear  me”   (153)  motif   in   lyric  poetry.  Cf.  also  ENGLAND  ad   loc.,  who  refers   to  665d9   to  support  his  
translation  “to  support  the  toil  of”.    
162  It  should  be  noted  that  education  does  not  last  life  long,  but  only  until  the  age  of  60.  We  will  see  
that   the   age   limit   of   60   is   also   the   maximum   age   of   a   member   of   the   nocturnal   council,   whose  
composition  to  some  extent  reflects  the  Dionysian  chorus  (for  the  members  of  the  nocturnal  council,  
see   chapter   six,   p.   220),   cf.   RITTER   (1896),   350.   See   for   discussion   of   this   (nevertheless   long)  
education,  ΤECUȘAN  (1990),  248;  The  fact  that  education  lasts  (almost)  lifelong  has  often  been  given  
a  downright  pessimistic  interpretation,  e.g.  WOERTHER  (2008),  96;  KAMTEKAR  (2010),  147.  
163  The  symposion  is  not  mentioned  in  the  later  books  of  Laws;  only  at  812b9-­‐‑c7  do  we  find  a  reference  
to  the  60-­‐‑year  old  singers  of  Dionysus.  MORROW  (1960)  considers  the  elder  singers’  almost  complete  
disappearance   after   the   second   book   reason   to   doubt   “whether   it   is   to   be   taken   as  more   than   a  
symbol  for  the  supervisory  role  of  the  elders,  particularly  as  critics  and  censors  of  dance  and  sond.  
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need   to   pour   fire   on   the   fire   already   present   in   the   bodies   and   souls   of   the  
youngest,  and  caution  has  to  be  taken  about  their  frantic  state  (τὴν  ἐµμµμανῆ  …  
ἕξιν  τῶν  νέέων,  666a7).  The  members  of  the  second  chorus,  youngsters  between  
18  and  30  years  of  age,  are  allowed  to  taste  wine  in  moderate  quantities.  From  
30   onwards,   the   participants   are   allowed   to   drink   immoderately.164   The   third  
chorus  is  restricted  to  those  between  30  and  60:  only  the  elderly  (πρεσβύύτεροι)  
are  allowed  to  drink  until  they  are  drunk.    
   In   the   context   of   χορείία,   as   with   the   symposion,   virtue   is   a   desirable  
behaviour:  dancing,  i.e.  elegant  bodily  postures,  and  singing,  i.e.  appropriate  use  
of  the  voice.165  But  whereas  the  introduction  of  the  symposion  is  concerned  with  
preventing   human   coexistence   from   getting   out   of   hand,   µμουσικήή166   is   more  
constructive.  Χορείία  presupposes  a  χορηγόός  who  governs  the  movements  and  
songs  of   the   chorus  as  a  whole.  This   stretches  considerably  beyond   the  ad  hoc  
nature   of   the   interventions   of   the   symposiarch.   Χορείία   does   not   (necessarily)  
envisage   punishment.   The   mechanism   that   guarantees   adherence   to  
choreography  and  melody  differs  according  to  age:  for  children  it  is  their  innate  
love   of   moving   and   making   sounds   (see   above).   For   the   elderly   it   is   fear   of  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
A  definite  state  organ  it  cannot  be  (…)”  (318).  ΤECUȘAN  (1990)  also  noting  its  disappearance  (with  
the  exception  of  Leg.  812)  suggests  that  the  syssition  “replaces”  the  symposion  in  the  law  code,  while  
also   aware  of  differences   in   their   “character   and   their  means”   (256).  That   the   symposion   is   not   an  
institution  of  Magnesia  is  corroborated  by  the  nature  of  the  reference  at  812b9-­‐‑10:  it  is  only  a  brief  
recapitulation  in  the  service  of  the  point  the  Athenian  goes  on  to  make  in  812d1ff  (τούύτων  τοίίνυν  
δεῖ  χάάριν  κτλ.).    
164   τετταράάκοντα  δὲ   ἐπιβαίίνοντα   ἐτῶν   in   666b2   is   to   be   explained,  with  ENGLAND,   as   “’when   a  
man  is  rising  forty,’  as  we  say—i.e.  enters  the  fourth  decade”;  endorsed  by  SCHÖPSDAU  (1994),  312,  
ad   loc.,  with  parallels   for   this   use   of   ἐπιβαίίνω.  The   reading   “after   reaching   forty”   (among  others  
BELFIORE  [1986],  80  n.  36,  see  SCHÖPSDAU   ibid.)  “ist  schon  deshalb  unwarscheinlich,  weil  dann  für  
die  Leute  zwischen  30  und  40   Jahren  überhaupt  keine  Regelung  bezüglich  des  Weins  vorgesehen  
wäre”.  
165  Rhythm   is   the  aspect  οf  χορείία   that  voice  and  body  have   in   common:   τὸ  δὲ  γε  κατὰ  τὴν  τοῦ  
σώώµματος  κίίνησιν  ῥυθµμὸν  µμὲν  κοινὸν  τῇ  τῆς  φωνῆς  εἶχε  κίίνησει,  Leg.  672e8-­‐‑9,  cf.  673d2-­‐‑5.  
166  Music  (µμουσικήή)  is  one  of  the  mimetic  τέέχναι  and  produces  “imitations  of  characters”  (or  “ways  
of  life”:  µμιµμήήµματα  τρόόπων  (655d5)  of  people  in  all  kinds  of  circumstances).    
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behaving  disgracefully.  Πρεσβύύτεροι   are   fearful  of   singing,   and  need  wine   in  
order  to  be  ready  to  do  so.167    
  
3.4.2   The  Dionysian  chorus  and  the  final  answer  to  the  benefit  of  symposia  
The  third,  Dionysian  chorus  is  in  retrospect  identical  to  the  symposion.168  For  the  
citizens  between  30  and  60,  drunkenness  (µμέέθη)  is  to  be  combined  with  singing  
and   dancing   (χορείία).   The   Athenian   concludes   that   what   their   argument  
(λόόγος)   had   been   aiming   to   demonstrate,   that   the   defence   of   the   Dionysian  
chorus  is  justified,  has  now  as  far  as  possible  been  stated.169  He  recapitulates  the  
question  whether  the  symposion  is  useful  for  paideia  one  last  time:  was  it  really  a  
legitimate  claim  that   this  Dionysian  chorus  deserved   the   interlocutors’  praise?  
The   interlocutors   now   for   the   last   time   return   to   the   question   whether   the  
                                                                                                              
167   Leg.   665d9-­‐‑e10:   ΑΘ.   Πᾶς   που   γιγνόόµμενος   πρεσβύύτερος   ὄκνου   πρὸς   τὰς   ᾠδὰς   µμεστόός,   καὶ  
χαίίρει   τε   ἧττον   πράάττων   τοῦτο   καὶ   ἀνάάγκης   γιγνοµμέένης   αἰσχύύνοιτ᾿   ἂν   µμᾶλλον,   ὅσῳ  
πρεσβύύτερος  καὶ  σωφρονέέστερος  γίίγνεται,  τόόσῳ  µμᾶλλον.  ἆρ᾿  οὐχ  οὕτως;  ΚΛ.  Οὔτω  µμὲν  οὖν.  AΘ.  
Οὐκοῦν  ἐν  θεάάτρῳ  γε  καὶ  παντοίίοις  ἀνθρώώποις  ᾄδειν  ἑστὼς  ὀρθὸς  ἔτι  µμᾶλλον  αἰσχύύνοιτ’  ἄν·∙  
καὶ   ταῦτάά   γ’   εἰ   καθάάπερ   οἱ   περὶ   νίίκης   χοροὶ   ἀγωνιζόόµμενοι   πεφωνασκηκόότες   ἰσχνοίί   τε   καὶ  
ἄσιτοι   ἀναγκάάζοιντο  ᾄδειν   οἱ   τοιοῦτοι,   παντάάπασίίν   που   ἀηδῶς   τε   καὶ   αἰσχυντηλῶς  ᾄδοντες  
ἀπροθύύµμως  ἂν  τοῦτ’  ἐργάάζοιντο;  ΚΛ.  Ἀναγκαιόότατα  µμέέντοι  λέέγεις.  “ATH.  Every  man  as  he  grow  
older  becomes  reluctant  to  sing  songs,  and  takes  less  pleasure  in  doing  so;  and  when  compelled  to  
sing,  the  older  he  is  and  the  more  temperate,   the  more  he  will  feel  ashamed.  Is  it  not  so?  CL.   It   is.  
ATH.   Surely,   then,   he  will   be  more   than   ever   ashamed   to   get   up   and   sing   in   the   theatre,   before  
people  of  all  sorts.  Moreover,  if  old  men  like  that  were  obliged  to  do  as  the  choristers  do,  who  go  
lean  and  fasting  when  training  their  voices  for  a  competition,  they  would  assuredly  find  singing  an  
unpleasant  and  degrading   task,  and   they  would  undertake   it  with  no  great   readiness.  CL.  That   is  
beyond  a  doubt”  (transl.  BURY).  
168  At  Leg.  666a2-­‐‑c6  we  hear  that  the  lawgiver  forbids  those  under  18  to  drink  wine  altogether;  those  
under   30   (the   νέέοι)   are   allowed   to   taste   it   in   moderate   quantities   (drunkenness   prohibited);   by  
implication,  those  who  are  not  νέέοι  anymore  are  allowed  to  get  drunk  (and  recall  that  their  subject  
was  µμέέθη  (637d4,  d6,  638d1,  642a2),  and  meant  to  illustrate  the  advantages  of  µμέέθη  (671e5,  673d10,  
674a2)).  The  identification  of  the  symposiasts  with  the  chorus  of  Dionysus  becomes  clear  from  Leg.  
671a1   onwards.   For   the   identification   of   the   chorus   of   Dionysus   with   the   symposion,   see   RITTER  
(1896),  17  (and  350  for  the  Dionysian  chorus  as  “die  Vorschule  des  νυκτερινὸς  σύύλλογος);  ΤECUȘAN  
(1990),  246-­‐‑248.  
169   Leg.   671a1-­‐‑4:   καὶ   ὅπερ   ὁ   λόόγος   ἐν   ἀρχαῖς   ἐβουλήήθη,   τὴν   τῷ   τοῦ   Διονύύσου   χορῷ   βοήήθειαν  
ἐπιδεῖξαι  καλῶς  λεγοµμέένην,  εἰς  δύύναµμιν  εἴρηκεν·∙  σκοπώώµμεθα  δὴ  εἰ  τοῦθ’  οὕτω  γέέγονεν.  “The  
primary   intention  of   our   argument,  which  was   to  demonstrate   that   our  defence   of   the  Dionysiac  
chorus  was  justifiable,  has  now  been  carried  out  to  the  best  of  our  ability.  Let  us  consider  if  that  is  
really  so”  (transl.  BURY).  
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symposion   (now   combined   with   χορείία)   confers   important   benefits   for  
education.  The  last  part  of  Book  II  (before  a  new  topic  is  broached  in  III),  rounds  
off   the   discussion   of   the   paideia   by   recapitulating   the   different   phases   of  
παιδείία,  and   in  particular   its   last  phase,   the  paideia  of   the  citizens  between  30  
and  60.    
   We   return   to   the   symposion.   The   Athenian   recapitulates   a   number   of  
points   he  made   earlier,   just   after   the   puppet-­‐‑analogy.   Yet   whereas   before   he  
had  discussed  the  possible  effects  of  drunkenness  on  the  puppet  (645d1-­‐‑2),  here  
the   conversation   turns   to   the   effects   of   drunkenness   on   the   symposiasts  
themselves.  This  congregation  will,  as   the  drinking  proceeds,  grow  rowdier.170  
Wine  will   cause   a   profound   change   in   each   symposiast:   he  will   feel   uplifted,  
blurt  out  whatever  thought  comes  to  mind,  and  not  hold  his  tongue  in  order  to  
listen   to   his   neighbour   (παρρησίίας   ἐµμπίίµμπλαται   καὶ   ἀνηκουστίίας   …   τῶν  
πέέλας,  671b4-­‐‑5).171  He  will  consider  himself   fit   to  be   in  charge  of  both  himself  
and   of   others   (ἄρχων   δ᾿   ἱκανὸς  ἀξιοῖ   ἑαυτοῦ   τε   καὶ   τῶν  ἄλλων  γεγονέέναι,  
671b5-­‐‑6).  At  the  same  time,  wine  makes  the  souls  of  the  drinkers  softer,  like  iron  
that   is   melted   by   fire,   and   younger.   The   symposiasts,   who   are   of   the   age   of  
πρεσβύύτεροι,  become  “pliable”  (εὐαγωγούύς),  just  as  when  they  were  young.172    
   The  person  who  knows  how  to  educate  and  mould  the  souls  is  the  good  
lawgiver  (τῷ  δυναµμέένῳ  καὶ  ἐπισταµμέένῳ173  παιδεύύειν  τε  καὶ  πλάάττειν,  671c1-­‐‑
2;   πλάάστην   (…)   τὸν  ἀγαθὸν   νοµμοθέέτην,   671c3).  He  will   lay   down   sympotic  
laws   that   have   the   power   to   keep   under   control   the   person   whose  
presumptuousness,   audacity   and   impudence   cross   the   limit   of   what   is  
                                                                                                              
170  Leg.  671a4-­‐‑6.    
171  Cf.  645d1-­‐‑646a5.  
172  Cf.  Leg.  645e5-­‐‑6;  646a4-­‐‑5.    
173   Laws   entertains   a   consistent   distinction   between   “knowing   how”   (ἐπίίστασθαι,   γνῶναι)   and  
“being   able   to”   (δύύνασθαι).  We  may   compare   the   τέέχνη-­‐‑analogy   in  Leg.   639a9-­‐‑b2   (see   above,   p.  
96f.),  claiming  that   the  τέέχνη  of  steersmanship  has   to  be  complemented  by  a   firm  stomach  at  sea,  
and  Leg.  875a1-­‐‑b5,  especially  875a2-­‐‑4:  φύύσις  ἀνθρώώπων  οὐδενὸς  ἱκανὴ  φύύεται  ὥστε  γνῶναι  τε  τὰ  
συµμφέέροντα  ἀνθρώώποις   εἰς  πολιτείίαν  καὶ   γνοῦσα,   τὸ   βέέλτιστον  ἀεὶ  δύύνασθαίί   τε   καὶ   ἐθέέλειν  
πράάττειν.  
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acceptable,  and  who  refuses  to  take  turns  in  keeping  silent,  speaking,  drinking,  
and   singing.174   These   laws   will   bring   to   bear   αἰδώώς   and   αἰσχύύνη,   which   the  
interlocutors  have  called  “divine  fear”  (θεῖον  φόόβον,  671d2).  Furthermore,  the  
symposion   will   be   supervised   by   the   symposiarchs,   here   called   νοµμοφύύλακες  
and   συνδηµμιουργοίί,   who   are   imperturbable   and   sober   (τοὺς   ἀθορύύβους   καὶ  
νήήφοντας   τῶν   µμὴ   νηφόόντων   στρατηγούύς,   671d6-­‐‑7).175   Here,   they   are   called  
“officers”   of  Dionysus,   and   said   to   be   those   over   60.  Above,  we   saw   that   the  
entire  citizenry  up  till  60  was  to  be  divided  in  three  choruses,  while  those  over  
60,  who  were  unable  to  sing  and  dance,  were  called  µμυθολόόγοι.  It  now  becomes  
clear   that   these   µμυθολόόγοι   are   to   be   assigned   the   task   of   symposiarchs.   The  
sober  must  govern  the  unsober—for  to  fight  drunkenness  without  sober  leaders  
would  be  worse  than  fighting  enemies  without  imperturbable  leaders  (µμὴ  µμετάά  
ἀρχόόντων  ἀθορύύβων,  671d8).176  Anyone  who  disobeys  them  will  incur  as  much  
αἰσχύύνη   as,   and   even  more   than,   the   person  who   disobeys   the   governors   of  
Ares  (here  again,  the  symposia  are  envisaged  as  parallel  to  the  syssitia).177    
   The  Athenian  once  more  poses  the  question:  if  symposia  are  organized  in  
such   a  way,  will   they   not   benefit   the   participants?   If   the  whole   congregation  
and   the   manners   of   interaction   are   regulated   by   law,   and   if   the   sober   guide  
those  who  are  drunk,  the  symposiasts  will  end  up  becoming  better  friends  than  
                                                                                                              
174  Leg.  671c2-­‐‑8:  τοῦτον  δ’  εἶναι  τὸν  πλάάστην  τὸν  αὐτὸν  ὥσπερ  τόότε,  τὸν  ἀγαθὸν  νοµμοθέέτην,  οὗ  
νόόµμους  εἶναι  δεῖ  συµμποτικούύς,  δυναµμέένους  τὸν  εὔελπιν  καὶ  θαρραλέέον  ἐκεῖνον  γιγνόόµμενον  καὶ  
ἀναισχυντόότερον  τοῦ  δέέοντος,  καὶ  οὐκ  ἐθέέλοντα  τάάξιν  καὶ  τὸ  κατὰ  µμέέρος  σιγῆς  καὶ  λόόγου  καὶ  
πόόσεως  καὶ  µμούύσης  ὑποµμέένειν,  ἐθέέλειν  ποιεῖν  πάάντα  τούύτοις  τἀναντίία,  κτλ.  “And  now,  even  as  
then,  the  man  who  is  to  mould  them  is  the  good  legislator;  he  must  lay  down  banqueting  laws,  able  
to  control  that  banqueter  who  becomes  confident  and  bold  and  unduly  shameless,  and  unwilling  to  
submit  to  the  proper  limits  of  silence  and  speech,  of  drinking  and  of  music,  making  him  consent  to  
do  in  all  ways  the  opposite…”  (transl.  BURY).  
175  As  will  become  apparent  in  the  course  of  Books  I  and  II,  the  symposiasts  are  elders,  between  30  
and   60;   they   are   identified  with   the   chorus   of  Dionysus,   cf.   ΤECUȘAN   (1990),   247-­‐‑248.  As  may   be  
deduced  from  the  description  of  the  lawgiver’s  task,  who  is  to  educate  and  mould  (παιδεύύειν  τε  καὶ  
πλάάττειν)   the   person   who   does   not   restrain   himself,   the   only   τάάξις   is   that   of   taking   turns   in  
remaining   silent,   speaking,   drinking   and   singing:   ἐκεῖνον  …   οὐκ   ἐθέέλοντα   τάάξιν   καὶ   τὸ   κατὰ  
µμέέρος  σιγῆς  καὶ  λόόγου  καὶ  πόόσεως  καὶ  µμούύσης  ὑποµμέένειν,  671c5-­‐‑7.  
176  Cf.  above,  p.  97.  
177  Leg.  671d9-­‐‑e3.  
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they  were  before—instead  of  becoming  enemies,  as  happens  during  symposia  as  
they   are   currently   organized.178   Cleinias   agrees,   on   the   proviso   that   the  
symposion  is  organized  in  the  way  the  Athenian  has  proposed.179    
   The   discussion   is   close   to   reaching   its   end.   Upon   Cleinias’   affirmation,  
the  Athenian  concludes  that  they  should  no  longer  denounce  wine  (“the  gift  of  
Dionysus”,  672a5)  in  the  conviction  that  it  is  no  good  (κακήή)  and  not  deserving  
to  be  welcomed  in  a  polis  (εἰς  πόόλιν  οὐκ  ἀξίία  παραδέέχεσθαι,  672a6-­‐‑7).  On  the  
contrary,  wine  has  an  important  function  for  human  paideia.  Since  rationality  in  
no   animal   with   a   capacity   for   it   grow   automatically,   i.e.,   without   any   effort,  
νοῦς   must   therefore   be   practised.180   Wine   is   the   “drug”   (φάάρµμακον)   that   is  
given   to   humans   for   the   sake   of   acquiring   αἰδώώς   in   the   soul   and   health   and  
vigour  in  the  body.181    
   The  interlocutors  conclude  that  if  a  polis  uses  the  symposion  with  laws  and  
order   (µμετὰ   νόόµμων   καὶ   τάάξεως,   673e4)   for   the   use   of   practicing   self-­‐‑restraint  
(ὡς   τοῦ   σωφρονεῖν   ἕνεκα   µμελέέτῃ),   and   allows   pleasures   for   the   sake   of  
mastering  them  (τοῦ  κρατεῖν  αὐτῶν  ἕνεκα),  then  the  symposion  must  definitely  
be  instituted.  The  Athenian  would  never  agree  to  instituting  a  symposion  if  there  
were  no  severe  restrictions  as  to  who  would  be  allowed  to  consume  wine  (those  
whom  the  Athenian  thinks  should  not  be  allowed  to  consume  wine  are  slaves  
both  male  and  female,  magistrates  in  office,  steersmen  and  judges  on  duty  and  
                                                                                                              
178   Leg.   671e5-­‐‑672a3:   ΑΘ.   Οὐκοῦν   εἴ   γε   εἴη   τοιαύύτη   µμὲν   µμέέθη,   τοιαύύτη   δὲ   παιδιάά,   µμῶν   οὐκ  
ὠφεληθέέντες  ἂν  οἱ  τοιοῦτοι  συµμπόόται  καὶ  µμᾶλλον  φίίλοι  ἢ  πρόότερον  ἀπαλλάάττοιντο  ἀλλήήλων,  
ἀλλ’   οὐχ   ὥσπερ   τὰ   νῦν   ἐχθροίί,   κατὰ   νόόµμους   δὲ   πᾶσαν   τὴν   συνουσίίαν   συγγενόόµμενοι   καὶ  
ἀκολουθήήσαντες,   ὁπόότε   ἀφηγοῖντο   οἱ   νήήφοντες   τοῖς   µμὴ   νήήφουσιν;   ΚΛ.   Ὀρθῶς,   εἴ   γε   δὴ   εἴη  
τοιαύύτη   οἵαν   νῦν   λέέγεις.   “If   such   was   the   character   of   the   drinking   and   of   such   character   the  
recreation,  would   not   such   fellow-­‐‑drinkers   be   the   better   for   it,   and   part   from   one   another   better  
friends   than   before,   instead   of   enemies,   as   now?   For   they  would   be   guided   by   laws   in   all   their  
intercourse,   and  would   listen   to   the  directions  given   to   the  un-­‐‑sober  by   the   sober”   (transl.   BURY,  
adapted).  
179  Leg.  672a4.  
180   Leg.   672c1-­‐‑2:   πᾶν   ζῷον,   ὅσον   αὐτῷ   προσήήκει   νοῦν   ἔχειν   τελεωθέέντι,   τοῦτον   καὶ   τοσοῦτον  
οὐδὲν  ἔχον  ποτὲ  φύύεται·∙  
181  Cf.   649a1-­‐‑b6.  Leg.   647e1,  φόόβου  φάάρµμακον.  Cf.   ENGLAND   ad   loc.:   “a   drug   to   produce   fear”   (his  
italics);  not,  as  ΤECUȘAN  (1990)  thinks,  “the  supposed  medicine  against  fear”  (248).  
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members   of   the   βουλήή   who   plan   to   attend   a   meeting   ἀξίίαν  …   λόόγου;   also,  
drinking   during   the   day   is   only   permitted   for   reasons   of   health,   drinking   at  
night   is  prohibited   to  men  and  women  planning   to  procreate;  and  drinking   is  
also  prohibited  on  many  other  occasions182).  Furthermore,  if  wine  consumption  
is   limited,   no   polis   would   need   a   great   number   of   grapevines,   and   the  
production  of  wine  especially  would  be  kept  within  the  smallest  possible  limits.  
With  the  consent  of  his  interlocutors,  the  Athenian  closes  off  the  topic  of  wine.    
          
  
3 . 5    Conc lus ion   
In  Books  I  and  II  of  Laws,  Plato  sets  the  scene.  It  becomes  apparent  that  we  are  
on   new   territory,   both   geographically   and   conceptually.   The   present   chapter  
has   successively   looked   at   three   scenes   in   their   order   of   appearance:   Cretan-­‐‑
Spartan  ἀνδρείία  and  the  syssition  (section  3.1),  the  symposion  as  the  analogue  of  
the   syssition   (section   3.2),   and   χορείία  as   the   analogue   of   training   in   the  
gymnasion  (section  3.3),  and  traced  how  these  themes  successively  influence  and  
shape  the  notion  of  ἀρετήή.  The  emphatically  cultural  approach  to  virtue  at  the  
beginning   of   Book   I   serves   to   introduce   the   notion   of   ἀρετήή   as   a   cultural  
variable.  In  Crete  and  Sparta,  ἀρετήή  is  ἀνδρείία.  Once  this  has  been  established,  
the  way  is  free  for  Plato  to  introduce,  besides  ἀνδρείία  as  one  part  of  virtue,  the  
three   other   cardinal   virtues   (δικαιοσύύνη,  σωφροσύύνη  and  φρόόνησις)   and   the  
notion  of  “complete  virtue”  (ἡ  συµμπᾶσα  ἀρετήή).    
   The   scenario   of   the   symposion   established   that   social   excellence   can   be  
practised   and   trained,   analogous   to   courage   in   the   context   of   the   Cretan  
gymnasion.   In   fact,   ἀρετήή   can   only   be   acquired   by   training;   although   human  
beings   naturally   possess   a   potential   for   rationality,   this   potential   does   not  
develop  by  itself—it  needs  to  be  educated  in  the  context  of  the  polis,  by  the  laws.  
                                                                                                              
182  Leg.  674a7-­‐‑c1.  
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The  idea  that  paideia  is  the  education  of  a  person’s  innate  rationality  ties  in  with  
the  double  nature  of  ἀρετήή:  as  an  innate  potential  for  reason  and  order,  and  as  a  
cultural   variable.  Paideia   in   a  polis   serves   to   educate   the  universal  potential   in  
the  spirit  of  what  a  particular  polis  considers  ἀρετήή.  The  idea  of  complete  virtue,  
defined  as  the  quality  that  enables  a  society  to  avoid  internal  conflict,  allows  for  
a  generic  notion  of  ἀρετήή,  as  excellence  of  humankind  in  general.  This  generic  
notion   of   ἀρετήή   is   the   ability   to   restrain   oneself.   This   ability   is   referred   to   as  
αἰδώώς   on   the   social   level,   implying   that   the   motivation   for   virtue   is   a   social  
norm   (knowing   what   is   “not   done”),   while   σωφροσύύνη   focuses   on   the  
personal,   psychological   level,   and   is   closely   connected   to   the   idea   of   having  
moderate  emotions.    
   Subsequently,   the   discussion   moved   to   the   process   of   paideia—that   is,  
how   paideia   of   the   citizens   works   within   the   framework   of   a   polis.   The  
terminology  of  the  four  virtues—or  rather,  ἀνδρείία  and  φρόόνησις—is  resumed  
to   analyse   the   process   of   paideia   in   different   phases.   Ἀνδρείία,   the   virtue   least  
associated  with   rationality   (courage  can   relatively  easily   turn   into  audacity)   is  
used   for   the   conditioning  of   the  pleasures   and  pains  of   the  youngest   citizens.  
Φρόόνησις  is  used  for  the  phase  of  the  πρεσβύύτεροι,  the  senior  citizens  (between  
30   and   60).   The   whole   process   of   paideia   within   the   polis   is   cast   in   terms   of  
χορείία.  The  youngest  citizens  are  motivated  to  participate  through  their  natural  
inclination   towards,   and   liking   of,  movement   and  making   sounds.   The   eldest  
citizens  are  motivated  by  their  fear  of  disgrace  (αἰσχύύνη).183  
                                                                                                              
183  In  Book  X,  there  is  a  passage  that  forms  part  of  the  defense  against  the  atheists.  The  argument  of  
the  atheists  is  that  the  gods  only  exist  τέέχνῃ  and  τισιν  νόόµμοις,  not  φύύσει.  They  also  claim  that  τὰ  
καλάά  and  τὰ  δίίκαια  are  matters  of  dispute,  and  therefore  do  not  exist  by  nature.  So  it  seems  that  we  
are  confronted  with  opposite  views  in  the  same  work:  the  recognition  (on  the  part  of  the  Athenian)  
on  the  one  hand  that  certain  things  can  be  disputed,  and  in  Book  X  an  attack  on  those  who  consider  
moral  concepts  as  the  product  of  νόόµμος,  human  agreement.  The  solution  lies,  I  submit,  in  how  we  
interpret   what   is   meant   by   νόόµμος   and   φύύσις   in   the   passage   in   Book   X.   Of   course,   as   we   have  
already  seen,   the  νόόµμοι  and  notions  of  ἀρετήή   indeed  differ  between  poleis.  Yet  at  a  more  general  
level,  that  of  the  human  being  as  species  and  what  is  necessary  for  his  survival,  ἀρετήή  is  the  same:  
φιλίία.  This  notion  of  ἀρετήή  is  not  conventional:  it  is  a  natural  fact  that  communities  cannot  survive  
unless   people   are   willing   to   moderate   their   impulses   and   restrain   their   most   self-­‐‑interested  
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   Laws’  naturalist  approach  to  virtue  suggests,  optimistically,  that  the  basis  
for   virtue   lies   in   human   beings   themselves,   and   that   virtue   is   a   capacity   for  
understanding  what  is  the  appropriate  reaction  (both  in  terms  of  affections  and  
in  terms  of  behaviour)  in  any  given  situation.  The  attitude  of  Laws  to  the  moral  
and   political   issues,   and   man’s   ability   to   address   these,   is   thus   much   more  
“open”,  and  hopeful,   than   that  of  Republic.  Any  pessimistic   reading  of  Laws   is  
therefore   a   serious   misinterpretation   of   the   thrust   of   its   argument.   Precisely  
because  Laws  conceives  of  virtue  as  contextual  and  situational,  the  ultimate  goal  
of   one’s   actions   always   being   social   stability   and   the  maintenance   of   friendly  
relations  between  individuals,  the  norm  for  virtue,  and  a  sense  of  that  norm,  are  
innate   in   (human)   nature,   but   in   biological   rather   than   metaphysical   nature.  
This  does  not  mean  that  virtue   is  completely  subjective,  but   it  does  mean  that  
the   answer   to  what  morality   and  moral   goodness   are,   lies,   and   can  be   found,  
within  society,  and  is  not  given  by  another  world.    
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        









OUTLINE  AND  AMENDMENT:  






The   previous   chapter   argued   that   the   opening  discussion   of  Laws   (Books   I-­‐‑II)  
introduces   a   universal   and   naturalistic   concept   of   virtue   as  αἰδώώς   and  φιλίία.  
Inspite  of  local  differences,  across  all  societies  virtue  is  in  a  sense  also  identical:  
it   is   the   quality   that   enables   human   beings   to   live   in   peaceful   coexistence  
(φιλίία).  The  general  goal  of  society  being  σωτηρίία,  the  precise  rules  that  define  
well-­‐‑behaved,   elegant   conduct—ἀρετήή   on   the   level   of   the   polis—are   strictly  
speaking  of  secondary  importance.  Within  the  confines  of  φιλίία  and  εἰρήήνη,  a  
lawgiver  is  free  to  lay  down  his  laws  as  he  sees  fit.  The  making  of  laws  is  first  
and  foremost  viewed  as  a  practical  necessity  so  as  to  enable  a  polis  to  educate  its  
citizens  and  cultivate  social  behaviour.  
   After   the   discussion   of   ἀρετήή   and   the   historical   overview   in   Book   III,1  
Cleinias   reveals   that   he   has,   with   nine   other   Cnossians,   a   commission   to   lay  
down   a   law   code   for   a   new   Cretan   colony.   The   three   interlocutors   then  
formulate,  on  their  own  authority,  a  law  code,  inspired  by  the  case  of  the  future  
Cretan   colony.   This   law   code   is   a   law   code   λόόγῳ,   “in   speech”—i.e.,   the   laws  
                                                                                                              
1   The   historical   overview   in   Book   III   basically   serves   to   introduce   the   need   and   principle   of  
moderation,  which  has  been  identified  as  the  key  to  a  livable  society,  also  on  the  level  of  the  ruling  
element  in  the  constitution,  producing  the  notion  of  the  “mixed  constitution”.    
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that  follow  are  not  the  laws  for  Magnesia,  but  it  is  a  law  code  for  a  polis  inspired  
by  the  case  of  Magnesia.  The  actual  law  code  (the  διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων)  starts  at  
771a5  (Book  VI)  and  runs  until  960b5  (Book  XII).    
   This   act   of   lawgiving   has   been   prepared   for   conceptually   by   the  
discussion   of   the   basis   of   the   laws   in   Books   I   and   II.   Also,   the   fact   that   the  
interlocutors  on  their  own  authority  frame  laws  is  legitimated  by  what  we  have  
heard  about  lawgiving  and  its  purpose  so  far.  The  structure  of  the  text  suggests  
that  the  interlocutors  operate  within  the  framework  of  Books  I  and  II  (and  III):  
the  interlocutors’  law  code  follows,  and  is  embedded  in,  the  discussion  that  has  
served   to   establish   φιλίία   (αἰδώώς,   etc.)   as   the   universally   human   ἀρετήή.   The  
present  chapter   focuses  on   the   legislation  on   the  dramatic   level  of  Laws.  Here,  
we  witness   a   concrete   case  of   lawgiving.  How  do   the   legislating   interlocutors  
conceptualize   the   act   of   lawgiving   (about  which  we   have   heard   little   so   far)?  
What  sort  of  endeavour  is  lawgiving,  if  we  keep  in  mind  the  conceptual  system  
of  τέέχνη  as  a  comparandum?  What  considerations  inform  the  interlocutors’  laws?          
   In   investigating   the   interlocutors’   own   notion   of   the   procedure   of  
lawgiving,   this   chapter   will   take   its   cue   from   an   analogy   in   Book   VI.   This  
analogy   occurs   at   a   highly   significant   place   in   the   architecture   of   Laws,   right  
before  the  interlocutors  begin  their  own  lawgiving,  and  at  a  point  at  which  they  
have  already  announced   its  beginning.  This  suggests   that   the  analogy  offers  a  
crucial  contribution  to   the  approach  of   the   legislators:   it   frames   lawgiving.  The  
Athenian  likens  a  lawgiver  to  (a  particular  kind  of)  painter.  As  we  have  seen  in  
chapter  one   (1.3.1)  and  chapter   two   (2.4.1),  τέέχνη-­‐‑analogies   in  Plato   introduce  
into  the  discussion  a  particular  conceptual  framework  and  set  of  assumptions.    
   In  addition,   the  painter-­‐‑analogy   is  of  great  structural   importance   for   the  
subsequent   lawgiving   in   the   Laws.   The   analogy   precedes   the   dramatic   act   of  
lawgiving   portrayed,   and   it   articulates   the   subsequent   lawgiving   on   the  
dramatic   level:   at   different   stages   in   the   course   of   their   legislation   the  
interlocutors   reflect   on   their   own   legislative   activity   in   the   terms   and  
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distinctions   originally   introduced   by   the   analogy.   Laws   thus   features   a  
combination   of   an   analogy   for   a   τέέχνη   (lawgiving),   followed   by   an   actual  
example   of   that   τέέχνη   in   the   subsequent   discourse.   Whereas   the   opening  
discussion   legitimates   the   fact   that   the   interlocutors   themselves   legislate,   the  
painter-­‐‑analogy   legitimates   the   details   of   their   mode   of   procedure.   After   the  
analysis  of  the  analogy,  the  subsequent  sections  will  discuss  those   junctures  in  
the   law   code   at  which   the   interlocutors   reflect   on   the   activity   of   lawgiving   in  
terms  of  the  painting-­‐‑analogy.  
  
  
4 . 1    F r aming    l awg iv ing :    the   pa in te r -­‐‑ ana logy    in   Book   VI   
Before  we  turn  to  the  analogy  in  Book  VI,  however,  something  ought  to  be  said  
about  the  interlocutors’  decision  to  found  a  city  in  speech  in  Book  III,  and  about  
the  discussion  in  Books  IV  to  VI  (until  the  ἀρχήή  of  the  law  code  at  771a5).  At  the  
end   of   Book   III,   Cleinias   has   revealed   that   he   is   a   member   of   a   legislative  
committee  of  Cretans  entrusted  with  the  foundation  of  a  new  colony  on  Crete.  
The   interlocutors   take   this   as   an   incentive   to   found   a   polis   “in   speech”   (τῷ  
λόόγῳ,   702d1-­‐‑2,   cf.   702e1).   Interestingly,   the   commission   of   the   ten   Cretan  
lawgivers   is   to   select   whatever   laws   the   members   of   the   committee   find  
superior,  whether  local  laws  or  laws  from  different  countries.2  The  constitution  
of   the  Cretan   new   colony   thus   lays  much  more   open   than  usual;   for   in  most  
historical  cases,  colonies  adopted  the  constitution  of  the  metropolis.3  This  open  
                                                                                                              
2  Leg.  702c5-­‐‑9:  ἅµμα  δὲ  καὶ  νόόµμους  τῶν  τε  αὐτόόθι,  εἴ  τινες  ἡµμᾶς  ἀρέέσκουσιν,  τίίθεσθαι  κελεύύει,  καὶ  
εἴ  τινες  ἑτέέρωθεν,  µμηδὲν  ὑπολογιζοµμέένους  τὸ  ξενικὸν  αὐτῶν,  ἂν  βελτίίους  φαίίνωνται.  “We  are  
bidden  also  to  frame  laws,  choosing  such  as  we  please  either  from  our  own  local  laws  or  from  those  
of   other   countries,   taking   no   exception   to   their   alien   character,   provided   only   that   they   seem  
superior”  (transl.  BURY).    
3  “Bei  der  Einrichtung  der  Colonie  folgte  man  vielfach  den  Einrichtungen  der  Mutterstadt,  aus  der  
man   auch   das   heilige   Feuer   vom   Prytaneion   mitnahm”,  RE   s.v.   ἀποικίία   (where   see   also   for   an  
alphabetically   ordered   overview   of   the   Greek   colonies,   2828-­‐‑2836),   with   reference   to   Hdt.   I,   146  
(with   STEIN   ad   loc.:   “Auswanderer   pflegten   aus   dem   Prytaneion,   dem   Herde   und   Mittelpunte  
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definition  of  Cleinias’  commission  creates  room  for  the  interlocutors  to  explore  
their   own   (or   especially   the   Athenians’)   ideas   about   lawgiving   and   a  
functional—in  terms  of  maintaining  εἰρήήνη—constitution.  
   Yet   the   interlocutors   do   not   embark   upon   framing   laws   immediately.  
What  follows  their  decision  to  found  a  city  in  speech  at  the  end  of  Book  III  is  an  
inventory  of  the  location  and  natural  resources  of  the  new  city,  of  the  selection  
and   background   of   the   colonists,   the   local   climate,   and   general   stipulations  
about  the  size  of  the  population,  the  distribution  of  land,  and  the  possession  of  
money   (704a1-­‐‑751a1,   Book   IV   and   part   of   V).   This   in   turn   is   followed   by   an  
overview  of  the  future  Magnesian  magistrates  (751a1-­‐‑768c2,  Book  V  and  part  of  
VI).4   The   fact   that,   upon   the   interlocutors’   agreement   to   found   a   colony,   the  
Athenian   proceeds   to   discuss   these   practicalities   signals   that   such   issues   are  
necessary   preliminaries   that   have   to   be   taken   into   account   in   any   act   of  
lawgiving.  This  mode  of  procedure  reflects  a  conception  of  lawgiving  as  always  
and  necessarily   tailored   to  a   specific—geographical,   cultural—context   (we  may  
also   recall   Cleinias’   instant   connection   of   Cretan   laws   to   the   nature   of   the  
Cretan  χώώρα,  625c10ff.).5  Laws  are  not  made  tabula  rasa.  Books  IV  until  halfway  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
(ἑστίία)  der  Mutterstadt,  vom  heiligen  Feuer  in  die  neue  Ansiedlung  mitzunehmen,  als  Zeichen  und  
Pfand   fortdauernder   Blutsverwandtschaft   und   gemeinsamen   Kultes”).   Motives   for   founding  
colonies   are   discussed   in   Leg.   707e1-­‐‑708d7,   see   also   MORROW   (1960),   3-­‐‑4;   Leg.   752e4-­‐‑754d4   for  
assistance  of  Cnossus  in  the  establishing  of  the  νοµμοφύύλακες  for  the  colony,  with  MORROW  (1960),  
204-­‐‑205,  238-­‐‑240  (Excursus  D),  who  thinks  that  this  passage  reflects  two  versions  of  Plato’s  thought  
on  the  matter;  the  same  textual  problem  is  addressed  in  WILAMOWITZ  (1910),  cf.  chapter  one,  p.  20,  
n.  52.  GRAHAM  (1964)  for  a  study  of  the  relation  between  historical  colonies  and  their  mother  city.  
That  the  law  code  of  the  future  colony  will  not  be  entirely  identical  to  the  Cnossian  law  code  also  
becomes  apparent  from  the  fact  that  the  colonists  need  some  time  to  become  accustomed  to  the  laws  
of   the   colony,  which   are   new   to   them   752b9-­‐‑c8   (with  MILLER   [1997],   253-­‐‑254),   cf.   οἱ   γευσάάµμενοι  
παῖδες   τῶν   νόόµμων   (752c3).   See   MILLER   (1997),   253-­‐‑257   on   the   metaphor   of   child/mother   for  
colony/metropolis.  The  new  colony’s  potential  for  survival  increases  if  the  lawgivers  remain  in  the  
city   until   the   citizens   are   ready   to   take  part   in   the   selection   of  magistrates:   see  Leg.   752-­‐‑753.  Leg.  
752b9-­‐‑c8:   the   character   of   citizens   is   determined   by   the   customs   of   their   city:   the   citizens   are   to  
become  “of  the  same  disposition”  (συνήήθεις)  as  the  laws.    
4  For  a  succinct  overview  of  the  bodies  of  officials  with  relevant  passages,  see  STALLEY  (1983),  186-­‐‑
189.  
5   The   geographical   circumstances   have   direct   implications   for   the   quality   of   the   citizenry:   some  
localities   are   more   likely   to   produce   good   or   bad   characters   than   others   (πρὸς   τὸ   γεννᾶν  
ἀνθρώώπους   ἀµμείίνους   καὶ   χείίρους,   Leg.   747d1-­‐‑e5);   good   laws   must   not   fly   in   the   face   of   local  
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through  VI  constitute  a  kind  of  intermediate  phase  in  the  discussion,  preparing  
for  the  actual  διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων.  
   When  the  last  magistrates  have  been  introduced,  the  Athenian  announces  
that   there   is   no   need   to   postpone   their   legislation   any   longer.6   But   instead   of  
proposing   the   first   law  of   their   code,  he   introduces  an  analogy   for   lawgiving.  
Or,   more   accurately,   he   introduces   an   analogy   for   lawgivers.   The   lawgiver’s  
analogon   is   the   professional   painter.  We  will   look   into   the   painter-­‐‑analogy   in  
more  detail  below,  but  before  we  do  so,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  analogy  in  
fact   exploits   a   contrast   that   features   in   a   brief   afterthought   on   the   courts  
(δικαστήήρια),   whose   magistrates   were   the   last   in   line   to   be   discussed   in   the  
overview  of  the  magistrates.7  The  Athenian  concludes  the  subject  of  the  courts  
by   commenting   that   they   have,   “like   some   kind   of   outline  with   a   line   drawn  
around  it  from  the  outside,  said  some  things,  yet  more  or  less  omitted  others”  
(οἷον   περιγραφήή   τις   ἔξωθεν   περιγεγραµμµμέένη   τὰ   µμὲν   εἴρηκεν,   τὰ   δὲ  
ἀπολείίπει  σχεδόόν8,  768c5-­‐‑6).  The  fact  that  at  this  point  they  make  only  a  sketch,  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
circumstances   (οἷς   οὐκ   ἐναντίία   νοµμοθετητέέον,   747d4-­‐‑5,   cf.   e6-­‐‑8)   such   as   climate,   quality   of   the  
water   and   soil.   The   preamble   on   hunting   (Leg.   823d7-­‐‑824a9)   for   example   explicitly   takes   into  
consideration  the  possibilities  offered  by  the  country  for  training  the  right  (θείία)  kind  of  ἀνδρείία.  
Cf.   Arist.   Pol.   1265a18-­‐‑20:   λέέγεται   δ᾿   ὡς   δεῖ   τὸν   νοµμοθέέτην   πρὸς   δύύο   βλέέποντα   τιθέέναι   τοὺς  
νόόµμους,  πρόός  τε  τὴν  χώώραν  καὶ  τοὺς  ἀνθρώώπους,  “It  is  said  that  the  legislator  ought  to  have  his  
eye  directed  to  two  points—the  people  and  the  country”.  The  χώώρα  for  the  new  colony  (Leg.  704a1-­‐‑
d6);  the  people  (707e1-­‐‑708d5  the  future  colonists;  in  Book  V  the  magistrates).  There  is  no  reason  to  
suppose,   with   LAKS   (2000)   (see   especially   263-­‐‑264,   266,   286-­‐‑288),   that   discussion   of   the   local  
conditions  in  Books  IV  and  V,  and  of  the  preambles  in  IV,  is  designed  to  “postpone”  or  “suspend”  
the  law  because  law  is  “a  certain  kind  of  violence”  (287).  The  discussion  in  Books  IV  and  V  is  clearly  
part  of  what  νοµμοθεσίία   involves,  and   is   thus  not  a  strategy   to  postpone   lawgiving.  Furthermore,  
the  actual  διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων  contains  both  preambles  and  laws,  and  there  is  thus  no  question  of  
“suspending”  law.  
6  Leg.   768d7-­‐‑e3:  νῦν  µμὴν  ἐν  τῷ  παρόόντι  µμέέχρι  τῆς  τῶν  ἀρχόόντων  αἱρέέσεως  γενοµμέένης  τελευτὴ  
µμὲν   τῶν   ἔµμπροσθεν   αὕτη   γίίγνοιτ᾿   ἂν   ἱκανήή,   νόόµμων   δὲ   θέέσεως   ἀρχὴ   καὶ   ἀναβολῶν   ἅµμα   καὶ  
ὄκνων  οὐδὲν  ἔτι  δεοµμέένη,  “So  now,  at  the  point  where  we  stand—when  our  exposition  has  reached  
so  far  so  as  to  include  the  election  of  the  officials—we  may  find  a  fit  place  to  terminate  our  previous  
subject,  and  to  commence  the  subject  of   legislation,  which  no  longer  needs  any  postponements  or  
delays”   (transl.  BURY).  The  actual   lawgiving  starts  at  771a5   (ἀρχὴ  δὲ  ἔστω  τῶν  µμετὰ  ταῦτα  ἡµμῖν  
νόόµμων  ἥδε  τις  κτλ.).  
7  Leg.  768c3-­‐‑d7.  
8   The   adverb   σχεδόόν,   “ferme,   propemodum”   or   “fere,   quodammodo”   (AST   [1835-­‐‑1838],   348),   “about,  
approximately,  more  or   less,   roughly  speaking”  (LSJ,   IV),  or  σχεδόόν  τι,  mitigates   the  exactness  of  
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and  omit  other  things  from  consideration  altogether   is  motivated  by  the  claim  
that  the  whole,  and  accuracy  about  all  of  the  details,  cannot  become  clear  before  
they   have   completed   the   διέέξοδος   (πρὶν   ἂν   ἡ   διέέξοδος   ἀπ᾿   ἀρχῆς   τάά   τε  
δεύύτερα   καὶ   τὰ   µμέέσα   καὶ   πάάντα   µμέέρη   τὰ   ἑαυτῆς   ἀπολαβοῦσα   πρὸς   τέέλος  
ἀφίίκηται,  768d5-­‐‑7).9    
   In   769a7   the   Athenian   introduces   the   painter-­‐‑analogy   (καθάάπερ  
ζωγράάφων).  The  implication,  made  explicit  somewhat  further  onwards  (769d1),  
is  that  the  painter  is  analogous  to  the  lawgiver.  Painting  is  of  course  a  frequent  
analogon   in   the   Platonic   corpus;   it   is,   together  with  different   genres   of   poetry  
and  µμουσικήή,  one  of  the  so-­‐‑called  “imitative  arts”,  µμιµμητικαὶ  τέέχναι.  But  from  
the   very   beginning   it   becomes   clear   that   the   approach   of   this   particular  
painting-­‐‑analogy   is   highly  unusual.   The  perspective   adopted  here   is   that   of   a  
layman  who  observes  professional  painters  at  work,  769a7-­‐‑b3:  
ΑΘ.  Οἶσθ’   ὅτι   καθάάπερ   ζωγράάφων   οὐδὲν   πέέρας   ἔχειν   ἡ   πραγµματείία  
δοκεῖ   περὶ   ἑκάάστων   τῶν   ζῴων,   ἀλλ’   ἢ   τοῦ   χραίίνειν   ἢ   ἀποχραίίνειν,   ἢ  
ὁτιδήήποτε  καλοῦσι  τὸ  τοιοῦτον  οἱ  ζωγράάφων  παῖδες,  οὐκ  ἄν  ποτε  δοκεῖ  
παύύσασθαι  κοσµμοῦσα,  ὥστε  ἐπίίδοσιν  µμηκέέτ’  ἔχειν  εἰς  τὸ  καλλίίω  τε  καὶ  
φανερώώτερα  γίίγνεσθαι  τὰ  γεγραµμµμέένα.  
ATH.  You  know  how  painting  a  picture  of  anything  seems  to  be  a  never-­‐‑
ending  business.  It  always  looks  as  if  the  process  of  touching  up  by  adding  
colour  or  relief  (or  whatever  it’s  called  in  the  trade)  will  never  finally  get  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
the   statement   by   inserting   a   degree   of   vagueness   or   indeterminacy:   e.g.   STEIN   III   (1894),   ad  Hdt.  
V.19.10   with   further   parallels:   “σχεδόόν   ermäßigt   die   Zuversichtlichkeit   des   Tons”.   σχεδόόν   is  
therefore,  like  ὡς  ἔπος  εἶπεῖν,  a  sign  of  a  colloquial  use  of  terms,  instead  of  using  precise  language  
(ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι),   which   is   characteristic   of   Socrates’   use   of   his   terminology   (at   least,   it   is   an  
accusation  that  we  hear  Thrasymachus  make  against  Socrates,  see  chapter  one,  p.  27,  n.  80).  σχεδόόν,  
with  125  instances,  occurs  relatively  often  in  Laws.  See  also  768d2.  
9  Leg.  768c6-­‐‑d7.  The  subject  of  the  courts  is  taken  up  again  in  956b3ff.,  see  SCHÖPSDAU  (2003),  437.  
This  means  that  the  subject  of  the  courts  is  addressed  at  the  very  beginning  as  well  as  at  the  very  
end  of  the  law  code.  SCHÖPSDAU  ibid.  ponders  on  a  possible  connection  between  the  courts  and  the  
end  of   the  νοµμοθεσίία:  “Ein  zwingender  sachlicher  Zusammenhang  zwischen  der  Vollendung  der  
Gesetze  und  der  Regelung  und  Einteilung  des  Gerichtswesens  läßt  sich  allerdings  höchstens  durch  
den   Gedanken   herstellen,   daß   zuerst   die   Gesetze   zu   geben   und   danach   die   Organe   zur  
Überwachung   der   Einhaltung   der   Gesetze   einzusetzen   sind;   (…).”   As   SCHÖPSDAU   notes,   not   all  
issues   involving   the   court   are   settled   in   957a-­‐‑b;   rather,   the   settling   of   the   details   is   left   to   the  
νοµμοφύύλακες  (957a1-­‐‑b5).  
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to   the   point   where   the   clarity   and   beauty   of   the   picture   are   beyond  
improvement.  (Transl.  SAUNDERS)  
This  seems  to  be  an  outright  paradoxical  representation  of  painting:   is  not   the  
painter  a  producer  of  paintings,  i.e.,  of  finished  products?  Not  so  here:  painting  
is  an  activity  without  “limit”  (πέέρας).  Or  at  least,  that  is  the  viewer’s  impression:  
it   seems   that   painters   never   cease   to   continue   their   work   on   a   painting  
(χραίίνειν,  ἀποχραίίνειν,  κοσµμεῖν10).  The  natural   conclusion   is   that  painting   is  
an   activity   which   always   allows   room   for   “improvement”   (ἐπίίδοσις)11—or,  
alternatively,  that  a  painting  is  never  finished,  and  that  perfection  is  impossible.  
This   analogy   clearly   does   not   assume   an   idealized   version   of   an   expert.  
Whereas   Socrates   often   adduces   the   expert   in   very   a   schematic   fashion   (the  
doctor  as  a  producer  of  health,  or  health  as  the  result  of  the  doctor’s  τέέχνη),  that  
image   is   now   problematized.   Part   of   this   has   to   do   with   the   perspective  
adopted:   that  of   the   layman  observer.  His   focalization  builds   into   the  analogy  
from   the   start   a   dimension   of   uncertainty   about  whether   or   not   a   painting   is  
ever  finished.    
   Yet,  curious  as  this  depiction  of  a  painter  may  sound  in  general,  it  seems  
even   more   puzzling   to   a   reader   who   is   familiar   with   the   numerous   painter  
analogies   in   the   rest   of   the   Platonic   corpus.   The   painter   is   typically   a  mimetic  
artist:  indeed,  the  painter  and  his  art  often  figure  as  the  prototype  of  the  class  of  
the  µμιµμητικαὶ  τέέχναι,  as  he  does  for  example  in  Republic  X.12  In  chapter  one,  we  
                                                                                                              
10  χραίίνειν  is  to  “touch  slightly”  hence  to  “smear,  paint”  (LSJ);  apparently  this  refers  to  the  painter  
lightly   touching   his   painting   with   his   brush;   ἀποχραίίνειν,   “colour,   tint   evenly”   (LSJ),   may,   in  
contrast   to  χραίίνειν,   refer   to  colouring   larger  spaces.   In  Resp.  586b7-­‐‑c5  we  find   that  pleasures  are  
inevitably  mixed  with  pains,  “taking  their  colour  from  juxtaposition”,  ADAM  ad  loc.  He  further  notes  
that  ἀποχραίίνειν  “had  also  a  more   technical   sense   (τὸ  τὰ  χρωσθέέντα  ἑνοποιεῖν  Τim.   lex.  Pl.  s.v.  
χραίίνειν),   to   which   Plato   alludes   is   Laws   769a”.   AST   (1835-­‐‑1838)   has   “colorem   vel   lumen   umbra  
tempero”  and  cites  both  Resp.  586b  and  Leg.  769a.  
11  ἐπίίδοσιν  ἔχειν,  “to  be  capable  of  progress  or   improvement”   (LSJ):  Tht.   146b6;  Symp.   175e5.  For  
ἐπίίδοσις   in   the   positive   sense   of   “progress”:   τὴν   τῶν  πόόλεων   ἐπίίδοσιν   εἰς   ἀρετήήν   (Leg.   676a5);  
βλάάστην   καὶ   ἐπίίδοσιν   (Leg.   679b2);   negative,   in   the   sense   of   development   beyond   the   proper  
measure:  τὴν  τοῦ  ἐλευθέέρου  λίίαν  ἐπίίδοσιν  βίίου  (Leg.  700a8).  
12      For   the   painter   as   an   imitator,   see,   e.g.,  Crat.   424d7-­‐‑425a4,   430b3-­‐‑4,   430d1-­‐‑434b2;  Soph.   235d6-­‐‑
236c7;  Phdr.  275d5-­‐‑6;  Prot.  312c6-­‐‑d3;  Gorg.  503d5-­‐‑504a2;  Resp.  472d4-­‐‑7,  596e6,  598bff.  
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saw  that  the  “product”  (ἔργον)  of  a  τέέχνη  is  one  of  the  standards  elements  of  
the   conceptual   framework   of   τέέχνη.   The   product   of   a  mimetic   τέέχνη   has   the  
status   of   an   imitation   (µμίίµμησις   or   µμίίµμηµμα):   it   is   a   likeness   of   a   “model”  
(παράάδειγµμα,  ἰδέέα).    
   This  can  work  out  in  either  of  two  ways.  One  possible  implication  is  that  
the  imitation  exists  on  an  ontologically  inferior  level  than  the  object  of  which  it  
is   an   imitation.   The   most   notorious   example   of   this   negative   evaluation   of  
µμίίµμησις   is  no  doubt   the  discussion  of  poetry   in  Book  X  of   the  Republic.  There,  
painting  is  the  prototypical  mimetic  τέέχνη  to  which  poetry  (imitation  in  words)  
is   likened:   although   capable   of   accurate   reproduction,   both   poet   and   painter  
lack   knowledge   (ἐπιστήήµμη)   of   the   things   they   reproduce.13  Yet   the   idea   of   an  
imitation   of   a   model   can   also   be   used   to   emphasize   the   similarity   between  
model  and  imitation.  For  an  example  of  this  understanding  of  µμίίµμησις,  we  may  
also   turn   to  Republic.  The  philosopher-­‐‑ruler   is   likened   to  a  painter  who  paints  
the   just   polis   after   the   divine   παράάδειγµμα.14   In   both   its   positive   and   negative  
form,  the  notion  of  a  µμιµμητικὴ  τέέχνη  presupposes  ontological  dualism.    
   With  the  mimetic   interpretation  of  painting  as  our  frame  of  reference,   it  
becomes   immediately   noticeable   that   the   implications   attached   to   painting   in  
Laws   VI   are   completely   different.15   First   and   foremost,   in   this   analogy   the  
painter  does  not  appear  to  be  imitating  anything.  Second,  painting  seems  to  be  
a  never-­‐‑ending  business   (even   if   the  perspective  of   the   layman   leaves   it   open  
whether   painting   really   never   stops).   These   two   aspects   are   two   sides   of   the  
same  coin:  the  absence  of  a  πέέρας  for  the  act  of  painting  a  picture  is  the  direct  
consequence  of  the  absence  of  a  model.  When  the  painter  is  a  copyist,  it  is  never  
                                                                                                              
13  Resp.  596b4-­‐‑597e5.  This  does  not  mean  that  Plato’s  attitude  to  poetry  is  one  of  pure  hostility.  See  
HALLIWELL  (2011),  155-­‐‑207  for  a  recent  and  nuanced  argument  for  “Platonic  ambivalence”  towards  
poetry.  About  Resp.  X,  see  especially  his  observations  ibid.,  182-­‐‑204.    
14  Resp.  500d11-­‐‑501c9.  The  philosopher  is  a  “painter  of  constitutions”,  πολιτειῶν  ζωγράάφος  (501c6-­‐‑
7).  See  HALLIWELL  (2011),  182.  
15  πραγµματείία,  “occupation”,  can  be  almost  synonymous  with  τέέχνη.  See  Resp.  528d4,  531d4,  532c.  
It  is  also  the    “treatment”  of  a  subject,  manner  of  dealing  with,  philosophical  argument  (LSJ).  
CHAPTER   FOUR   141  
a  question  whether  or  not  the  painting  can  be  finished:  the  τέέχνη  itself  consists  
in  ‘producing  a  copy’.16      
   The   next   stage   of   the   analogy   assumes   a  more   hypothetical   standpoint  
than  that  of  the  layman  observer  of  painters,  769b6-­‐‑c8:    
ΑΘ.  (…).  χρησώώµμεθάά  γε  µμὴν  τῷ  νῦν  παρατυχόόντι  περὶ  αὐτῆς  ἡµμῖν  λόόγῳ  
τὸ   τοιόόνδε,  ὡς   εἴ   ποτέέ   τις   ἐπινοήήσειε   γράάψαι   τε  ὡς   κάάλλιστον   ζῷον17  
καὶ  τοῦτ’  αὖ  µμηδέέποτε  ἐπὶ  φαυλόότερον  ἀλλ’  ἐπὶ  τὸ  βέέλτιον   ἴσχειν  τοῦ  
ἐπιόόντος   ἀεὶ   χρόόνου,   συννοεῖς   ὅτι   θνητὸς   ὤν,   εἰ   µμήή   τινα   καταλείίψει  
διάάδοχον  τοῦ  ἐπανορθοῦν  τε,   ἐάάν  τι  σφάάλληται  τὸ  ζῷον  ὑπὸ  χρόόνων,  
καὶ   τὸ   παραλειφθὲν   ὑπὸ   τῆς   ἀσθενείίας   τῆς   ἑαυτοῦ   πρὸς   τὴν   τέέχνην  
οἷόός   τε   εἰς   τὸ   πρόόσθεν   ἔσται   φαιδρύύνων   ποιεῖν   ἐπιδιδόόναι,   σµμικρόόν  
τινα  χρόόνον  αὐτῷ  πόόνος  παραµμενεῖ  πάάµμπολυς;  
ΑTH.   (…).   We   may   still   use   this   fact,   which   it   has   occurred   to   us   to  
mention,   to   illustrate   the   following   point.   Suppose   that   a   man   should  
purpose  to  paint  a  figure  as  beautiful  as  he  can,  and  [to  purpose]  that  this  
should  never  grow  worse,  but  always  better,  as  time  went  on,  do  you  not  
see   that,   since   the  painter   is  mortal,   unless   he   leaves   a   successor  who   is  
able  to  repair  the  picture  if  it  suffers  through  time,  and  also  in  the  future  to  
improve   it   by   touching   up   any   deficiency   left   by   his   own   imperfect  
craftsmanship,  his  great  effort  will  last  only  a  brief  period  of  time?  (Transl.  
BURY,  adapted)  
In   the   text   cited   above   the   painter   himself   is   the   focalizer.   What   in   the   first  
excerpt  of   the  analogy  (769a7-­‐‑b3)  was  the   impression  of   the   layman  observing  
painters   at  work,   has   now   become   the   painter’s   own   recognition:   the   painter  
                                                                                                              
16   Cf.   CAMPBELL   (1981),   440:   “The   discussion   of   the   nomoi   is   throughout   grounded   in   practical  
experience   rather   than   in   metaphysics.   (…)   The   Lawgiver   is   no   longer   the   metaphysical   artist,  
described  in  the  Republic,  who,  viewing  the  pattern  of  absolute  truth,  would  wipe  clean  his  mortal  
canvas  and  establish  in  ‘this  world  also  the  laws  of  the  beautiful,  the  just,  and  the  good…’.  Now  he  
resembles  the  less  exalted  bricklayer  engaged  in  mere  piecemeal  construction.”    
17  ζῷον  is  the  technical  term  for  the  object  of  the  painter  (ζω-­‐‑γράάφος).  In  the  context  of  the  arts,  the  
term  ζῷον  refers  to  an  “image”,  or  “picture”  (see  also  the  references  in  AST  [1835-­‐‑1838],  “imago”).  
Hence   ζῷον   in   769c1   may   seem   to   import   after   all   the   idea   that   the   painting   is   an   imitation.  
However,  τοῦτ᾿  in  769c1  (ὡς  κάάλλιστον  ζῷον  καὶ  τοῦτ᾿  αὖ  µμηδέέποτε  ἐπὶ  φαυλόότερον  ἀλλ᾿  ἐπὶ  τὸ  
βέέλτιον,  769c1-­‐‑2)  and  ζῷον  in  769c5  clearly  refer  to  the  material  picture  (ἐάάν  τι  σφάάλληται  τὸ  ζῷον  
ὑπὸ  χρόόνων,   769c4-­‐‑5).   Therefore,   especially   because   of   τοῦτο,  we  have   to   conclude   that   ζῷον   in  
769c1   also   refers   to   the   (resultant,  material)   painting.   The   superlative  ὡς   κάάλλιστον   is   not   to   be  
understood  as  “the  (objectively)  most  beautiful  imitation  (of  all)”,  but  “the  most  beautiful  painting  
(of  which   the   painter   is   capable)”.   This   interpretation   is   endorsed   by   ἐπινοέέω,   “to   have   in   one’s  
mind”,  “intend”,  which  suggests  a  personal  idea  rather  than  a  priori  knowlegde.  
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knows   that   he   is   unable   to   finish   his   painting   himself.   He   knows   that   he   is  
mortal   and   that   he   will   leave   bits   and   parts   open,   which   will   have   to   be  
supplemented  by  a  successor.  The  underlying  assumption  here  is  that  making  a  
painting  is  a  lengthy  endeavour,  which  takes  years  of  time.  The  second  passage  
remains   inconclusive   about   the   question   of   whether   a   painting   can   ever   be  
finished.  
   The  initial  painter  (τις  in  769c1)  purposes  (ἐπινοήήσειε)  to  paint  a  picture  
as  beautiful  as  he  can  (ὡς  κάάλλιστον  ζῷον).  It  should  be  noted  that  the  analogy  
does  not  apply  to  painting  in  general,  but  to  the  individual  act  of  ‘fabricating  a  
painting’   (cf.   εἴ   ποτέέ   τις   ἐπινοήήσειε,   769b7-­‐‑c1).   The   painter   who   fabricates   a  
painting   is  analogized  to   the   lawgiver  who,  on  his  own  authority,   fabricates  a  
law  code  as  he  sees  fit  (cf.  chapter  three).  Also,  ὡς  κάάλλιστον  ζῷον  is  the  object  
of   ἐπινοεῖν:   it   is   ‘the   most   beautiful   painting’   according   to   the   individual  
painter’s  insight.    
   Speaking   of   lawgiving,   this   passage   suggests   to   us   that   something   is  
being  designed  that  needs  filling  in.18  The  incomplete  parts  of  the  painting  are  
left   open   “by   [the   painter’s]   weakness   in   relation   to   the   art”   (ὑπὸ   τῆς  
ἀσθενείίας  τῆς  ἑαυτοῦ  πρὸς  τὴν  τέέχνην).  That  a  professional  has  a  “weakness”  
(ἀσθέένειάά)   “in   respect   to   his   art”   (πρὸς   τὴν   τέέχνην)   is   unthinkable   from   the  
point  of  view  of  Gorgias  or  Republic:  the  expert  is  qualified  to  realize  the  aim  of  
his  τέέχνη—otherwise,  he  would  not  be  an  expert  in  the  first  place.    
   The   function   of   the   successor   (διάάδοχος,   769c4)   is   twofold:   (i)   he  must  
correct  any  part  of  the  painting  that  may  have  deteriorated  by  the  lapse  of  time  
(ἐπανορθοῦν  ἐάάν  τι  σφάάλληται  τὸ  ζῷον  ὑπὸ  χρόόνων,  769c4-­‐‑5);  and  (ii)  he  has  
to  fill  in  “what  is  left  open”  by  the  original  painter  (τὸ  παραλειφθέέν,  769c5).  To  
create  a  painting  that  will  not  deteriorate,  but  acquire  a  better  condition  is  part  
of   the   very   intention   of   the   original   painter:   ἐπινοήήσειε   (…)   τοῦτ᾿   [ζῷον]  αὖ  
µμηδέέποτε   ἐπὶ   φαυλόότερον   ἀλλ᾿   ἐπὶ   τὸ   βέέλτιον   ἴσχειν   τοῦ   ἐπιόόντος   ἀεὶ  
                                                                                                              
18  Later  onwards,  the  term  we  encounter  for  this  original  design  is  περιγραφήή,  “outline”.  
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χρόόνου  (769c2).  The  description  of  the  successor’s  task  is  ambiguous:  it  does  not  
give   a   decisive   answer   to   the   question   whether   painting   is   a   never-­‐‑ending  
process.  The  task  under  (i)  does  not  necessarily  entail  an  endpoint;  in  fact,  τοῦ  
ἐπιόόντος   ἀεὶ19   χρόόνου   (769c2-­‐‑3)   and   the   pronoun   ἐπίί   (“towards”)   seem   to  
suggest   that   the   process   of   correction   will   last   indefinitely.   If   the   painting   is  
inevitably  affected  by  the  lapse  of  time,  there  will  be  a  commensurate  process  of  
restoration  needed   to   counteract   these   affects.  By   contrast,   the   task  under   (ii),  
filling   in  what   is   left   open,  may   seem   to   entail   that   that   process  will   at   some  
point  in  the  (distant)  future  be  finished.        
   In  this  analogy,  the  τέέχνη  of  painting  is  much  more  complicated  than  the  
static  idea  of  ‘copying  a  model’.  Creating  a  painting  is  a  dynamic  activity:  it  is  a  
continuous   process  with   various   stages   that   are   not   clearly   demarcated   from  
each   other   (apart   from   the   fact   that   filling   in   what   is   left   open   is   apparently  
limited   to   the   successor),   a   painting   takes   a   very   long   time   (many   years)   to  
make,  different  people  will  work  on  the  painting  (at  least  two),  the  painting  is  
susceptible  to  deterioration  over  the  course  of  time,  and  continuous  efforts  are  
needed   to   restore   its  defects.   Strictly   speaking,   all  of   these  activities  belong   to  
the   τέέχνη  of  making   a   painting   (sketching   as  well   as   restoring   and   filling   in)  
insofar   as   they   are   all   necessary   to   complete   and   preserve   the   whole.   The  
analogy  is  highly  rhetorical  in  assuming  a  clear  distinction  between  an  outline  
and   filling   in  what   is   left  open.   In   the  process  of  painting  what   is   left  open   is  
evident;   yet   in   the   case  of   lawgiving,   these  distinctions  may  not   always  be   so  
clear.  
   The   idea   of   painting   as   a   τέέχνη   of   which   the   final   product   cannot   be  
realized  by  its  original  creator  is  imposed  upon  it  by  the  analogon  of  lawgiving,  
which  of   course   is  Plato’s   reason   for   introducing   the   simile.   The  analogon   and  
                                                                                                              
19   In   the   apparatus   criticus   of   the  OCT   edition,  we   find   c3   δήή   in  marg.   γρ.  O.  The  more  detailed  
apparatus  criticus  of   the  Budé-­‐‑edition  gives  αἰεὶ  AO   :  δὴ  ἀ.   s.v.  O4   (δὴ  supra  αἰεὶ).  O   is   the  Laws  
manuscript   in   the  Vatican   (Vaticanus  graecus   I,   9th   century).  Ο4   is   a   recensio   from   the  11th  or  12th  
century  ex  libro  Patriarchae.    
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definiendum   mutually   frame   one   another.   That   lawgiving   is   the   analogon  
becomes   explicit   in   769d1-­‐‑e2,   when   the   Athenian   states   that   the   lawgiver’s  
intention  is  similar  to  the  painter’s: 
ΑΘ.  Τίί  οὖν;  ἆρ’  οὐ  τοιοῦτον  δοκεῖ  σοι  τὸ  τοῦ  νοµμοθέέτου  βούύληµμ’  εἶναι;  
πρῶτον   µμὲν   γράάψαι   τοὺς   νόόµμους   πρὸς   τὴν   ἀκρίίβειαν   κατὰ   δύύναµμιν  
ἱκανῶς·∙   ἔπειτα   προϊόόντος   τοῦ   χρόόνου   καὶ   τῶν   δοξάάντων   ἔργῳ  
πειρώώµμενον,   ἆρ’   οἴει   τινὰ   οὕτως   ἄφρονα   γεγονέέναι   νοµμοθέέτην,   ὥστ’  
ἀγνοεῖν   ὅτι   πάάµμπολλα   ἀνάάγκη   παραλείίπεσθαι   τοιαῦτα,   ἃ   δεῖ   τινα  
συνεπόόµμενον  ἐπανορθοῦν,   ἵνα  µμηδαµμῇ  χείίρων,  βελτίίων  δὲ  ἡ  πολιτείία  
καὶ  ὁ  κόόσµμος  ἀεὶ20  γίίγνηται  περὶ  τὴν  ᾠκισµμέένην  αὐτῷ  πόόλιν;  
ATH.:   Well   then,   do   you   not   think   that   the   purpose   of   the   lawgiver   is  
similar?  He  purposes,  first,  to  write  down  the  laws,  so  far  as  he  can,  with  
complete  precision;  next,  when   in   the  course  of   time  he  puts  his   ideas   to  
the   test   of   practice,   you   cannot   suppose   that   any   lawgiver   will   be   so  
foolish  as  not   to  perceive   that  very  many   things  must  necessarily  be   left  
over,  which   it  will  be   the  duty  of  some  successor   to  make  right,   in  order  
that  the  constitution  and  the  order  of  the  polis  he  has  founded  may  always  
grow  better,  and  never  in  any  way  worse.  (Transl.  BURY,  adapted)  
Since   the   idea   that   the   original   creator   of   a   painting   is   unable   to   finish   his  
painting  himself  has  already  been  introduced  in  the  context  of  the  analogon,  the  
idea  of  an  original  lawgiver  who  is  unable  to  finish  his  law  code  himself  is  not  
new  (πάάµμπολλα  ἀνάάγκη  παραλείίπεσθαι  τοιαῦτα,  769d5-­‐‑6).    
   What  is  new,  however,  is  that  here  we  acquire  some  idea  about  why  he  is  
unable  to  do  so.  We  hear  that  the  original  lawgiver  will  attempt  to  write  down  
laws   “as   accurate   as   his   power   permits   him”   (πρὸς   τὴν   ἀκριβείίαν   κατὰ  
δύύναµμιν).   For   the   first   time   in   the   context   of   the   analogy   the   notion   of  
“accuracy”   (ἀκριβείία)   is   introduced.   But  what   does   that  mean,   if   there   is   no  
                                                                                                              
20  Like  the  painter,  the  lawgiver  desires  that  his  picture  is  preserved,  and  will  improve  in  the  course  
of  time.  This  analogy  makes  the  preservation  (σωτηρίία)  of  the  law  code  and  of  the  polis  for  which  
the  laws  are  made  are  an  integral  part  of  lawgiving.  In  terms  of  the  analogy,  therefore,  the  nocturnal  
council,  whose  function   it   is   to  preserve  the   law  code,  also  has   in   that  sense  a   legislative  function  
and  legislative  authority  as  second  lawgivers.  Yet  there  is  a  fundamental  caesura  between  making  
new   laws   by   the   original   lawgiver,   and   preserving   existing   ones,   which   is   also   reflected   in   the  
caesura  in  the  text  of   the  Laws   itself,  which  introduces  the  nocturnal  council  only  at   the  very  end,  
when   the  νοµμοθεσίία  has  been   completed.  On   the   role   and   function  of   the  nocturnal   council,   see  
chapter  six,  section  6.1.  
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model   to   be   copied?   In   the   case   of   lawgiving,   it   is   easier   to   imagine   that   it   is  
necessary  to  omit  some  things  than  it  is  in  the  case  of  painting  (where  it  seems  
to  raise  more  questions  than  answers).  The  lawgiver’s  ideas  (δόόξαντα)  must  be  
tested  “in  practice”  (ἔργῳ)  “in  the  course  of  time”  (προϊόόντος  τοῦ  χρόόνου).    
   The   necessity   to   omit   so   many   elements   lies   in   the   “material”   of   the  
lawgiver:  the  topics  to  be  regulated  are  so  intricate  that  it  is  impossible,  at  least  
for  a  human  lawgiver,  to  foresee  in  advance  every  law  that  may  be  needed.  The  
lawgiver   is   not   omnipotent:   κατὰ   δύύναµμιν   and  γράάψαι   (…)   ἱκανῶς   limit   the  
degree   to   which   a   first   design   can   be   accurate.21   We   saw   above   that   the  
representation  of  painting   (and   lawgiving)   are  highly  dynamic.   Part   of   this   is  
that  the  analogy  creates  the  effect  of  a  struggle:  making  a  painting  confronts  the  
painter   and   his   successor   with   difficulties   that   can   only   be   overcome   in   the  
course  of  time.  In  this  context,  ἀκριβείία  therefore  refers  to  the  fittingness  of  the  
laws,  their  being  tailored  to  the  demands  of  practice  (and  not  to—as  one  might  
have  expected  in  the  context  of  a  painting-­‐‑analogy—accuracy  of  replication).    
   The   painting   apparently   begins   on   a   clean   canvas   and   shapes   a   polis’  
notion   of   ἀρετήή;   as  we   saw   in   chapter   three,   the   idea   is   that   a   lawgiver   is   in  
principle,  his  aim  being  the  σωτηρίία  of  the  polis,  free  to  enact  as  he  sees  fit.  Yet  
                                                                                                              
21   The   idiosyncratic   nature   of   the   painting-­‐‑analogy   in   Laws   may   be   assessed   more   clearly   in  
comparison   to   the   analogy   between   painter   and   philosopher   in   Resp.   500d11ff.,   which   was  
discussed  briefly  in  chapter  two,  see  above,  p.  79.  Socrates  likes  the  philosopher-­‐‑ruler  to  a  painter  
who  paints  a  constitution  on  the  basis  of  a  divine  model.  Several  differences  seem  significant:  (1)  the  
philosophers  refuse  to  work  on  a  pinax  that  is  not  pure  (καθαράάν,  501a3,  a6)  and  erase  the  existing  
polis  and  characters  of  its  citizens  (ἤθη  ἀνθρώώπων)  before  they  commence  their  own  painting.  (2)  
The  philosophers  work  on  the  basis  of  a  model  (παράάδειγµμα).  Their  eyes  quickly  zigzag  between  
model   and   imitation,   so   as   to   produce   the   best   likeness   (ἔπειτα   (...)   ἀπεργαζόόµμενοι   πυκνὰ   ἂν  
ἑκατέέρωσ᾿   ἀποβλέέποιεν,   501b1-­‐‑2).   They   look   alternatively   “at   natural   justice,   the   good,   the  
temperate,  and  all  such  things”  (πρόός  τε  τὸ  φύύσει  δίίκαιον  καὶ  καλὸν  καὶ  σῶφρον  καὶ  πάάντα  τὰ  
τοιαῦτα,   501b2-­‐‑3),   and   at   the   painting,   the   δίίκαιον   in   people   (καὶ   πρὸς   ἐκεῖνο   αὖ   τὸ   ἐν   τοῖς  
ἀνθρώώποις   ἐµμποιοῖεν,   501b3-­‐‑4).   Cf.   ADAM   ad   loc.   That   the   philosophers   paint   a   likeness   is   also  
suggested  by  the  fact  that  they  sometimes  erase  things,  when  the  likeness  is  not  good  enough,  and  
then   again   paint   things   anew   (τὸ  µμὲν  ἄν   (…)   ἐξαλείίφοιεν,   τὸ   δὲ  πάάλιν   ἐγγράάφοιεν,   501c1).   (3)  
Finally,  Republic   speaks   about  painters   in   the  plural.   In  Republic   there   are  no  differences  between  
individual   philosophers—they   are   identical   qua   philosophers   and   operate   on   the   same   basis,   the  
divine  paradeigma.  By  contrast,  Laws  speaks  of  an  individual  lawgiver,  each  of  whom  fabricates  his  
own  creation;  the  import  of  the  painter-­‐‑analogy  is  distributive  rather  than  collective.  
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the  lawgiver’s  original  ideas  must  in  the  course  of  time  be  adapted  and  become  
attuned  to  real  life.  Therefore,  ἀκριβείία  requires  that  one  must  have  completed  
the   διέέξοδος   from   beginning   to   end.   Furthermore,   we   may   surmise   that  
ἀκριβείία   in   the   case   of   laws   carries   overtones   of   practicality,   detail,   and  
perhaps   also   of   equity   and   fairness;   accuracy   is   necessary   because,   the  more  
accurate  laws  are,  the  less  possibility  for  conflicts  is  left.    
   That   the   efforts   of   the   first   painter   are   necessarily   limited   is  due   to   the  
nature  of  the  business.  This  is  not  to  say  that  individual  lawgivers  do  not  differ  
from   each   other;   there   may   be   differences   in   δύύναµμις.   But   the   general  
implication   is   that,   whatever   the   quality   of   the   lawgiver,   the   product   of   any  
human   lawgiver  will—necessarily—remain   incomplete   for   at   least   some   time.  
When  painting  is  conceived  of  as  copying  a  model,  the  painter’s  own  judgement  
is  excluded  from  consideration.  Δόόξα  is  completely  irrelevant,  since  the  nature  
of  the  product  depends  solely  on  replication,  and  is  not  influenced  by  personal  
ideas.  Every  painter  of  constitutions  in  the  Republic  will  paint  the  same  picture.    
   But  the  painter-­‐‑analogy  in  Laws  does  allow  for  differences  in  judgements  
(ἐπινοήήσειε   in   769c1   implies   a   form   of   personalized   inspiration).   The  
correspondence   between   painters/lawgivers   is   formal,   not   substantial:   every  
sensible   act   of   lawgiving   will   start   out   by   drawing   a   framework   and   fill   in  
details   later.  Differences  in  δόόξα  and  δύύναµμις  suggest  a  dynamic  τέέχνη.22  It   is  
logical  not  to  start  with  working  out  the  details  (for  instance,  the  eyes  or  nose)  if  
one  aspires  to  paint  a  picture  of,  say,  mythological  figures,  or  a  procession.  The  
                                                                                                              
22  The  appeal  of  this  analogy  should,  however,  not  obscure  the  fact  that  the  transition  from  painting  
to  formulating  laws  requires  a  major  conceptual  leap.  It  is  evident  what  filling  in  the  blanks  in  the  
outline   of   a   painting  means.   But   how   are  we   to   imagine   the   same   activity   when   applied   to   the  
analogon,  i.e.,  lawgiving?  The  idea  of  “filling  in  blanks”  suggests,  from  an  optimistic  point  of  view,  
that   the   number   of   domains   for  which   laws   are   yet   to   be  made   is   finite,   as   if   they  were   clearly  
visible  blanks  in  a  picture.  But  who  knows,  and  on  what  basis,  what  these  “blanks”  are  in  the  first  
place?  To  conceive  of  absent  of  insufficient  regulations  as  blanks  in  a  whole,  i.e.,  as  evident  lacunae  
that   still  need   to  be   covered   is   a   clear   case  of   framing:   it  presents  as   surveyable  at  one  glance  an  
issue  that  is   in  fact  much  more  intricate,  since  it  can  only  become  clear  what  the  blanks  are  in  the  
course  of  time.  Moreover,  to  formulate  (explicit,  verbal)  rules  to  govern  people’s  behaviour  is  much  
more  complex  than  filling  in  blanks  on  a  canvas  within  an  outline.    
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painting-­‐‑analogy   presents   provisionality   and   vagueness   as   inherent   in  
lawgiving,  since  human  foresight  is  necessarily  limited.  Painting  is  a  process  in  
which  the  first  phases  are  characterized  by  a  certain  degree  of  fuzziness;  leaving  
things  undetermined  thus  becomes  a  structuring  principle  of  lawgiving  as  it   is  
represented  here.  This   corresponds   to   the   interlocutors’  own   legislation   in   the  
context  of  dialectic,  λόόγῳ.  In  a  law  code  that  is  not  for  real,  leaving  things  open  
and  provisional   is  not  problematic.  The  painter-­‐‑analogy  is  thus  an  analogy  for  
the  dramatic  act  of   lawgiving  of   the   interlocutors   in  Laws,   rather   than   for  any  
act  of  legislation.    
     
  
4 . 2      From    the   pa in t ing -­‐‑ana logy    to    the    l aw    code    in   Laws   
The   painter-­‐‑analogy   presents   lawgiving   as   a   long   process   which   the   original  
lawgiver   is   unable   to   complete   (if   finishing   is   possible   at   all).  At   some  point,  
successors  have  to  be  appointed.  This  is  preferably  to  be  done  before  the  death  
of  the  lawgiver,  since  in  that  case,  the  lawgiver  has  the  opportunity  to  instruct  
his  successors.    
   Appointing  successors   is   in  fact  what   the   interlocutors   themselves  proceed  
to  do   immediately   after   the   painter-­‐‑analogy,  with   reference   to   their   advanced  
age   (ἡµμεῖς   δ’   ἐν   δυσµμαῖς   τοῦ   βίίου,   770a6).23   The   advanced   age   of   the   first  
lawgiver   constitutes   a   practical   reason   why   a   successor   is   necessary.24  
                                                                                                              
23   On   the   high   age   of   the   interlocutors,   see   Leg.   799c4-­‐‑d4   (πρεσβῦται   by   implication),   821a7  
(πρεσβῦται),   846c3   (the   interlocutors   identify   themselves   implicitly   with   the   first   lawgiver,   the  
γέέρων  νοµμοθέέτης).  Cf.  625b4-­‐‑5,  634d1-­‐‑2.  The  successors  are  not  of  the  age  of  νέέοι  absolutely  (which  
is  between  18  and  30:  Leg.  664c6-­‐‑d1,  and  Book  II,  where  the  group  of  νέέοι  is  in  between  παῖδες  and  
πρεσβύύτεροι);   they  are  young  (νέέοι)   in  relation   to   the  aged   interlocutors   (πρὸς  ἡµμᾶς).  Leg.  892d7  
(νεώώτατος  δ᾿  ἐγὼ  τυγχάάνων  ἡµμῶν)  is  part  of  an  irrealis  (εἰ  …  ἔδει  …  διαβαίίνειν,  d6),  and  does  not  
imply  that  the  Athenian  is  indeed  younger  than  the  other  two.    
24   This   assumption   is   also   compatible   with   the   consistent   connection   between   ἀληθεῖς   δόόξαι   or  
φρόόνησις   and   seniority   in   the  Laws,   see   chapter   three,   especially   p.   116;   also   p.   117,   n.   137.   The  
distinction  between  the  lawgiver  and  his  successor(s)  is  cast  in  terms  of  either  age  or  chronology:  ὁ  
πρῶτος  νοµμοθέέτης  and  οἱ  δεύύτεροι  (835b1-­‐‑2);  the  γέέρων  νοµμοθέέτης  is  distinguished  from  οἱ  νέέοι  
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Therefore,   the  reference  to  a  successor  may  imply  that  a  first   lawgiver  will   (in  
most   cases,   necessarily)   be   of   advanced   age,   which   is   consistent   with   the  
association  of  authority  with  seniors  in  Laws.25  It  is,  however,  only  in  light  of  the  
analogy   that   the   interlocutors’   strategy   is   fully   understandable,   for   it   is   the  
analogy  that  has  framed  lawgiving  as  a  lengthy  process.    
   But  the  parallelism  between  the  lawgivers  in  Laws  and  the  lawgiver  in  the  
analogy  also  manifests  itself  in  the  interlocutors’  own  lawgiving.  The  Athenian  
clearly   approaches   lawgiving   as   a   lengthy   process,   similar   to   the   principles  
stipulated   in   the  analogy,   and   reflects  on   their  own   lawgiving   in   the   terms  of  
the  painting-­‐‑analogy.  Both  the  place  of  the  analogy,  immediately  preceding  the  
lawgiving   in   the  Laws,   and   the   correspondence   in  procedure,   suggest   that  we  
can  read  the  analogy  as  the  pattern  after  which  the  lawgiving  on  the  dramatic  
level  is  modelled.    
   By  appointing  successors,  the  interlocutors  put  themselves  on  a  par  with  
the   first   painter-­‐‑lawgiver   of   the   analogy.26   It   is   their   role   in   the   dialogue   to  
legislate.  The   interlocutors  appoint   the  magistrates  designated  as  “lawguards”  
(νοµμοφύύλακες),   who   were   introduced   in   the   discussion   of   the   Magnesian  
officials   in   Book   V,   as   their   successors.27   The   Athenian,   imagining   that   these  
lawguards  are  present,  addresses   them   in  a   fictional   speech.   In   this   speech  he  
describes  their  upcoming  legislation  in  the  terms  of  in  the  analogy,  770b4-­‐‑b8:    
ΑΘ.   Λέέγωµμεν   δὴ   πρὸς   αὐτούύς·∙  Ὦ   φίίλοι   σωτῆρες   νόόµμων,   ἡµμεῖς   περὶ  
ἑκάάστων  ὧν  τίίθεµμεν  τοὺς  νόόµμους  πάάµμπολλα  παραλείίψοµμεν—ἀνάάγκη  
γάάρ—οὐ   µμὴν   ἀλλ’   ὅσα   γε   µμὴ   σµμικρὰ   καὶ   τὸ   ὅλον   εἰς   δύύναµμιν   οὐκ  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
(846c3-­‐‑4);  cf.  οἱ  νεωτέέροι  νοµμοθέέται  (855d2);  the  things  left  out  by  the  πρεσβύύτης  νοµμοθέέτης  have  
to  be  “filled  in”  (ἀναπληροῦν)  by  ὁ  νέέος  νοµμοθέέτης  (957a2-­‐‑3).    
25  See  chapter  three,  p.  118,  n.  138;  also  p.  109;    also  BARTELS  (2012).  
26  For   the   interlocutors  as   the  structural  equivalent  of   the   lawgiver:  Leg.  855c6-­‐‑d4.  The  εἰσαγωγαίί  
and  the  προσκλήήσεις  etc.  (ὅσα  τοιαῦτα  καὶ  ὡς  δεῖ  γίίγνεσθαι)  in  cases  involving  the  death  penalty  
have   to   be   left   to   the   younger   lawgivers   (τοῖς   νεωτέέροις   νοµμοθέέταις   χρὴ  µμέέλειν,   855d2-­‐‑3).   It   is  
“our   job”   (ἡµμέέτερον  ἔργον),   the   interlocutors   say,   to   legislate  about   the  procedure   for   the  voting  
(τὴν  διαψήήφισιν).  The  procedure  follows  in  855d4-­‐‑856a8.  
27  Leg.  752d2-­‐‑755b6.  On  the  lawguards,  see  MORROW  (1960),  198-­‐‑204;  STALLEY  (1983),  113-­‐‑114,  116.    
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ἀνήήσοµμεν   ἀπεριήήγητον   καθάάπερ   τινὶ   περιγραφῇ·∙   τοῦτο   δὲ   δεήήσει  
συµμπληροῦν  ὑµμᾶς  τὸ  περιηγηθέέν.  
ATH.  “Let’s  address  them  thus:—‘Beloved  preservers  of  the  laws,  in  many  
departments   of   our   legislation   we   shall   leave   out   a   vast   number   of  
matters—for  we  cannot  do  otherwise;  yet,  nothwithstanding,  all  important  
matters,  as  well  as  the  general  description,  we  shall   include,  so  far  as  we  
can,  in  our  outline  sketch.  Your  help  will  be  required  to  fill  in  this  outline;  
(…)”  (Transl.  BURY,  adapted)    
Like   the   lawgiver-­‐‑painter   in   the   analogy,   the   interlocutors   will   by   necessity  
(ἀνάάγκη)  leave  many  issues  open  (πάάµμπολλα  παραλείίψοµμεν).  But  whatever  is  
important   (ὅσα   γε   µμὴ   σµμικράά),   and   the   whole   (τὸ   ὅλον),   will   not   be   left  
“without  outline”  (ἀπεριήήγητον),  “precisely  as  a  kind  of  sketch”  (καθάάπερ  τινὶ  
περιγραφῇ).  Although  the  term  περιγραφήή  is  not  used  in  the  painter-­‐‑analogy  
itself,  the  analogy  has  prepared  us  for  conceiving  of  lawgiving  as  an  “outline”,  
and  for  conceiving  of  lawgiving  as  a  lengthy  process  in  the  first  place.28  The  task  
of   the   lawguards   will   be   to   “fill   in   the   outline”   (συµμπληροῦν   …   τὸ  
περιηγηθέέν).29  This  terminology  creates  the  expectation  (which  is  subsequently  
confirmed)   that   lawgiving   in   Laws   will   proceed   along   the   same   lines   as  
lawgiving   in   the   analogy.   What   the   interlocutors   will   be   doing   in   Laws   is  
formulate   the   outline—the   idea   is   that   more   detailed   regulations   have   to   be  
deferred  until  the  whole  διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων  is  complete.  
                                                                                                              
28  The  Athenian  twice  refers  to  their  law  code  as  a  περιγραφήή  (768c5,  770b8).  The  interlocutors  will  
give  some  regulations  concerning  οἰκοδοµμικήή:  ὅσον  τινα  τύύπον  αὐτῶν  δι᾿  ὀλίίγων  ἐπεξέέλθωµμεν  
(778c1-­‐‑2).      Also,   the   first   lawgiver   must   “set   out”   (ἐξηγεῖσθαι   τύύποις,   816c2)   the   two   types   of  
dances,  whereas  the  lawguard  has  to  trace  them  and  fit  them  into  the  rest  of  the  musical  education.  
The  lawgiver  also  has  to  make  a  distinction  between  songs  suitable  for  males  and  for  females  (τύύπῳ  
τινὶ  802e1).  Cf.  803e5,  809b5.  In  that  sense,  sometimes  it  is  almost  identical  to  νόόµμος  (801c6,  801d7).  
In   905c2   there   is   some   suggestion   about   the   basis   for   that   τύύπος:   if   one   is   not   aware   of   the  
συντέέλεια  of  the  gods,  one  will  never  be  capable  of  seeing  a  τύύπος  or  composing  a  speech  about  life  
to  both  a  person  in  a  state  of  happiness  and  to  one  in  a  less  fortunate  state.  In  876e1  περιγραφήήν  τε  
καὶ  τοὺς  τύύπους  specifically  refers  to  the  section  of  the  law  code  that  concerns  punishments  (τῶν  
τιµμωριῶν).    
29  The  age  requirements  for  lawguards  are  such  that  they  will  be  between  50  and  70.  Leg.  755a4-­‐‑b2:  
the  lawguards  ought  not  to  be  in  function  for  longer  than  20  years.  They  must  on  appointment  be  
no   less   than   50   years   of   age,   and   not   hold   office   for   longer   than   twenty   years.   If   someone   is  
appointed   lawguard   at   60,   he   must   not   remain   in   office   for   more   than   ten   years.   The   oldest  
lawguards  will  be  members  of  the  nocturnal  council  (see  chapter  six,  p.  220).  
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   We   may   compare   Laws’   appraisal   of   a   περιγραφήή   to   a   passage   in  
Republic,  that  casts  the  notion  of  an  outline  in  a  different  light.  In  relation  to  the  
µμαθήήµματα   µμέέγιστα,   the   apodeixeis   of   the   εἴδη   of   the   four   cardinal   virtues  
presented   earlier30   in   the   discussion   amounts   only   to   a   “sketch”   (ὑπογραφήή,  
504d6).31  The  interlocutors’  earlier  statements  were  lacking  in  precision  (τὰ  τόότε  
τῆς   µμὲν   ἀκριβείίας  …   ἐλλιπῆ,   504b5-­‐‑6;   cf.   µμέέτρον   τῶν   τοιούύτων  ἀπολεῖπον,  
504c1).   The   incomplete   (ἀτελέές)   cannot   be   a   measure   of   anything   (οὐδενὸς  
µμέέτρον).  Therefore  a  mere  “sketch”  of   the  virtues  will  not  do   (504d6-­‐‑7).  Their  
guards  must  walk  “the  longer  road”  (τὴν  µμακρόότεραν  …  περιιτέέον,  504d1,  cf.  
b6),  aspire   to   the  most  complete  product   (τελεωτάάτη  ἀπεργασίία),  and  aim  at  
the  highest  precision  (µμεγίίστας  …  τὰς  ἀκριβείίας)  in  the  most  important  affairs  
(τῶν  …  µμεγίίστων,  504d6-­‐‑e2).  This  high  degree  of  precision  is  possible  in  virtue  
of  the  greatest  object  of  knowledge  (µμέέγιστον  µμάάθηµμα),  the  Idea  of  the  Good  (ἡ  
τοῦ  ἀγαθοῦ  ἰδέέα,  505a2).    
   Here,  ἀκριβείία  depends  on  (a  discussion  of)  the  Good.  In  the  worldview  
of  Republic,   incompleteness   amounts   to   a   failure   to   persevere,   to   indifference  
(ῥᾳθυµμίία,   504c5),   a   trait   explicitly   said   to  be  of  no  avail   to  polis   and   laws.  By  
implication,   a   city   and   laws   benefit   from   the   zeal   of   a   guard   who   takes   the  
longer   road   (τὴν   µμακροτέέραν   [ὁδόόν])   and   who   exerts   himself   both  
intellectually  and  physically   (µμανθάάνοντι  πονητέέον  ἢ  γυµμναζοµμέένῳ,  504d1);  
otherwise   he   will   never   reach   the   great   principle   that   is   most   befitting   for   a  
                                                                                                              
30  For  the  references,  see  ADAM  ad  loc.  
31  The  difference  between  περιγραφήή  and  ὑπογραφήή  seems  to  be  twofold.  (1)  ὑπογράάφειν  is  what  
teachers  do:  “trace  letters  for  children  to  write  over”  (LSJ,  II).  In  Prot.  326d2-­‐‑5,  we  find  an  analogy  
between   this   school   practice   and   the   education   of   the   citizen   by   law,   both   of   which   enforce  
(ἀναγκάάζειν)  a  certain  kind  of  writing  and  behaviour  respectively.  The  ὑπογραφήή  of  the  virtues  in  
Resp.  504d6  is  only  an  adumbratio   (ADAM,  ad  loc.),  and  points  to  the  need  for  their  realization,  here  
called  τελεωτάάτη  ἀπεργασίία.  By  contrast,  περιγραφήή  does  not  imply  a  difference  between  a  more  
and   less   realised   form,   an   indication   and   its   tracing.   (2)   ὑπογραφήή,   as   an   indication   of   how  one  
write   (or  behave),  presupposes  a  conception  of  what   the  whole   is   to   look   like.  By  contrast,   in   the  
case   of   a   περιγραφήή   it   can   only   become   clear   what   the   whole   looks   like   when   the   outline   is  
complete,  see  Leg.  768c5-­‐‑d7  (also  above).    
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person  in  his  position  (as  guard  of  polis  and  laws)  to  learn  (τοῦ  µμεγίίστου  τε  καὶ  
µμάάλιστα  προσήήκοντος  µμαθήήµματος  ἐπὶ  τέέλος  οὔποτε  ἥξει,  504d2-­‐‑3).32    
   In   Laws,   ἀκριβείία   depends   on   the   completion   of   the   διέέξοδος   τῶν  
νόόµμων:  a  rough  draft  of  the  whole  has  to  be  outlined  before  further  details  can  
be  filled  in.  Due  to  the  nature  of  the  subject  matter  and  the  limitations  of  human  
foresight,   it   is   simply   impossible   to   advance   beyond  drawing   an   outline.   The  
initial  incompleteness  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  τέέχνη  of  lawgiving  as  a  process.  
The   three   interlocutors   in   Laws   will   do   whatever   lies   in   their   power   (εἰς  
δύύναµμιν,  770b7):  they  will  not  fall  short  in  zeal.  The  fact  that  complete  precision  
is  simply  not  possible  at  this  absolves  the  interlocutors  from  having  to  go  into  
more  detail.33  
   In   their   speech   to   the   lawguards,   the   interlocutors   assume  a   favourable  
initial   situation:   a   situation   in  which   the  original   legislators   are   still   alive   and  
can   give   explicit   instructions   to   their   successors   (this   may   not   always   be   the  
case,  for  instance,  when  the  lawgiver  should  die  unexpectedly).  In  such  a  case,  
there   is   a   maximum   degree   of   consistency   between   the   two   groups   of  
lawgivers,   since   the   second   generation   of   lawgivers   has   explicitly   been  
instructed  by  the  first  lawgiver  about  what  he  had  in  mind  in  framing  his  laws.  
This   move   seems   to   express   faith   in   the   instruction   of   (relatively)   younger  
people   by   older,   tying   in   with   the   Laws’   high   confidence   in   the   success   of  
                                                                                                              
32  LISI  (1998)  argues  that  both  Republic  and  Laws  represent  “ein  theoretisches  Modell”;  and  that  the  
Laws   is,   like   the  Republic,   “nur   ein   Umriß,   der   der   nötigen   Nuancierungen   und   Verbesserungen  
bedarf”  (101-­‐‑102).  In  LISI  (1985),  246-­‐‑250  he  argues  that  the  Laws  coincide  with  the  constitution  the  
philosopher  writes  in  the  Statesman,  when  he  exercises  power  himself;  in  LISI  (1998)  he  adds  that  the  
rule  of  law  anticipates  the  rule  of  philosophy:  Magnesia  is  “ein  Staat  im  Werden,  d.h.  die  Herrschaft  
des   Gesetzes   soll   solange   bleiben,   bis   die   Philosophen   ausgebildet   werden   und   schließlich   die  
Macht  übernehmen  können”   (104).  He   suggests   that   the   fact   that  Laws  mostly  appeals   to   existing  
laws  must  be  explained  by  the  “Vorläufigkeit”  of  the  rule  of  law  (104,  cf.  99).    
33  Cf.  Leg.   875d4-­‐‑5:   it   is   inherent   in   law   that   it   can   take   into  account   the  majority  of   cases,  not  all:  
τάάξιν  καὶ  νόόµμον,  ἃ  δὴ  τὸ  µμὲν  ὡς  ἐπὶ  τὸ  πολὺ  ὁρᾷ  καὶ  βλέέπει,  τὸ  δ᾿  ἐπὶ  πᾶν  ἀδυνατεῖ.  Cf.  925e8-­‐‑
926a3.   Some  domains,   however,   cannot   be   legislated   for,   or   are   too   trivial   to   be   regarded   as   real  
laws:  788a1-­‐‑c4,  822d2-­‐‑823a6.  
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paideia—at  least  with  those  people  who  have  already  gone  through  some  kind  
of  selection,  just  as  the  lawguard.34    
   The  lawguards  have  to  “complete”  the  interlocutors’  “outline”:  τοῦτο  δὲ  
δεήήσει  συµμπληροῦν  ὑµμᾶς  τὸ  περιηγηθέέν   (770b8).  The  Athenian   instructs   the  
lawguards  where  they  should  look  (ὅποι  …  βλέέποντες,  770c1).  This  is  familiar  
terminology:  βλέέπειν  εἰς  or  πρόός  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  idiom  of  the  τέέχναι.35  
But  whereas  in  other  Platonic  texts  the  aim  of  the  τέέχνη  (for  example  ὑγίίεια,  or  
δικαιοσύύνη)  was   established   by   an   objective   norm   (φύύσις),   the   lawguards   in  
the  Laws  have  to  “look  at  that  which  we  have  agreed  among  each  other  that  a  
lawguard   and   lawgiver   ought   to   look   at”   (βλέέποντας   πρὸς   ταῦτα   εἰς   ἅπερ  
ἡµμεῖς   συνεχωρήήσαµμεν   ἀλλήήλοις   τὸν   νοµμοφύύλακάά   τε   καὶ   νοµμοθέέτην   δεῖν  
βλέέπειν,   770c5-­‐‑7;   cf.   779e6-­‐‑7:   τόό   γε   µμὴν   δοκοῦν   ὀρθὸν   καὶ   ἀληθὲς   εἶναι  
πάάντως  ῥητέέον).  This  goal  is,  of  course,  social  stability  (φιλίία,  εἰρήήνη),  the  goal  
of   lawgiving   as   determined   in   Books   I-­‐‑II,36   and   III.37   The   object   of   the  
lawguards’   contemplation   is  what   these   interlocutors   in   this  conversation  have  
agreed  that  πᾶσα  ἀρετήή  amounts  to.  The  younger  lawgivers  are  to  become  “of  
the   same   conviction”   (συγγνώώµμονας)   as,   and   “pupils”   (µμαθητάάς)   of,   the  
interlocutors.38  The  law  code  takes  as  its  goal  “complete  virtue”,  and  hence  the  
                                                                                                              
34  The  instruction  of  the  younger  members  of  the  nocturnal  council  by  the  council’s  older  members  
seems  to  be  a  similar  mechanism.  See  chapter  six,  p.  220,  p.  221.  
35  See  chapter  one,  p.  29.  
36  See  chapter  three,  especially  p.  91,  p.  111.  
37  See  Leg.  693b1-­‐‑d1;  when  the  interlocutors  said  that  the  lawgiver  ought  to  look  at  (βλέέπειν  πρόός)  
τὸ  σωφρονεῖν,  φρόόνησις  or  φιλίία,   it  should  be  realized  that  these  goals  are  not  different,  but  the  
same  (ὡς  ἔσθ᾿  οὗτος  ὀ  σκόόπος  οὐχ  ἕτερος  ἀλλ᾿  ὁ  αὐτόός,  693c3-­‐‑4).  Cf.  701d7-­‐‑9:  Ἐλέέξαµμεν  ὡς  τὸν  
νοµμοθέέτην   δεῖ   τριῶν   στοχαζόόµμενον   νοµμοθετεῖν,   ὅπως   ἡ   νοµμοθετουµμέένη   πόόλις   ἐλευθέέρα   τε  
ἔσται  καὶ  φίίλη  ἑαυτῇ  καὶ  νοῦν  ἕξει.  The  ἔλεγχος  (702b2)  the  interlocutors  want  to  submit  to  is  a  
practical   test   (εἰ  …   τι   πεποιήήκαµμεν   προὔργου)   of   the   viability   of   this   conclusion.   The   lawgiver  
ought  to  look  at  “virtue  as  a  whole”,  πᾶσα  ἀρετήή,  630e1-­‐‑4.  Cf.  705e1-­‐‑706a4.  
38   The   principle   (ἀρχήή,   742d1)   being   that   a   man   will   become   ἀγαθόός   and   acquire   the   virtue  
appropriate   to  man.  The   first   lawgiver  also  gives   the   second   lawgivers  “bestimmte   ‘Muster’  oder  
‘Umrisse’  an  die  Hand  oder  verweist  auf  eigene  Gesetze,  die  sie  als  Muster  nehmen  sollen”,  or  even  
in   840a6ff.,   “detaillierte   Anweisungen   zur   Formulierung   einer   zweitbesten   Gesetzfassung”:   see  
(with  references)  SCHÖPSDAU  (2003),  439.  These  concrete  cases  ought  to  be  settled  “mit  Hilfe   ihrer  
eigenen  Erfahrungen”:  772b-­‐‑c,  779c-­‐‑d,  846c  (ibid.).  
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conception(s)  of  excellence  in  the  opening  conversation  (see  chapter  three).  The  
most  important  point  of  the  interlocutors’  agreement  (ἡ  συγχώώρησις)  was  that  
a   citizen   ought   at   some   point   in   time   (ποτέέ)   to   become   a   “good  man”   (ἀνὴρ  
ἀγαθόός),  and  acquire   the  “excellence  of   soul   suitable   to  a  human  being”   (τὴν  
ἀνθρώώπῳ  προσήήκουσαν  ἀρετὴν  τῆς  ψυχῆς,  770d1-­‐‑2).39  The  goal  of  the  laws  is  
ἡ  πᾶσα  ἀρετήή,  the  virtue  befitting  a  human  being  because  of  his  social  nature.40    
   So  far,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  law  code  of  Laws   is  on  a  par  with  the  
outline   in   the   analogy,   and   that   the   interlocutors   are   on   a  par  with   the   initial  
lawgiver.  This  does,  however,  require  some  further  elaboration.  The  law  code  in  
Laws   is   a   law   code   “in   speech”   (λόόγῳ);   the   interlocutors’   law   code   is   a   “test”  
(ἔλεγχος)  to  see  whether  their  statements  about  the  best  life  for  the  individual  
and  the  best  organization  for  a  polis  were  suitable  in  any  way.41  Their  law  code  
is   not   the   law   code   for  Magnesia   (legislation   ἔργῳ),   which   is   to   follow   later  
(outside  the  plot  of  Laws).42  In  addition,  the  interlocutors  sometimes  emphasize  
                                                                                                              
39   “…   through   some   occupation,   or   character   trait,   some   acquisition   or   desire,   opinion,   or   some  
kinds  of  studies”,  ἔκ  τινος  ἐπιτηδεύύµματος  ἤ  τινος  ἤθους  ἢ  ποιᾶς  κτήήσεως  ἢ  ἐπιθυµμίίας  ἢ  δόόξης  ἢ  
µμαθηµμάάτων  ποτέέ   τινων   (770d2-­‐‑4).   In   other  words,   how   they  will   acquire   virtue   is   of   secondary  
importance.  What  counts  is  the  right  behaviour.  An  example  of  encouraging  virtue  through  κτῆσις  
may  be  the  “additional  payment”  (δίίκη  …  συνεποµμέένη)  that  is  owed  by  the  person  who  commits  
theft   or   violence:   see   below,   p.   168,   n.   82.   This   is   also   connected   with   the   relatively   egalitarian  
conception  of  virtue  (see  chapter  three,  p.  114):  virtue  is  not  πράάττειν  τὰ  ἑαυτοῦ,  an  occupation  or  
curriculum  appropriate  to  members  of  a  specific  class  (ἐµμπειρίία,  not  the  assumed  condition  of  the  
ψυχήή).   Rather,   every   citizen   will   acquire   virtue   in   the   way(s)   that   is   or   are   open   to   him   or   her  
(770d4-­‐‑5).  
40  See  chapter  three,  p.  91.  
41  Leg.  702b1-­‐‑3   (the  Athenian):  εἰ  δὲ  δήή  τι  πεποιήήκαµμεν  προὔργου,  τίίς  ποτ᾿  ἂν  ἔλεγχος  γίίγνοιτο  
ἡµμῖν   πρὸς   ἡµμᾶς   αὐτοὺς   λεχθείίς,   ὦ   Μέέγιλλέέ   τε   καὶ   Κλεινίία;   “But   as   to   the   value   of   our  
conclusions   [in  Books  I-­‐‑III],  what   test  can  we  apply   in  conversing  among  ourselves,  Megillus  and  
Cleinias?”  (transl.  BURY,  adapted).    
42  See  chapter  five,  section  5.3.2,  p.  204.  The  current  order  may  deviate  from  the  order  adopted  in  a  
case  of  real  legislation,  778b4-­‐‑c2:  γάάµμων  δ’  ἦν  ἔµμπροσθεν  ταῦτα,  ὦ  Κλεινίία,  νῦν  δ’  ἔπειπερ  λόόγῳ  
γίίγνεται,  καὶ  µμάάλ’  ἐγχωρεῖ  ταύύτῃ  γίίγνεσθαι  τὰ  νῦν·∙  ἔργῳ  µμὴν  ὅταν  γίίγνηται,  ταῦτ’  ἔµμπροσθεν  
τῶν   γάάµμων,   ἐὰν   θεὸς   ἐθέέλῃ,   ποιήήσαντες,   ἐκεῖνα   ἤδη   τόότε   ἐπὶ   πᾶσιν   τοῖς   τοιούύτοις  
ἀποτελοῦµμεν.  νῦν  δὲ  µμόόνον  ὅσον  τινὰ  τύύπον  αὐτῶν  δι’  ὀλίίγων  ἐπεξέέλθωµμεν,  “These  things  are  
really,   Cleinias,   prior   to  marriage;   but   since   our   construction   is   now   a   verbal   one,   this   is   a   very  
suitable  place   to  deal  with   them;  when  we  come   to   the  actual   construction  of   the  State,  we   shall,  
God  willing,  make   the   houses   precede  marriage,   and   crown   all   our   architectural  work  with   our  
marriage-­‐‑laws.   For   the   present   we   shall   confine   ourselves   to   a   brief   outline   of   our   building  
regulations”  (transl.  BURY).    
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that   they   are   not   yet   lawgivers.43   This   is   also   the   note   on  which   the   dialogue  
ends:   if  we  turn  to   the  closing  page  of  Laws,  we  see  that   the  dialogue  ends  on  
the   prospect   of   laying   the   actual   law   code.   In   sum,   the   lawgiving   at   the  
dramatic  level  of  Laws  is  an  (1)  exercise  for  (2)  an  outline.  
  
  
4 . 3    B lanks    in    the   ou t l ine :    t o   be    con t inued…  
In  view  of  the  presentation  of  the  law  code  in  the  Laws  as  an  outline,  it  should  
come  as  no  surprise  that  many  issues  raised  in  the  interlocutors’  own  legislation  
in  Books  VI-­‐‑XII  are  explicitly  left  open44  and  are  deferred  to  a  fictive  moment  in  
the   future.45  Now   that  we  have   looked   at   the   instruction   of   the   successors,   in  
this   section  we  will   investigate   in  more   detail   the   omissions   in   the   law   code  
itself.    
   The   interlocutors   frame   their   laws   on   the   fiction   that  many   things  will  
eventually  be  completed  by  others.  The  present  section  will  examine   the  open  
ends  in  the  law  code,  i.e.,  those  junctures  in  the  διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων  at  which  
the   interlocutors   defer   further   legislation   ot   their   successors.   To   be   sure,  
                                                                                                              
43  Cleinias   likens   their  own  approach   to   lawgiving   to  “bricklayers”,  λιθολόόγοι   (857e10-­‐‑858c4).  He  
laughs  away   the   idea   that   they  would  have   to   choose  between   looking  at   the  best   (τὸ  βέέλτιστον  
σκοπεῖν)  and  looking  at  that  which  is  most  necessary  (τὸ  ἀναγκαιόότατον).  Instead,  they  have  the  
leisure  to  proceed  in  the  way  that  bricklayers  do:  they  can  gather  material  at  random  (χύύδην)  and  
select   at   leisure   the   items   for   the   future   construction   (τὰ   πρόόσφορα   τῇ   µμελλούύσῃ   γενήήσεσθαι  
συστάάσει).  At  778b1-­‐‑c1,  the  interlocutors  state  that  the  order  in  which  they  have  discussed  marriage  
and  building  λόόγῳ  (marriage  prior  to  building)  should  be  reversed  when  they  will  legislate  in  deed,  
ἔργῳ.  
44   Made   explicit   at   Leg.   768c3-­‐‑e3,   769a7-­‐‑771a4,   772c6-­‐‑d4,   779c5-­‐‑d2,   816c1-­‐‑d2,   828b3-­‐‑7,   835a2-­‐‑b4,  
840e2-­‐‑7,  846b6-­‐‑c8,  847d1-­‐‑7,  849e1-­‐‑6,  855d1-­‐‑4,  871c3-­‐‑d2,  875d4-­‐‑5,  917e2-­‐‑918a5,  920b3-­‐‑c7,  923e8-­‐‑926a3,  
957a1-­‐‑c1;   cf.   BOBONICH   (2002),   573   n.   67.   For   a   discussion   of   the   law   code   as   an   outline,   see   also  
SCHÖPSDAU  (2003),  438-­‐‑441ff.  On  the  incompleteness  of  the  law  code,  see,  e.g.,  MORROW  (1960),  203-­‐‑
208,  224-­‐‑228;  BRUNT  (1993),  249-­‐‑250.    
45  This  later  stage  may  also  be  inside  the  law  code,  as  is  the  case  with  the  syssitia,  783b5-­‐‑c4.  Although  
the   Athenian   does   come   back   to   the   syssitia   in   842b,   the   participation   of   women   is   not   settled,  
SCHÖPSDAU   (2003),   478-­‐‑479.  According   to   SAUNDERS   (1995),   597   the   issues   left   open  are   settled   in  
779dff.,  788ab,  839cd.  In  any  case,  the  thought  is  that  some  things  will  become  clear  at  a  later  stage.    
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statements   of   this   kind   are  made  on   the   level   of   the   outline;   the   interlocutors  
themselves   are   in   no   way   concerned   with   making   amendments   or   filling   in  
details.    
   The   blanks   in   the   outline   offer   a   view  of   how   the   interlocutors   suggest  
that  their   law  code  ought  to  be  filled  in.  They  offer  but  a  glimpse  of  a  process  
aiming   at   completion   at   some   point   in   the   future.   The   recognition   that  
additional  regulation  is  needed  is  often  accompanied  by  explicit  instructions  to  
or  about  the  second  lawgivers  about  future  legislative  procedures.46  If  anything  
in  Laws,  these  “vistas”  into  the  future  are  also  likely  to  offer  us  a  view  of  what  is  
involved   in   the   dynamic   process   of   making   a   law   code.  What   topics   are   left  
open,  and  how  will  the  future  lawgivers  proceed?  In  addition,  these  vistas  may  
also   offer   a   vision   of   whether   the   interlocutors   think   that   a   law   code   will   be  
finished  at  some  point   in   the  future.  The  painter-­‐‑analogy   implied  that   the   law  
code   is   in   first   instance   not   finished,   but   what   about   the   activities   of   the  
successors?   What   determines   that   laws   are   finished?   The   next   section   will  
investigate   in   what   sort   of   contexts   the   lawgivers   leave   certain   issues  
undetermined,  how  they  motivate  their  decision  to  do  so,  and  what  they  reveal  
about  the  mode  of  proceeding  to  be  adopted  by  their  successors.    
   In   the   vast   majority   of   cases,   filling   in   the   blanks   is   assigned   to   the  
lawguards   (as   may   be   expected   in   light   of   the   Athenian’s   announcement   in  
770a8-­‐‑9).47   They   have   to   legislate   on  matters   which   the   law   has   left   open   δι᾿  
                                                                                                              
46   SCHÖPSDAU   (2003),   438-­‐‑439   distinguishes   between   three   grounds   for   the   inevitable  
“Lückenhaftigkeit”   of   the   law   code:   the   complete   regulation   of   all   the   “Sachbereiche”   (1)   is  
impossible  (for  three  reasons:  the  abstractness  and  generality  of  the  law;  because  not  all  necessary  
“Voraussetzungen”   can  be  known   in  advance;   and  because  of   the   limited   time   that   is   left   for   the  
lawgiver  of  high  age);  (2)  is  unnecessary,  since  many  smaller  things  can  be  settled  by  any  lawgiver;  
(3)  would  be  unbefitting,  since  a  lawgiver  of  high  age  would  make  himself  ridiculous.  
47  Οn   the   lawguards,   see   the   index   of  MORROW   (1960);   further   GUTHRIE   V   (1978),   333,   353,   369;  
STALLEY   (1983),  113-­‐‑114;  BRUNT   (1993),  250;  BOBONICH  2002,  380-­‐‑384,  397;  KLOSKO   (2006),  250-­‐‑251,  
256-­‐‑257.  For  a  list  of  passages  about  the  lawguards’  involvement  in  amending  and  revising  laws,  see  
BOBONICH  (2002),  573-­‐‑574,  n.  67.  
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ἀπορίίαν.48  Yet   the   lawguards  are  not   the  only  ones   involved;   in  most  cases  of  
supplementary   legislation,   they   have   to   cooperate   closely   with   the   officials  
holding   the   ἀρχήή   over   the   relevant   sphere   of   life.   In   many   instances,   for  
example,   the   νοµμοφύύλακες   are   to   formulate   laws   in   conjunction   with   the  
ἀγορανόόµμοι  and/or  the  ἀστυνόόµμοι.49  The  impression  one  gets  is  indeed  one  of  
close   collaboration   between   the   lawguards   and   the   astynomoi,   as   becomes  
evident   from   the   regulations   about   selling   in   markets.50   Legislation   is   also  
further  deferred  to  the  δικαστήήρια.51    
                                                                                                              
48  Leg.  779c7-­‐‑d2:  ταῦτα  δὲ  πάάντα  συνιδόόντες  ταῖς  χρείίαις  οἱ  νοµμοφύύλακες  ἐπινοµμοθετούύντων  καὶ  
τῶν   ἄλλων   ὁπόόσα   ἂν   ὁ   νόόµμος   ἐκλείίπῃ   δι᾿   ἀπορίίαν,   “All   such   details—and   all   else   that   the  
lawgiver  is  unable  to  deal  with  and  omits—the  lawguards  shall  regulate  by  supplementary  decrees,  
taking  account  of   the  practical   requirements”   (transl.  BURY,   adapted).  The   law  cannot   foresee   the  
needs  (χρείίαι)  that  will  arise.  Cf.  ENGLAND  ad  loc.  
49  Suitable  and  adequate  regulations  concerning  import  and  export  (νόόµμους  δὲ  περὶ  τούύτων  …  τοὺς  
πρέέποντάάς  τε  καὶ  ἱκανούύς)  (847d1-­‐‑7);  the  lawguards,  ἀγορανόόµμοι  and  ἀστυνόόµμοι  are  to  designate  
suitable   places   (ἕδρας   πρεπούύσας,   849e5)   for   the   exchange   of   goods   for   money   and  money   for  
goods   (849e1-­‐‑6);   the   ἀγορανόόµμοι   and   lawguards   are   to   be   informed   about   the   adulterations   and  
malpractices  of  the  vendors  by  those  experienced  in  them  (πυθόόµμενοι  τῶν  ἐµμπείίρων  περὶ  ἕκαστα,  
917e4),  and  to  write  down  rules  for  what  vendors  must  do  and  what  not  (917e2-­‐‑918a5);  legislation  is  
explicitly   deferred   to   the   ἀστυνόόµμοι   (918a1-­‐‑5);   the   lawguards   are   to   hold   a  meeting   about   retail  
trading  together  with  all   those  experienced  in  every  branch  of  retail   trading  (µμετὰ  τῶν  ἐµμπείίρων  
ἑκάάστης  καπηλείίας)  (920b7-­‐‑c1).  
50  Leg.  917e2-­‐‑918a5:  τὰ  δὲ  κιβδηλεύύµματάά  τε  καὶ  κακουργίίας  τῶν  πωλούύντων  οἵ  τε  ἀγορανόόµμοι  καὶ  
οἱ   νοµμοφύύλακες,   πυθόόµμενοι   τῶν   ἐµμπείίρων  περὶ   ἕκαστα,   ἀναγραψάάντων  ἅ   τε   χρὴ  ποιεῖν   τὸν  
πωλοῦντα  καὶ  ἃ  µμήή,   καὶ  πρόόσθε   τοῦ  ἀγορανοµμίίου  θέέντων   ἐν  στήήλῃ  γράάψαντες  νόόµμους   εἶναι  
τοῖς  περὶ  τὴν  τῆς  ἀγορᾶς  χρείίαν  µμηνυτὰς  σαφεῖς.  τὰ  δὲ  περὶ  τῶν  ἀστυνόόµμων  ἐν  τοῖς  πρόόσθεν  
ἱκανῶς   εἴρηται·∙   ἐὰν   δέέ   τι   προσδεῖν   δοκῇ,   νοµμοφύύλαξιν   ἐπανακοινώώσαντες   καὶ   γράάψαντες   τὸ  
δοκοῦν   ἐκλιπεῖν,   εἰς   ἀστυνόόµμιον   θέέντων   ἐν   στήήλῃ   τάά   τε   πρῶτα   καὶ   τὰ   δεύύτερα   τεθέέντα  
αὐτοῖσιν  τῆς  ἀρχῆς  νόόµμιµμα.  “Touching  acts  of  fraud  and  wrongful  acts  done  by  sellers,  the  market-­‐‑
stewards  and  the  lawguards,  after  making  enquiry  from  experts  in  each  trade,  shall  write  out  rules  
as  to  what  the  seller  ought  to  do  or  avoid  doing,  and  shall  post  them  up  on  a  pillar  in  front  of  the  
stewards’  office,  to  serve  as  written  laws  and  clear  instructors  for  those  engaged  in  business  in  the  
market.  The  duties  of  the  city-­‐‑stewards  have  been  fully  stated  already;  in  case  any  addition  seems  to  
be   required,   they   shall   inform   the   lawguards,   and  write  out  what   seems   to  be  wanting;  and   they  
shall   post   up   on   the   pillar   at   the   city-­‐‑stewards’   office   both   the   primary   and   the   secondary  
regulations  pertaining  to  their  office”  (transl.  BURY,  adapted).  
51   Leg.   855d1-­‐‑4.  Cf.   876a3-­‐‑876d4:   the   discretion   left   to   the   judges   depends   on   their   quality.   Some  
things  may  be  left  to  the  δικαστήήρια  (dependent  on  their  quality),  whereas  some  must  be  laid  down  
in  laws  by  the  lawgiver  himself  (αὐτῷ).  The  lawgiver  must  τὸ  περιγραφήήν  τε  καὶ  τοὺς  τύύπους  τῶν  
τιµμωριῶν   εἰπόόντας,   δοῦναι   τὰ   παραδείίγµματα   τοῖσι   δικασταῖς   τοῦ   µμήήδεποτε   βαίίνειν   ἔξω   τῆς  
δίίκης   (876e1).  See  SAUNDERS   (2001),  89;  SCHÖPSDAU   (2011)  ad   loc.,  MORROW  (1960)  243:  “law   itself  
pretends   to   give   only   an   illustrative   sample   from   the   multitude   of   circumstances   in   which   the  
magistrates   are   expected   to   administer   reproof,   correction,   and   punishment”.   For   the   relation  
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   In  religious  matters,  the  νοµμοφύύλακες  are  to  collaborate  with  the  various  
religious  officials.  In  order  to  draw  up  a  sacrificial  calendar  for  the  new  colony,  
for   instance,   the   expounders   (ἐξηγηταίί),   priests   (ἱερεῖς),   priestesses   (ἱέέρειαι),  
and   diviners   (µμάάντεις,   cf.   µμετὰ   τῶν   ἐκ   Δελφῶν   µμαντειῶν,   828a2)   must,  
together   with   the   lawguards   (µμετὰ   νοµμοφυλάάκων),   regulate   the   things   that  
have   necessarily   been   left   out   by   the   lawgiver   (ἃ   παραλείίπειν   ἀνάάγκη   τῷ  
νοµμοθέέτῃ,   828b5).52   Moreover,   it   is   at   the   discretion   of   those   same   religious  
officials   to   decide   where   the   laws   need   supplementation   (καὶ   δὴ   καὶ   αὐτοῦ  
τούύτου   χρὴ   γίίγνεσθαι   ἐπιγνώώµμονας   τοῦ   παραλειποµμέένου   τούύτους   τοὺς  
αὐτούύς,   828b5-­‐‑7).   Contrary   to   what   has   often   been   assumed,   the   supposed  
immutability  of  the  laws  in  the  future  is  not  a  sign  of  their  divine  origin.53  The  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
between   lawgiver   and   judge,   see   also   933c3,   934b7.   Greek   legislation   in   general   is   distinct   from  
Roman  and  modern  legal  systems  in  being  procedural  rather  than  substantive:  WILLETTS  (1977),  165  
(“Greek   law,  as  compared  with  Roman   law,   is  undefinitive  and  untidy”);  CARTLEDGE,  MILLETT  &  
TODD  (1990),  1-­‐‑12.  GAGARIN  (2005):  Greek  legislation  is  unusual  “not  because  gaps  are  present,  but  
because  the  Greeks  explicitly  recognize  gaps  and  are  willing  to  tolerate  them.  Instead  of  striving  to  
find  rules  to  fill  the  gaps  in  this  legislation,  laws  in  several  poleis  specify  that  judges  or  jurors  should  
judge   cases   not   covered   by   the   laws   ‘according   to   the   view   that   is   most   just   (γνώώµμῃ   τῇ  
δικαιοτάάτῃ)’,   or   some   variation   of   this   Athenian   expression”,   ibid.,   35.   Cf.   the   legislation   from  
Eresus,  Naupactus  and  Gortyn  cited  by  SEALEY   ([1994],  51-­‐‑52)   (but  see  GAGARIN’s  criticism  about  
SEALEY’s  partial  misinterpretation  of  the  law  from  Gortyn).  For  gaps  in  the  legislation  at  Gortyn,  see  
GAGARIN  ibid.,  36  n.  16.    
52   In   cases   of   homicide,   the   lawgiver   himself   may   easily   demonstrate   (ῥᾴδιον   ἀποφαίίνεσθαι  
νοµμοθέέτῃ)   that   the   prosecution   of   a   person   who   fails   to   exact   retribution   for   the   premeditated  
murder   of   a   relative   must   take   place   through   certain   prayers   and   sacrifices   to   certain   gods;  
however,  who  these  gods  are  and  which  procedure  of  bringing  such  cases  to  court  is  most  correct  
with  respect  to  the  divine  (τίίς  ὁ  τρόόπος  …  ὀρθόότατα  πρὸς  τὸ  θεῖον  ἂν  γιγνόόνεµμος  εἴη)  ought  to  be  
legislated   for  by   lawguards   together  with  expounders,  diviners,   and   the  god   (νοµμοφύύλακες  µμετ᾿  
ἐξηγητῶν  καὶ  µμάάντεων  καὶ  τοῦ  θεοῦ,  871c8-­‐‑d1).  The  priests  have  the  authority  to  judge  claims  by  
or   against   music   tourists   (who   come   to   the   city   for   the   performances   at   festivals)   up   to   fifty  
drachmae;  a  greater  claim  is  to  be  taken  to  the  ἀγορανόόµμοι  (953a3-­‐‑b5).  The  ἐξηγηταίί,  διδάάσκαλοι  
and  νοµμοθέέται  also  have  a  role  in  the  re-­‐‑education  of  criminals  (964b8-­‐‑c4).    
53  Whether  the  laws  are  really  immutable,  is  disputed;  see  BOBONICH  (2002),  400-­‐‑408.  The  import  of  
the  unchangeability  of  the  laws  thus  does  not  corroborate  scholars’  claim  that  the  laws  are  founded  
on  divine   authority.   See   STALLEY   (1983),   81-­‐‑82;   BRUNT   (1993),   249;  NIGHTINGALE   (1999a),   121:   “In  
Magnesia  (…)  the  laws  are  the  product  of  divine  wisdom”;  KLOSKO  (2006),  250-­‐‑251,  256-­‐‑257,  “Plato  
intends  the  laws  in  Magnesia  to  have  the  rigidity  of  a  theocracy”,  (257).  BRUNT  and  MORROW  (1953),  
244-­‐‑245   connect   the   invariability   of   the   laws   with   the   alleged   requirement   in   Leg.   713-­‐‑714   that  
“positive  law  ought  to  be  modelled  on  divine  law  (…)  [that]  will  then  ensure  the  true  welfare  of  the  
citizens.  (…)  Everywhere  Plato  [sic!]  tacitly  assumes  that  he  himself  apprehends  the  divine  law  and  
can  embody  it  in  his  code”  (244).  
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provisions  for  future  legislation,  including  the  provisions  for  rendering  the  laws  
immutable,   are   informed   by   purely   pragmatic   considerations;   the   laws   are   to  
become   immutable   only   after   a   due   period   of   testing;   they   are   not   immutable  
laws  from  the  beginning  because  they  have  been  given  to  humans  by  a  god.  It  is  
simply  nonsensical  to  keep  changing  laws  all  the  time.    
   Also  involved  in  legislation  are  the  prize  winners  in  the  competitions  for  
virtue:   these   people   have   been   supremely   educated   in   the   polis’   own  
educational   system.54   In   Laws,   authority   within   the   polis   is   related   to,   and  
depends  on,  experience  (ἐµμπειρίία).  Like  the  elderly  citizens,55  the  prize  winners  
are  an  internal  authority.  The  elders  are  most  experienced  with  the  polis’  notion  
of  ἀρετήή;  the  prize  winners  are  superior  performers.  The  requirement  of  having  
practical   experience   with   the   kind   of   issues   of   which   one   is   in   charge   also  
emerges   from   the   requirement   that   those   who   act   as   judges   in   cases   of  
woundings   inflicted   by   one’s   children,   ought   to   be   over   60   years   of   age   and  
have   children  of   their  own   (not   adopted  ones!).56  The   supervisor  of   education  
must  also  have  children  of  his  own.57    
  
                                                                                                              
54  Leg.  919d3-­‐‑e9.  We  may  think  back  to  the  Athenian’s  description  of  paideia  in  virtue  in  Book  I,  see  
chapter  three,  p.  99.  Also,  the  composers  of  poetry  should  have  distinguished  themselves  by  noble  
deeds  (829c6-­‐‑e4)):  they  have  to  be  τίίµμιοι  ἐν  τῇ  πόόλει.  This  is  more  important  than  technical  skills.    
55  Leg.  659c9-­‐‑d4   (the  Athenian):  Δοκεῖ  µμοι  τρίίτον  ἢ  τέέταρτον  ὁ  λόόγος  εἰς  ταὐτὸν  περιφερόόµμενος  
ἥκειν,  ὡς  ἄρα  παιδείία  µμέέν  ἐσθ᾿  ἡ  παίίδων  ὁλκήή  τε  καὶ  ἀγωγὴ  πρὸς  τὸν  ὑπὸ  τοῦ  νόόµμου  λόόγον  
ὀρθὸν   εἰρηµμέένον,   καὶ   τοῖς   ἐπιεικεστάάτοις   καὶ   πρεσβυτάάτοις   δι᾿   ἐµμπειρίίαν   συνδεδογµμέένον   ὡς  
ὄντως  ὀρθόός  ἐστιν,  “This  is,  I  imagine,  the  third  or  fourth  time  that  our  discourse  has  described  a  
circle   and   come   back   to   this   same   point—namely,   that   education   is   the   process   of   drawing   and  
guiding  children  towards  that  principle  which  is  pronounced  right  by  the  law  and  which  the  most  
decent   and   eldest   people   all   consider   correct   on   the   basis   of   their   experience”   (transl.   Bury,  
adapted).  For  a  discussion  of  the  term  ἐπιεικέές  from  Homer  to  Aristotle,  see  SAUNDERS  (2001).  
56  Leg.  878e5-­‐‑7:  ἐκγόόνοις  δὲ  πρὸς  γονέέας  εἶναι  τῶν  τοιούύτων  τραυµμάάτων  δικαστὰς  µμὲν  τοὺς  ὑπὲρ  
ἑξήήκοντα   ἔτη   γεγονόότας   ἐπάάναγκες,   οἷς   ἂν   παῖδες   µμὴ   ποιητοίί,   ἀληθινοὶ   δέέ,   ὦσιν,   “When  
woundings  of   this  kind  shall  be   inflicted  by  children  on  parents,   the   judges  shall  be,  of  necessity,  
over  sixty  years  of  age  who  have  genuine,  and  not  merely  adopted,  children  of  their  own”  (transl.  
BURY).  
57  For  the  supervisor  of  education,  see  Leg.  811d5,  812e10,  829d4,  964c4.  
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Rel ig ious   choruses   o f   boys   and  g ir ls   
The   first   laws   formulated   are   those   governing   a   certain   type   of   religious  
festivals  (771a5ff.).58  These  festivals  take  place  both  on  the  level  of  the  tribe  and  
on   the   lower   level   of   the   twelve   communities   of   which   each   tribe   consists.59  
Such  particular  religious  festivals  are  not  an  arbitrary  starting  point  for  the  law  
code,   since   one   of   their   functions   is   to   provide   young   boys   and   girls   with  
opportunities  to  find  a  suitable  marriage  partner  (771e1ff.).  And  since  marriage  
is   necessary   for   procreation,   and  procreation   forms   the   start   of   a   new  human  
life,  the  regulations  about  forming  partnerships  are  logically  aimed  at  begetting  
new  citizens.  As  explained  in  chapter  one,  the  law  code  follows  to  a  large  extent  
the   human   life   cycle   from   cradle   to   grave.60   Laws   and   life   are,   however,   not  
entirely   co-­‐‑extensive:   the   law   code   begins   with   festivals   that   may   lead   to   a  
suitable  marriage,  and  after  death  continues  with  a  discussion  of  burial  rituals,  
bequests,   testaments   and   some   miscellaneous   topics.   A   scope   that   extends  
beyond   the   life  of   a   single  human  being   leads   to  a  broader  perspective  of   the  
law  code  on  humankind  and  its  mode  of  life;  it  is  exactly  this  larger  perspective  
on  humans  as  a  kind  that  is  characteristic  of  the  Laws  in  general.61    
   In  the  context  of  these  festivals,  it  is  made  explicit  that  some  things  have  
not  been  settled,  and  we  hear  explicit  instructions  about  future  lawgiving.  First,  
the   supervisors   (ἐπιµμελητάάς),   organizers   (κοσµμητάάς)   and   the   rulers   of   the  
choruses  (τοὺς  τῶν  χορῶν  ἄρχοντας)  are  appointed  as  lawgivers  together  with  
the   lawguards   (γίίγνεσθαι   καὶ   νοµμοθέέτας   µμετὰ   τῶν   νοµμοφυλάάκων).62   These  
                                                                                                              
58   The   law   mentioned   in   666a3   (ἆρ᾿   οὐ   νοµμοθετήήσοµμεν   πρῶτον   µμέέν   κτλ.)   about   the   complete  
abstinence  from  wine  of  those  under  eighteen  is  not  part  of  the  διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων.  
59  Leg.  771d3-­‐‑e1.  
60  See  above,  p.  39,  and  n.  135  on  p.  40.  
61  Cf.  the  description  of  human  civilization  at  large  as  a  cycle  in  Laws  Book  III.  
62  Leg.  772a4-­‐‑6.  
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must   settle   all   of   the   things   that   the   interlocutors   leave   open   (ὅσον  ἂν   ἡµμεῖς  
ἐκλείίπωµμεν,  772a6).63  The  Athenian  continues,  772a6-­‐‑c4:  
ἀναγκαῖον   δέέ,   ὅπερ   εἴποµμεν,   περὶ   τὰ   τοιαῦτα   πάάντα   ὅσα   σµμικρὰ   καὶ  
πολλὰ  νοµμοθέέτην  µμὲν   ἐκλείίπειν,   τοὺς   δ’   ἐµμπείίρους  ἀεὶ   κατ’   ἐνιαυτὸν  
γιγνοµμέένους   αὐτῶν,   ἀπὸ   τῆς   χρείίας   µμανθάάνοντας,   τάάττεσθαι   καὶ  
ἐπανορθουµμέένους  κινεῖν  κατ’   ἐνιαυτόόν,  ἕως  ἂν  ὅρος   ἱκανὸς  δόόξῃ  τῶν  
τοιούύτων   νοµμίίµμων   καὶ   ἐπιτηδευµμάάτων   γεγονέέναι.   χρόόνος   µμὲν   οὖν  
µμέέτριος  ἅµμα  καὶ  ἱκανὸς  γίίγνοιτ’  ἂν  τῆς  ἐµμπειρίίας  δεκαετηρὶς  θυσιῶν  τε  
καὶ  χορειῶν,  ἐπὶ  πάάντα  καὶ  ἕκαστα  ταχθείίς,  ζῶντος  µμὲν  τοῦ  τάάξαντος  
νοµμοθέέτου  κοινῇ,  τέέλος  δὲ  σχόόντος,  αὐτὰς  ἑκάάστας  τὰς  ἀρχὰς  εἰς  τοὺς  
νοµμοφύύλακας   εἰσφερούύσας   τὸ   παραλειπόόµμενον   τῆς   αὑτῶν   ἀρχῆς  
ἐπανορθοῦσθαι,   µμέέχριπερ   ἂν   τέέλος   ἔχειν   ἕκαστον   δόόξῃ   τοῦ   καλῶς  
ἐξειργάάσθαι,  τόότε  δὲ  ἀκίίνητα  θεµμέένους,  ἤδη  χρῆσθαι  µμετὰ  τῶν  ἄλλων  
νόόµμων  οὓς  ἔταξε  κατ᾿  ἀρχὰς  ὁ  θεὶς  αὐτοῖς  νοµμοθέέτης·∙  
It  is,  as  we  said,  necessary  that  in  regard  to  all  matters  involving  a  host  of  
petty   details   the   lawgiver   should   leave   omissions,   and   that   rules   and  
amendments   should   be   made   from   year   to   year   by   those   who   have  
constant  experience  of  them  from  year  to  year  and  are  taught  by  practice,  
until   it  be  decided  that  a  satisfactory  code  has  been  made  out  to  regulate  
all   such   proceedings.   A   fair   and   sufficient   period   to   assign   for   such  
experimental  work  would  be  ten  years,  both  for  sacrifices  and  for  dances  
in  all  their  several  details;  each  body  of  officials,  acting  in  conjunction  with  
the  original   lawgiver,   if  he  be  still  alive,  or  by   themselves,   if  he  be  dead,  
shall   report   to   the   Law-­‐‑wardens   whatever   is   omitted   in   their   own  
department,   and   shall   make   it   good,   until   each   detail   seems   to   have  
reached  its  proper  completion:   this  done,   they  shall  decree   them  as   fixed  
rules,  and  employ  them  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  laws  originally  decreed  
by  the  lawgiver.  (Transl.  BURY)  
This  is  the  first  time  that  the  painting  terminology  is  applied  to,  and  interpreted  
in,   a   concrete   case   of   legislation:   it   is   necessary   (ἀναγκαῖον64)   that   other  
lawgivers  will  settle  (τάάττεσθαι)  all  those  numerous  small  things  that  the  first  
lawgiver   leaves  open   (τὰ  τοιαῦτα  πάάντα  ὅσα  σµμικρὰ  καὶ  πολλὰ  νοµμοθέέτην  
µμὲν  ἐκλείίπειν,  772a7-­‐‑b1).  The  original   lawgiver  will  draw  an  outline   (implicit  
                                                                                                              
63  The  Athenian  again  implicitly  identifies  themselves  with  the  first  lawgiver  by  switching  from  the  
first  person  plural  (ἐκλείίπωµμεν  τάάττοντες  in  772a6)  to  the  neutral  νοµμοθέέτης  in  772b1.  
64  Cf.  ἀνάάγκη,  769d6,  770b6.  
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in   ἐκλείίπειν);   the   officials   in   charge   of   the   festivals   (τούύς   δ᾿   in   772b1,   αὐτὰς  
ἑκάάστας  τὰς  ἀρχάάς  in  772c1)  will  then  fill  in  what  is  left  open.    
   In  this  context,  we  hear  more  specifically  how  the  remaining  lacunae  are  
actually  to  be  filled  in.  The  ἐπιµμεληταίί,  κοσµμηταίί,  etc.  in  charge  of  the  festivals  
are   to   be   made   lawgivers   together   with   the   lawguards.   As   specialized  
officials—in  the  sense  of  familiar  with  a  certain  area  of  social  life—they  acquire  
experience   with   every   new   year   that   passes   (τοὺς   δ᾿   ἐµμπείίρους   ἀεὶ   κατ᾿  
ἐνιαυτὸν  γιγνοµμέένους  αὐτῶν65,  772b1-­‐‑2).  They   learn  from  different  situations  
and   needs   (ἀπὸ   τῆς   χρείίας   µμανθάάνοντας).   The   officials   will   formulate   new  
rules   and   amend   existing   ones   (τάάττεσθαι   καὶ   ἐπανορθουµμέένους   κινεῖν,  
772b3)   every   year   (κατ᾿   ἐνιαυτόόν,   772b3).   Later   lawgivers   are   necessary  
because   the   supplementation   of   the   law   code   requires   experience   with   the  
practicalities   (τοὺς  δ᾿  ἐµμπείίρους  770b1;  ἐµμπειρίία   in  770b6;  cf.  ἀπὸ  τῆς  χρείίας  
µμανθάάνοντας  in  b2).    
   This   explains   in   retrospect  why   the   painter-­‐‑analogy   underscores   that   a  
certain  period  of   time   is  necessary  before   the  painting   can  be   finished.   In   this  
case,  the  interlocutors  actually  stipulate  an  appropriate  period  beforehand:  ten  
years   will   be   a   period   of   appropriate   measure   (µμέέτριος,   i.e.,   “reasonable”,  
neither  excessively  long,  nor  too  short)  and  of  sufficient  length  (ἱκανόός)  to  gain  
experience  with   sacrifices   and   choruses   (χρόόνος  …   τῆς   ἐµμπειρίίας   θυσιῶν   τε  
καὶ  χορειῶν).66    
   As   long  as   the  original   lawgiver   is  still  alive,  he  will   join   the   officials   in  
making  new  laws  (κοινῇ,  772c1).  After  his  demise,   the  officials  presiding  over  
                                                                                                              
65  αὐτῶν  is  very  unspecific:  with  what  have  these  officials  become  experienced?  Cf.  BOBONICH  (2002),  
who  notes  that  it  is  “idle”  to  search  in  the  text  for  an  exact  answer  to  questions  like  “Exactly  what  
officials  should  be  involved  in  each  kind  of  change  and  how  does  the  procedure  work?  Where  can  
the  proposals  for  change  originate?  If  the  Assembly  is  involved,  does  it  need  to  approve  by  a  simple  
majority  of  those  present  and  voting  or  is  a  super-­‐‑majority  required?  If  the  latter,  how  high  is  it?  In  
the  offices  that  must  approve,  does  Plato  include,  e.g.,  the  select  judges?  The  city  wardens?”  (399)  
66  For  other  suggestions  of  a  trial  phase:  e.g.  846c5-­‐‑7:  καὶ  τῆς  ἀναγκαίίας  αὐτῶν  χρείίας  ἐµμπείίρως  
ἴσχοντες,  µμέέχριπερ  ἂν  πάάντα  ἱκανῶς  δόόξῃ  κεῖσθαι  (discussed  below).  Concerning  the  regulation  
of  the  thorny  domain  of  sexual  conduct:  if  the  interlocutors’  first  law  about  sexual  conduct  does  not  
work,  an  alternative  law  must  be  made  instead  (840e2-­‐‑842a3).    
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the   choruses   must   themselves   (αὐτὰς   ἕκαστας   τὰς   ἀρχάάς)   entrust   the  
lawguards  with   that   part   left   open  within   their   own   jurisdictional   sphere   (τὸ  
παραλειπόόµμενον  τῆς  αὑτῶν  ἀρχῆς,  772c2-­‐‑3).  The  filling  in  of  these  gaps  is  to  
continue   until   every   aspect   (ἕκαστον   sc.   τὸ   παραλειπόόµμενον)   is   believed   to  
have  reached  the  “end  of  having  been  completed  in  a  fine  way”  (µμέέχριπερ  ἂν  
τέέλος   ἔχειν   ἕκαστον   δόόξῃ   τοῦ  καλῶς   ἐξειργάάσθαι,   772c3-­‐‑4;   cf.   ἕως  ἂν  ὅρος  
δόόξῃ   τῶν   τοιούύτων   νοµμίίµμων   καὶ   ἐπιτηδευµμάάτων,   772b3-­‐‑4).   The   τέέλος   τοῦ  
καλῶς   ἐξειργάάσθαι   and   ὅρος   of   the   laws   depends   on   δόόξα.   It   is   not   made  
explicit  whose  δόόξα  it  is,  but  it  is  presumably  the  δόόξα  of  the  officials  involved  
in   the   lawgiving.   The   final   result   is   a   product   of   agreement   on   pragmatic  
grounds:   it   depends   on   the   conviction   of   those   involved   rather   than   on   some  
external  criterion  (such  as  likeness  to  a  model).67  
   When   the   end   (ὅρος,   τέέλος)   has   been   reached,   the   regulations  must   be  
made   unchangeable   (τόότε   δὲ   ἀκίίνητα   θεµμέένους).68   However,   change   is—at  
least   in   this   case—not   completely   excluded.69   After   this   ten-­‐‑year-­‐‑period,  
changes  can  still  be  made.  The  impulse  has  to  come  from  practice  itself:  when  it  
is   believed   that   a   need   for   change   arises,   εἰ   …   τις   ἀνάάγκη   δόόξειε   (772c7).70  
                                                                                                              
67  Amendment  is  therefore  not  the  imitation  of  some  ideal  or  pattern  world,  contra  MORROW  (1960),  
584-­‐‑585;   cf.   570-­‐‑571.   Cf.   ZELLER   (1839),   29:   “nicht   der   Begriff   des   Staats   ist   es,   aus   welchem   die  
einzelnen  Bestimmungen  hervorgehen,  sondern  ganz  wie  in  einer  positiven  Gesetzgebung  werden  
dieselben  einzelnen  auseinandergereiht,  und  eben  so  vereinzelt  und  empirisch  begründet.”  
68  For  the  proverbial  phrase  µμὴ  κινεῖν  τὰ  ἀκίίνητα,  see  Leg.  684e1,  843a1  (of  the  boundary-­‐‑marks  of  
someone’s  land),  913b9  (of  another  person’s  possessions).  
69  For  procedure  of  νοµμοθεσίία  and  amending  laws  at  Athens:  TODD  (1993)  for  the  claim  that  after  
the  restoration  of   the  democracy   (in  403/2),  nomoi  “were   for   the   first   time  distinguished  from  and  
given  a  privileged  status  over  psêphismata  (decrees),  such  that  no  decree  could  in  future  overrule  a  
law”  (294-­‐‑295).  In  the  second  half  of  the  fifth  century  the  previously  unlimited  legislative  capacity  of  
the  assembly  was  substituted  with  the  power  only  to  pass  psêphismata,  while  the  creation  of  nomoi  
was  reserved  to  a  separate  body  of  nomothetai,  while  the  assembly  could  only  initiate  the  procedure.    
70  Whether   this  procedure   for  making  amendments  pertains  only   to   these   religious   festivals  or   to  
laws  in  general  is  contested.  AST  was  the  first  to  argue  for  a  more  general  reading  and  proposed  to  
delete  θυσιῶν  τε  καὶ  χορειῶν.  This  was  countered  by  RITTER  (1896),  171,  who  rightly  argued  that  
the   involvement   of   the   µμαντεῖαι   θεῶν   in   the   procedure   points   to   the   narrow   reading   (the   same  
argument   is  made  by  SCHÖPSDAU  [2003],  449,  and  BOBONICH  [2002],  396,  with  reference  to  RITTER  
and   ENGLAND).   The   general   reading   is   adopted   by  MORROW   (1953),   245;   GUTHRIE   V   (1978),   368;  
KLOSKO   (2006),   250-­‐‑251;   COHEN   (1993),   314;   BRUNT   (1993),   250;   ZUCKERT   (2009),   115.   For   the  
narrower  reading  have  argued  ENGLAND  ad  772b6;  MORROW  (1960),  571  n.  54;  STALLEY  (1983),  82;  
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Again,  it  is  not  made  explicit  whose  δόόξα  this  is.  This  vagueness  is  inherent  in  
the   nature   of   lawgiving:   it   cannot   be   foreseen   how   need   for   changes   will  
appear;   and,   in   any   case,   it   seems   that   anyone   might   signal   the   need   for   a  
change.    
   The   Athenian   is   explicit   about   the   procedure   to   be   followed   once   the  
proposal  for  a  change  in  the  laws  has  been  put  forward:  all  officials,  the  whole  
dêmos  and  all  the  oracles  of  the  gods  must  be  consulted,  and  only  if  the  vote  is  
unanimous   in   favour   of   change,  must   the   law   be   amended   (ἐὰν   συµμφωνῶσι  
πάάντες,   772d2).71   The   participation   of   the   entire   citizenry   in   changing   these  
laws  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  law  concerns  festivals  in  which  all  citizens  
are  involved,  and  that  are  crucial  for  channelling  the  social  interaction  between  
the  citizens  (this  may  be  the  reason  why  all  the  oracles  are  consulted  as  well).72    
  
Detai ls   o f    the   music    f es t iva ls   
Although  most  musical  topics  have  been  dealt  with  exhaustively,  some  matters,  
such   as   regulations   concerning   the   rhapsodes   and   their   retinue   and   the   stock  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
BOBONICH  (2002),  396  (cf.  573,  nn.  63  and  64,  and  for  other  references  see   ibid.,  573  n.  62).   In  some  
other   instances   the  nomophylakes   are   involved   (…)In   any   case,   SCHÖPSDAU’s   comment   ibid.   seems  
reasonable:  “Da  aber  Platon  auch  in  andern  Fällen  zunächst  eine  Zeit  der  Erprobung  und  dann  eine  
endgültige  Fixierung  von  Gesetzbestimmungen  vorsieht  (vgl.  846b-­‐‑d,  957b),  erscheint  eine  analoge  
Anwendung   der   hier   gegebenen   Vorschriften   auf   den   gesamten   Kodex   zumindest   Platons  
Intentionen  zu  entsprechen;  der  Passus  wäre  dann  ein  Nachtrag  zu  den  allgemeinen  Ausführungen  
über  die  Ergänzung  des  Gesetzeskodex  in  770b-­‐‑771a,  auf  die  hier  772a6-­‐‑7  (”es  ist  jedoch,  wie  gesagt,  
unvermeidlich…”)  zurückverwesen  wird.”    
71  MORROW   (1960),   571   argues   that   none   of   these   bodies  may  object,   rather   than,   literally,   “every  
member   of   the   people”;   cf.   BOBONICH   (2002),   396-­‐‑397.   SCHÖPSDAU   (2003),   450,   notes   that  
“Gesetzestheoretiker[n]”   saw   the   introduction  of   new   laws   as   καινοτοµμίία,   a   term  with  distinctly  
negative  connotations,  while  the  expression  ἐπανορθοῦν  τοὺς  νόόµμους  common  in  Athens  suggests  
that   “das   Ziel   der   Neueinführung   von   Gesetzen   [ist]   die   Verbesserung   des   bestehenden  
Gesetzeskodex”.      
72  There  is  no  hint  in  this  passage  that  the  protection  of  the  laws  against  changes  is  connected  with  a  
desire   to  maintain   a   close   relation   between   colony   and  metropolis,   as   it   becomes   apparent   from  
many  foundation  decrees.  For  Cyrene,  Naupactus  and  Brea,  see  GRAHAM  (1964),  60-­‐‑61,  67-­‐‑68.  In  the  
case  of  Naupactus   (a   colony  of  Opus)   and  Brea   (a   colony  of  Athens)   for   instance,   the   foundation  
decrees  show  that  a  change  in  the  laws  would  have  to  be  agreed  upon  by  both  the  colony  and  the  
mother  city.  In  the  case  of  Brea,  the  Athenians  deny  themselves  the  right  to  initiate  changes  (ibid.,  
60-­‐‑61).    
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chorus-­‐‑competitions   at   religious   festivals,   have   to   be  postponed   to   some   later  
moment   (τόότε),73   namely   when   the   respective   days,   months   and   years   have  
been  allocated  to  the  gods  and  the  frequency  of  the  festivals  and  their  intervals  
is   clear.74   The   determination   of   the   exact   date   and   program   for   these   choral  
contests  befalls  the  “regulators  of  the  games”  (ἀθλοθεταίί),  “the  educator  of  the  
young”  (παιδευτὴς  τῶν  νέέων)  and  the  lawguards  (835a3-­‐‑4).  These  will  meet  in  
an   assembly   and   become   lawgivers   themselves   (εἰς   κοινὸν  …   συνελθόόντων  
καὶ  γενοµμέένων  νοµμοθετῶν  αὐτῶν,  835a4-­‐‑5).    
   The   first   lawgiver   has   already   stated  what   is   to   be   the   character   of   the  
choruses:   their   speech,   theirs   songs,   the   harmoniai   that   accompany   certain  
rhythms  and  dance-­‐‑movements.75  The  second  lawgivers  ought  to  follow  in  the  
footsteps   of   the   first   lawgiver   (καθ᾿   ἃ   …   µμεταδιώώκοντας   δεῖ   νοµμοθετεῖν,  
835b2).   The   latter   instruction   is   not   unique   to   this   case;   as   the   Athenian  
repeatedly   makes   explicit,   the   second   lawgivers   must   take   the   τύύποι   or  
intention(s)   (βουλήήµματα,   νοῦς)   of   the   first   lawgiver   as   their   guideline.76   The  
matters   about  which   the   later   lawgivers   have   to   decide   (and   cannot   fail)   are:  
when   the   choral   contests   are   to   be   held,   who   is   to   perform,   and   who   is   to  
                                                                                                              
73  Leg.  834e2-­‐‑835a1.    
74  Leg.  834e5-­‐‑6:  ταχθέέντων  τοῖς  θεοῖς  τε  καὶ  τοῖς  µμετὰ  θεῶν  µμηνῶν  καὶ  ἡµμερῶν  καὶ  ἐνιαυτῶν.  
75  Leg.   835e7-­‐‑b2:   οἷα   δὲ   ἕκαστα  αὐτῶν   εἶναι   δεῖ   κατὰ  λόόγον  καὶ   κατ᾿  ᾠδὰς  καὶ   καθ᾿  ἁρµμονίίας  
ῥυθµμοῖς   κραθείίσας   καὶ   ὀρχήήσεσι,   πολλάάκις   εἴρηται   τῷ   πρώώτῳ   νοµμοθέέτῃ.   Πόόλλακις   refers   to  
“e.g.   at   798-­‐‑802”   (ENGLAND   ad   loc.).   Contrary   to   ENGLAND   ibid.,   δεύύτεροι   does   not   refer   to   “the  
committee”   (sc.   of   Cretan   legislators   of   which   Cleinias   is   part).   This   committee   is   again   in   the  
position  of   the   first   legislator.  The   second   lawgivers   are   the  officials   stipulated,  who  will   become  
lawgivers  themselves  to  finish  the  work  of  the  first  lawgiver.  
76  Cf.  802a5-­‐‑c4:   the   δοκιµμασταίί   are   to   select   from   the  many  old  musical   and  poetical  works   ‘that  
which  is  appropriate  and  fitting  to  the  consitution  under  construction’  (τῇ  καθισταµμέένῃ  πολιτείίᾳ  
τὸ  πρέέπον  καὶ  ἁρµμόόττον,  802a8-­‐‑b1).  To  arrive  at   their   selection   they  ought  not  be  guided  by   the  
poetic   powers   of   the   poets   and  musicians,   but   they   should   interpret   the  wishes   of   the   lawgiver  
(ἐξηγουµμέένους  δὲ  τὰ  τοῦ  νοµμοθέέτου  βουλεύύµματα,  802c2)  so  as   to  select  dance,  song  and  χορείία  
‘in   accordance   with   the   intention   of   those   [wishes]’   (κατὰ   τὸν   αὐτῶν   [sc.   βουλευµμάάτων]   νοῦν,  
802c4).  Ιn  816c1-­‐‑d2  it  is  said  that  the  first  lawgiver  ought  to  ‘expound  in  types’  (ἐξηγεῖσθαι  τύύποις)  
two  types  of  dance:  war-­‐‑dance  (πυρρίίχη)  and  peace-­‐‑dance  (ἐµμµμέέλεια),  which  the  second  lawgiver  
has  to  “search  for”  (ζητεῖν),  apparently  in  other  poleis,  and  “track  them  down”  (ἀνερευνησάάµμενον).  
In  846c4-­‐‑5  the  younger  lawgivers  are  to  “imitate”  the  laws  of  the  old  lawgiver  (οἱ  νέέοι  πρὸς  τὰ  τῶν  
πρόόσθεν  νοµμοθετήήµματα  ἀποµμιµμούύµμενοι).  
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accompany   the  performers   (τοῦ  τε  πόότε  καὶ   τίίνες  καὶ  µμετάά  τίίνων,   835a6).   In  
any  case,   it   is  not  difficult   to  know  how  things   like   these  ought   to  acquire   the  
form  of   law  (ταῦτα  …  καὶ  ἄλλα  τοιαῦτα  οὔτε  χαλεπὸν  γνῶναι  τίίνα  τρόόπον  
χρὴ  τάάξεως  ἐννόόµμου  λαγχάάνειν,  835b5-­‐‑6).  There  is  little  at  stake  here:  whether  
something  has   to   be   altered   again   afterwards   at   some  place   or   other,   is   of   no  
great  importance  (οὐδ᾿  αὖ  µμετατιθέέµμενα  ἔνθα  ἢ  ἔνθα  µμέέγα  τῇ  πόόλει  κέέρδος  ἢ  
ζηµμίίαν  ἂν  φέέροι,   835b6-­‐‑7).77  The  use  of   the  verb  λαγχάάνειν   (“obtain  by   lot”)  
reinforces  the  underlying  idea  of  minor  importance.78  Both  connotations  of  the  
lot  adduced  elsewhere  in  Laws,  that  it  does  not  matter  whether  x  or  y  is  selected,  
and  no   special   qualification   is   needed   to  make   the  decision,   are   present   here.  
The   interlocutors   merely   state   a   general   principle   at   this   stage:   it   is   to   be  
expected  that  the  future  musical  officials  will  offer  the  choruses  the  opportunity  
to  compete  in  turn  (χρὴ  προσδοκᾶν  κατὰ  µμέέρος  ἀγωνιεῖσθαι,  835a2-­‐‑3).79    
   Yet  in  a  domain  where  differences  do  matter,  and  where  it  is  difficult  to  
convince   (πείίθειν   τε   χαλεπόόν,   835c1),   there   is   need   of   an   exceptionally   bold  
person  (νῦν  δὲ  ἀνθρώώπου  τολµμηροῦ  κινδυνεύύει  δεῖσθαίί  τινος,  835c3-­‐‑4).  This  
                                                                                                              
77  Cf.   957a1-­‐‑3:  πάάντα  δ’  οὖν  ὁπόόσα  σµμικρὰ  καὶ  ῥᾴδια  νόόµμιµμα  εὑρίίσκειν,  πρεσβύύτου  νοµμοθέέτου  
παραλιπόόντος,   τὸν   νέέον   ἀναπληροῦν   χρὴ   νοµμοθέέτην.   “The   old   lawgiver,   however,   may   pass  
over  all  such  legal  observances  as  are  trivial  and  easy  of  discovery,  and  the  young  lawgiver  shall  fill  
up  his  omissions”  (transl.  BURY).  
78  The  verb  λαγχάάνειν  denotes  a  non-­‐‑complex  situation  in  which  (i)  there  is  no  difference  between  
the  items  or  people  from  whom  must  be  selected;  and  (ii)  it  does  not  require  special  insight  to  know  
what  is  to  be  done.  These  two  connotations  are  apparent  from  the  Athenian’s  theorizing  about  the  
equality   imposed   by   lot,   in   the   context   of   the   discussion   of   the   selection   procedure   of   the  
βουλευταίί,   especially   757b3-­‐‑5:   τὴν   µμὲν   ἑτέέραν   [sc.   ἰσόότητα]   εἰς   τὰς   τιµμὰς   πᾶσα   πόόλις   ἱκανὴ  
παραγαγεῖν  καὶ  πᾶς  νοµμοθέέτης,   τὴν  µμέέτρῳ   ἴσην  καὶ  σταθµμῷ  καὶ  ἀριθµμῷ,  κλήήρῳ  ἀπευθύύνων  
εἰς  τὰς  διανοµμὰς  αὐτήήν·∙  “The  one  of  these  [kinds  of  equality]  any  State  or  lawgiver  is  competent  to  
apply   in   the   assignment   of   honours,—namely,   the   equality   determined   by  measure,   weight   and  
number,—by  simply  employing  the  lot  to  give  even  results  in  the  distributions”  (transl.  BURY).  The  
lot,   which   comes   in   at   the   final   stage   of   the   selection   procedure   (757d5-­‐‑758a2),   constitutes   the  
application  of  the  second,  democratic  kind  of  equality.  
79   χρήή   (835b6)   expresses   another   kind   imperative   than   δεῖ   (835b1).   χρήή   in   general  pertains   to   the  
content   of   the   laws,   it   is   a   behavioural   norm.   δεῖ   on   the   other   hand   is   given   with   ἀνάάγκη   and  
pertains   to   things   that   cannot   be   changed.   That   the   lawgiver   is   mortal,   cannot   be   altered;   it   is  
therefore   necessary   that   he   appoints   successors,   and   it   is   in   the   same   range   that   the   second  
lawgivers   must   “follow   closely   after”   (µμεταδιώώκειν)   the   stipulations   of   the   first   lawgiver.   Cf.  
BERNADETE  (1965).  
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ominous  introduction  appears,  upon  Cleinias’  enquiry,  to  refer  to  the  rules  for  
sexual  conduct  (835d4  ff.;  cf.  ταῖς  µμεγίίσταισιν  ἐπιθυµμίίαις,  c7).  The  “man  with  
guts”   (ἄνθρωπος   τολµμηρόός)   will   state   without   inhibition   what   he   considers  
best  for  the  city  and  citizens  (τὰ  δοκοῦντα  ἄριστ᾿  εἶναι),  ordering  that  which  is  
appropriate   and   in   keeping  with   the   constitution   as   a  whole   (τὸ   πρέέπον   καὶ  
ἑπόόµμενον  πάάσῃ   τῇ  πολιτείίᾳ).80  He   does   not   orient   himself   towards   a   higher  
norm;  he  is  guided  by  τὸ  πρέέπον:  what  is  in  keeping  with  the  current  laws,  i.e.,  
by   what   has   been   laid   down   by   the   original   lawgiver.   In   dealing   with   the  
extremely   difficult   subject   of   sexual   passion,   he   has   no   other   human   as   his  
helper,   but  must   follow   his   own   reason   alone   (λόόγῳ   ἑπόόµμενος   µμόόνῳ  µμόόνος,  
835c8).81  Again,  we  meet  an  authority  figure  who  is  qualified  by,  and  within,  the  
educational   system   of   the   polis.   The   supreme  παιδευτήής,  who   is   in   charge   of  
paideia  as  a  whole,  is  himself  of  course  one  of  the  most  distinguished  citizens.    
  
Publ ic   courts   
Another  context  in  which  the  Athenian  defers  further  laws  to  the  interlocutors’  
successors   concerns   the   topic  of   the  public   courts.  While   it  does  not   receive   a  
separate  heading,  this  topic  is  addressed  at  several  points  in  the  lawgiving.  The  
courts   are   adduced   whenever   a   reference   to   them   is   necessary   because   of   a  
possible  transgression  of  the  law(s)  stipulated  immediately  before.    
   The   law  on  bringing   in   the  harvest   is  one  of   these  cases.  A  person  who  
brings   in  his   crop  may  do  so  by  any   route   that  pleases  him,  provided   that  he  
does   not   cause   damage   to   the   property   of   others.   This   train   of   thought   then  
receives   a   follow-­‐‑up:   the   Athenian   proceeds   to   stipulate   what   is   to   be   done  
when  damage  is  actually  inflicted.  What  is  to  be  done  depends  on  the  size  of  the  
damage;   if   the   damage   is   below   three   minas,   the   victim   must   report   to   the  
                                                                                                              
80  Cf.  783b3-­‐‑c4:  τοὺς  προσήήκοντας  (…)  καὶ  πρέέποντας  νόόµμους.  
81   About   the   παρρησίία   of   the   παιδευτήής   in   Laws   (compared   with   Socratic   παρρησίία),   see   VAN  
RAALTE  (2004),  308-­‐‑309.    
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magistrates  and  obtain  redress  from  them.  If   the  damage  exceeds  three  minas,  
the  victim  must  obtain  redress  from  the  culprit  by  taking  his  case  to  the  public  
court.  If  penalties  are   judged  in  a  biased  way,  the  official  must  be  liable  to  the  
victim  for  double  the  damage.  This,  in  turn,  is  reason  to  stipulate  a  general  rule:  
injustices   of  magistrates  may   be   brought   to   the   public   courts   by   anyone  who  
wishes   (τὰ   δὲ   αὖ   τῶν   ἀρχόόντων   ἀδικήήµματα   εἰς   τὰ   κοινὰ   δικαστήήρια  
ἐπανάάγειν  τὸν  βουλόόµμενον  ἑκάάστων  τῶν  ἐγκληµμάάτων,  846b4-­‐‑6).  The  details  
of   bringing   a   case   to   a   public   court   are   many,   and   they   cannot   be   left  
unlegislated   for,   but   they  are  not  worthy  of   the   attention  of   the  old   lawgiver,  
846b2-­‐‑c8:  
µμυρίία   δὲ   ταῦτα   ὄντα   καὶ   σµμικρὰ   νόόµμιµμα,   καθ’   ἃ   δεῖ   τὰς   τιµμωρίίας  
γίίγνεσθαι,  λήήξεώών  τε  πέέρι  δικῶν  καὶ  προσκλήήσεων  καὶ  κλητήήρων,  εἴτ’  
ἐπὶ   δυοῖν   εἴτ’   ἐφ’   ὁπόόσων   δεῖ   καλεῖσθαι,   καὶ   πάάντα   ὁπόόσα   τοιαῦτάά  
ἐστιν,  οὔτ’  ἀνοµμοθέέτητα  οἷόόν  τ’  εἶναι  γέέροντόός  τε  οὐκ  ἄξια  νοµμοθέέτου,  
νοµμοθετούύντων   δ’   αὐτὰ   οἱ   νέέοι   πρὸς   τὰ   τῶν   πρόόσθεν   νοµμοθετήήµματα  
ἀποµμιµμούύµμενοι,  σµμικρὰ  πρὸς  µμεγάάλα,  καὶ  τῆς  ἀναγκαίίας  αὐτῶν  χρείίας  
ἐµμπείίρως   ἴσχοντες,   µμέέχριπερ   ἂν   πάάντα   ἱκανῶς   δόόξῃ   κεῖσθαι·∙   τόότε   δὲ  
ἀκίίνητα  ποιησάάµμενοι,  ζώώντων  τούύτοις  ἤδη  χρώώµμενοι  µμέέτρον  ἔχουσι.  
And  since  there  are  countless  petty  cases  for  which  penalties  must  be  laid  
down,   concerning   written   complaints   and   citations   and   evidence   of  
citation,—whether   the   citation   requires   two   or  more  witnesses,—and   all  
matters   of   the   like   kind,—these   cases   cannot   be   left   without   legal  
regulation,   but   at   the   same   time   they  do  not  deserve   the   attention  of   an  
aged   lawgiver;   so   the   young   lawgivers   shall  make   laws   for   these   cases,  
modelling   their   small   rules   on   the   great   ones   of   our   earlier   enactments,  
and  learning  by  experience  how  far  they  are  necessary  in  practice,  until  it  
be   decided   that   they   are   all   adequately   laid   down;   and   then,   having  
permanently  fixed  them,  they  shall   live   in  the  practice  of   them,  now  that  
they  are  set  out  in  due  form.  (Transl.  BURY)  
   A   similar   passage   can   be   found   in   a   passage   in   Book   XI,   where   the  
Athenian  reflects  on  the  rationale  behind,  and  the  purpose  of,  paying  monetary  
fines  (ἔκτισις,  δίίκη).  Every  offender  who  harms  another  person,  either  by  theft  
or  violence,  must,  in  addition  to  the  indemnity  paid  to  the  victim,  complete  an  
additional   payment   (δίίκην   …   συνεποµμέένην)   “for   the   sake   of   correction”  
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(σωφρονιστύύος  ἕνεκα).82  The   idea   is,  apparently,   that  an  additional  monetary  
fine  constitutes  an  extra  motivation  to  refrain  from  committing  theft  or  violence  
in  the  future.83  The  Athenian  continues,  934b3-­‐‑c3:  
ὧν  δὴ  πάάντων  ἕνεκα  χρὴ  καὶ  πρὸς  πάάντα  τὰ  τοιαῦτα  βλέέποντας  τοὺς  
νόόµμους   τοξόότου   µμὴ   κακοῦ   στοχάάζεσθαι   δίίκην   τοῦ   τε   µμεγέέθους   τῆς  
κολάάσεως   ἑκάάστων   ἕνεκα   καὶ   παντελῶς   τῆς   ἀξίίας·∙   ταὐτὸν   δ’   ἔργον  
δρῶντα   συνυπηρετεῖν   δεῖ   τῷ   νοµμοθέέτῃ   τὸν   δικαστήήν,   ὅταν   αὐτῷ   τις  
νόόµμος  ἐπιτρέέπῃ  τιµμᾶν  ὅτι  χρὴ  πάάσχειν  τὸν  κρινόόµμενον  ἢ  ἀποτίίνειν,  τὸν  
δέέ,  καθάάπερ  ζωγράάφον,  ὑπογράάφειν  ἔργα  ἑπόόµμενα  τῇ  γραφῇ.  ὃ  δὴ  καὶ  
νῦν,  ὦ  Μέέγιλλε  καὶ  Κλεινίία,  ποιητέέον  ἡµμῖν  ὅτι  κάάλλιστα  καὶ  ἄριστα·∙    
All  these  reasons  and  considerations  make  it  necessary  for  the  law  to  aim,  
like  a  good  archer,  at  a  penalty  that  will  both  reflect  the  magnitude  of  the  
crime   and   fully   indemnify   the   victim.   The   judge   has   the   same   aim,   and  
when  he   is   faced  by  his   legal  duty  of   assessing  what  penalty  or   fine   the  
defendant  must   pay,   he  must   follow   closely   in   the   legislator’s   footsteps;  
and   the   latter   must   turn   himself   into   a   sort   of   artist   and   sketch   some  
specimen   measures   consistent   with   his   written   prescriptions.   That,  
                                                                                                              
82  LSJ.  Cf.  AST   (1835-­‐‑1838)  correctio.  Leg.   934e1   is   the  only  attestation  of   the  word  ἡ  σωφρονιστύύς.  
LSJ:   σωφρονιστύύς   =   σωφρονισµμόός,   “teaching   of   morality   or   moderation”.   The   interpretation  
“correction”  derives  from  the  explanation  a  few  lines  later:  the  fine  is  not  to  be  paid  for  the  sake  of  
paying  justice  for  committing  a  crime—what  is  done  cannot  be  made  undone—but  for  the  sake  of  
making   both   the   person   who   commits   the   crime   and   those   who   have   seen   him   being   called   to  
justice  either  loathe  injustice  completely,  or  to  recover  from  such  an  infliction  to  a  large  extent  (οὐχ  
ἕνεκα  τοῦ  κακουργῆσαι  διδοὺς  τὴν  δίίκην—οὐ  γὰρ  τὸ  γεγονὸς  ἀγέένητον  ἔσται  ποτέέ—τοῦ  δ᾿  εἰς  
τὸν  αὖθις  ἕνεκα  χρόόνον  ἢ  τὸ  παράάπαν  µμισῆσαι  τὴν  ἀδικίίαν  αὐτόόν  τε  καὶ  τοὺς   ἰδόόντας  αὐτὸν  
δικαιούύµμενον,  ἢ  λωφῆσαι  µμέέρη  πολλὰ  τῆς  τοιαύύτης  συµμφορᾶς,  934a6-­‐‑b3).    
83   For   the   idea   that   punishments   serve   to   encourage   correct   behaviour   and   to   teach,   cf.   Pl.   Prot.  
324a5-­‐‑c1.   This   forward-­‐‑looking   attitude   is   notably   different   from   the   Gorgias’   justification   of  
punishment  as  “curing  of  the  soul”  (Gorg.  476a7-­‐‑479e9,  525b1-­‐‑c8,  also  including  a  deterring  function  
towards  others).  The   idea   that   (increase  of)  σωφροσύύνη   is   the  product  of  a   fine  seems  odd   in   the  
light   of   the   Republic’s   opposition   between   σωφροσύύνη   and   φιλοχρηµματίία   (485e3,   486b6),   the  
association   of   φιλοχρηµματίία   with   ἀνευλευθερίία   (Resp.   391c5,   469d6)   and   with   the   uncurtailed  
ἐπιθυµμητικόόν   (553c5).   The   logic   of   imposing   fines   assumes   that  people   are   generally   attached   to  
possessions   (this  may  be  why  a   city   in  which  all  property   is   common   is  a  “city  of  gods”   see  Leg.  
739b8-­‐‑e4,  discussed  in  chapter  one,  p.  11).  We  may  compare  the  lawgiver’s  use  of  τιµμήή  and  ἀτιµμίία  
to   motivate   people   to   restrain   themselves   (631e2-­‐‑632a2).   Therefore,   σωφροσύύνη   is   not  
conceptualized   in   terms   of   a   quality   of   soul   (order   of   parts),   but   in   terms   of   something   like   self-­‐‑
restraint,  “foresight”,  attentiveness  to  others.  This  is  a  more  colloquial  use  of  σωφροσύύνη,  factoring  
in  that  something  may  go  wrong:  an  occasional  wrong  act  does  not  mean  that  one  is  not  virtuous.  
Cf.   for   a   similar   argument   about   the   δίίκαιος   in   the   penal   laws   of   Book   IX,   SCHOFIELD   (2012).   In  
another   case,   σωφροσύύνη   is   itself   a   kind   of   tax:   metics   do   not   have   to   pay   even   the   smallest  
metoikion,  “except  self-­‐‑restraint”  (πλὴν  τοῦ  σωφρονεῖν,  850b3).  
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Cleinias  and  Megillus,   is   the   job   to  which  we  must  now  devote  our  best  
efforts;  (…)”  (Transl.  SAUNDERS)  
This  passage  shows  once  more  that  the  aim  of  the  laws  is  to  provide  the  citizens  
with  ample  motivation  to  behave  properly.  The  lawgiver  “aims”  (στοχάάζεσθαι)  
at  the  desired  result.  Lawgiving  is  a  stochastic  endeavour.  The  lawgiver  tries  to  
come  up  with  ways  to  motivate  people  to  exhibit  the  desired  kind  of  behaviour,  
using  whatever  he  thinks  (on  the  basis  of  his  experience,  of  his  insight  in  human  
behaviour,  etc.)  will  be  most  effective—in  this  case  the  risk  of  being  obliged  to  
pay  a  fine.    
  
  
4 . 4    Ex t e rna l    in f luences :    adop t ing    l aws    f rom   o the r   po l e i s   
In   the   sections   above,   it   has   been   argued   that   the   process   of   lawgiving   is  
depicted   in   terms   of   consistency   and   pragmatism.   The   second   lawgivers  
operate  on  the  basis  of  what  was  stipulated  by  the  first  lawgiver.  The  fact  that  
lawgiving   is   to   be   executed   by   the   lawguards   in   conjunction   with   the  
specialized   officials   in   the   relevant   areas,   suggests   that   a   familiarity  with   the  
respective   issues   is   a   conditio   sine   qua  non   for   adequate   legislation.  That   is   the  
reason  why  lawgiving  is  a  long  process:  lawgiving  is  modelled  upon  a  notion  of  
τέέχνη   that   is   rooted   in   experience.   But   it   is   not   only   a   matter   of   experience  
gained  by  the  magistrates  in  their  own  city;  experience  may  also  be  drawn  from  
other  poleis,  957a4-­‐‑b3:  
τὰ   µμὲν   ἴδια   δικαστήήρια   ταύύτῃ   πῃ   γιγνόόµμενα   µμέέτρον   ἂν   ἔχοι·∙   τὰ   δὲ  
δηµμόόσια   καὶ   κοινὰ   καὶ   ὅσοις   ἀρχὰς   δεῖ   χρωµμέένας   τὰ   προσήήκοντα  
ἑκάάστῃ   τῶν   ἀρχῶν   διοικεῖν,   ἔστ’   ἐν   πολλαῖς   πόόλεσιν   οὐκ   ἀσχήήµμονα  
ἐπιεικῶν  ἀνδρῶν  οὐκ  ὀλίίγα  νοµμοθετήήµματα,  ὅθεν  νοµμοφύύλακας  χρὴ  τὰ  
πρέέποντα   τῇ   νῦν   γεννωµμέένῃ   πολιτείίᾳ   κατασκευάάζειν  
συλλογισαµμέένους   καὶ   ἐπανορθουµμέένους,   ταῖς   ἐµμπειρίίαις  
διαβασανίίζοντας,  ἕως  ἂν   ἱκανῶς  αὐτῶν  ἕκαστα  δόόξῃ  κεῖσθαι,  τόότε  δὲ  
τέέλος   ἐπιθέέντας,   ἀκίίνητα   οὕτως   ἐπισφραγισαµμέένους,   χρῆσθαι   τὸν  
ἅπαντα  βίίον.    
OUTLINE   AND  AMENDMENT  170  
In  dealing  with  the  private   law  courts   that  method  would  be  reasonable,  
but  in  connection  with  the  public  courts  of  the  State,  and  all   those  which  
the   officials   have   to   use   in   managing   the   affairs   which   belong   to   their  
several   offices,   there   exist   in   many   States   quite   a   number   of   admirable  
ordinances   of   worthy   men;   and   from   these   the   Law-­‐‑wardens   must  
construct  a  code  which  is  suitable  to  the  polity  we  are  now  framing,  partly  
by  comparing  and  amending  them,  partly  by  submitting  them  to  the  test  
of  experience,  until  each  such  ordinance  be  deemed  satisfactory;  and  when  
they   have   been   finally   approved,   and   have   been   sealed   as   absolutely  
unchangeable,   then   the  magistrates   shall   put   them   into   practice   all   their  
life  long.  (Transl.  BURY,  adapted)  
On   the   subject   of   public   courts,   the   interlocutors   instruct   the   lawguards   to  
adopt  laws  in  use  in  other  poleis.84  In  fact,  there  is  a  special  body  instituted  for  
the   purpose   of   observing   laws   in   other   poleis:   the   observers   (θεωροίί).85   The  
Athenian   even   seems  quite   optimistic   on   this  point:   in   order   to   regulate   their  
public   courts,   many   poleis   have   no   small   number   of   respectable   laws   (οὐκ  
ἀσχήήµμονα  …  οὐκ  ὀλίίγα  νοµμοθετήήµματα,  957a6-­‐‑7).    
   Laws   from   other   poleis  may   thus   be   adopted   in   the   interlocutors’   own  
city,  provided  that   they  are  made  to  fit   their  own  constitution.  The   lawguards  
must   adopt   the   laws   suitable   to   the   politeia   (ὅθεν   νοµμοφύύλακας   χρὴ   τὰ  
πρέέποντα   τῇ   νῦν   γεννωµμέένῃ   πολιτείίᾳ   κατασκευάάζειν,   957a7-­‐‑b1).   Τὰ  
                                                                                                              
84  Cf.  843e3-­‐‑844a7:  καὶ  ἐὰν  φυτεύύων  µμὴ  ἀπολείίπῃ  τὸ  µμέέτρον  τῶν  τοῦ  γείίτονος  χωρίίων,  καθάάπερ  
εἴρηται  καὶ  πολλοῖς  νοµμοθέέταις  ἱκανῶς,  ὧν  τοῖς  νόόµμοις  χρὴ  προσχρῆσθαι  καὶ  µμὴ  πάάντα  ἀξιοῦν,  
πολλὰ   καὶ   σµμικρὰ   καὶ   τοῦ   ἐπιτυχόόντος   νοµμοθέέτου   γιγνόόµμενα,   τὸν   µμείίζω   πόόλεως   κοσµμητὴν  
νοµμοθετεῖν·∙  “So   too   if  a  man,  when  planting   trees,   fail   to   leave   the  due  space  between   them  and  
this  neighbour’s  plot:   this  has  been  adequately  stated  by  many   lawgivers,  whose   laws  we  should  
make  use  of,  instead  of  requiring  the  great  organiser  of  the  city  to  legislate  about  all  the  numerous  
small  details  which  are  within  the  competence  of  any  chance  lawgiver”  (transl.  BURY,  adapted).  
85  See  Leg.  951a4-­‐‑952d4.  The  observers  have  to  collect  information  from  the  rare  “divine  persons”  in  
other   cities,   with  whom   it   is   worth   to   associate   (ἄνθρωποι  …   θεῖοίί   τινες—oὐ   πολλοίί—παντὸς  
ἄξιοι   συγγίίγνεσθαι,   951b5).   The   observers   have   to   report   back   to   the   nocturnal   council.   This  
suggests  that  practical  experience  has  a  clear  surplus  value  for  the  preservation  of  the  laws  (for  the  
observers,   see   also   chapter   six,   pp.   220,   221,   222).   Cf.   BOBONICH   (2002),   399,   the   “rationale  
underlying   the   appointment   of   the   observers   explicitly   presumes   that   the   laws   of  Magnesia  may  
need  supplementation  or  revision  and  allows  for   them”.  The  observers  have  to  report  back  to   the  
nocturnal   council,   see   chapter   six,  p.   222.  The  nocturnal   council,   that  has   the   task   to  preserve   the  
laws,   is   thus   involved  in  the  process  of  amending  and  correcting  laws,  cf.  SCHÖPSDAU  (2011),  580:  
“Die   Bewahrung   der   Gesetze   impliziert   also   keineswegs   eine   starre   Unveränderlichkeit   der  
Gesetze”.    
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πρέέποντα   [sc.   νοµμοθετήήµματα]   have   to   be   compared   and   corrected   in   that  
process   (συλλογισαµμέένους   καὶ   ἐπανορθουµμέένους,   957b286);   subsequently,  
they  have  to  be  tested  in  practice  (ταῖς  ἐµμπειρίίαις  διαβασανίίζοντας,  957b2-­‐‑3).  
In  a  way  similar  to  the  regulations  concerning  the  chorus  festivals  of  the  young  
discussed   under   above,   this   process   of   testing   is   supposed   to   continue   until  
every   aspect   of   it   is   agreed   to   have   been   settled   in   an   adequate  way   (ἕως  ἂν  
ἱκανῶς   αὐτῶν   ἕκαστα   δόόξῃ   κεῖσθαι,   957b3).87   The   δόόξα   is   that   of   the  
νοµμοφύύλακες.  When  they  decide  that  the  laws  have  been  sufficiently  finalized,  
the   lawguards   will   conclude   the   process   and   give   the   laws   a   seal   that   will  
render   them   immutable   (τόότε   δὲ   τέέλος   ἐπιθέέντας,   ἀκίίνητα   οὕτως  
ἐπισφραγισαµμέένους,  957b4).88    
     
  
4 . 5    Conc lus ion   
This  chapter  has  analysed  how  the  interlocutors  conceptualize  their  own  act  of  
legislation,   that  takes  place  on  the  dramatic   level  of  Laws.  The  chapter  took  its  
cue  from  the  painter-­‐‑analogy  in  Book  VI.  The  painter-­‐‑analogy  depicts  lawgiving  
as  a  lengthy  process.  This  process  starts  with  the  drawing  of  an  outline  by  a  first  
lawgiver,  and  subsequently  this  outline  is  filled  in  by  the  lawgiver’s  successors.    
   The   painter-­‐‑analogy   appeared   to   have   structural   implications   for   the  
lawgiving  in  Laws.  After  the  painter-­‐‑analogy,  the  first  thing  the  interlocutors  do  
is  appoint  successors  for  their  own  legislation;  furthermore,  in  addressing  their  
successor   (the   lawguards)   in   a   fictive   speech,   they  use   the   terminology   of   the  
painter-­‐‑analogy   (the   distinction   between   outline,   and   the   filling   in   of  what   is  
                                                                                                              
86  Cf.  Leg.  951c2-­‐‑3.  
87  Cf.  Leg.  772b4,  c4,  and  p.  159  above.  
88   The   fact   that   the   laws   are   to  be   “deployed   for   the   entire   lifetime”   (χρῆσθαι   τὸν  ἅπαντα  βίίον,  
957b5)  may  modify   the   unchangeability,   and   suggest   an   amount   of   pragmatism:   that   these   laws  
remain   valid   and   unchangeable   only   for   the   period   of   one   lifetime.   See   also   the   discussion   in  
BOBONICH  (2002),  400-­‐‑408  on  the  alleged  immutability  of  the  laws.  
OUTLINE   AND  AMENDMENT  172  
left  open).  The  suggestion  is  therefore  that  the  interlocutors’  own  law  code  has  
the   status   of   such   an   outline   (or   rather,   of   an   exercise   for   a   real   case   of  
legislation).  This  idea  also  continues  to  underlie  the  subsequent  formulation  of  
the   law   code   itself:   the   interlocutors   repeatedly   state   that   they   leave   further  
legislation  to  other  lawgivers,  and  more  detailed  stipulations  are  given  as  to  the  
process  of  supplementing  the  existing  laws.  The  painter-­‐‑analogy  thus  seems  to  
be  particularly  designed  for  the  legislation  of  the  interlocutors  that  follows  it.  
   This  chapter  proceeded  by  examining  the  basis   for   the   legislation  of   the  
interlocutors,   and   the   sources   for   their   laws.   First,   the   interlocutors   instruct  
their   successors   to   legislate   in   accordance   with   what   they   themselves   have  
agreed  to  be  the  goal  of  legislation,  “complete  virtue”.  The  idea  is  hence  clearly  
that  the  interlocutors  consider  their  own  legislation  to  be  in  line  with  the  notion  
of  virtue  set  out  in  Books  I  and  II.    
   Second,   an   investigation  of   the  “open  ends”  within   the   law  code  of   the  
interlocutors  themselves  offers  us  vistas  into  their  idea  of  the  sources  of  future  
legislation.  Whereas  the  painter-­‐‑analogy  does  not  make  explicit  why   lawgiving  
is  a  process  that  lasts  many  years,  these  open  ends  reveal  how  the  law  code  is  to  
be  supplemented,  and  by  whom.  The  involvement  of  specialized  officials,  and  
the   insistence  on   the   fact   that   supplementation   takes  many  years   suggest   that  
further   lawgiving  depends   on,   and   is   informed   by,   experience.  Vagueness   and  
incompleteness   are   therefore   inherent   in   any   first   act   of   lawgiving,   which   is  
therefore  necessarily  an  “outline”.    
   Whether  a  law  code  is  ever  finished  remains  equivocal:  on  the  one  hand,  
for  pragmatic  reasons  it  is  preferable  not  to  keep  changing  the  laws  all  the  time;  
on   the   other   hand,   change   is   not   completely   ruled   out.   The   institution   of   the  
observers   suggests   a   constant   and  dynamic   re-­‐‑evaluation   of   the   fittingness   of  
the   laws   Furthermore,   the   fact   that   the   observers   have   to   report   back   to   the  
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nocturnal   council   seems   to   entail   that   insights   of   the   kind   collected   by   the  
observers  are  crucial  for  the  preservation  of  the  laws.89    
  
                                                                                                              
89   SAUNDERS   (1995)   draws   a   similar   conclusion   from   his   investigation   into   the   ambiguous  
indications   about   the   participation   of   women   in   Magnesian   society.   He   warns   against   a  
“documentary   fallacy”,  which   is   “to   suppose   that  Magnesia   is   an   exact   blueprint,   fixed   in   all   its  
details  (…)  That  is  not  so:  Magnesia  is  a  shifting  structure”,  and  “incorporates  all  sorts  of  tensions  
within  itself”  (603).  Cf.  BOBONICH  (2002),  406.  

  





PERSUADING  THE  CITIZENS:  






So  far,  we  have  looked  at  how  Plato  sets  the  scene  in  the  opening  Books  of  Laws,  
bringing  to  the  fore  the  role  of  lawgiving  in  facilitating  peaceful  coexistence  in  
the  form  of  societies  (chapter  three),  and  at  how  the  interlocutors  represent  their  
own   lawgiving   (chapter   four).   We   have   argued   that   the   opening   scene  
introduces   a   pragmatic   conceptual   framework   for   morality,   and   that   this  
pragmatic  outlook  prepares  the  way  for  the  interlocutors’  own  lawgiving  on  the  
dramatic  level,  which  in  turn  reveals  a  pragmatic  approach  and  proceeds  along  
pragmatic  lines.    
   In   this   chapter,   we   will   investigate   another   aspect   of   lawgiving  
(νοµμοθεσίία).   Besides   the   act   of   formulating   laws—the   aspect   of   νοµμοθεσίία  
investigated   in   chapter   four—this   aspect   of   νοµμοθεσίία   views   lawgiving   as   a  
mode  of  affecting  the  mind  and  behaviour  of  the  citizens.  The  present  chapter  
will   investigate   how   Laws   conceptualizes   this   aspect   of   lawgiving,   and   what  
criterion  determines  the  proper  discourse  of  the  law.  This  aspect  of  lawgiving  is  
particularly  interesting  from  our  point  of  view,  since  on  the  dramatic  level  the  
laws  are  embedded  in,  and  hence  part  of,  the  dialogue.  For  the  communicative  
aspect   of   νοµμοθεσίία   the  Athenian   also   introduces   an   analogy:   the   analogy  of  
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the   doctor   in   Book   IV   (with   a   recapitulation   in   Book   IX).   Central   to   the  
argument  of  this  chapter  is  the  notion  of  πείίθειν,  persuasion.  
      
     
5 . 1       The   pu rpose   o f    the    l awg ive r :   πε ιθώώ   and   β ίία   
The  Athenian   asks  what   the   lawgiver   aims   to   achieve  with  his   lawgiving.  He  
puts   forward   his   own   suggestion:   were   he   a   lawgiver,   his   goal   would   be   to  
make   the   citizens   “as  persuadable   as   he  possibly   can”   (ὡς   εὐπειθεστάάτους).1  
The   issue  broached   is   that  of   the  appropriate   form  of   the   laws  relative   to   their  
purpose.2   The   form  of   the   laws   should   be   such   that   it   furthers   the   lawgiver’s  
intention,  or   that   it  at   least  does  not   thwart   it.  The  goal  of  making  citizens  ὡς  
εὐπειθεστάάτους   is   subsequently   glossed   by   ἡµμερώώτερον   τε   ἂν   ἀκούύειν   καὶ  
εὐµμενέέστερον,   “more   docile   and   benevolent   in   listening”.   The   lawgiver  
purposes   to   make   the   listener   εὐµμενέέστερος   “more   benevolent”,   and  
                                                                                                              
1   Leg.   718c8-­‐‑10:   Βουλοίίµμην   ἂν   αὐτοὺς   ὡς   εὐπειθεστάάτους   πρὸς   ἀρετὴν   εἶναι,   καὶ   δῆλον   ὅτι  
πειράάσεται   τοῦτο   ὁ   νοµμοθέέτης   ἐν   ἁπάάσῃ   ποιεῖν   τῇ   νοµμοθεσίίᾳ,   “I   want   the   citizens   to   be   as  
persuadable   as   possible   to   [behave   in   accordance   with]   virtue,   and   evidently   this   is   what   the  
legislator  will  attempt  to  do  in  his  entire  legislation”  (transl.  BURY).  The  pronoun  αὐτούύς  can  either  
refer   to   the   laws,   in   which   case   εὐπειθεστάάτους   is   active/transitive   (“persuasive”),   or   to   the  
citizens,  in  which  case  εὐπειθεστάάτους  is  passive  (“persuadable”,  “obedient”).  On  the  ground  that  
the  adjective  has   just   (715c2)  been  used  in  the  passive  sense,  ENGLAND  ad   loc.  opts  for  the  passive  
sense.  This  is  corroborated  by  the  train  of  thought  in  this  passage.  The  issue  lies  open:  how  can  the  
lawgiver  make  the  citizens  as  pliable  as  possible?  Moreover,   the  ultimate  end  the   lawgiver  has   in  
view  is  to  make  the  citizens  persuadable;  to  make  laws  persuasive  is  the  means  to  that  end.  
2  εὐπειθέέστατοι  πρὸς  ἀρετήήν—in  fact,  instead  of  πρὸς  ἀρετήήν,  the  Athenian  might  also  have  said  
πρὸς   τοὺς   νόόµμους,   since   that   effectively   means   the   same.   πρὸς   ἀρετήήν   is,   however,   stronger  
rhetorically:   these   are   no   arbitrary   laws.  Virtue   as   obedience   to   the   laws:  Leg.   922a3-­‐‑5;   cf.  ADKINS  
(1960),   294.  But   obedience   is   only   the   first   step   in  Laws’   construction  of   virtue.   It   is   essential   that  
obedience  is  secured  by  friendly  means,  involving  what  may  be  labelled  “cognitive  endorsement”  
of  the  rules.  See  BOBONICH  (1991)  for  the  argument  that  besides  obedience,  rational  persuasion  aims  
at   “inculcating   true   ethical   beliefs   and   the   proper   desires   and   emotions   in   the   citizens”   and   that  
“having  the  right  beliefs  and  the  right  desires   is,   in  Plato’s  view,  part  of  what   it   is   to  be  virtuous”  
(383,  my  italics).  
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εὐµμαθέέστερος,   “more   prone   to   learning”.3   The   citizen   has   to   be   made  
susceptible  to  new  input.  What  form  of  the  law  would  maximize  this  effect?    
   Now  that  it  has  been  agreed  that  the  lawgiver’s  intention  is  to  make  the  
citizens   “as   persuadable   as   possible”,   it  may   not   come   as   a   surprise   that   the  
solution   the  Athenian  puts   forward   is   to   add  an  element  of  persuasion   to   the  
law  itself.  The  Athenian  proposes  to  preface  the  law  (νόόµμος)  with  a  “preamble”  
(προοίίµμιον),   an   idea   he   derives   from   contemporary   musical   practices.   A  
musical  νόόµμος  is  customarily  preceded  by  a  προοίίµμιον.4  The  same  ought  to  be  
done   with   regard   to   the   political   νόόµμος.   In   fact,   the   Athenian   claims   that  
starting   with   a   preamble   is   the   usual   practice   in   all   compositions   that   are  
uttered  by  the  voice,  that  is,  not  only  in  musical  ones.5  From  the  very  beginning,  
it  should  be  noted,  laws  are  treated  as  speech,  a  mode  of  address,  rather  than  as  
texts  that  are  written  down.  
   The  preamble   adds   an   element   of   persuasion   to   the   law.6   The   law   thus  
consists   of   two   parts:   the   προοίίµμιον,   and   the   νόόµμος   in   the   strict   sense.   The  
                                                                                                              
3  Leg.  718d4-­‐‑6;  cf.  723a2-­‐‑7.  On  εὐµμαθήής,  see  BOBONICH  (1991),  371,  n.  23,  referring  to  BRANDWOOD  
(1976):  εὐµμαθήής  “always  means  “good  at  learning”  or  “quick  at  learning  (…)  and  is  a  trait  that  Plato  
thinks   is   especially   distinctive   of   philosophers”   (with   references),   rather   than   (pejoratively)  
“docile”.   Eὐµμενήής   and   εὐµμαθήής   are   standard   terminology   in   rhetorical   handbooks,   see  
GÖRGEMANNS   (1960):   “Die   Schulrhetorik   gibt   als  Aufgabe  des   Proömiums   an,   es   solle   den  Hörer  
wohlwollend,  aufmerksam  und   leicht  belehrbar  machen  (εὔνους,  προσεκτικόός,  εὐµμαθήής;  bei  den  
Lateinern:   benevolus,   attentus,   docilis).   Diese   Regeln   scheinen   im   allgemeinen   von   Isokrates  
ausgegangen  zu  sein,  doch  läßt  sich  das  in  den  Einzelheiten  nicht  mehr  nachweisen”  (40,  with  nn.  2  
and  3;  see  also  41).  
4  Leg.  722d6-­‐‑e7.  It  is  traditional  practice  that  κιθαρῳδικὴ  ᾠδήή  (also  called  κιθαρῳδικὸς  νόόµμος)  and  
“every  musical  composition”  (πάάση  µμούύση)  starts  with  a  preamble.  On  the  musical  νόόµμοι,  see  WEST  
(1992),   215-­‐‑217,  with   references  on   217,  n.   69;   also   242,   360-­‐‑363.   “At  Athens   it  was   the   citharodes  
who  were  the  great  display  musicians,  and  nomos  came  to  be  used  especially  of  their  compositions”  
(ibid.,   217).  On  κιθαρῳδίία,   see   POWER   (2006),   for   the  προοίίµμιον  his   chapter   2.  He  notes   that   “for  
Plato,  writing  in  the  fourth  century  BCE,  prooimia  belong  first  and  foremost  to  kitharôidia”  (See  the  
website  of  the  Center  for  Hellenic  Studies:  
http://chs.harvard.edu/wb/1/wo/v8qdlHtbCCaWftTg0yuSHg/10.0.0.0.19.1.7.15.5.1.1.1.5.7.1.1).    
5  Leg.  722d3-­‐‑5:  λόόγων  πάάντων  καὶ  ὅσων  φωνὴ  κεκοινώώνηκεν  προοίίµμιάά  τέέ  ἐστιν  καὶ  σχεδὸν  οἷόόν  
τινες   ἀνακινήήσεις.   For   a  προοίίµμιον   he   gives   a   rather   abstract   definition,   “a   kind   of   preparation  
possessing   some   artistic   stimulation   expedient   for   the   upcoming   recitation”,   τινες   ἀνακινήήσεις,  
ἔχουσαίί  τινα  ἔντεχνον  ἐπιχείίρησιν  χρήήσιµμον  πρὸς  τὸ  µμέέλλον  περαίίνεσθαι  (722d5-­‐‑6).  
6  Leg.  722d2-­‐‑723b6.  Cf.  718d4-­‐‑7,  890d1-­‐‑8.  
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Athenian   presents   the   persuasive   preface   to   the   law   as   an   innovation   in   the  
field   of   lawgiving.7   Current   legislative   practice,  which   omits   the   preamble,   is  
less  preferable,  because,  as  we  now  understand,   it  does  nothing   to   further   the  
lawgiver’s   purpose.8   Indeed,   lawgiving   by   “unmixed   laws”   is   claimed   to   be  
equivalent  to  “violence”,  βίία.  Violence  effectuates  the  very  opposite  of  what  the  
lawgiver   aims   to   achieve,   for   it   makes   a   person   “fiercer”,   “more   resistant”  
(ἀγριώώτερον,   720e4).9   Πειθώώ   thus   makes   its   entrance   as   the   more   effective  
means  the  lawgiver  has  at  his  disposal.  Every  sensible  lawgiver  ought  to  prefer  
the   “double  method”  of   attaching  a  προοίίµμιον   to   the  νόόµμος   simplex   (ἁπλοῦς,  
721e2;   also   νόόµμος   ἄκρατος,   723a1-­‐‑2).10   If   convincing,   the   preamble   will   pre-­‐‑
empt  the  need  for  the  “tyrannical  command”  of  the  law  to  speak  out.11    
                                                                                                              
7  Preambles  indeed  do  not  seem  to  be  a  custom  in  ancient  Greek  legislation.  MORROW  (1960):  “There  
is  indeed  a  tradition  that  both  Zaleucus  and  Charondas  attached  preambles  of  this  sort  to  certain  of  
their   laws,  and  some  alleged  fragments  of   these  preambles  have  been  preserved.   [Reff.   ibid.  n.  25]  
But  it  is  more  likely  that  the  writings  from  which  Diodorus  and  Stobaeus  drew  their  excerpts  are  a  
later  composition  fictitiously  ascribed  to  these  early  legislators,  (…).  It   is  more  probable  that  Plato  
influenced   the   later   tradition   about   Zaleucus   and  Charondas   than   that   they   influenced   him.   The  
Attic   laws   that  have  been  preserved  are  without  preambles,  and  are  addressed   to   the  magistrates  
who  are  to  enforce  them,  not  to  the  general  public.   (…)  In  the  absence  of  better  evidence  than  we  
have  for  the  genuineness  of  the  fragments  of  Zaleucus  and  Charondas,  we  must  conclude  that  this  
doctrine  is  original  with  Plato”  (555-­‐‑556).  
8  ΑΘ.  Πόότερον  οὖν  ἡµμῖν  ὁ  τεταγµμέένος  ἐπὶ  τοῖς  νόόµμοις  µμηδὲν  τοιοῦτον  προαγορεύύῃ  ἐν  ἀρχῇ  τῶν  
νόόµμων,   ἀλλ’   εὐθὺς   ὃ   δεῖ   ποιεῖν   καὶ   µμὴ   φράάζῃ   τε,   καὶ   ἐπαπειλήήσας   τὴν   ζηµμίίαν,   ἐπ’   ἄλλον  
τρέέπηται   νόόµμον,   παραµμυθίίας   δὲ   καὶ   πειθοῦς   τοῖς   νοµμοθετουµμέένοις   µμηδὲ   ἓν   προσδιδῷ;   ΑTH.  
Should,   then,   the   commander   of   the   laws   begin   his   laws  with   no   such   prefatory   statement,   but  
declare   at   once   what   must   be   done   and   what   not,   and   state   the   penalty   which   threatens  
disobedience,   and   so   turn   off   to   another   law,   without   adding   to   his   statutes   a   single   word   of  
encouragement  and  persuasion?  (transl.  BURY,  adapted).    
9  Leg.  718b3:  βίίᾳ  καὶ  δίίκῃ  κολάάζουσα;  719e9:  ἐπαπείίλησας  τὴν  ζηµμίίαν;  721e2:  τῷ  ἀπειλεῖν  µμόόνον  
χρωµμέένους;   722b6-­‐‑c1:   of   the   two  methods   πειθώώ   and   βίία   contemporary   lawgivers   use   only   the  
latter;   722c2:   ἄκρατος   βίία;   723a1-­‐‑2:   the   νόόµμος   ἄκρατος   is   τυραννικὸν   ἐπίίταγµμα   ἀπεικασθέέν,  
722e7-­‐‑8.  The  Athenian  starts  by  observing  that  a  run-­‐‑through  of  the  law  code  (τῶν  νόόµμων  αὐτῶν  ἡ  
διέέξοδος),  which  involves  both  πειθώώ  (“persuasion”)  and  βίία  (“violence”),  will  make  their  own  city  
blessed   and   happy:   Leg.   718b2-­‐‑5:   τῶν   νόόµμων   αὐτῶν   ἡ   διέέξοδος,   τὰ   µμὲν   πείίθουσα,   τὰ   δὲ   µμὴ  
ὑπείίκοντα  πειθοῖ  τῶν  ἠθῶν  βίίᾳ  καὶ  δίίκῃ  κολάάζουσα,  τὴν  πόόλιν  ἡµμῖν  συµμβουλευθέέντων  θεῶν  
µμακαρίίαν  τε  καὶ  εὐδαίίµμονα  ἀποτελεῖ.  
10  Leg.  722b4-­‐‑c2  (text  of  Loeb):  πρὸς  τοῦτο  δὲ  οὐδεὶς  ἔοικε  διανοηθῆναι  πώώποτε  τῶν  νοµμοθετῶν,  
ὡς  ἐξὸν  δυοῖν  χρῆσθαι  πρὸς  τὰς  νοµμοθεσίίας,  πειθοῖ  καὶ  βίίᾳ,  καθ᾿  ὅσον  οἷόόν  τε  ἐπὶ  τὸν  ἄπειρον  
παιδείίας   ὄχλον,   τῷ   ἑτέέρῳ   χρῶνται   µμόόνον·∙   οὐ   γὰρ   πειθοῖ   κεραννύύντες   τὴν   ἀνάάγκην  
νοµμοθετοῦσιν,  ἀλλ᾿  ἀκράάτῳ  µμόόνον  τῇ  βίίᾳ.  “But  as  regards   this,   it  appears   that  no   legislator  has  
ever  yet  observed  that,  while  it  is  in  their  power  to  make  use  in  their  law-­‐‑making  of  two  methods,—
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   It  is  within  the  terms  of  the  antithesis  between  violence  and  friendliness  
that   persuasion   as   a   method   of   lawgiving   acquires   the   status   of   ”the   more  
friendly   method”   (τὸν   πρᾳόότερον   …   τρόόπον,   720a5-­‐‑6;   cf.   859a1-­‐‑6).12   Laws’  
positive  assessment  of  πείίθειν  thus  to  a  large  extent  derives  from  its  opposition  
to  βίία,  “violence”,  or  “force”.13  The  power  of   speech   is  not,   as   it   is   in  Gorgias,  
contrasted  with  ἐπιστήήµμη,  “expert  knowledge”.14  Laws  uses  πείίθειν  as  the  term  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
namely,  persuasion  and  force,—in  so  far  as  that  is  feasible  in  dealing  with  the  uncultured  populace,  
they   actually   employ   one  method   only:   in   their   legislation   they   do   not   temper   compulsion  with  
persuasion,  but  use  untempered  force  alone”  (transl.  BURY).  AST  (coni.)  and  ANNAS  (2010),  74  n.  20,  
have  τὴν  ἀνάάγκην  instead  of  MSS  τὴν  µμάάχην  (so  ZELLER  [1839],  90).  
11   Leg.   854c7-­‐‑d1,   870e4-­‐‑871a1,   880a7-­‐‑b1,   932a5-­‐‑7,   941c2-­‐‑4.   The   coercive   force   of   law   as   rule,   and  
stipulation   of   punishment,   remains   necessary   because   there   may   always   be   cases   in   which  
persuasion  fails—after  all,  the  interlocutors  are  legislating  for  humans,  not  for  the  offspring  of  gods,  
853b4-­‐‑d4.  Here  again,  preamble  and  law  are  treated  as  speech:  if  the  preamble  is  effective,  the  law  
can  remain  silent.  
12  The  term  πρᾷος  is  relatively  frequent  in  Laws.  Its  basic  semantic  value  appears  to  be  “friendly”  as  
the   result   of   a   supression   of   anger   (friendliness   as   the   result   of   one’s   own   interference   in   one’s  
emotions):   one   remains   friendly   inspite   of   feelings   that   would   normally   induce   aggressive  
behaviour.  We  may  recall   the  Athenian’s  emphatic  assertion   in  Book  X   (Leg.  888a4-­‐‑d3)   to  address  
the   atheists   in   a   gentle   way   (λέέγωµμεν   πρᾴως,   888a6,   cf.   a1   ἐν   πρᾳέέσι   λόόγοις;   for   insistence   on  
friendliness  also:  ἴτω  δὴ  πρόόρρησις  τοιάάδε  τις  ἄθυµμος  (…)  σβέέσαντες  τὸν  θυµμόόν,  888a4-­‐‑6),  inspite  
of  the—entirely  justified—anger  that  the  well-­‐‑educated  feels  regarding  such  views.  ἀγρίίως,  “wild”,  
is   the   normal   term   for   offensive   behaviour   towards   others,   opposite   πρᾴως   (sometimes   also  
χαλεπῶς).   In   Phdr.   268d7-­‐‑e6,   Socrates   imagines   how   a   musician   will   respond   to   the   man   who  
considers  himself  an  expert   in  harmonics  (ἁρµμονικόός)  simply  because  he  can  produce  the  highest  
and   lowest   note   on   his   string.   The  musician  will   not   respond  wildly   (οὐκ  ἀγρίίως   εἴποι   ἄν·∙   “῏Ω  
µμοχθηρέέ,  µμελαγχολᾷς”),  but  in  a  more  gentle  way,  which  is  in  line  with  his  profession  (ἀλλ᾿  ἅτε  
µμουσικὸς  ὢν  πρᾳόότερον   ὅτι   “Ὦ   ἄριστε,  …”   κτλ.).  Here,  we   again   (cf.   p.   122,   n.   156   above)   see  
evidence   for   the   4th   century   Greek   association   between   musicality   and   social,   (self-­‐‑)controlled  
behaviour.  We  should  therefore  not  read  ἀγροίίκως  for  ἀγρίίως  in  (i)  Phdr.  268e1,  with  OSANN  (OCT,  
app.  crit.)  and  HACKFORTH  (1952),  141,  n.  2;  (ii)  nor  in  Soph.  217e7,  as  does  CORNFORD  (1973),  167,  n.  
2,  who  considers  ἄγριον  “too  strong  a  word”.  
13  E.g.  Gorg.  517b6.   In  Republic,  persuasion  (story-­‐‑telling  and  myths)   is  a   trick  to  subdue  the   lower  
classes:   the  “Noble  Lie”.  Likewise,   the  effect  brought  about  by  πειθώώ  in  Phaedrus,  ψυχαγωγίία  τις  
διὰ  τῶν  λόόγων  (261a8)  entails  the  absence  of  self-­‐‑control  and  understanding:  one  is  beguiled  by  the  
words   and   arguments   and   ready   to   be   lulled   into   believing   anything.   In   this   context,   it  may   be  
recalled  that  in  his  Encomium  of  Helen,  Gorgias  acquits  Helen  of  committing  injustice  on  the  ground  
that   she  has  been  overpowered  by  a  higher   force.  This  may  be   either  Ἀνάάγκης  ψηφίίσµματα,  βίία,  
λόόγος,  or  ἔρως  (§6).  Speech  is  a  “powerful  master”  (λόόγος  δυνάάστης  µμέέγας  ἐστίίν,  §8).  About  the  
force   of   persuasion,   Gorgias   claims:   λόόγος   γὰρ   ψυχὴν   ὁ   πείίσας,   ἣν   ἔπεισεν,   ἠνάάγκασε   καὶ  
πιθέέσθαι   τοῖς   λεγοµμέένοις   καὶ   συναινέέσαι   τοῖς  ποιουµμέένοις.   ὁ   µμὲν   οὖν  πείίσας  ὡς  ἀναγκάάσας  
ἀδικεῖ,  ἡ  δὲ  πεισθεῖσα  ὡς  ἀναγκασθεῖσα  τῷ  λόόγῳ  µμάάτην  ἀκούύει  κακῶς  (§12).    
14   Gorg.   452e9ff.,   with   conclusion   in   455a2-­‐‑6:   the   rhetor   who   makes   speeches   about   justice   and  
injustice   to   courts   or   other   crowds   only   persuades   (οὐδ᾿   ἄρα   διδασκαλικὸς   ὁ   ῥήήτωρ   (…),   ἀλλὰ  
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for  the  lawgiving  that  is  more  promising  with  regard  to  the  lawgiver’s  purpose  
of  enhancing  the  citizen’s  willingness  to  obey  the  law.15    
   It  should  be  noted  that  issue  under  discussion  here  is  an  issue  of  method.  
The  question  is  what  approach  to  legislation  is  likely  to  be  most  effective,  given  
that  the  goal  stipulated  by  the  interlocutors  is  to  make  the  citizen  adhere  to  the  
law.   By   engaging   in   a—pragmatic—deliberation   about   the   effectiveness   of  
different  methods,  Laws  brings  up  considerations  that  are  foreign  to  those  of  the  
conceptual  framework  of  τέέχνη  as  sketched  in  chapter  one  (section  1.3.1).  In  the  
scenario  of  Laws,  the  end  is  given  (virtue,  obedience  to  the  laws).  What  remains  
is  the  question  of  the  means.  The  question  discussed  is  part  and  parcel  of  what  I  
have   called   a   “stochastic”   conception  of   τέέχνη   (section   1.3.2):   if  X   is   the  goal,  
what   means   would   achieve   the   maximum   result   possible?   In   a   stochastic  
conceptual   framework,  a  method  aims   at   a  goal,   can  be  more  or   less  effective,  
and  one  may  distinguish  between  methods  in  terms  of  how  successful  they  are  
in  attaining  that  goal.  
   This   is   a   fundamentally   different   way   of   approaching   τέέχνη   (here,  
νοµμοθεσίία)  than  the  usual  approach  to  it  reflected  by  other  Platonic  texts,  and  
the   consequences   of   this   new   approach   cannot   be   overestimated.   From   other  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
πειστικὸς  µμόόνον),  since  he  cannot  educate  a  crowd  in  a  small  amount  of  time  about  such  important  
affairs   (οὐ   γὰρ   δήήπου   ὄχλον   γ᾿   ἂν   δύύναιτο   τοσοῦτον   ἐν   ὀλίίγῳ   χρόόνῳ   διδάάξαι   οὕτω   µμεγάάλα  
πράάγµματα),   “craftsman   of   didactic   persuasion   concerning   the   just   and   the   unjust”   (πειθοῦς  
δηµμιουργόός  …  διδασκαλικῆς  περὶ  τὸ  δίίκαιον  τε  καὶ  ἄδικον,  454e9-­‐‑455a2).  By  contrast,  ῥητορικήή  is  
“only  persuasive”  (πειστικὸς  µμόόνον).  For  πειθώώ  as  the  product  of  ῥητορικήή:  Gorg.  453a2-­‐‑455a7.  For  
the   κολακείία-­‐‑status   of   σοφιστικήή:   463a6-­‐‑b6.   In   general,   what   is   said   about   ῥητορικήή   pertains  
equally  to  σοφιστικήή;  the  main  difference  between  the  two  is  that  ῥητορικήή  is  corrective  and  used  
to   acquit   oneself   of   having   committed   an   injustice,   while   σοφιστικήή   is   regulative.   Since   the  
regulative  τέέχνη  can  prevent  wrong  from  being  done,  the  regulative  member  of  the  pair  is  “more  
noble”  (κάάλλιον)  than  its  corrective  counterpart,  Gorg.  520a3-­‐‑b3.  
15   This   opposition   of   πειθώώ   versus   βίία—the   verbal   versus   the   physical—is   a   more   common  
opposition  than  that  of  πειθώώ  versus  ἐπιστήήµμη.  See  for  this  opposition  in  Greek  literature  BUXTON  
(1982).  For  persuasion  in  other  Platonic  dialogues,  see  the  Appendix  of  BOBONICH  (1991),  387-­‐‑388;  
LISI  (2000),  66-­‐‑69  for  the  view  that  the  different  forms  of  persuasion  are  all  part  of  a  continuum,  and  
that   in  Laws  we   find  different  kinds  of  persuasion,  adjusted   to   the  educational  background  of   the  
addressees;   BRISSON   (2000)   for   the   idea   that   rational   persuasion   of  Gorgias   is   jettisoned   once   the  
intelligible   forms  have  been   introduced;   the  preambles   in  Laws   enchant   the   citizens  by  myth  and  
rhetoric.    
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Platonic  discussions,  the  notion  of  τέέχνη  that  emerges  is  essentialistic;  that  is,  it  
is  assumed  that  to  each  object  (ἔργον)  applies  one  τέέχνη.  This  is  the  principle  of  
the  one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one  mapping  of  τέέχνη  to  subject  matter.16  The  immediate  concern  in  
those  cases  is  not  the  question  of  the  right  method  (since  that  is  assumed  to  be  
given  with  the  goal),  but  the  question  of  the  true  goal,  or  object,  on  the  a  priori  
assumption  that  there  exists  only  one  true  method  to  achieve  that  purpose.  For  
example,   ἰατρικήή   is   the  τέέχνη  that  aims  at  what  ὑγίίεια  really   is.  Methods  that  
do  not  aim  at  the  true  goal  are  strictly  speaking  not  a  τέέχνη  (cf.  the  distinction  
in   Gorgias   between   τέέχναι   and   ἐµμπειρίίαι).   The   true   ἰατρόός   is,   in   turn,   the  
person  who  possesses  the  τέέχνη.    
   As  we   saw   in   chapter   one,   the   priority   of   the   truth   status   of   the   object  
brings  with   it   a   certain   indifference  with   regard   to   the   question  of   the  means  
deployed   to   achieve   that   end.17   The   method   of   the   expert   is   by   definition  
correct,  whether  this  method  involves  the  use  of  violence  or  not.  When  it  comes  
to   the   capacity   to   improve  others  morally,   texts   such  as  Gorgias,  Republic,   and  
Statesman18  show  little  hesitation  in  resorting  to  violent  means  in  order  to  impose  
virtue.  “Plato’s  position  (…)  follows  from  his  belief  that  these  political  matters,  
like  technical  subjects,  are  the  province  of  the  expert,  whose  automatic  aim  for  
the   betterment   of   his   subjects   gives   him   not   only   the   right   but   the   duty   to  
impose   his  will   on   them.”19   Since   it   is   always   better   to   be   just,   the   ruler  who  
                                                                                                              
16   See   KAHN   (1996),   105-­‐‑110   (in   a   discussion   of   Ion).   The   same   idea   underlies   the   principle   of  
specialization  in  the  just  polis  of  Republic.  
17  See  chapter  one,  pp.  30-­‐‑31.  
18  For  example  (1)  Gorg.  517b5-­‐‑c2:  the  sole  duty  of  the  good  citizen  (ἀγαθὸς  πολίίτης)  is  to  redirect  
his   fellow   citizens’   desires   and   not   to   allow   them   free   play,   so   that   they   will   be   better   people  
(ἀµμείίνους  ἔσεσθαι),  whether  by  persuasion  or  force  (πείίθοντες  καὶ  βιαζόόµμενοι);  cf.  DODDS’  note  ad  
loc.  (2)  Resp.  488d-­‐‑e:  if  a  captain  possesses  the  τέέχνη  (of  steersmanship),  it  does  not  matter  whether  
others  consent  or  not  (ἐάάν  τέέ  τινες  βούύλωνται  ἐάάν  τε  µμήή).  Cf.  ADAM  ad  loc.:  “Whether  others  wish  
[the   pilot]   to   steer   or   not,   is   wholly   irrelevant”.   Plt.   293aff.   declares   this   principle   “of   universal  
application”,   and   the   same   appears   true   of   Resp.   488d-­‐‑e.   (3)   Plt.   296a4-­‐‑c2:   a   scientific   ruler   (or  
doctor!)   who   uses   force   to   impose   the   best   (παρὰ   τὰ   γεγραµμµμέένα   βέέλτιον   ἀναγκάάζῃ   δρᾶν),  
contrary  to  the  established  rules,  should  not  be  reproached  for  doing  so;  and  the  patients  subject  to  
such  force  would  hardly  call  it  “noxious  and  unartistic”  (νοσώώδη  καὶ  ἄτεχνα).  
19  EMLYN-­‐‑JONES  in  the  accompanying  comments  to  his  translation  of  Gorgias,  121.  
PERSUADING   THE   C IT IZENS   182  
imposes  a  person’s  true  good  upon  him  is  acting  in  that  person’s  own  interest.  
Whether  that  person  accepts  the  ruler’s  injunctions  or  not  is  irrelevant  from  this  
perspective.  In  Callipolis,  the  preservation  of  the  social  order  depends  upon  an  
armed  class.  Justice  (δικαιοσύύνη)  is  viewed  as  an  imposition  of  the  just  on  each  
of   the   three   classes   of   the   just   polis   (including   the   class   of   the   philosopher-­‐‑
kings).20   There   is   simply   no   other  way:   the   imposition   of   virtue   against   one’s  
will  is  claimed  to  be  a  bare  necessity,  for  most  people  are  not  qualified  to  know  
what  their  true  interest  (εὐδαιµμονίία)  is.21    
   By   contrast,  Laws  distinguishes   a   successful   or  more   promising  way   of  
lawgiving  from  a  less  successful  one,  culminating  in  the  preference  for  the  more  
friendly  method.  This  reflects  a  shift  of  focus  from  the  object  of  medicine  (what  
is   true   health?)   to   the   method   of   practicing   it   (what   is   the   right   way   for   a  
lawgiver  to  address  a  citizen,  or  (as  we  will  see  below)  for  a  doctor  to  address  
his  patient?).22  The  criterion  is  a  method’s—presumed—effectiveness.  Persuasion  
wins  the  day  because  only  friendly  means  will  further  the  lawgiver’s  intention.  
The   impact  of   this   shift   for   the   conceptual   framework  of  Laws   is   enormous:   it  
implies  that  virtue  is  not  assumed  to  be  analogous  to  expert  knowledge  (τέέχνη,  
ἐπιστήήµμη).23  This  may  also  be  why  the  term  νοµμοθετικήή  is  not  mentioned;  that  
term  may  carry  with  it  too  “absolutist”  overtones  (derived  from  Gorgias)  to  fit  in  
this  context.24    
   The  preference  of   friendly  means  over  violent  ones   to   secure  obedience  
taps  into  Laws’  conceptualization  of  ἀρετήή  as  self-­‐‑control.25  Laws  maintains  that  
ἀρετήή   can   only   be   attained   by   friendly   means   (force,   after   all,   will   make   a  
                                                                                                              
20  See  chapter  two,  especially  section  2.3.3.  
21  See  also  chapter  two,  p.  69,  with  n.  71  ibid.  
22  Cf.   LAKS   (1991),   “Or   les   choses   se   présentent   différemment   dans   les   Lois,   où   le   fondement   de  
l’analogie  cesse  d’être   le   simple   résultat  de   l’art   (à  savoir,   la   santé  corporelle  ou  psychique),  pour  
inclure   ce  que   l’on  pourrait   appeler   la   relation   intersubjective  du  médecin   et  de   son  patient  d’un  
côté,   du   législateur   et   de   ses   sujets   de   l’autre”   (423).   BOBONICH   (2002):   “Here   Plato   uses   the   old  
analogy  for  quite  different  purposes…”  (98).  KOEPLIN  (2009),  19:  persuasion  is  part  of  the  cure.  
23  Compare  chapter  three,  p.  113.  
24  Neither  is  ἰατρικήή  in  the  context  of  the  doctor-­‐‑analogy.  
25  Cf.  chapter  three,  pp.  93,  130.  
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person   less   submissive,   fierce   and   resistant   (ἀγριώώτερος)).   It   is   constitutive   of  
virtue  that  a  person  obeys  out  of  his  own  free  will.26  The  citizens  have  to  subject  
themselves   to   the   laws.   Maintaining   the   social   order   is   as   much   as   possible  
achieved  through  the  non-­‐‑violent,  positive  mechanisms  of  paideia.  Punishment  
only   comes   into  play   if  paideia  and   the  preambles  have   failed   to   achieve   their  
goal.27  Ideally,  the  idea  seems  to  be,  a  person  is  his  own  lawgiver  and  does  not  
need  the  laws.  
     
  
5 . 2    Two   k inds   o f   doc to r s   
5.2.1   The  doctor-­‐‑analogy  of  Book  IV    
The  Athenian  has  highlighted  a  new  aspect  of  νοµμοθεσίία,  its  mode  of  address,  
and  introduced  the  persuasive  preamble  as  the  proper  way  for  the  lawgiver  to  
tackle   the  goal  of   securing  obedience.  To  elucidate   the  difference  between   the  
lawgiver  who  uses  an  element  of  persuasion  in  his  laws  and  the  lawgiver  who  
does  not,  the  Athenian  introduces  an  analogy  with  two  kinds  of  doctors.28  This  
τέέχνη-­‐‑analogy  is  an  analogy  within  the  stochastic  framework:  it  compares  two  
                                                                                                              
26  A  number  of  interpreters  have  emphasized  the  importance  of  consent  in  Laws  as  a  deviation  from  
Republic:  e.g.  KLOSKO  (2006),  204-­‐‑205.  Cf.   ibid.,  244:  “The  need  for  consent  sets  the  Laws  apart  from  
Plato’s  other  political  works.”  In  the  final  analysis,  however,  KLOSKO  considers  the  role  of  consent  
in  Laws  “similar  to,   though  more  explicit   than,   the  role  of   temperance  in  the  state   in  the  Republic”  
(245).   In   any   case,   there   is   no   such   thing   as   “an   inherent   right   of   consent”   (ibid.,   246)   in   Laws.  
According  to  LAKS  (1991),  since  Laws  does  not  relinquish  the  demand  that  knowledge  is  sovereign,  
the  challenge  is  “de  savoir  comment   le  savoir  et  la  raison  peuvent  gouverner  avec  la  consentement  
des   citoyens”   (422,   italics   in   original).   Further:   BOBONICH   (1994);  MEYER   (2006),   387.   For   another  
view,  see  PRADEAU  (2004),  121,  n.  34.  Therefore,   it  seems  that  “consent”  is  too  weak  a  term  in  this  
context.  It  may,  for  instance,  imply  that  a  person  consents  to  do  B  while  he  in  fact  wishes  to  do  A.  In  
Laws,  to  act  virtuously  is  to  want  to  act  virtuously.  Instead  of  “consent”,  it  would  be  better  to  speak  
of    “voluntariness”.  
27   Cf.   Zeus’   remark   in   the   Protagoras-­‐‑myth   in   Plato’s   Protagoras,   that   he   will   institute   a   law  
stipulating  that  the  person  who  is  unable  to  acquire  a  sense  of  justice  will  be  killed  as  a  disease  of  
the  polis  (καὶ  νόόµμον  γε  θὲς  παρ᾿  ἐµμοῦ  τὸν  µμὴ  δυνάάµμενον  αἰδοῦς  καὶ  δίίκης  µμετέέχειν  κτείίνειν  ὡς  
νόόσον  πόόλεως,  322d4-­‐‑5).  
28  Leg.  719e7-­‐‑720a2.  See  also  n.    8  on  p.  178  above.    
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types  of  doctors,   instead  of,   as   is  most   often   the   function  of   a   τέέχνη-­‐‑analogy,  
distinguishing   the   expert,   who   possesses   the   τέέχνη,   from   a   non-­‐‑expert.   The  
question   is   not  who   possesses   the   τέέχνη,   but  which   doctor   is  more   effective.  
The  doctor-­‐‑analogy  fleshes  out   the  distinction  between  the  mode  of   lawgiving  
by  which  current  lawgivers  proceed  (to  lay  down  laws  without  preambles)  and  
the   lawgiver  who  proceeds   according   to   the   interlocutors’  method   (to  preface  
laws  with  persuasive  preambles),  and  illustrates  what  the  Athenian  has  in  mind  
when  he  labels  the  latter’s  method  πρᾳόότερος.      
   There  are  two  kinds  of  doctors:  free  doctors  and  slave  doctors.  The  free-­‐‑
born  doctors  mostly   treat   free  patients   (ἰατροίί,   720a7;   ἐλεύύθεροι,   720b2).   It   is  
this   kind   of   doctor   to   whom   the   lawgiver   who   deploys   persuasion   is  
analogized.   The   servants   of   the   free   doctors   are   slaves,   and   their   patients   are  
slaves  like  themselves  (ὑπηρέέται  τῶν  ἰατρῶν,  ἰατροὺς  δὲ  καλοῦµμεν  δήήπου  καὶ  
τούύτους,   720a7-­‐‑8;   δοῦλοι,   720b2).   These   slave   doctors   resemble   the   current  
lawgivers,   who   fail   to   use   persuasion.   The   slave   doctors   are   either   itinerant,  
paying  flying  visits  to  the  sick,  or  remain  in  the  hospitals,  720c1-­‐‑d1:    
(…)   τοὺς   µμὲν   δούύλους   σχεδόόν   τι   οἱ   δοῦλοι   τὰ   πολλὰ   ἰατρεύύουσιν  
περιτρέέχοντες  καὶ  ἐν  τοῖς  ἰατρείίοις  περιµμέένοντες,  καὶ  οὔτε  τινὰ  λόόγον  
ἑκάάστου   πέέρι   νοσήήµματος   ἑκάάστου   τῶν   οἰκετῶν   οὐδεὶς   τῶν   τοιούύτων  
ἰατρῶν   δίίδωσιν   οὐδ’   ἀποδέέχεται,   προστάάξας   δ’   αὐτῷ   τὰ   δόόξαντα   ἐξ  
ἐµμπειρίίας,   ὡς   ἀκριβῶς   εἰδώώς,   καθάάπερ   τύύραννος   αὐθαδῶς,   οἴχεται  
ἀποπηδήήσας   πρὸς   ἄλλον   κάάµμνοντα   οἰκέέτην,   καὶ   ῥᾳστώώνην   οὕτω   τῷ  
δεσπόότῃ  παρασκευάάζει  τῶν  καµμνόόντων  τῆς  ἐπιµμελείίας·∙  
(…)   the   slaves  are  usually  doctored  by   slaves,  who  either   run   round   the  
town  or  wait  in  their  surgeries;  and  not  one  of  these  doctors  either  gives  or  
receives  any  account  of  the  several  ailments  of  the  various  domestics,  but  
prescribes  for  each  what  he  deems  right  from  experience,  just  as  though  he  
had   exact   knowledge,   and   with   the   assurance   of   an   autocrat;   then   he  
jumps  and  off  he  rushes  to  another  sick  domestic,  and  thus  he  relieves  his  
master  in  his  attendance  on  the  sick.  (Transl.  BURY)  
The  slave  doctor  does  not  give  an  account  of  the  illness  to  the  individual  patient  
(οὔτε  τινὰ  λόόγον  …  οὐδεὶς  τῶν  τοιούύτων   ἰατρῶν  δίίδωσιν),  nor  does  he  ever  
receive   an   account   (οὐδ᾿   ἀποδέέχεται   [sc.   λόόγον],   720c4-­‐‑5).   Perhaps   the   slave  
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doctor  would  not  know  what  to  do  with  such  an  account,  and  in  any  case,  he  
does   not   have   the   time   to   listen   to   one.  His   diagnosis   is   therefore   necessarily  
based   on   routine   (τὰ   δόόξαντα   ἐξ   ἐµμπειρίίας),   rather   than   on   careful   scrutiny,  
and   his   prescription   on   a   first   quick   impression   (he   gives   his   prescription  
“immediately”,   εὐθύύς,   719e8).   The   slave   doctor’s   permanent   shortage   of   time  
makes   him   a   tyrant   to   his   patients   (καθάάπερ   τύύραννος,   720c6),  who   departs  
immediately   after   having   issued   his   command.29   The   tyrannical   aspect   of   his  
mode  of  procedure  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  states  a  prescription  without  granting  
any  opportunity  for  discussion.    
   The   free   doctor’s   treatment   of   free   patients   is   of   an   entirely   different  
nature  than  that  of  the  slave  doctor,  720d1-­‐‑e1:  
[Ἆρ᾿  οὖν  καὶ  συννοεῖς  ὅτι  …]  ὁ  δὲ  ἐλεύύθερος  ὡς  ἐπὶ  τὸ  πλεῖστον  τὰ  τῶν  
ἐλευθέέρων  νοσήήµματα  θεραπεύύει  τε  καὶ  ἐπισκοπεῖ,  καὶ  ταῦτα  ἐξετάάζων  
ἀπ’  ἀρχῆς  καὶ  κατὰ  φύύσιν,  τῷ  κάάµμνοντι  κοινούύµμενος  αὐτῷ  τε  καὶ  τοῖς  
φίίλοις,  ἅµμα  µμὲν  αὐτὸς  µμανθάάνει   τι  παρὰ  τῶν  νοσούύντων,  ἅµμα  δὲ  καὶ  
καθ’   ὅσον   οἷόός   τέέ   ἐστιν,   διδάάσκει   τὸν   ἀσθενοῦντα   αὐτόόν,30   καὶ   οὐ  
πρόότερον   ἐπέέταξεν   πρὶν   ἄν   πῃ   συµμπείίσῃ,   τόότε   δὲ   µμετὰ   πειθοῦς  
ἡµμερούύµμενον  ἀεὶ  παρασκευάάζων  τὸν  κάάµμνοντα,  εἰς  τὴν  ὑγίίειαν  ἄγων,  
ἀποτελεῖν  πειρᾶται;    
[And  do  you  know   that31  …   ]   the   free-­‐‑born  doctor   is  mainly   engaged   in  
visiting   and   treating   the   ailments   of   free  men,   and   [that]   he   does   so   by  
investigating   them   from   the   beginning   and   in   accordance   with   nature;  
[that]  he  talks  with  the  patient  himself  and  with  his  friends,  and  thus  both  
learns   himself   from   the   sufferers   and   imparts   instruction   to   the   patient  
                                                                                                              
29  Apparently,  “tyrannical”  equals  the  absence  of  opportunity  for  exchange.  Discussion,  of  course,  
takes  time.  We  may  compare  the  Athenian’s  claim  that  the  easiest  and  quickest  way  to  change  the  
ἤθη  in  a  city  (adduced  in  Leg.   IV,  711a1-­‐‑c8)  occurs   in  a   tyrannical  city  (τυραννουµμέένη  πόόλις).   If  a  
tyrant  wishes   to   change   the   ἤθη   in   his   city,   he   simply  makes   statutes   that   praise   one   thing   and  
denunciate   the   other,   and   dishonours   the   disobedient.   Yet   this   allows   the   ἤθη   to   change   for   the  
better   or   the   worse:   the   tyrant   can   change   the   ἤθη   in   any   way   which   he   pleases   (ὅπῃπερ   ἂν  
ἐθελήήσῃ,   711b6):   towards   virtue,   or   towards   the   opposite   (ἐάάντε   πρὸς   ἀρετῆς   ἐπιτηδεύύµματα,  
προτρέέπεσθαι  τοὺς  πολίίτας,  ἐάάντε  ἐπὶ  τοὐναντίίον,  711b6-­‐‑8).  Hence,  to  change  ἤθη  in  a  tyrannical  
way   entails   the   risk   of   arbitrariness:   a   tyrannical   way   of   changing   ἤθη   does   not   offer   room   for  
discussion,  and  the  change  can  either  be  for  better  or  for  worse.  By  implication,  the  thought  seems  
to   be   that   to   change   ἤθη   via   discussion   will   at   least   enhance   the   chances   that   they   will   change  
towards  the  better.    
30  The  implication  seems  to  be:  and  if  that  is  impossible,  to  his  φίίλοι.  
31  This  sentence  is  part  of  a  question,  that  starts  at  720b8  (Ἆρ᾿  οὖν  καὶ  συννοεῖς  ὅτι  κτλ.).    
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himself,   so   far  as  possible;  and  that  he  gives  no  prescription  until  he  has  
gained   the  patient’s   consent,   and   only   then,  while   securing   the  patient’s  
continued  docility   by  means  of  persuasion,  does  he   attempt   to   complete  
the  task  of  restoring  him  to  health?  (Transl.  BURY,  adapted)  
The   free   doctor’s   method   largely   consists   of   an   extensive   examination   of   the  
patient   and   his   illness   “from   the   beginning”   (ἀπ᾿   ἀρχῆς)   and   “according   to  
nature”  (κατὰ  φύύσιν).32  This  examination  involves  both  the  patient  himself,  and  
his   relatives.  The   free  doctor,   to   the  extent   that  he   is  able,   educates  his  patient:  
διδάάσκει  τὸν  ἀσθενοῦντα  αὐτόόν  (720d6);33  as  opposed  to   the  slave  doctor,  he  
gives   every   individual   patient   an   account   of   his   illness   (λόόγον   ἑκάάστου  πέέρι  
νοσήήµματος   (…)   δίίδωσιν,   720c3-­‐‑4).34   The   free   doctor’s   treatment   involves  
mutual  instruction:  according  to  the  analogy,  the  free  doctor,  in  communicating  
with  his  patient,  himself  learns  from  his  patient  as  well.  Here,  again,  it  becomes  
apparent  that,  from  the  start,  lawgiving  is  envisaged  as  speech.  The  free  doctor  
tries  as  best  as  he  can  to  instruct  his  patient,  and,  in  marked  contrast  to  the  slave  
doctor,   refrains   from   issuing   prescriptions   until   he   has   secured   the   patient’s  
consent.  Also,  while  curing  his  patient,  the  free  doctor  continuously  keeps  him  
calm   by   means   of   persuasion   (τόότε   δὲ   µμετὰ   πειθοῦς   ἡµμερούύµμενον   ἀεὶ  
παρασκευάάζων  τὸν  κάάµμνοντα).    
                                                                                                              
32   SCHÖPSDAU   (2003)   connects   κατὰ  φύύσιν   in   720b4   (and  d3)   to   857d3-­‐‑4,   and   thinks   that   the   free  
doctor   “die  Natur   (φύύσις)   des  menschlichen  Körpers   berücksichtigt”   (238).   Yet   in   720b4   at   least,  
slave  doctors  are  said  to  acquire  medicine  “by  practice,  not  by  nature”  (κατ᾿  ἐµμπειρίίαν  τὴν  τέέχνην  
κτῶνται,  κατὰ  φύύσιν  δὲ  µμήή),  φύύσιν  thus  defining  the  method  of  acquisition  rather  than  the  subject  
of   study.   Likewise,   720d3   κατὰ   φύύσιν   is,   like   ἀπ᾿   ἀρχῆς,   a   qualification   of   ταῦτα   [sc.   τὰ   τῶν  
ἐλευθέέρων  νοσήήµματα]   ἐξετάάζων,   thus   referring   to   the  method   of   investigation.   The   implication  
seems   to   be   that   any   τέέχνη   ought   to   be   acquired   not   by   trial   and   error,   but   in   the   natural  way:  
through  αὐτὸς  µμανθάάνειν,   720b4-­‐‑5.  That   this   is   the   correct   interpretation  of  αὐτὸς  µμανθάάνειν   is  
corroborated  by  the  argument  that  virtue  is  self-­‐‑control:  one  has  to  learn  to  master  oneself.  
33  διδάάσκειν;  cf.  παιδεύύειν  in  Book  IX,  857d7,  e4.  Cf.  Leg.  885d2.  Laws  encourages  us  to  resist  such  
impressions   as   that   of   YUNIS’   (2007),   who   claims   that   in   Laws,   “law   becomes   a   tool   of   mass  
education”  (81).    
34   In   Phdr.   271b1-­‐‑5,   the   rhetoric   modelled   upon   philosophy   is   distinguished   from   contemporary  
rhetorical  practice  by  a  similar  argument:  philosophy  selects  the  type  of  speech  appropriate  to  the  
kind  of  soul.  Education  (διδάάσκειν)  can  only  take  place  through  fitting  (προσαρµμόόττειν)  the  right  
kind  of  speech  to  the  right  kind  of  soul.  
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   The  method  of  the  free  doctor  effectuates  what  the  Athenian  declared  to  
be   the   purpose   of   lawgiving   earlier   in   the   text:   to  make   the   addressee   “more  
docile   and   benevolent   in   listening”   (ἡµμερώώτερόόν   τε   ἂν   ἀκούύειν   καὶ  
εὐµμενέέστερον,   718d4)   as  well   as   a   better   learner   (εὐµμαθέέστερον,   718d5-­‐‑6).   In  
the   doctor-­‐‑analogy,   πείίθειν  becomes  more   or   less   identical   to   διδάάσκειν,   and  
effectuates   µμάάθησις.   The   difference,   to   the   extent   that   there   is   one,   entails  
merely   that   πείίθειν   includes   the   practical   consequences   of   instruction:   the  
patient’s  willingness  to  adhere  to  the  doctor’s  prescription(s).35  The  underlying  
assumption   is   that   a   citizen   who   is   furnished   with   sufficient   background  
information  about  what  to  do,  can,  as  a  rule,  be  expected  to  obey.    
   The  difference  between  the  two  modes  of  doctoring  may  be  summed  up  
as  follows.  The  method  of  the  slave  doctor  is  characterized  by  (1)  treatment  on  
the  basis  of  routine;  by  (2)  hurry  and  the  absence  of  a  longer-­‐‑lasting  interaction;  
and   by   (3)   the   complete   lack   of   opportunity   for   explanation   and   clarification.  
The  patient’s  individual  situation  is  entirely  lost  in  the  case  of  the  slave  doctor.  
This  type  of  doctor  remains  in  the  hospital  (720c3),  wherefore  he  cannot  observe  
the   patient   in   his   own   environment,   or   converse  with   the   sick   and   his  φίίλοι.  
The  slave  doctor  pays  his  patients  only  flying  visits,  during  which  he  does  not  
have   time   to   make   inquiries   into   his   patient’s   individual   situation.   The  
description   of   the   slave   doctor   repeatedly   draws   attention   to   his   permanent  
shortage   of   time.  He   is   in   too  much   of   a   hurry   to   be   able   to   perform   his   task  
properly.36    
                                                                                                              
35  In  the  Platonic  corpus,  πείίθειν  and  διδάάσκειν  are  usually  opposites.  For  example,  in  Gorg.  455a1  
πιστευτικήή  is  opposed  to  διδασκαλικήή.  In  Tht.  201a4-­‐‑c2,  the  sophists  persuade  without  educating  
(πείίθουσιν   οὐ   διδάάσκοντες   ἀλλὰ   δοξάάζειν   ποιούύντες).   In   Plt.   303e7-­‐‑304d2,   ῥητορείία,   besides  
warfare   and   judging,   is   one   of   the   supportive   arts   of   the   true   statecraft,   persuades   the  mass   by  
myths   (µμυθολογίία),   and   does   not   convey   teaching   (διδαχήή).   It   has   to   implant   in   the   soul   of   the  
citizens   true   opinions   about   the   just,   the   good   and   the   beautiful   (305c5-­‐‑d8).  Tim.   51e1-­‐‑6   draws   a  
contrast  between  νοῦς,  effectuated  by  teaching  (διὰ  διδαχῆς),  and  true  opinion,  effectuated  through  
persuasion  (ὑπὸ  πειθοῦς  ἡµμῖν  ἐγγίίνεται).    
36  He  states  immediately  (εὐθύύς)  what  must  be  done  and  what  not  (719e8-­‐‑720a1).  Other  references  
to   continuous   haste:   περιτρέέχοντες   (720c2),   προστάάξας  …   τὰ   δόόξαντα  …  οἴχεται   ἀποπήήδησας  
(720c5-­‐‑7).   Τhe   aorist   participles   (προστάάξας,   ἀποπήήδησας)   suggest   a   lack   of   time:   the   chain   of  
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   By  contrast,  the  free  doctor’s  method  is  essentially  a  form  of  instruction.  
It   is   a   one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one   conversation.37   The   free  doctor’s   instruction   is   tailored   to   the  
personal  needs  and  specific  condition  of  the  patient.  The  description  of  the  free  
doctor’s  method   seems   in   fact   to   recall   a   very   familiar  process:   the  dialectical  
method.38   Therefore,   instead   of   drawing   on   theories   of   persuasion   in   other  
dialogues,39   it   seems   more   fruitful   to   evaluate   Laws’   notion   of   persuasion   in  
terms   of   Plato’s   own   notion   of   dialectic.   The   depiction   of   the   free   doctor’s  
method  is  replete  with  the  familiar  dialectical  motives:  (1)  just  like  dialectic,  it  is  
a  shared  enterprise  between  doctor  and  patient  (about  τὰ  νοσήήµματα,  in  which  
the   doctor   communicates   and   also   learns   himself);40   (2)   it   is   a   one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
completed  events  produces  a  kind  of  staccato  effect.  The  lawgiver/doctor  seems  already  on  his  way  
to  a  next  patient  when  he  has  stated  the  threat.  In  Tht.  172d4-­‐‑173b3,  Socrates  likens  those  who  are  
regulars   of   law   courts   to   slaves   in   comparison   to   those   who   have   spent   their   lives   pursuing  
philosophy,  on  the  ground  that  the  latter  always  have  leisure  (σχολήή),  and  develop  their  arguments  
in   peace   at   their   leisure   (τοὺς   λόόγους   ἐν   εἰρήήνῃ   ἐπὶ   σχολῆς   ποιοῦνται),   just   like   Socrates   and  
Theodorus   are   doing.   The   others   always   have   to   speak   in   a   hurry   (οἱ   δὲ   ἐν   ἀσχολίίᾳ   τε   ἀεὶ  
λέέγουσι),   because   they   have   to   stick   to   the   time-­‐‑limit   (the   water-­‐‑clock)   and   to   the   pre-­‐‑fixed  
statement  in  the  ἀντωµμοσίία.  The  effect  is  moral  corruption  (173a1-­‐‑b3).    
37  Cf.  Leg.  888a6-­‐‑7:  λέέγωµμεν  πρᾴως,  σβέέσαντες  τὸν  θυµμόόν,  ὡς  ἑνὶ  διαλεγόόµμενοι  τῶν  τοιούύτων  [sc.  
people  who  deny  the  existence  of  the  gods].  A  face  to  face  conversation  seems  to  be  part  and  parcel  
of  the  attempt  to  remain  friendly  to  dissidents  who  refuse  to  believe  in  the  city’s  religion.  
38  Cf.  LAKS  (2000),  289:  “The  Laws  even  goes  so  far  as  to  picture  the  doctor  ‘going  back  to  the  general  
nature  of   bodies’  ….   the  hyperbole   is   evident,   but   so   is   the   reason   for   it:   the   Socratic  model   of   a  
dialectical   conversation   constitutes   the   horizon   within   which   the   theory   of   legislative   preamble  
must  be  situated.”    
39  As  interpreters  have  usually  done;  a  parallel  with  Gorgias:   JAEGER  (1945),  217;  MESCH  (2003),  60.  
Parallel   with   Phaedrus:   MORROW   (1953):   “Plato’s   legislation   is   (…)   one   vast   system   of   total  
persuasion,  the  climactic  fulfilment  of  the  art  of  psychagogy  that  he  had  outlined  in  the  Phaedrus”  
(242).  Cf.  YUNIS   (1996):  “within   the   legal  preambles  of   the  Laws  Plato  attempts   to   implement  on  a  
massive  scale   the  kind  of   instructive  rhetoric  proposed   in   the  Phaedrus”  (ibid.,  212);  YUNIS  stresses  
the  difference  between  the  rejection  of  rhetoric  in  Gorgias  and  “the  creation  of  a  new  rhetorical  genre  
of  legal-­‐‑political  discourse”  in  Laws  (235-­‐‑236).  According  to  YUNIS  (2011),  10,  Phaedrus  discusses  the  
didactic  rhetoric  hinted  at  in  Gorgias.    
40   Cf.   ENGLAND   ad   720d3.   The   term   ἐξετάάζειν   is   used   by   Socrates   in   Apology   to   describe   his  
philosophical   activity,  Apol.   23c4,   c5,   c8,   28e6,   33c3,   38a5,   41b5,   41c3;   cf.   Tht.   155a1;   Phdr.   270c7;  
Charm.  172b7;  Tim.  62c4.  It  is  typically  concerned  with  being  (τὰ  ὄντα,  Gorg.  495a8),  and  with  true  
moral  improvement  (Gorg.  515b1).  Hence  in  that  context  it  refers  to  conversations  that  irritate  those  
subject  to  his  scrutiny.  By  contrast,  in  Laws  the  scrutiny  of  the  patient  about  his  illness  (and  in  fact,  if  
we   recall   that   the   doctor   is   the   analogon  of   the   lawgiver,   the   νόόσηµμα   is   in   fact   the   inclination   to  
commit  an  illegal  act,  a  moral  weakness),  is  welcomed  (this  is  the  gentler  treatment  the  interlocutors  
are   after),   and   can   emerge   as   the   positive   counterpart   to   the   slave   doctor  who   hurries   from   one  
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conversation  (cf.  ὡς  ἑνὶ  διαλεγόόµμενοι,  888a641);  (3)  it  instructs  the  patient  on  the  
basis   of   an   account   of   his   individual   situation   (τινὰ   λόόγον   ἑκάάστου   πέέρι  
νοσήήµματος  ἑκάάστου  τῶν  οἰκέέτων  …  δίίδωσιν  720c3-­‐‑5;  cf.  διδάάσκει  in  720d6  and  
ἔλεγχον   διδόόναι   in   891a2);42   (4)   similarly   to   the   dialectical   method,   which  
requires   that   the   interlocutor   explicitly   declares   himself   in   “agreement”  
(ὁµμολογίία),   the   treatment   of   the   free   doctor   does   not   proceed   without   the  
patient’s  assent  (cf.  οὐ  πρόότερον  ἐπέέταξεν  πρὶν  ἄν  πῃ  συµμπείίσῃ,  720d6-­‐‑7);  (5)  
again,   like  dialectic,   the  free  doctor’s  method  is  not  constrained  by  time  (quite  
unlike   the   visits   of   the   slave   doctor).43   Regarding   the   representation   of   the  
preambles   as   a   distinctly   πρᾷος   mode   of   address,   we   may   recall   that   the  
willingness  to  clarify  one’s  statements,  σαφέέστερον  λέέγειν,  is  a  token  of  one’s  
εὔνοια   (“benevolence”)   to   a   serious   interlocutor.44   The   free   doctor’s   method  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
patient   to   the   next.   In   the   doctor-­‐‑analogy,   ἐξετάάζειν   is   therefore   part   of   a   process   of   friendly,  
mutually  instructive  conversation  between  doctor  and  patient  (and  his  φίίλοι).  The  interlocutors  in  
Laws  refer  to  their  own  conversation  as  ἐξετάάζειν  in  685a7,  891c9,  900d5.  
41     Leg.   888a6   seems   to   assume   a   link   between   speaking   one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one   and   the   ability   to   curb   one’s  
anger  and  remain  well-­‐‑mannered.  
42  Giving  a  logos  (‘account’)  as  part  what  it  means  to  possess  a  τέέχνη:  Gorg.  464b-­‐‑465a5;  cf.  500b-­‐‑501a  
and  501a1-­‐‑3.  On  giving  an  account  in  the  context  of  τέέχνη:   IRWIN  (1977),  71-­‐‑77;  WOODRUFF  (1992);  
ROOCHNIK  (1996);  BALANSARD  (2003),  47-­‐‑51,  141-­‐‑2,  146-­‐‑7.    
43  For  this  aspect  of  dialectic,  see,  e.g.,  Tht.  154e7-­‐‑155a2,  172c2-­‐‑173b3.  When  the  case  of  the  δυσµμαθήής  
is  discussed  (891a1-­‐‑4),  for  whom,  on  first  hearing,  what  such  προστάάγµματα  say  may  be  difficult  (εἰ  
χαλεπὰ  κατ᾿  ἀρχὰς  ἀκούύειν),   it   is  important  to  realize  that  the  preambles  remain  “in  all  respects  
fixed”   (πάάντως   ἠρεµμεῖ)   and   offer   him   the   opportunity   to   visit   them   many   times   (πολλάάκις  
ἐπανιόόντι).  This  suggests  that   the  preambles  will  be  saying  the  same  thing  over  and  over.  This   is  
not  inconsistent  with  the  idea  that  the  preambles  will  address  every  person  in  the  appropriate  way:  
for  the  δυσµμαθήής  the  appropriate  is  repetition  of  the  same.  
44  Plt.   262c2-­‐‑4.  When   the  young  Socrates   asks  Πῶς,  ὦ  ξέένε,  λέέγεις   τοῦτο;   the  Stranger   responds:  
Πειρατέέον  ἔτι  σαφέέστερον  φράάζειν  εὐνοίίᾳ  τῆς  σῆς  φύύσεως,  ὦ  Σώώκρατες  “I  must  try  to  tell  you  
still  more  clearly,  Socrates,  out  of  good  will  towards  your  natural  endowments”  (transl.  ROWE).  In  
Gorgias,   εὔνοια  was  stipulated  as  one  of   the   three  conditions   for   successful  dialectic.  Gorg.   486e6-­‐‑
487a3  (Socrates  is  speaking):  ἐννοῶ  γὰρ  ὅτι  τὸν  µμέέλλοντα  βασανιεῖν  ἱκανῶς  ψυχῆς  πέέρι  ὀρθῶς  τε  
ζώώσης  καὶ  µμὴ  τρίία  ἄρα  δεῖ  ἔχειν  ἃ  σὺ  [sc.  Callicles]  πάάντα  ἔχεις,  ἐπιστήήµμην  τε  καὶ  εὔνοιαν  καὶ  
παρρησίίαν,  “I  realize  that  a  person  who  is  going  to  put  a  soul  to  an  adequate  test  to  see  whether  it  
lives   rightly  or  not  must  have   three  qualities,   all   of  which  you  haveL  knowledge,  good  will,   and  
frankness”   (transl.   ZEYL).   Cf.   BOBONICH   (1991),   376,   n.   45:   “Plato   often   suggests   a   connection  
between  ‘gentleness’  and  the  ability  to  learn  and  teach”,  with  references  ibid.  
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also   seems   to   be   properly   attuned   to   the   needs   of   each   patient.45   Finally,   the  
social   status   of   the   free   doctor   (ἐλεύύθερος)   may   also   imply   that   there   is   no  
reason  not  to  speak  candidly,  but  that  the  conversation  is  solely  informed  by  the  
considerations  and  concerns  that  come  up.    
   It   should   be   noted   however,   that   dialectic   in   the   context   of   the   doctor-­‐‑
analogy  is  not  entirely  the  same  as  dialectic  as  a  search  for  truth.  The  dialectical  
discussion   as   a   search   for   truth   creates,   or   at   least   pretends   do   so,   an  
equilibrium,   in   which   pressure   to   state,   or   agree   to,   something   one   does   not  
really   hold   true   is   minimalized.46   In   Laws,   dialectic—if   we   can   still   call   it  
dialectic—functions   in   the   service   of   convention.   The   discussion   between   the  
doctor  and  patient  ultimately  has  the  purpose  of  getting  the  patient,  or  citizen,  
to  submit  to  the  prescription  willingly.  In  the  case  the  citizen  resists  voluntary  
submission,  the  law  itself  will  raise  its  voice  and  punishment  will  follow.      
     
5.2.2   The  preambles:  a  brief  overview  
What   sort   of   texts   are   these   persuasive   preambles?   The   Athenian   himself  
illustrates   his   innovation   by   an   example.  He   first   formulates   a   law  without   a  
preamble  (ὁ  µμὲν  ἁπλοῦς  [νόόµμος]),  which  runs  as  follows,  721b1-­‐‑3:    
                                                                                                              
45   In   this   respect,   the   speech   of   the   doctor   in   the   analogy  may   resemble   Phaedrus’   philosophical  
rhetoric,  Phdr.  271c10-­‐‑272a8.  In  virtue  of  the  preambles’  representation  as  philosophical  rhetoric,  it  
seems   reasonable   to   suppose   that   controlling   their   reception   works   similarly   to   the   effect   of  
philosophical  rhetoric  in  Phaedrus:  to  select  an  argument  appropriate  to  the  person  who  needs  to  be  
instructed.  Phdr.   270b1-­‐‑272b2.   In  Phaedrus,   rhetoric   is   also   compared   to  medicine.   Furthermore,   it  
may  be  noted  that  the  only  time  the  Athenian  alludes  to  the  laws/preambles  as  written  texts,  this  is  
as  an  advantage  (µμεγίίστη  βοήήθεια)  for  νοµμοθεσίία:  laws’  written  nature  allows  the  δυσµμαθήής  to  be  
educated   as   well,   since   he   can   come   back   often   and   reread   them:   890e6-­‐‑891a4.   Of   course,   this  
insistence   on   the   preambles   as   written   texts   is   inconsistent   with   their   presentation   as   speeches  
elsewhere.   These   claims   cannot   be   true   at   the   same   time.   This   inconsistency   is,   however,   not  
problematic  in  the  realm  of  fiction  or  thought  experiment.  
46  We  may  think,  for  instance,  about  Socrates’  insistence  on  “speaking  one’s  mind”,  παρρησίία.  We  
find  the  insistence  on  παρρησίία  in  contexts  when  convention  may  prevent  the  interlocutor  to  speak  
his   mind,   as   in   the   case   of   Callicles   in   Gorgias.   The   absence   of   time-­‐‑constraints   is   part   of   this  
equilibrium.   The   availability   of   time   enhances   the   chances   to   reach   the   truth,   because   one   is   not  
forced   to   give   up   when   truth   appears   to   be   more   difficult   to   attain   than   initially   assumed.   On  
παρρησίία  in  Plato,  see  VAN  RAALTE  (2004).  
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Γαµμεῖν   δέέ,   ἐπειδὰν   ἐτῶν   ᾖ   τις   τριάάκοντα,   µμέέχρι   ἐτῶν   πέέντε   καὶ  
τριάάκοντα,  εἰ  δὲ  µμήή,  ζηµμιοῦσθαι  χρήήµμασίίν  τε  καὶ  ἀτιµμίίᾳ,  χρήήµμασι  µμὲν  
τόόσοις  καὶ  τόόσοις,  τῇ  καὶ  τῇ  δὲ  ἀτιµμίίᾳ.  
A  man  shall  marry  when  he  is  thirty  years  old  and  under  five  and  thirty;  if  
he   fails   to   do   so,   he   shall   be   punished   both   by   a   fine   in  money   and   by  
degradation,   the   fine   being   of   such   and   such   an   amount,   and   the  
degradation  of  such  and  such  a  kind.  (Transl.  BURY).  
The  double  law  is  preceded  by  a  preamble,  which  runs  as  follows,  721b6-­‐‑c8:  
Γαµμεῖν   δέέ,   ἐπειδὰν   ἐτῶν   ᾖ   τις   τριάάκοντα,   µμέέχρι   τῶν   πέέντε   καὶ  
τριάάκοντα,   διανοηθέέντα   ὡς   ἔστιν   ᾗ   τὸ   ἀνθρώώπινον   γέένος   φύύσει   τινὶ  
µμετείίληφεν   ἀθανασίίας,   οὗ   καὶ   πέέφυκεν   ἐπιθυµμίίαν   ἴσχειν   πᾶς  
πᾶσαν·∙   τὸ   γὰρ   γενέέσθαι   κλεινὸν   καὶ   µμὴ   ἀνώώνυµμον   κεῖσθαι  
τετελευτηκόότα   τοῦ   τοιούύτου   ἐστὶν   ἐπιθυµμίία.   γέένος   οὖν   ἀνθρώώπων  
ἐστίίν  τι  συµμφυὲς  τοῦ  παντὸς  χρόόνου,  ὃ  διὰ  τέέλους  αὐτῷ  συνέέπεται  καὶ  
συνέέψεται,   τούύτῳ   τῷ   τρόόπῳ   ἀθάάνατον   ὄν,   τῷ   παῖδας   παίίδων  
καταλειπόόµμενον,   ταὐτὸν   καὶ   ἓν   ὂν   ἀείί,   γενέέσει   τῆς   ἀθανασίίας  
µμετειληφέέναι·∙  τούύτου  δὴ  ἀποστερεῖν  ἑκόόντα  ἑαυτὸν  οὐδέέποτε  ὅσιον,  ἐκ  
προνοίίας  δὲ  ἀποστερεῖ  ὃς  ἂν  παίίδων  καὶ  γυναικὸς  ἀµμελῇ.      
A   man   shall   marry   when   he   is   thirty   years   old   and   under   thirty-­‐‑five,  
bearing  in  mind  that  this  is  the  way  by  which  the  human  race,  by  nature’s  
ordinance,  shares  in  immortality,  a  thing  for  which  nature  has  implanted  
in   everyone   a  keen  desire.  The  desire   to  win  glory,   instead  of   lying   in   a  
nameless   grave,   aims   at   a   like   object.   Thus  mankind   is   by  nature   coeval  
with  the  whole  of  time,  in  that  it  accompanies  it  continually  both  now  and  
in   the   future;  and  the  means  by  which   it   is   immortal   is   this:—by   leaving  
behind  it  children’s  children  and  continuing  ever  one  and  the  same,  it  thus  
by  reproduction  shares  in  immortality.  That  a  man  should  deprive  himself  
thereof  voluntarily  is  never  an  act  of  holiness;  and  he  who  denies  himself  
wife  and  children  is  guilty  of  such  intentional  deprivation.  (Transl.  BURY)    
The  preamble  places   the   act   of   the   individual   in   a   larger,   cosmic,   framework.  
The   refusal   to   have   children   is   not   an   act   that   concerns   only   oneself;   it   has   a  
significance   for   the   whole   of   humankind.   The   obligation   to  marry   and   beget  
children  is  motivated  by  an  appeal  to  humankind  (τὸ  ἀνθρώώπινον  γέένος)  and  
his  natural  predisposition  (φύύσει,  πέέφυκεν).  Humankind  shares  in  immortality  
by   reproduction,   and   is   claimed   to   have   a   natural   desire   for   immortality.   By  
reproduction   humankind   is   coeval   with   time   (συµμφυὲς   τοῦ   παντὸς   χρόόνου,  
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721c3).  Νot  begetting  children  is,  reasoned  along  these  lines,  against  nature,  and  
a  failure  to  honour  what  needs  to  be  honoured  (man’s  share  in  immortality).  
   The  preambles  are,  however,  more  diverse  in  kind  than  one  might  have  
expected   on   the   basis   of   this   example.   A   classification   endorsed   by   several  
interpreters   is   to   divide   them   into   three   kinds:   rational   argument,  
encouragement  by  praise   and  blame,   and  deterring47   tales   about  divine  wrath  
and   punishment.48   The   preambles   exhibit   differences   both   in   respect   of   the  
phase  of  paideia  to  which  they  contribute,  and  in  respect  of  their  style  and  type  
of  arguments.49  It  seems  that  several  factors  are  at  play  here.    
                                                                                                              
47   SCHÖPSDAU   (2003),   223-­‐‑224,   rightly   notes   the   deterring   effect   of   “[d]as   mit   dem   Hinweis   auf  
göttliche  Sanktionen  argumentierende  Proömium,  das  in  der  Regel  warnende  Funktion  hat”  (223).  
Threat  of  legal  punishment  in  these  cases  makes  way  for  threat  of  divine  wrath  and  punishment  for  
particular  actions.  For  mythical  motives  in  the  preambles,  see  GÖRGEMANNS  (1960),  n.  3,  pp.  59-­‐‑61;  
BRISSON  (2000),  244-­‐‑248.    
48  This   is   the  classification  of  SCHÖPSDAU   (2003),   223-­‐‑224;   similarly  LAKS   (1991),  BOBONICH   (1994),  
and  BRISSON  (2000).    
49   Most   older   analyses   of   the   preambles   have   claimed   that   (with   only   a   few   exceptions)   the  
preambles  are  instances  of  (irrational)  “praise  and  blame”  or  enchantment  (with  the  implication  that  
such   arguments   are   incomparable   to  philosophical   argument):  MORROW   (1953)   (“adoption  of   this  
art   of   enchantment”),   and   (1960),   552-­‐‑560;   GÖRGEMANNS   (1960),   30-­‐‑49;   VERSENYI   (1961)   (“non-­‐‑
rational   persuasive   material   rather   than   reasoning”,   70);   HALL   (1963),   203-­‐‑208;   STALLEY   (1983)  
(“primarily  intended  to  provide  moral  exhortation”,  10,  cf.  42-­‐‑44)  and  (1994),  169;  LAKS  (1990),  209-­‐‑
229;  YUNIS  (1996)  (“deliberative  rhetoric”,  217;  “authoritatively  pronounced  admonition,  sometimes  
with  a   strong  emotional   colouring”,  229);  BRISSON   (2005)   (“the  preambles   to   the   laws  do  not   seek  
rationally  to  convince,  but  to  enchant  the  citizens  by  means  of  the  charms  dispensed  by  mythology  
and  rhetoric”,  117).  THESLEFF  (1967)  on  the  basis  of  stylistic  analysis  concludes   that   the  preambles  
often   use   the   “rhetorical   style”.  Against   these,   BOBONICH   (1991),   (1994),   (1996),   has   defended   the  
view   that   the  preambles  employ  “rational  persuasion”.  Recently,   it  has  been  emphasized   that   the  
preambles  deploy  a  spectrum  of  arguments:  SAUNDERS  (1992)  “combined  appeal  to  sensibility  and  
reason”   (472);   LISI   (2000);   BRISSON   (2000):   preambles   draw   on   means   necessary   for   a   particular  
group   of   citizens   with   a   particular   educational   background   (especially   69-­‐‑71);   PRADEAU   (2005)  
denies   that   the   preambles   “set   forth   rationally   the   appropriateness   of   such-­‐‑and-­‐‑such   a   conduct”  
(135,   cf.   n.   20   ibidem:   they   “do   not   transmit   a   teaching”),   but   he   does   speak   of   a   “totality   of  
resources”,   including   “religious   authority   as  well   as   threats”,   “appeal   to   tradition”,   “recourse   to  
edifying   examples”   (136);   MEYER   (2006):   “[g]iven   the   Athenian’s   later   comment   that   to   legislate  
using  preludes  is  in  fact  to  engage  in  paideia  (857e),  we  should  not  be  surprised  to  find  the  preludes  
appealing   to   the   citizens   in   rhetorical   as   well   as   intellectual   means”   (386);   ZUCKERT   (2009):  
“combination  of  reason  with  appeals  to  the  passions”  (113,  cf.  122).  KOEPLIN  (2009):  “the  preambles  
use  a  variety  of  methods  of  persuasion”  (15,  cf.  18);  BICKFORD  (2009)  (contra  BOBONICH  [2002]):  “the  
soul-­‐‑shaping   of   the  Laws   involves   teaching-­‐‑persuasion   and   reasoned   inspiration,   implying   a   rich  
conception  of  human  capacity  and  change”  (150).  
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   The  first  is  the  kind  of  νόόµμος  for  which  the  preamble  is  the  preface:  some  
preambles   are   the  prefaces  of   a   law   that   attempts   to  guide  a   certain  aspect  of  
citizen  life,  for  instance  marriage;  other  preambles  preface  a  criminal  statute,  or  
set  of  criminal  statutes.  The  difference  is  that  a  preamble  that  guides  the  correct  
customs  to  be  observed  in,   for   instance,  marriage  or  wills,  does  not  operate   in  
the   same   dangerous   zone   as   the   preamble   to   the   penal   law,   that   attempts   to  
change   the   mind   of   an   almost-­‐‑criminal.   The   second   relevant   aspect   that  
determines  the  nature  of  a  preamble  is  the  type  of  person  or  group  of  citizens  to  
whom  it  is  addressed.  In  most  cases,  a  preamble  (and  law)  is  only  directed  at  a  
specific   group   of   people,   or   a   specific   individual.50   These   two   aspects,   the  
preamble’s   contribution   to   paideia   and   its   intended   audience,   are   of   course  
closely   related.   Together,   they   determine   the   nature   of   the   preamble.   In  
addition,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  stages  of  completion  of  the  preambles  vary.51  
Some   preambles   seem   to   have   received   their   more   or   less   definitive   form,  
whereas  others  have  to  be  supplemented.  Most  of  the  preambles  in  the  category  
of   (almost)   final   preambles   are   those   addressed   to   potential   criminals,   a   fact  
which  may  suggest  that  a  penal  preamble  constitutes  the  most  original  form,  or  
that  the  preamble  was  originally  designed  as  a  preface  for  this  kind  of  statutes  
(which  seems  to  be  corroborated  by  the  fact  that  the  analogon  used  to  explain  the  
function   of   the   preambles   is   the   doctor,   implying   that   a   preamble   addresses  
someone  who  has  fallen  ill).  A  third  category  of  preambles  consists  of  excerpts  
from  the  discussion  that  the  interlocutors  say  have  to  be  turned  into  preambles,  
but  are  not  preambles  yet.  
   Examples   of   preambles   that   do   not   introduce   penal   laws   and   have   a  
formative  function  include  the  preamble  that  precedes  the  law  code  as  a  whole  
                                                                                                              
50  See  Leg.  723c1-­‐‑4:  Καλῶς  µμὲν  τοίίνυν,  ὦ  Κλεινίία,  δοκεῖς  µμοι  τόό  γε  τοσοῦτον  λέέγειν,  ὅτι  πᾶσίίν  γε  
νόόµμοις  ἔστιν  προοίίµμια  καὶ  ὅτι  πάάσης  ἀρχόόµμενον  νοµμοθεσίίας  χρὴ  προτιθέέναι  παντὸς  τοῦ  λόόγου  
τὸ  πεφυκὸς  προοίίµμιον  ἑκάάστοις.  
51  See  for  this  categorization  of  the  preambles  YUNIS  (1996),  227,  nn.  26,  27,  28.  
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(addressed   to   all   mature   citizens),52   the   proposed   preamble   for   marriage  
regulations   (addressed   to   the   young   men),53   and   the   preamble   for   hunting  
(addressed  to   the  youths).54  Most  preambles,  however,  precede  the  penal   laws  
formulated   in   Books   IX   and   X.55   These   are   the   preambles   against   temple-­‐‑
robbing,56  against  all  types  of  murders,57  against  impiety,58  against  adulteration  
(κιβδηλείία),59  the  one  addressed  to  those  who  are  dying  and  are  about  to  make  
a  will,60  a  preamble  to  the  lawguards  and  guardians  about  the  care  of  orphans,61  
and   one   for   the  worship   of   gods,   deemed   equally   fitting   for   honouring   one’s  
parents.62  The  preambles  in  Book  IX  and  X  are  often  considered  to  be  the  most  
                                                                                                              
52  Leg.  729a1-­‐‑734e2.  Τhis  preamble  is  in  fact  clearly  demarcated:  at  734e3-­‐‑4,  it  ends  with  the  closure  
Καὶ  τὸ  µμὲν  προοίίµμιον  τῶν  νόόµμων  ἐνταυθοῖ  λεχθὲν  τῶν  λόόγων  τέέλος  ἐχέέτω.  This  preamble  is  in  
fact  an  exception,  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  only  preamble  addressed  to  the  citizenry  as  a  whole.  But  see  
also  Leg.  722d1-­‐‑2,  where  the  interlocutors  state  that  their  whole  discussion  till  then  is  a  προοιµμίίον.  
53  Leg.   721b6-­‐‑d6;   also   announced   in  Leg.   772e3-­‐‑4;   the  προοίίµμιον   starts   at   772e7   and  addresses   the  
sons  of  good  fathers:  Ὦ  παῖ,  τοίίνυν  φῶµμεν  ἀγαθῶν  πατέέρων  φύύντι.  See  also  chapter  four,  p.  159.  
54  Leg.  823b1-­‐‑824a19.  This  προοίίµμιον  is  part  of  that  part  of  the  law  code  that  belongs  to  paideia  in  a  
more  strict  sense  (that  it,  the  laws  that  address  the  νέέοι),  for  after  the  preamble  for  hunting  has  been  
concluded,   the  Athenian  states  Νῦν  οὖν  ἤδη  πάάντα  χρὴ  φάάναι  τέέλος  ἔχειν  τάά  γε  παιδείίας  πέέρι  
νόόµμιµμα  (824a20-­‐‑21).  
55  See  Leg.  880a8  (not  precisely  clear  to  what  preamble  this  refers).  
56  The  preamble  is  announced  in  Leg.  854a3-­‐‑5,  concluded  by  854c6-­‐‑7;  the  preamble  in  854b1-­‐‑c5;  the  
law  begins   in   854d1,   and  probably   ends  at  d4,   or  perhaps  after   the  γάάρ-­‐‑interlude  of   854d4-­‐‑e1,   in  
855a2   (cf.   the   lay   out   in   SAUNDERS’   translation).   The   preamble   explicitly   claims   to   instruct:   µμαθέέ  
(854b6).  If  the  person  who  intends  to  rob  a  temple  notices  that  his  “disease”  does  not  diminish,  he  
should  look  upon  death  as  the  better  alternative.  
57   At  Leg.   870d4-­‐‑5   the  Athenian   says   that   for   all   the   cases   of  murder   they   have   enumerated,   the  
preambles  mentioned  ought  to  be  stated  (προοίίµμια  µμὲν  εἰρηµμέένα  ταῦτ᾿  ἔστω),  probably  referring  
to  analysis  of  the  various  kinds  of  emotions  that  may  provoke  murder  in  870a1-­‐‑d4,  but  perhaps  also  
the  discussion  about  the  distinctions  between  voluntary  and  involuntary  crime  in  860c4ff.  The  series  
of  laws  against  premeditated  murder  on  different  types  of  people  begins  in  871a2  and  is  concluded  
in  872c6.  
58  The  preamble  against  impiety  is  referred  to  in  Leg.  887a3,  c1.  It  begins  in  888a7  and  is  concluded  
in  907d1.  After  the  preamble,  the  law  itself  follows  in  907d7-­‐‑  (probably)  908a1.  
59  Leg.  916d6-­‐‑917b7.  The  law  follows  in  917b7.  
60  Leg.  923a2-­‐‑c2.  The  law  follows  in  923c4.  Also  a  special  general  preamble  is  to  be  designed  with  the  
purpose  of  pardoning  the  lawgiver  in  case  the  situation  compels  the  person  to  disobey  the  law,  as  
the  Athenian  explains  in  925d5-­‐‑926a3.  
61   This   preamble   is   mentioned   in   926e8.   They   have   given   fitting   preludes   (ἐµμµμελῆ   …  
προοιµμιασάάµμενοι,  926e7-­‐‑8)  earlier,  probably  referring  to  965eff.  (ENGLAND  ad  927a1).    
62  Leg.  930e5.  The  discussion  that  follows  (until  932a6)  seems  to  contain  fragments  that  might  add  up  
to  a  complete  preamble.  The  law  follows  in  932a7-­‐‑d8.  
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“rational“   ones   in   their   kind   by   modern   interpreters,   because   they   offer   the  
most   complex,   philosophically   sophisticated   argumentation.63   But   rationality  
does   not   depend   on   the   kind   of   arguments   used.   The   preambles   are   rational  
because  they  are  mechanisms  that  encourage  a  person  to  restrain  oneself.64  
   The   preambles   in  most   cases   address   potential   criminals,   and   therefore  
become  effective  when  paideia  has  failed.  Their  role  in  the  series  of  mechanisms  
that   are   designed   to   maintain   the   legal   order   is   thus   strictly   speaking   after  
paideia:   paideia   is   a   regulative   mechanism   designed   for   all   citizens,   educating  
them   and   training   them   to   internalise   the   norms.   If   paideia   fails   and  
transgression  of  the  law  becomes  more  likely,  the  preamble  has  the  function  to  
motivate  the  potential  criminal  to  restrain  himself.  Persuasion  is  used  to  make  
him  internalize  the  specific  law.    
   If,  however,  the  persuasion  of  the  preamble  fails,  then  there  remains  the  
violence   (βίία)   of   the   law   (νόόµμος),  which,   had   the  persuasion  of   the  preamble  
been   successful,  would   have   remained   silent.65   In   case   of   transgression   of   the  
law,   punishment   (δίίκη)   follows,   although   even   punishment   can   assume   the  
form  of  paideia,  as   in  case  with   the  criminals   (the  atheists)  who  are  sent   to   the  
σωφρονιστήήριον   where   they   are   to   be   instructed   by   the   members   of   the  
nocturnal   council.66   In   the   final   instance,   if   the   crime   is   very   serious   and   all  
other  mechanisms  have   repeatedly   failed   to  cure  a  person  of  his  ”illness”,   the  
criminal  is  considered  “incurable”.67  The  final  remedy  is  death.68  
  
                                                                                                              
63  See  n.  81  on  p.  201  below.  
64  Cf.  the  representation  of  the  laws  as  assisting  the  λογισµμόός  in  the  puppet  εἰκώών,  section  3.2.2.  
65   Leg.   854c7-­‐‑8:   τῷ   µμὲν   πειθοµμέένῳ   τὸν   νόόµμον   ἐᾶν   σιγῇ   δεῖ;   938a6-­‐‑7:   πειθοµμέένοις   µμὲν   σιγήή,  
ἀπειθοῦσιν  δὲ  φωνὴ  νόόµμου  ἥδε.  
66  The  σωφρονιστήήριον  is  one  of  three  kinds  of  prisons  in  the  envisaged  polis,  Leg.  908a1-­‐‑7:  (1)  one  is  
to  be  situated  near  the  market-­‐‑place;  (2)  the  σωφρονιστήήριον  is  to  be  near  the  meeting  place  of  the  
nocturnal  council,  and  (3)  one  is  to  be  situated  in  the  loneliest  and  wildest  spot  in  the  middle  of  the  
country.  
67  See  e.g.  Leg.  854c4-­‐‑5,  941d4,  942a4;  cf.  877a5.    
68  E.g.  Leg.  942a4.  
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5.2.3   The  doctor-­‐‑analogy  of  Book  IX  
In   Book   IX,   we   encounter   a   recapitulation   of   the   doctor-­‐‑analogy   of   Book   IV.  
Book   IX   for   the   most   part   contains   penal   laws.   The   doctor-­‐‑analogy   is   thus  
recalled   in   the   context   of   a   special   type   of   laws:   those   addressing   possible  
criminals,  who  are  about  to  transgress  a  particular  law.  The  idea  of  a  doctor  of  
course   implies   that   the   person   addressed,   the   patient,   is   someone   who   has  
fallen   ill.   In   the   realm   of   the   doctor’s   analogon,   the   lawgiver,   the   preamble   is  
addressed  to  the  person  who  almost  fails  to  control  himself.  The  doctor-­‐‑analogy  
in  Book  IX  thus  seems  designed  as  the  analogon  for  a  specific  type  of  preamble:  
the   preamble   that   is   prefaced   to   criminal   legislation.   It   is   apparently   the  
criminal  who   needs  more   elaborate   instruction,   and   arguments   that   draw   on  
philosophical  conversation.  In  fact,  the  doctor-­‐‑analogy  of  book  IX  is  followed  by  
one   of   the   most   complex   pieces   of   argument   in   Laws:   the   reflection   on   the  
distinction  between  voluntary  and  involuntary  crimes.  The  doctor-­‐‑analogy  thus  
anticipates   this   intricate   piece   of   argument.   The   same   principle   seems   to  
underlie   the   extremely   elaborate   preamble   addressed   to   the   atheist:   like   the  
preamble   that   addresses   the   possible   future   criminal,   it   (or   rather   the   three  
preambles   that   target   three  kinds  of  atheism)  deploys  advanced  philosophical  
reasoning  and  gives  philosophical  arguments   for  why  a  person  ought   to  obey  
the  law.    
   Apparently,   to   make   these   citizens   control   themselves   requires   much  
more   than   ordinary   paideia—philosophy   (or   the   kinds   of   definitional   and  
cosmological  arguments  that  we  associate  with  philosophy  of  a  more  advanced  
level)  is  a  rough  remedy,  to  be  deployed  in  order  to  inspire  the  wicked  to  self-­‐‑
restraint.   The   re-­‐‑education   of   atheists   of   course   requires   a   firm   paideia   on   the  
part  of  the  educator.  The  citizens  who  have  the  task  to  re-­‐‑educate  the  atheists  in  
the  σωφρονιστήήριον  are  the  members  of  the  nocturnal  council.69    
                                                                                                              
69  Leg.  908a3-­‐‑5.  For  the  nocturnal  council,  see  chapter  six,  section  6.1.  
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   The  link  between  the  preambles  (πείίθειν)  and  education  (διδάάσκειν)  that  
came  to  the  fore  in  Book  IV  is  also  made  explicit  in  Book  IX,  857c4-­‐‑d4:  
οὐ   κακῶς   ἀπῃκάάσαµμεν,   ὅτε   δούύλοις   ὡς   ἰατρευοµμέένοις   ὑπὸ   δούύλων  
ἀπῃκάάζοµμεν   πάάντας   τοὺς   νῦν   νοµμοθετουµμέένους.   εὖ   γὰρ   ἐπίίστασθαι  
δεῖ   τὸ   τοιόόνδε,   ὡς   εἰ   καταλάάβοι   ποτέέ   τις   ἰατρὸς   τῶν   ταῖς   ἐµμπειρίίαις  
ἄνευ   λόόγου   τὴν   ἰατρικὴν   µμεταχειριζοµμέένων   ἐλεύύθερον   ἐλευθέέρῳ  
νοσοῦντι   διαλεγόόµμενον   ἰατρόόν,   καὶ   τοῦ   φιλοσοφεῖν   ἐγγὺς   χρώώµμενον  
µμὲν  τοῖς  λόόγοις,   ἐξ  ἀρχῆς  τε  ἁπτόόµμενον  τοῦ  νοσήήµματος,  περὶ  φύύσεως  
πάάσης   ἐπανιόόντα   τῆς   τῶν   σωµμάάτων,   ταχὺ   καὶ   σφόόδρα   γελάάσειεν   ἂν  
καὶ  οὐκ  ἂν  ἄλλους  εἴποι  λόόγους  ἢ  τοὺς  περὶ  τὰ  τοιαῦτ᾿  ἀεὶ  προχείίρους  
ὄντας   τοῖς   πλείίστοις   λεγοµμέένοις   ἰατροῖς·∙   φαίίη   γὰρ   ἂν   “῏Ω   µμῶρε,   οὐκ  
ἰατρεύύεις   τὸν   νοσοῦντα   ἀλλὰ   σχεδὸν   παιδεύύεις,   ὡς   ἰατρὸν   ἀλλ᾿   οὐχ  
ὑγιῆ  δεόόµμενον  γίίγνεσθαι”.  
It   was   no   bad   comparison   we   made   when   we   compared   all   existing  
legislation   to   the  doctoring   of   slaves   by   slaves.   For   one   should   carefully  
notice   this,   that   if   any   of   the   doctors   who   practise   medicine   by   purely  
empirical   methods,   devoid   of   theory,   were   to   come   upon   a   free-­‐‑born  
doctor   conversing   with   a   free-­‐‑born   patient,   and   using   arguments   that  
come  close  to  philosophy,  dealing  with  the  course  of  the  ailment  from  its  
origin   and   surveying   the   natural   constitution   of   the   human   body,—he  
would   at   once   break   out   into   a   roar   of   laughter,   and   the   language   he  
would  use  would  be  none  other   than   that  which  always   comes   ready   to  
the   tongue  of   the  so-­‐‑called   ‘doctors’:  “You  fool”,  he  would  say,  “you  are  
not  doctoring  your  patient,  but  schooling  him,  so  to  say,  as   though  what  
he  wanted  was  to  be  made,  not  a  sound  man,  but  a  doctor.”  (Transl.  BURY,  
adapted)  
In  a  similar  way  to  the  doctor-­‐‑analogy  in  Book  IV,  the  one  in  Book  IX  presents  
treatment  by  the  free  doctor  as  a  conversation.   It   likens   the  exchange  between  
preamble   and   citizen   to   the   exchange   between   two   free   persons   (ἐλεύύθερον  
ἐλευθέέρῳ  νοσοῦντι  διαλεγόόµμενον   ἰατρόόν).  The  doctor’s  words  are  even  said  
to  be  “drawing  on  arguments  resembling  philosophy”  (τοῦ  φιλοσοφεῖν  ἐγγὺς  
χρώώµμενον  τοῖς  λόόγοις),  since  they  deal  with  the  illness  from  the  beginning  (ἐξ  
ἀρχῆς  (…)  ἁπτόόµμενον  τοῦ  νοσήήµματος),  and  take  into  consideration  the  entire  
physique  of  bodies  (περὶ  φύύσεως  πάάσης  ἐπανιόόντα  τῆς  τῶν  σωµμάάτων).70  This  
is  significant   in   the  context  of  Book  IX,   for,  as  we  have  seen,   the  preambles   in  
                                                                                                              
70  Cf.  Phdr.  270b4-­‐‑9.  
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Book  IX  and  X  are  the  most  sophisticated  preambles.71  The  recapitulation  of  the  
doctor-­‐‑analogy   of   Book   IV   in   Book   IX   thus   seems   specifically   designed   to  
illustrate  the  envisaged  effect  of  the  preambles  in  the  immediate  context  (Books  
IX  and  X).    
   To  the  slave  doctor,  the  free  doctor’s  procedure  is  incomprehensible.  The  
slave   doctor,   we   may   recall,   represents   the   lawgiver   who   does   think   that   in  
lawgiving,   the  mode   of   address   is   irrelevant.   Confronted  with   the  method  of  
the   free   doctor,   he   will   say:   “You   fool,72   you   are   not   curing   the   sick   but  
educating   him,   as   if   he   needed   to   become   a   doctor   instead   of   healthy”   (“Ὦ  
µμῶρε,   οὐκ   ἰατρεύύεις   τὸν  νοσοῦντα  ἀλλὰ  σχεδὸν  παιδεύύεις,  ὡς   ἰατρὸν  ἀλλ᾿  
οὐχ  ὑγιῆ  δεόόµμενον  γίίγνεσθαι”,  857d6-­‐‑e1).  The  slave  doctor  thinks  that  the  sole  
goal  of  medical  treatment  is  to  make  the  patient  healthy.73  But  according  to  the  
analogy   in   Laws,   violence   makes   people   obstinate   rather   than   compliant,   an  
insight  we  owe  to  the  Athenian.  Imposing  on  someone  what  is  good  for  him  is  
thus   not   an   option   in   the   present   scenario.   The   only   option   is   to   educate   the  
patient  so  as  to  enable  him  to  control  himself.      
   The   slave  doctor   ridicules  his   free   colleague  because   the   latter   acts  as   if  
his  aim  is  to  turn  his  patient   into  a  doctor,   instead  of  making  him  healthy  (ὡς  
ἰατρὸν   ἀλλ᾿   οὐχ᾿   ὑγιῆ   δεόόµμενον   γίίγνεσθαι,   857e1).   Instruction   by   the   free  
doctor   apparently   entails   that   the   virtuous   person,   at   least   to   some   extent,  
himself   acquires   the   necessary   basis   for   persuading   and   (hence)   educating  
others:  he  has   to  become  master  of  himself,  his  own   lawgiver  as   it  were.  This  
may,  in  some  cases,  entail  the  ability  to  persuade  others.74  An  active  endeavour  
to  make  one’s  fellow  citizens  virtuous  is  also  praised  in  the  preamble  to  the  law  
                                                                                                              
71  See  below,  n.  81  on  p.  201.  
72  Naturally,  good  manners  are  beyond  the  slave  doctor.  His  behaviour  is  ἄγριον.  
73  Which  is,  of  course,  the  idea  in  Republic.  
74  A  different   interpretation  of   the  analogy   is  offered  by  NIGHTINGALE   (1999).  She  argues   that   the  
law   code   in   Laws   is   “accorded   an   almost   scriptural   status”   (102).   Correspondingly,   when   the  
citizens  are  said  to  become  like  a  doctor  in  857e1,  they  are  asked  to  become  like  Egyptian  doctors,  
who  practice  medicine  by  the  book  (119).  
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code  as  a  whole.75  In  that  preamble,  the  faculty  to  communicate  and  share  one’s  
own  virtue  with  others  makes  a  person  twice  as  virtuous  and  commendable  as  
the  “grudging”  person  who  keeps  his  virtue  to  himself.76    
  
  
5 . 3       Lawg iv ing   λόόγῳ   
5.3.1   Embedded  preambles  
We   have   noted   several   times   that   the   Athenian   consistently   represents  
lawgiving  as  speech.  The  doctor-­‐‑analogy  fits  this  pattern:  it  represents  both  the  
unmixed   and   the  mixed   legislation   as  modes   of   speech;   in   other  words,   laws  
without   preambles   are   also   imagined   as   a   kind   of   speech,   but   a   less   effective  
mode.  In  Laws,  the  setting  guarantees  that  the  actual  preambles  and  the  laws  are  
in  fact  spoken,  since  the  interlocutors  engage  in  lawgiving  “in  speech”,  λόόγῳ.77  
Thus,  on  the  dramatic  level  of  the  dialogue,  preambles  and  laws  are  embedded  
in,   and  part   of,   the   conversation  between   the   interlocutors.  At   the   same   time,  
the   Athenian   postulates   an   analogy   between   lawgiving   and   doctoring   that  
presents  lawgiving  as  a  kind  of  speech  resembling  dialectic.  The  doctor-­‐‑analogy  
                                                                                                              
75  Leg.  726a2-­‐‑746d2.  
76  Leg.  730d2-­‐‑731b3.  
77  This  is  the  reason  why,  according  to  Laws’  own  theory  of  lawgiving,  its  laws  are  not  susceptible  to  
the   criticism   of   the   written   word   in   Phaedrus   (written   texts   are   only   valuable   for   mnemonic  
purposes,  since  they  can  only  “remind”  (ὑποµμνῆσαι)  one  of  something;  they  cannot  teach),  and  the  
criticsm   of  written   law   in   Statesman.  Phdr.   275d8-­‐‑9:   ἐὰν   δέέ   τι   ἔρῃ   τῶν   λεγοµμέένων   βουλόόµμενος  
µμαθεῖν,   ἕν   τι   σηµμαίίνει   µμόόνον   ταὐτὸν   ἀείί.  Cf.   ENGLAND   and  RITTER   ad   loc.  Cf.  Phdr.   275d4-­‐‑9,   cf.  
275c8-­‐‑d2  and  Ep.  VII,  344b5-­‐‑6;  344c1-­‐‑d2.  Phdr.  275d9-­‐‑e5;  cf.  Tht.  164e2-­‐‑4,  where  a  tale  whose  author  
(“father”,  πατήήρ)  is  not  present  to  defend  it,   is  called  an  “orphan”  (ὀρφανόόν).  Statesman  criticizes  
the  fixation  and  unchangeability  of  written  laws  on  the  grounds  that  they  cannot  stay  up  to  date  of  
the   condition   of   the   patient—in   Statesman   we   meet   an   analogy   between   law   (not   lawgiver)   and  
doctor—changes,  especially  Plt.  294a6-­‐‑c4,  296e4-­‐‑297a2,  300c10-­‐‑d2.  Statesman’s  verdicts  on  laws  can,  
however,   not  without   qualification   be   applied   to  Laws,   precisely   because   the   introduction   of   the  
preambles  is  designed  to  foster  laws  with  the  capacity  to  educate.  For  this  reason  would  be  wrong  
to   conclude,   as   BLUCK   (1947),   133-­‐‑134,   does   ad   344c   ἐν   νόόµμοις   νοµμοθέέτου   “Plato,   then,   did   not  
consider  his   own  Laws  σπουδαιόότατον”.  TOMIN   (1998),   204-­‐‑207,   argues,  drawing   also  on  Epistula  
VII,  that  Laws  “revises”  Phaedrus’  views  on  writing.    
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therefore  seems  to  be  designed  with  the  upcoming  laws  in  speech  in  mind  (just  
as   the  painter-­‐‑analogy  analyzed   in  chapter   four).  The  doctor-­‐‑analogy,   in  other  
words,  specifically  pertains  to  the  lawgiving  in  Laws—λόόγῳ,  that  is;  the  analogy  
does  not  offer  a  general  picture  of  lawgiving.78  
   Although   the   doctor-­‐‑analogy   is   sustainable   because   the   lawgiving   that  
follows   it   is   indeed   in   speech,   the   lawgiving   embedded   in   dialectic   on   the  
dramatic  level  and  the  lawgiving  represented  as  dialectic  in  the  analogy  are  not  
entirely   parallel.   In   the   lawgiving   λόόγῳ,   in   the   dialogue,   the   preambles   and  
laws  are  provisional  and  under  discussion.  Cleinias  and  Megillus  are  not  patients,  
but   lawgivers—the  patients   are   not   yet  within   sight.   The   interlocutors  do  not  
need  to  be  persuaded  not  to  commit  an  illegal  act.  (Although  in  Books  I  and  II  
the  Athenian   has   persuaded   them   in   dialogue   of   something   contrary   to   their  
own  cultural  tradition.)  Together  with  the  Athenian  the  interlocutors  engage  in  
a  process  of  formulating  a  law  code  for  a  hypothetical  polis.  They  repeatedly  ask  
the  Athenian   for   clarification,   and   the  Athenian  never   fails   to   clarify  what   he  
has  in  mind.79  The  interlocutors  discuss  the  preambles  with  the  objective  to  test  
whether   they   are   a   successful  means   to   assist   the   law   in   its   educational   task.  
Within   the  dialogue,  where   the   interlocutors  often   identify  with   the   lawgiver,  
                                                                                                              
78  The  analogy  is  therefore  less  misleading  than  some  scholars  have  assumed,  e.g.,  STALLEY  (1994):  
“the  analogy  between  the  legislator  and  the  doctor  is  (…)  highly  misleading”,  since  “the  activity  of  
the   lawgiver   is   “necessarily   one-­‐‑sided”   (170).  He   concludes   that,   therefore,   “we   cannot   reach   an  
accurate   evaluation   of   the   preludes   simply   by   taking   at   face   value   everything   the  Athenian   says  
about   them”   (170-­‐‑171).   Similar   critique   is   expressed   by   NIGHTINGALE   (1993),   283,   291;   also   id.,  
(1999a),  117-­‐‑118;  YUNIS  (1996),  220;  WAUGH  (2003),  30;  KLOSKO  (2006),  245,  with  reference  to  Phdr.  
275d  and  Prot.  329a-­‐‑b;  BICKFORD  (2009),  151,  n.  56  (Laws   is  second  best  because  it  relies  on  written  
laws).  MAYHEW  (2010)  holds  that  written  texts  are  praised  “because  Magnesia  is  second  best,  and,  
related  to  this,  because  the  rule  of  law  is  second  best,  behind  the  rule  of  philosopher-­‐‑kings  (see  Laws  
5.739b8-­‐‑e7   and   Statesman   293a6-­‐‑297e5)”   (98),   but   such   a   reading   misconstrues   the   Laws’   own  
representation  of  the  preambles.  See  also  below,  section  5.3.    
79  Like  spoken  texts   in  the  Phaedrus,   the  Athenian  can   respond,  and  give  clarification.  Often  in  the  
form   of   φράάζε   or   λέέγε   (ἔτι)   σαφέέστερον.  E.g.   Leg.   639e4-­‐‑640a2,   644d4-­‐‑6,   664e1,   668d3   (here   the  
Athenian   offers   clarification   himself),   691b10,   700a1-­‐‑2,   708d8-­‐‑9,   712c2-­‐‑5,   714c7,   801c7,   863a3-­‐‑6,  
888e3,  894b5,  960c2-­‐‑3.  Compare  also  the  many  instances  (especially  in  Book  X,  it  seems)  of  Cleinias’  
Πῶς  λέέγεις;  See  e.g.  889a9-­‐‑b1.  The  Athenian  always  complies  with  these  requests  for  clarification.  
For  willingness  to  do  so  as  a  token  of  εὔνοια,  see  above,  n.  44  on  p.  189.  
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the  Athenian’s  tendency  to  refer  to  the  preamble  as  if  it  were  a  text  spoken  by  
the  lawgiver,  makes  perfect  sense.    
   The   effect   of   the   presentation   of   the   preambles   and   laws   as   under  
discussion   and   provisional   is   reinforced   by   the   fuzzy   way   in   which   the  
preambles   are   embedded   in   the   dialogue.   It   is   often   not   quite   clear   where   a  
preamble   starts   and   where   it   ends.80   Τhis   creates   an   impression   of   fluidity.  
Hence,   there  exists,   for  example,  some  scholarly  dispute  over   the  status  of   the  
two   most   philosophical   and   elaborate   preambles   of   Laws,   (1)   the   preamble  
preceding   the  penal   laws   in  Book   IX,  and  (2)   the  preamble,  or   rather   series  of  
preambles,  addressed  to  the  three  kinds  of  atheists  in  Book  X—are  they  indeed  
preambles  or  are  they  to  be  understood  as  some  kind  of  extra-­‐‑legal  reflections?81  
The  function  of  this  vagueness  is,  at  least  on  the  level  of  the  lawgiving  λόόγῳ,  to  
suggest   that   the   laws   and   preambles   are   under   discussion,   and   remain  
provisional.   The   fuzzy   boundaries   suggest   that   the   preambles   as   they   are  
                                                                                                              
80  Cf.  STALLEY  (1983):  “In  practice  it  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  the  preamble  from  (a)  the  general  
discussion  which   introduces   a  particular   section  of   legislation   and   (b)   the   law  proper  which   lays  
down   the  penalty”   (42).  When   they  are   explicitly   introduced,   two   formulas   can  be  distinguished:  
NIGHTINGALE   (1993),   286-­‐‑287:   most   common   is   that   the   lawgiver   addresses   the   citizens   or   a  
subgroup   in   the   second  person   (“Oh   friends,  we   advise/warn   you   to   behave   as   follows…”).   The  
second   group   are   “injunctions   in   the   third   person   that   are   designated   either   prospectively   or  
retrospectively   as   ‘preludes’   (…).   The   formula   for   this   category   of   prelude   is:   “let   everyone   be  
advised/warned…”.    
81  These  two  preambles  (857e-­‐‑864c  and  887a-­‐‑907d)  are  also  classified  together  by  MORROW  (1960),  as  
preambles   that   “take[s]   the   form   of   a   dialogue,   eliciting   through   questions   and   answers   the  
distinctions   and   values   that   underlie   the   law   to   follow”   (554).   But   he   thinks   that   Plato   does   not  
intend  to  prefix  these  lengthy  discussions  to  the  actual  laws  (in  the  case  of  the  laws  against  impiety  
for  instance,  the  “briefer  statement  in  885b  is  evidently  the  formal  preamble”).  Rather,  they  “show  
the  kind  of  defense  that  he  thinks  a  legislator  should  be  able  to  give  for  his  prescriptions  and  that  he  
expects  the  officials  in  the  new  state  to  be  able  to  give  if  required.”  (ibid.)  In  a  similar  fashion,  LISI  
(2000)  argues  that  IX,  857b4-­‐‑8[7]64c8,  “ne  constitue  pas  un  préambule  au  sens  strict,  puisqu’elle  ne  
vise  pas   le  possible   criminel  et  n’est  pas  une  admonestation  destinée  à  obtenir  une  conduite  plus  
adaptée  aux  lois”  (62).  Detailed  interpretations  of  857e-­‐‑864c  in  SCHÖPSDAU  (1984),  SAUNDERS  (1991),  
and   SCHOFIELD   (2012).   YUNIS   (1996)   includes   the   address   to   the   atheists   in   Book   X   in   his   list   of  
“preambles   complete”   (227,   n.   26).   The   preamble   of   Book   X   is   often   adduced   as   a   “rational”  
preamble   (according   to   some   the   only   one   in   its   kind):   YUNIS   (1996),   234-­‐‑235;   BRISSON   (2000);  
KOEPLIN   (2009);   MAYHEW   (2008)   thinks   that   it   does   not   appeal   to   reason   alone.   According   to  
GÖRGEMANNS  (1960),   the  preambles  of  Book  IX  (see  82-­‐‑85)  and  X  (see  85-­‐‑100)   juxtapose  rhetorical  
and   philosophical   elements:   the   philosophical   framework   and   rhetorical   preambles   mutually  
influence  each  other.  
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formulated   in   Laws   are   not   imagined   to   be   fixed,   immutable   texts.82   The  
vagueness   of   their   exact   body   of   text   gives   the   impression   of   fluidity.   The  
preambles   are   simply   part   of   the   exchange   between   the   interlocutors;   meta-­‐‑
legislative   or   more   general   considerations   evolve   into   direct   injunctions   and,  
conversely,  injunctions  implicitly  pass  over  into  ideas  that  seem  to  be  stated  on  
the  level  of  the  dialogue  rather  than  with  an  imaginary  ‘patient’  in  mind.      
     
5.3.2   The  question  of  lawgiving  ἔργῳ  
Laws   is   a   legislative  project   λόόγῳ,   in   speech.   The  Athenian   asks  whether   it   is  
possible  to  submit  the  outcomes  of  their  discussion  to  some  kind  of  test.83  This  
is  the  immediate  cause  for  Cleinias  to  reveal  his  involvement  in  the  foundation  
of  a  Cretan  colony—as  a  test  he  therefore  proposes  to  establish  a  polis  in  speech.  
The   legislative   project   in   Laws   is   inspired,   or   motivated,   by   Cleinias’  
participation   in  a   real   foundation.  The   interlocutors  do  not   set   themselves   the  
task  of  laying  down  laws  for  Magnesia.  Magnesia  is  merely  the  reason  why  the  
idea   of   establishing   a   polis   occurred   to  Cleinias   as   a   test   of   the   kind   they   are  
looking   for.   In   fact,   to   establish  a  polis   in   speech   is  killing   two  birds  with  one  
stone:   it   provides   the   interlocutors  with   the   test   for  which   they  were   looking,  
and   at   the   same   time  Cleinias   thinks   it   likely   that   he   can  make  use   of   such   a  
                                                                                                              
82   YUNIS   (1996),   227,   nn.   26-­‐‑28   gives   an   overview   of   the   preambles,   with   passages.   Besides  
“complete”   and   “abbreviated”   preambles,   he   also   finds   “explanations   to   turn   into   preambles”.  
Again,  the  limits  cannot  always  so  clearly  be  drawn.  Laws  does  not  offer  a  complete  law  code,  but  
makes  suggestions  for  the  sort  of  preambles.  LISI  (2000)  insists  on  the  need  to  differentiate  between  
the   preamble   stricto   sensu   and   more   general   reflections   that   provide   “un   fondement   d’ordre  
philosophique”  (61).  Leg.  IX  857b4-­‐‑864c8  is  not  a  preamble,  according  to  him;  MORROW  (1960)  554,  
n.  29  for  the  contrary  view.  
83  Leg.  702a7-­‐‑b3:  ταῦτα  γὰρ  πάάντα  εἴρηται  τοῦ  κατιδεῖν  ἕνεκα  πῶς  ποτ’  ἂν  πόόλις  ἄριστα  οἰκοίίη,  
καὶ   ἰδίίᾳ  πῶς  ἄν  τις  βέέλτιστα  τὸν  αὑτοῦ  βίίον  διαγάάγοι·∙  εἰ  δὲ  δήή  τι  πεποιήήκαµμεν  προὔργου,  τίίς  
ποτ’  ἂν  ἔλεγχος  γίίγνοιτο  ἡµμῖν  πρὸς  ἡµμᾶς  αὐτοὺς  λεχθείίς,  ὦ  Μέέγιλλέέ  τε  καὶ  Κλεινίία;  “For  all  
these  things  have  been  stated  for  the  sake  of  observing  how  a  polis  may  be  best  organized,  and  how  
the  individual  may  live  his  life  in  the  best  way.  What  sort  of  test,  spoken  among  ourselves,  might  
there  be  to  indicate  whether  what  we  have  said  has  any  practical  value?”  (transl.  MLB).  
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project   for   the   future   colony.84   The   way   in   which   the   law   code   in   Laws   is  
embedded  makes  clear  that  it  is  emphatically  not  the  law  code  for  Magnesia.85    
   Only  at  the  very  end  of  the  dialogue  does  the  conversation  return  to  the  
foundation   of   the   colony   in   which   Cleinias   is   involved.   The   Athenian   has  
observed  that  the  education  of  the  members  of  the  nocturnal  council86  cannot  be  
laid   down   in   laws   before   those   most   fitted   to   the   task   of   guarding   (ὅσοι  
ἐπιτήήδειοι  πρὸς  τὴν  τῆς  φυλακῆς  φύύσιν)  have  been  selected.87  When  Cleinias  
asks  what  is  to  be  done  if  that  is  how  things  stand,88  the  Athenian  answers  that  
they  have   to  be  prepared  to   take   the  risk.89  He  himself   is  prepared  to  share   in  
that   risk   by   expounding   his   views   on   the   education   and   nurture   of   the  
nocturnal  council.90  With  the  right  selection  and  education,  he  says,  guards  may  
be  raised  such  as  they  have  never  seen  in  their  lives.91    
   Megillus   is   so   impressed   by   the   past   discussion   (ἐκ   τῶν   νῦν   ἡµμῖν  
εἰρηµμέένων  ἁπάάντων,   969c4)   that   according   to   him   there   can   follow  only   one  
conclusion:  turning  to  Cleinias,  he  claims  that  the  foundation  of  the  new  colony  
                                                                                                              
84  Leg.   702d1-­‐‑d5:   ἐκ   τῶν   εἰρηµμέένων   ἐκλέέξαντες,   τῷ   λόόγῳ   συστησώώµμεθα  πόόλιν,   οἷον   ἐξ   ἀρχῆς  
κατοικίίζοντες,   καὶ   ἅµμα   µμὲν   ἡµμῖν   οὗ   ζητοῦµμεν   ἐπίίσκεψις   γενήήσεται,   ἅµμα   δὲ   ἐγὼ   τάάχ’   ἂν  
χρησαίίµμην  εἰς  τὴν  µμέέλλουσαν  πόόλιν  ταύύτῃ  τῇ  συστάάσει,  “drawing  from  the  statements  we  have  
made,   let  us  establish   in  speech  a  polis,   imagining  we  are  erecting   it   from  the  beginning,  and   this  
will  at  the  same  time  provide  us  with  the  investigation  for  which  we  are  looking  [sc.  the  ἔλεγχος  of  
702b2],  and   I   shall   in  all  probability  be  able   to  make  use  of   that  establishment  with   regard   to   the  
future  polis”  (transl.  MLB).  
85  See  also  chapter  one,  p.  38,  and  chapter  four,  p.  136.  
86  For  the  nocturnal  council,  see  chapter  six,  section  6.1.  
87  Leg.  968c9-­‐‑e5.  The  selection  is  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of  age,  capacity  for  learning,  and  character  
and  habit:   ἡλικίίαις   τε   καὶ  µμαθηµμάάτων  δυνάάµμεσιν  καὶ   τρόόπων  ἤθεσιν  καὶ   ἔθεσιν   (968d2-­‐‑3).  Cf.  
969b8-­‐‑c3.  
88  Leg.  968e6.  
89  Leg.   968e7-­‐‑969a1:   Τὸ   λεγόόµμενον,  ὦ  φίίλοι,   ἐν   κοινῷ   καὶ   µμέέσῳ   ἔοικεν   ἡµμῖν   κεῖσθαι,   καὶ   εἴπερ  
κινδυνεύύειν   περὶ   τῆς   πολιτείίας   ἐθέέλοµμεν   συµμπάάσης,   ἢ   τρὶς   ἕξ,   φασίίν,   ἢ   τρεῖς   κύύβους  
βάάλλοντες,  ταῦτα  ποιητέέον,  “Apparently,  my  friends,  we  must  ‘take  our  chance  with  the  crowd’  
(as  the  saying  is),  and  if  we  are  willing  to  put  the  whole  polity  to  the  hazard  and  throw  (as  men  say)  
three  sixes  or  three  aces,  so  it  must  be  done”  (transl.  BURY).  
90  Leg.  969a1-­‐‑3:  ἐγὼ  δ᾿  ὑµμῖν  συγκινδυνεύύσω  τῷ  φράάζειν  τε  καὶ  ἐξηγεῖσθαι  τάά  γε  δεδογµμέένα  ἐµμοὶ  
περὶ  τῆς  παιδείίας  τε  καὶ  τροφῆς  τῆς  νῦν  αὖ  κεκινηµμέένης  τοῖς  λόόγοις,  “and  I  will  go  shares  with  
you   in   the   hazard   by   declaring   and   explaining  my   views   concerning   education   and   nurture,   the  
subject  now  started  anew  in  our  discourse”  (transl.  BURY).    
91  Leg.  969b8-­‐‑c3.  
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ought  either   to  be  abandoned  altogether,  or   that   they  should  use  all  means  at  
their  disposal  to  persuade  the  Athenian  to  join.92  Megillus  himself  is  prepared  to  
participate,  and  the  dialogue  ends  with  the  transition  from  lawgiving  λόόγῳ  to  
lawgiving  ἔργῳ.  
   Since   the   project   of   lawgiving   λόόγῳ  was   triggered   by   the   given   of   the  
plans  for  a  new  Cretan  foundation,  Magnesia,  and  the  dialogue  ends  by  turning  
back  to  the  Magnesian  case,  we  may  reasonably  ask  how  a  law  code  faithful  to  
Laws’   own   principles,   but   ἔργῳ,   “in   deed”,   would   look   like.   How   does   the  
lawgiving  λόόγῳ   (in  Laws)  differ   from   the   lawgiving  ἔργῳ   (for   the   future  polis  
Magnesia)?  What  does  Laws   itself  suggests  about   legislation  outside  the  world  
of  the  dialogue?  
   It  may   be   asked,   for   instance,  whether   there   is   any   suggestion   that   the  
laws  in  Magnesia  will  be  written  down.  There  seems  to  be  some  sort  of  hint  that  
they  will   be.   In   the   context   of   the   preambles   against   impiety   in   Book   X,   it   is  
noted  that  the  education  of  the  atheists  will  be  facilitated  by  the  fixation  of  laws  
in  writing:  the  written  nature  of  law  is  an  enormous  advantage  in  the  education  
of   these   stubborn   atheists.   Yet   Plato   puts   these   remarks   (perhaps   not  
insignificantly)  in  the  mouth  of  Cleinias,  not  in  the  mouth  of  the  Athenian.93      
   The   Athenian   himself,   it   should   be   noted,   is   never   made   to   refer   to  
written   laws,   and   emphatically   introduces   a   conception   of   lawgiving   as   a  
                                                                                                              
92  Leg.   969c4-­‐‑7.  Ὦ  φίίλε  Κλεινίία,   ἐκ   τῶν  νῦν  ἡµμῖν   εἰρηµμέένων  ἁπάάντων  ἢ  τὴν  πόόλιν   ἐατέέον  τῆς  
κατοικίίσεως   ἢ   τὸν   ξέένον   τόόνδε   οὐκ   ἀφετέέον,   ἀλλὰ   δεήήσεσιν   καὶ   µμηχαναῖς   πάάσαις   κοινωνὸν  
ποιήήτεον   ἐπὶ   τὴν   τῆς   πόόλεως   κατοίίκισιν.   For   the   enormous   impression   the   Athenian   in   the  
discussion  and  in  his  role  of  lawgiver  makes  on  his  interlocutors,  see  also  chapter  six,  p.  229.  
93  Leg.  890e6-­‐‑891a7  (Cleinias!):  καὶ  µμὴν  καὶ  νοµμοθεσίίᾳ  γέέ  ἐστίίν  που  τῇ  µμετὰ  φρονήήσεως  µμεγίίστη  
βοήήθεια,   διόότι   τὰ   περὶ   νόόµμους   προστάάγµματα   ἐν   γράάµμµμασι   τεθέέντα,   ὡς   δώώσοντα   εἰς   πάάντα  
χρόόνον  ἔλεγχον,  πάάντως  ἠρεµμεῖ,  ὥστε  οὔτ’  εἰ  χαλεπὰ  κατ’  ἀρχὰς  ἀκούύειν  ἐστὶν  φοβητέέον,  ἅ  γ’  
ἔσται   καὶ   τῷ   δυσµμαθεῖ   πολλάάκις   ἐπανιόόντι   σκοπεῖν,   οὔτε   εἰ   µμακράά,   ὠφέέλιµμα   δέέ,   διὰ   ταῦτα  
λόόγον   οὐδαµμῇ   ἔχει   οὐδὲ   ὅσιον   ἔµμοιγε   εἶναι   φαίίνεται   τὸ   µμὴ   οὐ   βοηθεῖν   τούύτοις   τοῖς   λόόγοις  
πάάντα   ἄνδρα   κατὰ   δύύναµμιν.   “Moreover,   such   a   discourse   is   of   the   greatest   help   for   intelligent  
legislation,  since  legal  ordinances  when  put  in  writing  remain  wholly  unchanged,  as  though  ready  
to  submit  to  examination  for  all  time,  so  that  one  need  have  no  fear  even  if  they  are  hard  to  listen  to  
at   first,  seeing  that  even  the  veriest  dullard  can  come  back  frequently   to  examine  them,  nor  yet   if  
they  are  lengthy,  provided  that  they  are  beneficial”  (transl.  BURY).  
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conversation  between  lawgiver  and  citizen.  As  we  have  argued,  this  conception  
can  be  sustained  within  the  world  of  Laws,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  interlocutors  
legislate  λόόγῳ  and  that  their  laws  are  embedded  in  a  conversation.  But  it  seems  
almost   as   if   the   Athenian   carefully   avoids   to   draw   from   his   proposals  
consequences  about  lawgiving  outside  the  dialogue.  The  analogues  he  offers  (of  
the  painter   (see   chapter   four)   and  doctor   (chapter   five)),   as  we  have   seen,   are  
closely  modelled  upon  the  lawgiving  λόόγῳ  of  the  interlocutors  themselves,  that  
is,   the   lawgiving   within   the   dialogue.   This   is   why,   as   we   saw,   the   doctor-­‐‑
analogy’s  tacit  equation  of  the  preamble  with  the  lawgiver  is  not  disturbing.94    
   The  Athenian   does   imagine   a  written   transcript   of   the   conversation   he  
and   his   interlocutors   have   been   carrying   on.95   This   transcript,   that   is,   the  
dialogue  Laws,  he  considers  the  best  reading  matter  for  νέέοι  he  can  think  of.  Of  
all   the   discourses   that   he   has   come   across,   both   in   poetry   and   prose,   Laws  
appears   to  him  to  be  absolutely   the  most   suitable  and   fitting   for   the  young   to  
hear   (πάάντων   µμοι   µμετριώώτατοίί   γε   εἶναι   κατεφάάνησαν   καὶ   προσήήκοντες   τὰ  
µμάάλιστα   ἀκούύειν   νέέοις,   811d3-­‐‑5).   He   cannot   think   of   a   better   example  
(παράάδειγµμα)  for  a  lawguard  and  head  of  education  to  order  the  educators  to  
teach  the  children  (διδάάσκειν  …  τοὺς  παῖδας).96  The  Athenian  also  insists  that  
Laws  will  have  to  be  read  by  the  διδάάσκαλοι  themselves  first,  who  are  then  to  
educate  their  pupils  on  the  basis  of  that  reading.97      
                                                                                                              
94  See  p.  200  and  n.  78  ibid.  above.  
95  Leg.  811b8-­‐‑812a1.  See  on  this  passage  JAEGER  (1945),  255;  MORROW  (1960),  339-­‐‑340;  STALLEY  (1983),  
10  interprets  the  fact  that  Laws,  or  parts  of  it,  can  “have  a  morally  improving  effect  on  a  relatively  
unsophisticated  audience”  as  a  sign  that  Laws   is  concerned  with  “popular”  virtues  “of  the  man  in  
the  street”  rather   than  with   the   true  virtue  of  Republic   that   is  only  attainable  by   the  philosophers;  
BOBONICH  (1991)  argues  that  making  Laws  itself  the  reading  matter  for  the  citizens  ensures  that  the  
citizens   will   receive   a   public   statement   and   rational   justification   of   the   laws,   for   which   there   is  
nothing   comparable   in   Republic;   BOBONICH   (1996);   (2002),   106-­‐‑107;   ZUCKERT   (2009),   106;   KRAUT  
(2010),  68.  
96  Leg.  811d5-­‐‑e1.  That  the  Athenian  thinks  Laws  as  a  text  is  suitable  reading  matter  for  the  young  and  
even  children  seems  highly  remarkable.  
97  Leg.  811e5-­‐‑812a1.  
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   On   closer   analysis,   it   appears   that  Laws   remains   silent   about   lawgiving  
ἔργῳ.  The  dialogue  seems  deliberately  to  forbear  making  definitive  statements  
about  what  laws  faithful  to  its  principles  would  be  like.  This  is  fully  in  line  with  
its   pragmatic   and   open   perspective   on   the   good   society.   The   practical   (yet  
perhaps   not   initially   intended)   outcome   of   the   conversation   on   the   dramatic  
level   is   that   the   Athenian   has,   in   the   eyes   of   his   interlocutors,   proven   to   be  
qualified   as   a   lawgiver.   This   qualification   simply   manifests   itself   on   the  
dramatic   level.   That   qualification   is   a   matter   of   practical   demonstration   is  
congruous  with   the   scantiness  of  Laws’   explicit   statements  about   the  qualified  
lawgiver:98   without   expliciting   much   about   a   lawgiver’s   qualifications,   the  
lawgiver   is—pragmatically—the   person   in   whom   those   involved   store   their  
trust  to  perform  the  task  well.99  The  idea  speaking  from  this  reticence  seems  to  
be  that  real  laws  ultimately  depend  on  the  insight  of  the  lawgiver  in  case.    
       
  
5 . 5       Conc lus ion   
In   this   chapter,   we   have   investigated   νοµμοθεσίία   as   the   influencing   of   the  
citizens  within  a  polis,   that  is,   lawgiving  conceived  of  as  a  mode  of  addressing  
the  citizen(s)  in  order  to  make  them  adhere  to  the  law.  Not  all  modes  of  address  
are  deemed  as  successful  as  others.  We  have  seen  that  the  Athenian  regards  the  
discourse   of   the   law   by   itself   as   a   form   of   violence   (βίία).   To   mitigate   that  
violence,   he   introduced   the   mechanism   of   the   persuasive   preamble.   The  
preamble  is  to  preface,  and  ideally  to  render  superfluous,  the  imperative  of  the  
law  in  the  narrow  sense.  The  preambles  do  not  impose,  but  attempt  to  persuade  
(πείίθειν).  Persuasion   is   thus  accorded  a  central  and  crucial   role   in   the  polis  of  
virtuous  citizens.  
                                                                                                              
98  Cf.  n.  53  on  p.  224.  
99  See  also  chapter  six,  section  6.2,  p.  229.  
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   We  have  proceeded   to   investigate   the   conceptualization  of  πείίθειν   and  
the  preambles  in  Laws.  The  role  of  πείίθειν  may  seem  bewildering  in  the  light  of  
its   assessment   in   other   Platonic   texts.   Important   for   our   analysis   are   the   two  
doctor-­‐‑analogies   in   Laws   (Book   IV   and   IX).   The   preambles   are   emphatically  
presented   as   a   “friendly”   means   to   make   the   citizen   adhere   to   the   law,   as  
opposed  to  the  “violent”  mechanism  of  the  law  itself.  The  doctor-­‐‑analogies  thus  
frame   lawgiving  as  the  interaction  between  a  good  doctor  and  his  patient.  This  
interaction   between   doctor   and   patient   in   several   respects   closely   resembles  
dialectic.  Thereby,  πείίθειν  becomes  virtually  indistinguishable  from  διδάάσκειν.  
In   addition,   the   presentation   of   the   preambles   as   resembling   dialectic  
interaction—the  doctor  will  not  give  an  order  until  he  has  secured  the  patient’s  
assent—suggests  that  voluntary  submission  to  the  law  is  constitutive  of  virtue.  
Thus,  virtue   is  conceived  of,   formally,  as  self-­‐‑control   (which   is  consistent  with  
the  findings  of  chapter  three).  Ideally,  a  person  is  one’s  own  lawgiver  and  does  
not  need  laws.    
   Via   the   introduction   of   the   preamble   and   its  analogon,   the   good  doctor,  
the  Athenian   is  able   to  construe  a  notion  of   lawgiving  as  resembling  dialectic.  
The  analogy  creates  the  effect  of  a  mise  en  abyme-­‐‑effect:  it  constructs  an  image  of  
νοµμοθεσίία   that   resembles   the  dialectical   conversation   of   the   interlocutors,   on  
the   level   of   which   the   analogy   is   introduced.   Subsequently,   of   course,   the  
interlocutors   will   formulate   laws   and   preambles   in   the   context   of   their  
dialectical  discussion.  It  therefore  seems  that  the  analogy  itself  is  designed  with  
the   upcoming   legislation   on   the   dramatic   level   in   mind:   for   on   the   dramatic  
level,   the   preambles   are   in   fact   in   speech   and   form   part   of   the   dialectical  
conversation.    
   At  the  same  time,  the  analogy  acquires   its  own  persuasiveness  from  the  
fact   that   it   is   followed   by   lawgiving   in   speech.   It   is   because   the   interlocutors  
frame  the  preambles  and  laws  in  speech  that  the  analogy  of  lawgiving  as  such  
can  be  upheld.  It  is  also  because  the  Athenian  is  formulating  the  preambles  live  
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that  the  comparison  of  the  preamble  to  a  living  doctor  is  convincing.  Although  
Cleinias  and  Megillus  are  not  the  addressees  of  the  preambles  in  the  sense  that  
they  are  on  the  verge  of  committing  an  illegal  act  and  have  to  be  persuaded  to  
do   otherwise,   they   have   been   persuaded   when   the   Athenian   refuted   their  
cultural   conception   of   ἀρετήή   as   ἀνδρείία.   In   that   sense,   as   people   whom   the  
lawgiver   persuades   to   change   their   mind,   the   relation   between   the   Athenian  
and   his   interlocutors,   and   between   the   lawgiver/doctor   and   his   patient,   are  
parallel.    
   The  analogy  becomes  plausible  because,  when  the  interlocutors  start  their  
own   legislation,   it   seems   that  we  witness   something  very  much   like  what   the  
analogy   had   earlier   described.   The   analogy   also   works   because   in   the  
conversation  between   the   interlocutors,   lawgiving   is  not   subject   to   constraints  
of   time,  and  because  of   the  way   in  which   the  preambles  are  embedded   in   the  
dialectical   conversation.   The   transitions   between   preamble,   law,   and  
conversation   of   the   interlocutors   are   not   always   clearly   demarcated.   This  
compositorial  strategy  creates  indeed  the  impression  that  lawgiving  is  more  like  
a  dialectical  conversation  than  like  a  fixed  and  unchangeable  text.  The  analogy  
is  modelled  on   the   lawgiving  of   the   interlocutors   in   speech,  and   the  claims  of  
the  analogy  can  be  sustained  because  the  example  of  lawgiving  that  we  do  get  
in  Laws  is  a  dialectical  conversation.  The  composition  of  Laws  seems  to  have  the  
very   purpose   of   corroborating   its   own   claim   that   the   preambles   are   a   live  
conversation  with,  and  instruction  by,  a  lawgiver.  
   In  Laws,  the  interlocutors  lay  down  laws  λόόγῳ,  “in  speech”,  and  test  the  
outcomes  of  their  discussion  by  applying  their  insights  to  the  framing  of  a  law  
code.  One  may  therefore  wonder  how  this  will  work  in  the  lawgiving  ἔργῳ,  for  
Magnesia.  Yet,   characteristically,   the  Athenian  refrains   from  formulating  rules  
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In  this  chapter,  we  will  return  to  the  question  of  the  authority  of  the  law  code  in  
Laws.  So   far,   it  has  been  argued   that   the  source   for   the   laws   in  Plato’s  Laws   is  
dynamic   and   pragmatic   rather   than   static   and   absolute.   Laws   portrays   an  
exercise  in  legislation  inspired  by  a  particular,  Cretan,  case.  On  the  basis  of  an  
analysis  of  the  composition  of  Laws  in  terms  of  its  own  conceptual  framework,  I  
have  argued  that  this  exercise  presupposes  a  pragmatic  notion  of  morality  that  
excludes   the   absolute,   objectifying  perspective  of   the  moral   expert.  Yet  before  
the  absence  of  the  expert  can  be  securely  accounted  for,  two  entities  need  to  be  
examined  more  closely:  the  so-­‐‑called  “nocturnal  council”  and  the  figure  of  the  
Athenian   Stranger.   Is   one   of   these   in   some  way   comparable   to,   or   even   some  
sort  of  return  to,  the  philosopher-­‐‑king?    
   At   first   sight,   either   may   seem   a   plausible   candidate,   since   both   the  
nocturnal   council   and   the   Athenian   stranger   are   “outside”   the   law   code:   the  
nocturnal   council  because   it   is   introduced  after   the  exposition  of   law  code  has  
been  rounded  off;  the  Athenian  because  he  formulates  the  law  code.  This  chapter  
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will  examine  the  nocturnal  council  and  the  Athenian  as  possible  candidates  for  
expert   authority.   The   first   part   will   address   the   identity   and   function   of   the  
nocturnal  council,  regarding  its  role  both  within  the  envisaged  polis  and  within  
the  overall  composition  of  Laws.  The  second  half  will  examine  the  figure  of  the  
Athenian  stranger.  Is  there  any  hint  that  he  is  a  philosopher-­‐‑king  after  all—and  
if  not,  what  is  his  qualification  to  lay  down  laws?  
  
  
6 . 1    The    iden t i ty    and    func t ion   o f    the   noc tu rna l   nounc i l   
6.1.1   The  σκοπόός  of  the  nocturnal  council  
In  Book  XII,  the  διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων1  is  finished  off  (960b5).  Thus,  the  law  code  
in  the  strict  sense  ends  with  regulations  concerning  post  mortem  rituals  such  as  
the   πρόόθεσις.2   The   Athenian   concludes   that   the   laws   about   the   burial   of   the  
dead  and  other  ways  of  disposing  of  the  body  (in  case  of  parricides  and  temple-­‐‑
robbers)   have   been   stated   before.3  Although   the   διέέξοδος   τῶν   νόόµμων   is   now  
completed,  the  act  of  νοµμοθεσίία  has  only  nearly  reached  its  end  and  is  not  yet  
complete   (ὥστε   σχεδὸν   ἡ   νοµμοθεσίία   τέέλος   ἂν   ἡµμῖν   ἔχοι,   960b4-­‐‑5).4   What  
remains   to   be   done   is   developing   a   mechanism   for   the   “preservation”  
(σωτηρίία)  of  the  law  code,  960b5-­‐‑c1:    
τῶν   πάάντων   δ᾿   ἑκάάστοτε   τέέλος   οὐ   τὸ   δρᾶσαι   τι   σχεδὸν   οὐδὲ   τὸ  
κτήήσασθαι   κατοικίίσαι   τ᾿   ἐστίίν,   ἀλλὰ   τῷ   γεννηθέέντι   σωτηρίίαν  
ἐξευρόόντα   τελέέως   ἀείί,   τόότ᾿   ἤδη   νοµμίίζειν   πᾶν   ὅσον   δεῖ   πραχθῆναι  
πεπρᾶχθαι,  πρόότερον  δ᾿  ἀτελὲς  εἶναι  τὸ  ὅλον.  
                                                                                                              
1   τῶν  νόόµμων  αὐτῶν  ἡ   διέέξοδος:  Leg.   718b2,   718c2,   806d2;   διέέξοδος  περὶ   νόόµμων:   812a4-­‐‑9,   837;   cf.  
857e4-­‐‑5.  See  also  chapter  four,  p.  138.  
2   Leg.   958c7-­‐‑960b1.   The   law   code   therefore   ends   with   the   rites   accompanying   the   death   of   an  
individual.  On   the   law  code  as   following   (roughly)   the  course  of   the  human   life,   see  also  chapter  
one,  p.  39;  chapter  four,  p.  159.  
3  Leg.  717d,  719d,  854dff.,  873b-­‐‑d,  909c,  947b3ff.      
4  An  act  of  νοµμοθεσίία  thus  entails  more  than  simply  making  the  laws—as  we  saw  in  chapter  four,  a  
discussion   of   necessary   preliminaries   (in   Books   IV-­‐‑VI)   is   also   part   of   νοµμοθεσίία,   yet   not   of   the  
διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων.  
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But  in  every  case,  the  full  end  does  not  consist  in  the  doing,  establishing  or  
founding   something:   rather  our  view  should  be   that   it   is  only  when  one  
has  discovered   a  means   of   perfect  preservation   for   the   creation   in   every  
case  at  issue,  that  we  are  at  length  justified  in  believing  that  we  have  done  
all   that   ought   to   be   done:   until   then,  we  must   believe,   the  whole   of   our  
creation  is  incomplete.  (Transl.  BURY,  adapted)  
The  Athenian  goes  on  to  explain  that  this  mechanism  of  preservation  (σωτηρίία)  
is   “the   capacity   for   irreversibility”   (ἡ   ἀµμετάάστροφος   δύύναµμις),5   which   he  
connects  with  the  function  traditionally  ascribed  to  the  third  of  the  three  Moirai:  
Atropos,  whose   name   is   synonymous  with   ἀµμετάάστροφος,   is   the  Moira  who  
makes  one’s  fate  irreversible.6  Atropos  is  the  “saviour”  of  what  has  been  stated  
(σώώτειραν   τῶν   λεχθέέντων7),   since   she   makes   the   spinnings   of   the   Fates  
irreversible   in   the   fire  and  thereby  effectuates   this  ἀµμετάάστροφος  δύύναµμις.   In  
order  to  complete  their  project,  the  interlocutors  must  now  do  the  same  for  their  
law  code.  
   Cleinias   enquires   with   the   Athenian   what   kind   of   σωτηρίία   may   be  
secured  for  their  constitution  and  laws.8  The  σωτηρίία  the  Athenian  has  in  mind  
is  the  σύύλλογος  that  has  come  up  in  the  interlocutors’  discussion  several  times  
                                                                                                              
5  Leg.  960c9-­‐‑d1;  960d5-­‐‑6.  
6  Leg.  960c7-­‐‑d1.  Cf.  Epin.  982a4-­‐‑c5,  where  the  Moirai  are  associated  with  the  movements  of  the  type  
of  ζῷα  in  possession  of  νοῦς.  In  contrast  to  the  irrational  ζῷα,  like  human  beings  (who  are  ἄφρονα,  
moving  ἐν  ἀταξίίᾳ),  rational  ζῷα,  the  heavenly  bodies,  move  ἐν  τάάξει,  which  is  a  clear  sign  of  their  
possession  of  sense  (µμέέγα  τεκµμήήριον  …  τοῦ  φρόόνιµμον  εἶναι,  982b2).  Rational,  consistent  motion  is  
a  sign  of  νοῦς.  τὸ  δὲ  ἀµμετάάστροφον,  ὅταν  ψυχὴ  τὸ  ἄριστον  κατὰ  τὸ  ἄριστον  βουλεύύσηται  νοῦν,  
τὸ   τέέλεον   ἐκβαίίνει   τῷ   ὄντι   κατὰ   νοῦν,   καὶ   οὐδὲ   ἀδάάµμας   ἂν   αὐτοῦ   κρεῖττον   οὐδὲ  
ἀµμεταστροφώώτερον  ἄν  ποτε  γέένοιτο,  ἀλλ᾿  ὄντως  τρεῖς  Μοῖραι  κατέέχουσαι  φυλάάττουσι  τέέλεον  
εἶναι  τὸ  βελτίίστῃ  βουλῇ  βεβουλευµμέένον  ἑκάάστοις  θεῶν,  “When  a  soul  reaches  the  best  decision  
in   accordance   with   the   best   intelligence,   the   result,   which   is   truly   to   its   mind,   is   perfectly  
unalterable.  Not  even  adamant  could  be  mightier  or  more  unalterable.  Truly,  three  Fates  hold  fast  
whatever  has  been  decided  through  the  best  counsel  by  each  and  all  of  the  gods,  and  guarantee  that  
it  is  brought  to  pass”  (transl.  MCKIRAHAN).  
7   BEKKER   conjectures   ληχθέέντων   for   MS.   λεχθέέντων;   see   app.   crit.   and   ENGLAND   ad   loc.:   “It   is  
natural  after  the  pointed  mention  of  the  names  of  the  three  Fates  to  expect  three  etymologies;  (…).  
Otherwise  there  would  be  an  etymology  for  Κλωθώώ  in  the  word  κλωσθέέντων,  and  for  Ἄτροπος  in  
ἀµμετάάστροφον,  but  none  for  Λάάχεσις”  (italics  in  original).  
8  Leg.  960e9-­‐‑11  (Cleinias):  τίίς  οὖν  δήή,  φῄς,  σωτηρίία  γίίγνοιτ᾿  ἂν  καὶ  τίίνα  τρόόπον  πολιτείίᾳ  τε  καὶ  
τοῖς  νόόµμοις  ἡµμῖν;    
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before.9   The   “nocturnal   council”,   as   it   has   become   known   in   the   scholarly  
literature  (νυκτερινὸς10  or  ὄρθριος11  σύύλλογος),   is  explicitly  introduced  as  the  
device   of   σωτηρίία   for   the   polis   and   laws   that   have   been   founded   λόόγῳ.   As  
designing  a  mechanism  of  σωτηρίία  for  a  creation  necessarily   follows   the  act  of  
creation  proper,12  the  introduction  of  the  council  at  the  very  end  of  Laws  can  be  
fully   accounted   for   in   the   light   of   its   function.13   Yet   its   introduction   after   the  
διέέξοδος   τῶν   νόόµμων   raises   the   question  whether   the   council   is   not   in   fact   a  
means  of  reintroducing  the  philosopher-­‐‑kings,  on  whose  authority  the   laws  of  
the   interlocutors   are   to   be   accepted   as   objectively   good,   parallel   to   what  
happens   in  Republic.14   So,  who   are   the  members   of   the  nocturnal   council,   and  
how  is  its  function  defined?  
   In  a  recapitulation  of  what  the  Athenian  has  indicated  before,  the  council  
is   said   to   consist   of   [1]   the   ten   eldest   lawguards,   [2]   the   prize-­‐‑winners   in   the  
competitions   for   virtue,   [3]   the   observers,15   and   [4]   a   number   of   younger  
members,  who  have   been   scrutinized   in   advance.16   In   virtue   of   its   preserving  
                                                                                                              
9  Leg.  961a1-­‐‑2:  ΑΘ.:  Ἆρ᾿  οὐκ  εἴποµμεν  ὅτι  δεῖ  σύύλλογον  ἡµμῖν  ἐν  τῇ  πόόλει  γίίγνεσθαι  τοιόόνδε  τινάά;  
That   the  nocturnal   council   has   been  hinted   at   several   times   before  Book  XII   is   an   important,   but  
certainly  not  the  only  reason  why  it  is  an  integral  part  of  the  argument  of  Laws  and  completely  in  
harmony  with  what  preceded  its  introduction.  These  earlier  references  to  the  council  are:  Leg.  818a1-­‐‑
3   (the   τινες   ὀλίίγοι   who   will   receive   the   ἀκριβέέστερα   παιδείία   of   the   three   µμαθήήµματα   for   free  
people),  908a3-­‐‑909a5   (οἱ  τοῦ  νυκτερινοῦ  συλλόόγου  are   the  only  ones  who  are   to  come   in  contact  
with  the  atheists  sent  to  the  sophronistêrion),  951d3-­‐‑952b9  (τὸν  σύύλλογον  …  τὸν  τῶν  περὶ  νόόµμους  
ἐποπτευόόντων,   951d4-­‐‑5,   in   the   context  of   the   scrutinizing  of   the  observers).  MORROW   (1960),   502  
also   sees   in   632c4-­‐‑d1   a   reference   to   the   nocturnal   council;   cf.   GUTHRIE   V   (1978),   371,   n.   1   and  
SCHÖPSDAU  (2011),  576  (with  the  φύύλακες  in  632c4  “unmißverständlich  angekündigt”).  
10  Leg.  909a3-­‐‑4,  968a7.  
11  Leg.  961b6  
12  Leg.  960b5-­‐‑c1,  see  above,  p.  210.  
13   Concerns   about   the   incompatibility   of   the   nocturnal   council   with   the   supremacy   of   law   (e.g.  
BRUNT  [1993],  250,  “an  afterthought”;  see  also  the  references  in  SCHÖPSDAU  [2011],  576)  are  therefore  
misguided.  Cf.  SCHÖPSDAU  (2011),  581.  Some  scholars  have  thought  that  the  late  introduction  of  the  
council  raises  questions,  e.g.  BARKER  (1918),  339,  385,  398ff.;  MORROW  (1960),  500-­‐‑503,  573-­‐‑593.  The  
view  that  the  nocturnal  council  is  an  “afterthought”  has  been  criticized  by  STALLEY  (1983),  112.    
14  See  chapter  two,  section  2.4.  
15   The   observers   were   introduced   shortly   before   the   council   (ὁ   θεωρήήσας   τὰ   ἐν   τοῖς   ἄλλοις  
ἀνθρώώποις  νόόµμιµμα,  952b5-­‐‑6).  See  also  chapter  four,  section  4.3.3,  p.  170.    
16  Leg.   961a1-­‐‑b3:   [1]  δέέκα  µμὲν  τῶν  νοµμοφυλάάκων  τοὺς  πρεσβυτάάτους  ἀείί,   [2]   τοὺς  δὲ  τἀριστεῖα  
εἰληφόότας   ἅπαντας   δεῖν   εἰς   ταὐτὸ   συλλέέγεσθαι   τούύτοις,   [3]   ἔτι   δὲ   τοὺς   ἐκδηµμήήσαντας   ἐπὶ  
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function,   the   council   is   an   “anchor   of   the   entire   polis”   (ἄγκυρα[ν]  πάάσης   τῆς  
πόόλεως,  961c5).17  After  a  rather  solemn  exhortation,18   the  Αthenian  goes  on   to  
compare  a  polis  to  a  ζῷον.  This,  it  immediately  becomes  clear,  evokes  a  wholly  
different  set  of  associations  than  does  the  analogy  between  πόόλις  and  ζῷον  in  
Republic.  In  the  present  context,  a  ζῷον  is  indeed  a  “living  animal”,  and  in  need  
of  a  means  that  ensures  its  preservation.  Generally  speaking,  the  preservation  of  
a  ζῷον  depends  on  two  faculties:  on  the  ἀρετήή  of  the  soul,  and  on  the  ἀρετήή  of  
its  head.   It   is,   in   short,   the  ἀρετήή  of   these   two   that   for  every  ζῷον  secures   its  
salvation  (ἡ  τούύτοιν  ἀρετὴ  δήήπου  παντὶ  παρέέχει  ζῴῳ  σωτηρίίαν,  961d5).  The  
ἀρετήή  of  the  soul  is  νοῦς;  the  ἀρετήή  of  the  head  are  the  two  “sense-­‐‑perceptions”  
(αἰσθήήσεις),  “sight”  (ὄψις)  and  “hearing”  (ἀκοήή).  The  general  statement  about  
the   faculties   that   ensure   a   ζῷον’s   preservation   prepare   the   reader   for   the  
identification  of  these  faculties  in  the  council  itself  (see  below,  section  6.2).  
   In   yet   another   argumentative   step,   the   metaphor   of   the   council   as  
“anchor”   of   the   polis   is   amplified:   a   polis’   endeavour   to   secure   its   own  
preservation   is   likened   to   “the   art   of   ship-­‐‑steering”,   ἡ   κυβερνητικὴ   τέέχνη.19  
This,  it  soon  becomes  apparent,  is  not  the  art  of  the  expert  helmsman:  it  draws  
on  νοῦς  in  combination  with  the  αἰσθήήσεις  of  sight  and  hearing;  analogous  to  the  
preservation  of  a  ship,  that  is,  in  all  circumstances,  secured  by  the  κυβερνήήτης  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
ζήήτησιν  εἴ   τίί  που  πρὸς  τὴν  νοµμοφυλακίίαν  γίίγνοιτο  ἓν  καίίριον  ἀκοῦσαι  καὶ  σωθέέντας  οἴκαδε,  
δόόξαι,  τούύτοις  αὐτοῖς  διαβασανισθέέντας,  τοῦ  συλλόόγου  ἀξιοκοινωνήήτους  εἶναι·∙  [4]  πρὸς  τούύτοις  
δὲ  ἕνα  ἕκαστον  δεῖν  προσλαµμβάάνειν  τῶν  νέέων,  µμὴ  ἔλαττον  ἢ  τριάάκοντ᾿  ἔτη  γεγονόότα,  πρῶτον  
δὲ  αὐτὸν  κρίίναντα  ἐπάάξιον  εἶναι  φύύσει  καὶ  τροφῇ,  τὸν  νέέον  οὕτως  εἰς  τοὺς  ἄλλους  εἰσφέέρειν  
κτλ.  For  the  composition  of  the  nocturnal  council,  see  also  below.  Cf.  964e1-­‐‑965a4.    
17   Leg.   961c4-­‐‑6   (the   Athenian):   φηµμίί,   εἴ   τις   τοῦτον   βάάλοιτο   οἷον   ἄγκυραν   πάάσης   τῆς   πόόλεως,  
πάάντα  ἔχουσαν  τὰ  πρόόσφορα  ἑαυτῇ,  σῴζειν  ἂν  σύύµμπαντα  ἃ  βουλόόµμεθα.  
18  Leg.  961c8-­‐‑9.  
19  The  transition  from  the  council  as  the  “anchor  of  the  entire  city”  to  the  combined  efforts  of  those  
who  are  concerned  with  keeping  the  ship  on  course  in  the  κυβερνητικὴ  τέέχνη  (the  κυβερνήήτης  and  
ναῦται,   961e3)   is   not   entirely   straightforward.   The   metaphor   of   the   anchor   may   entail   that   the  
primary  function  of  the  council  is  to  either  (a)  to  keep  the  ship  on  the  exact  same  place  at  sea  in  all  
circumstances,  or  (b)  that  the  council  is  primarily  necessary  in  order  to  keep  the  ship  from  drifting  
away   in  more  dangerous   circumstances,   i.e.,   that   the   council’s   function   is  preventive,   rather   than  
active,   as   suggested   by   the   analogy   with   the   κυβερνητικὴ   τέέχνη.   For   another   use   of   the  
κυβερνητικὴ  τέέχνη  in  Laws,  see  chapter  three,  p.  96  (ναυτικὴ  τέέχνη).  
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ἅµμα  καὶ   ναῦται:   the  helmsman   together  with   the   sailors   (and   it   is   thus  not   the  
qualification   of   the   helmsman   alone   upon  which   the   preservation   of   the   city  
depends).   The   faculty   of   νοῦς   is   “mixed   with”   the   most   beautiful   sense-­‐‑
perceptions  of  sight  and  hearing.20    
   This   (κυβερνητικὸς)   νοῦς   that   is   active   in   conducting   the   process   of  
seafaring  has  an  object;  the  νοῦς  mixed  with  the  most  beautiful  senses  is  said  to  
be  γενόόµμενoς   (…)  εἰς  ἕν   (961d9-­‐‑10),  and  ὁ  περὶ  τίί  νοῦς   (961e1).  The  object  of  
this   mixed   νοῦς   is   its   “goal”,   the   σκοπόός   of   the   relevant   τέέχνη.   Every  
professional,   whether   a   steersman,   military   general,   or   doctor,   “aims”  
(στοχάάζοιτ᾿   ἄν)   at   a   particular   form   of   σωτηρίία.21   The   goal   of   the   steersman  
with  νοῦς  is  the  salvation  of  his  ship  in  all  circumstances,22  that  of  the  general  
with  νοῦς  victory  over  his  enemies,  and  that  of  the  doctor  with  νοῦς  a  healthy  
bodily  constitution.23  This  demonstrates   the   intrinsic  connection  between  νοῦς  
and   σωτηρίία:   the   natural   object   of   νοῦς   is   σωτηρίία;   conversely,   aiming   for  
σωτηρίία  requires  νοῦς.  
   The  nocturnal  council  as   the  salvatory  mechanism  of   the  polis  embodies  
νοῦς   and   the   two  most   beautiful   senses,   the  ἀρεταίί   of   head   and   soul;   and   in  
order   to   be   able   to   focus   on   ἕν,   one   needs   πᾶσα  ἀρετήή   (962d2).   The   leading  
                                                                                                              
20  Leg.  961d8-­‐‑10:  συλλήήβδην  δὲ  νοῦς  µμετὰ  τῶν  καλλίίστων  αἰσθήήσεων  κραθείίς,  γενόόµμενόός  τε  εἰς  
ἕν,  σωτηρίία  ἑκάάστων  δικαιόότατ᾿  ἂν  εἴη  καλουµμέένη;  In  other  words,  σωτηρίία  is  the  best  name  for  
the  mixed  νοῦς  that  is  directed  at  a  single  object.  Cf.  961e1-­‐‑3:  ἀλλ᾿  ὁ  περὶ  τίί  νοῦς  µμετ᾿  αἰσθήήσεων  
κραθεὶς   σωτηρίία   πλοίίων   ἔν   γε   χειµμῶσιν   καὶ   ἐν   εὐδίίαις   γίίγνοιτ᾿   ἄν;   961e3-­‐‑5:   ἆρ᾿   οὐκ   ἐν   νηὶ  
κυβερνήήτης   ἅµμα   καὶ   ναῦται   τὰς   αἰσθήήσεις   τῷ   κυβερνητικῷ   νῷ   συγκερασάάµμενοι   σῴζουσιν  
αὑτούύς  τε  καὶ  τὰ  περὶ  τὴν  ναῦν;    
21  Leg.   961e7-­‐‑962a3.  Cf.  Leg.   963a11-­‐‑b7.  SCHÖPSDAU   (2011),  ad  961e8ff.:   “Jede  Techne  erfordert   eine  
spezielle  Vernunft  (νοῦς),  die  sich  auf  diese  Techne  versteht  und  deren  spezifisches  Ziel  kennt;  so  
gibt  es   je  nach  Fachgebiet  einen  κυβερνητικὸς,   ἰατρικὸς,  στρατηγικὸς  und  einen  πολιτικὸς  νοῦς  
(961e1,  962b7,  963a-­‐‑b)”  (589).    
22  Leg.  961e2.  
23  Leg.  961e8-­‐‑962a3:  ἀλλ᾿  οἷον  περὶ  στρατοπέέδων  νοήήσωµμεν  τίίνα  θέέµμενοι  στρατηγοὶ  σκοπὸν  καὶ  
ἰατρικὴ   ὑπηρεσίία  πᾶσα   στοχάάζοιτ᾿   ἂν   τῆς   σωτηρίίας   ὀρθῶς.   ἆρ᾿   οὐχ   ἡ   µμὲν   νίίκην   καὶ   κράάτος  
πολεµμίίων,   ἡ   δὲ   ἰατρῶν   τε   καὶ   ὑπηρετῶν  ὑγιείίας  σώώµματι  παρασκευήήν;   “Consider,   for   instance,  
what  would   be   the   right  mark   for   a   general   to   set   up   to   shoot   at   in   the   case   of   an   army,   or   the  
medical  profession   in   the  case  of  a  human  body,   if   they  were  aiming  at   salvation.  Would  not   the  
former  make   victory   his  mark,   and  mastery   over   the   enemy,  while   that   of   the   doctors   and   their  
assistants  would  be  the  providing  of  health  of  the  body?”  (transl.  BURY).  
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principle  of  complete  virtue   is   that  one  “looks”  and  “aims  at”  an  object  that   is  
one  thing,   that  is,  ἀρετήή.24  The  law  codes  of  other  cities,  however,  even  though  
each  aims  at   its  own  purpose,  “wander”   (πλανᾶσθαι)  because   they  all  aim  at  
their  own—mistaken—purpose   (with  distributive  polyptoton:  πρὸς  ἄλλο  ἄλλη  
βλέέπει  τῶν  νοµμοθεσιῶν  ἐν  τῇ  πόόλει  ἑκάάστῃ,  962d8-­‐‑9).25  In  some  cities  justice  
is  defined  (τὸν  ὅρον  …  τῶν  δικαίίων)  by  the  aim  of  enabling  a  certain  group  in  
the  polis   to  rule  (ὅπως  ἄρξουσίί  τινες  ἐν  τῇ  πόόλει,  whether  those  be  the  better  
or   the  worse);   in  another  polis  everything   is  geared   towards   the  acquisition  of  
wealth   by   some   (ὅπως   πλουτήήσουσιν);   whereas   yet   another   polis   directs   it  
efforts   to   securing   a   life   of   freedom   (ὁ   ἐλεύύθερος  …  βίίος).26   The   diversity   of  
purposes  among  poleis  recalls  the  opening  scene  of  Laws:  ἀνδρείία  was  the  goal  
of  the  Cretan  and  Spartan  laws,  and  from  that  perspective  of  cultural  diversity  
it  was  implied  that  other  cities  have  yet  their  own  notion  of  ἀρετήή.  Some  cities  
even   focus   on   two   goals,   on   freedom   and   victory   in   war.27   Finally,   there   are  
those   lawgivers   who   pretend   to   be   σοφώώτατοι,   but   who   actually   end   up  
bringing  about  confusion  by  aiming  for  all  goals  at  the  same  time.28    
   In  that  case,  the  three  of  them,  Cleinias  concludes,  must  have  been  correct  
to   state   that   all   laws  need   to  have  a   single  goal,  which   is   virtue:  πρὸς  γὰρ  ἓν  
ἔφαµμεν  δεῖν  ἀεὶ  πάάνθ᾿  ἡµμῖν  τὰ  τῶν  νόόµμων  βλέέποντ᾿  εἶναι,  τοῦτο  δ᾿  ἀρετήήν  
που   συνεχωροῦµμεν   πάάνυ   ὀρθῶς   λέέγεσθαι   (963a2-­‐‑4).   Upon   the   Athenian’s  
                                                                                                              
24  Leg.  962d3-­‐‑5:  ἧς  [sc.  πάάσης  ἀρετῆς]  ἄρχει  τὸ  µμὴ  πλανᾶσθαι  πρὸς  πολλὰ  στοχαζόόµμενον,  ἀλλ᾿  
εἰς  ἓν  βλέέποντα  πρὸς  τοῦτο  ἀεὶ  τὰ  πάάντα  οἷον  βέέλη  ἀφιέέναι.  Cf.  963a2-­‐‑3,  963a11-­‐‑b7.  
25  SCHÖPSDAU  translates  962d7-­‐‑9:  “Nun  werden  wir  auch  verstehen,  daß  es  kein  Wunder  ist,  wenn  
die  gesetzlichen  Einrichtungen  der  Städte  ein  schwankendes  Bild  zeigen,  weil  die  Gesetzgebungen  
in  jeder  Stadt  jeweils  ein  anderes  Ziel  im  Auge  haben”.  The  Athenian’s  critique  applies  to  cities  in  
comparison:  every  city  pursues   itw  own  purpose,   showing  a  mosaic  of  purposes   rather   than   in  a  
consistent  image.  This  explanation  is  to  be  preferred  over  ENGLAND’s  paraphrase  ad  loc.  (“because  
in  each  separate  state  the  law-­‐‑makers  pursue  all  kinds  of  different  aims”),  which  only  applies  to  the  
statement  in  962e6-­‐‑9.  
26  Leg.  962d9-­‐‑e4.  
27   Leg.   962e4-­‐‑6:   οἱ   δὲ   καὶ   σύύνδυο   νοµμοθετοῦνται,   πρὸς   ἄµμφω   βλέέποντες,   ἐλεύύθεροίί   τε   ὅπως  
ἄλλων  τε  πόόλεων  ἔσονται  δεσπόόται.  
28  Leg.  962e6-­‐‑9:  οἱ  δὲ  σοφώώτατοι,  ὡς  οἴονται,  πρὸς  ταῦτάά  τε  καὶ  τὰ  τοιαῦτα  σύύµμπαντα,  εἰς  ἓν  δὲ  
οὐδὲν  διαφερόόντως  τετιµμηµμέένον  ἔχοντες  φράάζειν  εἰς  ὃ  τἆλλ᾿  αὐτοῖς  δεῖ  βλέέπειν.  
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affirmation,   Cleinias   cautiously   reintroduces   the   flip   side   of   the   coin:   they  
previously   stated   that   virtue  was   in   fact   four   things   (τὴν   δὲ  ἀρετὴν   τέέτταρα  
ἔθεµμέέν   που,   963a6).29   Cleinias   also   recalls   that   νοῦς   is   superior   to   the   other  
three   virtues,   recapitulating   the   Athenian’s   statement   in   Book   I   that  
νοῦς/φρόόνησις  is  the  “leader”  (ἡγέέµμων)  of  the  four  virtues  at  which  the  other  
three   look.30   Therefore   it   is   in   the   context   of   the   discussion   of   the   nocturnal  
council  that  the  theme  of  the  unity  and  plurality  of  virtue  is  reintroduced.  The  
reappearance  of   this   theme   in  Book  XII   echoes   the  opening   scene.31  The  unity  
and  plurality  of  virtue  has  been  discussed  only  in  Books  I  and  II,32  and  has  not  
been  referred  to  again  until  now.  Although  scholars  have  often  considered  the  
theme  of  the  unity  and  plurality  of  virtue  an  oblique  reference  to  the  Idea  of  the  
Good,33  I  submit  that  the  text  of  Laws  itself  (its  discussion  of  the  theme  in  Books  
                                                                                                              
29  Leg.  963a8-­‐‑9:  νοῦν  δέέ  γε  πάάντων  τούύτων  ἡγέέµμονα,  πρὸς  ὃν  δὴ  τάά  τε  ἄλλα  πάάντα  καὶ  τούύτων  τὰ  
τρίία  δεῖ  βλέέπειν.  Cleinias  here  recapitulates  631d5-­‐‑6;  cf.  also  631c5-­‐‑6,  where  φρόόνησις  is  said  to  be  
the  leader  of  the  divine  goods.  SCHÖPSDAU  (2011)  ad  loc.  also  proposes  a  reference  to  967d-­‐‑e.  
30  Leg.  631c6,  d56;  see  also  chapter  three,  n.  33  on  p.  90.    
31  See  chapter  three,  p.  84,  n.  2.  
32  The  overt   thematic  correspondences  between  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  Laws  have   led  some  
scholars  to  speculate  that  the  beginning  and  end  were  part  of  a  separate  work.  BRUNS  (1880)  (cited  
by  RITTER  [1896],  348-­‐‑349)  claims  that  the  council  is  incongruous  with  the  ἀρχαίί  expounded  in  Book  
VI  (cf.  GUTHRIE  V  [1978],  369,  n.  2),  and  concludes  that  the  passage  961aff.  is  attached  to  the  end  by  
Philip  of  Opus,  but  originally  belongs  together  with  Book  I,  to  “einer  anderen  Stufe  des  politischen  
Denkens  Platos  (…),  die  dem  Standpunkt  des  Staates  näher   liege  als  die  Hauptmasse  der  heute   in  
den  Gesetzen  vereinten  Gedanken”  (RITTER,   ibid.,  349).  Along  the  same   lines,  BERGK  (1880),  94-­‐‑95,  
has  argued  that  the  final  part  of  Laws  together  with  Book  I  belongs  to  a  separate  work,  the  δευτέέρα  
πολιτείία,  whereas  the  rest  of  Laws  (roughly)  belongs  to  the  τρίίτη  πολιτείία  (on  BERGK’s  argument,  
see   chapter   one,   n.   13   on   p.   6   above).   The   exposition   of   the   nocturnal   council   “zeigt   einen   ganz  
anderen  Charakter,  wir  befinden  uns  auf  einmal  aus  der  τρίίτη  πολιτείία   in  die  δευτέέρα  πολιτείία  
versetzt”  (95).    
33  E.g.  BARKER  (1918);  FESTUGIÈRE  (1936),  442-­‐‑445;  POPPER  OS  I,  215  n.  26(5);  CHERNISS  (1944):  “From  
among  the  earliest  of   the  dialogues  on  through  the   last—and  this  means,   then,   to   the  very  end  of  
Plato’s  life—the  doctrine  of  ideas  is  the  cornerstone  of  his  thought”;  CHERNISS  (1953),  375-­‐‑376,  and  
(1980),  60;  JAEGER  (1945),  260-­‐‑262  considers  the  unity  of  the  virtues  the  “old  Socratic  phrase”  for  the  
Idea  of  the  Good;  BLUCK  (1947),  104,  n.  77:  even  “Philebus  and  the  Laws  defend  the  theory  of  Ideas”;  
GÖRGEMANNS   (1960),   223;  MORROW   (1960),   573,   n.   1   finds   “clear   references”   to   the   Ideas   “in   the  
closing  pages   (965c)”;  GUTHRIE  V   (1978),   378-­‐‑381   (with   references);   PIERRIS   (1998);  KLOSKO   (2006),  
184  (and  235);  LEWIS  (1998),  6  and  ibid.  n.  15  finds  references  to  the  Forms  in  965d2,  836d7  and  966a5  
(also  his  note  16,  pp.  6-­‐‑7);  SCHÖPSDAU  (2011),  592;  ROWE  (2012),  332:  the  nocturnal  council  partakes  
“more  Socratico”  in  a  discussion  on  the  unity  of  virtue.  
CHAPTER   S IX    217  
I  and  II)  is  the  primary  framework  in  terms  of  which  the  discussion  of  the  unity  
and  plurality  of   the  ἀρεταίί   in  the  context  of   the  nocturnal  council   in  Book  XII  
ought  to  be  explained.      
   This  phase  of  the  discussion  is  of  a  highly  dialectical  character;   the  type  
of   the   conversation  hence   also   recalls   the   opening  discussion   of   the  dialogue.  
The  Athenian  explicitly  divides  the  roles  within  the  conversation.34  Yet  Cleinias  
and   Megillus   are   unable   to   answer   the   Athenian’s   question   in   what   respect  
these  four  ἀρεταίί  are  can  be  said  to  be  “one”.  The  Athenian  then  recapitulates  
the   distinction   between   ἀνδρείία   and   φρόόνησις   developed   in   Book   II,  
distinguished  by  the  presence  or  absence  of  λόόγος.35  It  is  not  hard  to  explain  in  
which  way  the  ἀρεταίί  differ  from  each  other,  he  says,  963e1-­‐‑8:      
Ἐρώώτησόόν   µμε   τίί   ποτε   ἓν   προσαγορεύύοντες   ἀρετὴν   ἀµμφόότερα,   δύύο  
πάάλιν   αὐτὰ   προσείίποµμεν,   τὸ   µμὲν   ἀνδρείίαν,   τὸ   δὲ   φρόόνησιν.   ἐρῶ   γάάρ  
σοι   τὴν  αἰτίίαν,   ὅτι   τὸ  µμέέν   ἐστιν  περὶ  φόόβον,   οὗ  καὶ   τὰ  θηρίία  µμετέέχει,  
τῆς   ἀνδρείίας,   καὶ   τάά   γε   τῶν   παίίδων   ἤθη   τῶν   πάάνυ   νέέων·∙   ἄνευ   γὰρ  
λόόγου   καὶ   φύύσει   γίίγνεται   ἀνδρείία   ψυχήή,   ἄνευ   δὲ   αὖ   λόόγου   ψυχὴ  
φρόόνιµμόός   τε   καὶ   νοῦν   ἔχουσα   οὔτ’   ἐγέένετο   πώώποτε   οὔτ’   ἔστιν   οὐδ’  
αὖθίίς  ποτε  γενήήσεται,  ὡς  ὄντος  ἑτέέρου.  
Ask  me  why,   when   calling   both   by   the   single   name   of   ‘virtue’,   did   we  
again  speak  of  them  as  two—courage  and  practical  wisdom?  Then  I  shall  
tell  you   the  reason:  because   the  one  of   them  has   to  do  with   fear,  namely  
courage,   in   which   beasts   also   have   a   share,   and   the   characters   of   very  
young  children;  for  a  courageous  soul  comes  into  existence  naturally  and  
without   reasoning,   but   without   reasoning,   on   the   other   hand,   there   has  
never  come  into  existence,  nor  is  there,  nor  will  there  be,  a  wise  soul  with  
understanding,   [that   would   be]   a   sign   of   a   different   kind   of   virtue.36  
(Transl.  BURY,  adapted)  
                                                                                                              
34  In  Leg.  963b2ff.:  Cleinias  and  Megillus  voice  the  position  of  the  πολιτικὸς  νοῦς,  but  the  Athenian  
will  soon  take  over  when  they  prove  unable  to  answer.  
35  Namely  at  Leg.  653a5-­‐‑c4.  For  a  discussion  of  this  passage,  see  chapter  three,  section  3.3,  p.  117ff.  
36  ἕτερον  ≠  ἄλλον,  and  is  “a  different  one  of  the  same  kind”,  hence  an  εἶδος  of  ἀρετήή  (φρόόνησις)  
different   from   another   εἶδος   of   ἀρετήή   (ἀνδρείία).   ENGLAND   assumes   that   ὄντος   ἑτέέρου   refers   to  
φρόόνησις  and  paraphrases:  “’for  wisdom  is  a  different  thing’;  i.e.  it  is  not  an  inborn,  physical  quality,  
but   a  mental   acquirement”   (his   italics),   and   is   followed  by  SCHÖPSDAU   (2011),   593   (“φρόόνησις  und  
νοῦς”).  Cf.  SUSEMIHL:  “ein  so  ganz  anderes  Ding  ist  die  Weisheit”.  RITTER  (1859)  on  the  other  hand  
connects   ὡς   ὄντος   ἑτέέρου   with   λόόγου   and   only   has   a   bearance   upon   the   second   part   of   the  
sentence:   “ohne   λόόγος,   als   ob  dieser   etwas   von  φρόόνησις   und   νοῦς  Verschiedenes  wäre,   gibt   es  
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In   line  with  the  definition  of  paideia   in  Book  II,  λόόγος   is  a  necessary  condition  
for   φρόόνησις   and   νοῦς.   Ἀνδρείία   is   the   ἀρετήή   applied   to   the   paideia   of   the  
youngest   children,   referring   to   their   early   sense   of   rhythm   and   melody   in  
music.37  It  is  distinct  from  φρόόνησις  because  the  latter  requires  reason  (λόόγος),  
while   the   acquisition   of   ἀνδρείία   does   not.   This   passage   in   Book   XII   can  
therefore   be   read   as   an   echo   of   the   discussion   in   Book   I.   In   Book   I,   the  
introduction  of  the  theme  of  the  unity  and  parts  of  ἀρετήή  triggered  a  discussion  
about  what  ought  to  be  the  basis  of  laws.  In  Book  XII,  this  same  theme  acquires  
relevance  in  the  discussion  of  the  nocturnal  council  and  its  function  to  preserve  
the  polis.  
   Now  that  the  Athenian  has  explained  in  what  way  two  of  the  four  virtues  
differ   from   each   other,   he   again   questions   his   interlocutors:   having   himself  
answered  the  question  in  what  way  these  two  ἀρεταίί  are  different  and  two,  it  is  
now   the   turn   of   Cleinias   and   Megillus   to   state   in   what   way   they   are   one;38  
whereupon  the  Athenian  will  again  ask  them  to  explain   in  what  way  they  are  
four  (ὅπῃ  τέέτταρα,  964a4-­‐‑5).  Whereas  in  Book  I  the  upbeat  for  the  introduction  
of   the   four   ἀρεταίί   is   ἀνδρείία   (introduced   in   the   discussion   of   the   military  
societies  of  Crete  and  Sparta),  in  Book  XII  it  is  the  virtue  of  νοῦς  as  the  ἀρετήή  of  
the  soul  concerned  with  the  σωτηρίία  of  a  ζῷον.    
   We  have  seen  that  the  function  of  the  nocturnal  council  is  to  preserve  the  
law  code  and   the  polis.   In  order   to  do  so,   the  council  keeps   its  gaze   fixed  at  a  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
keine  φρόόνιµμος  ψυχήή”  (355).  In  Laches  197a6ff.  (referred  to  by  ENGLAND)  Nicias  denies  that  animals  
and  little  children  can  be  properly  called  courageous  on  the  ground  that  their  fearlessness  is  µμετὰ  
ἀπροµμηθίίας  καὶ  ἀγνοίίας.  In  Laws,  by  contrast,  the  absence  of  something  ‘prudential’  or  ‘moderate’  
is   inherent   in   the   virtue   of   ἀνδρείία   and   animals   and   children   can   possess   this   virtue;   and   it   is  
precisely  the  criterium  on  the  basis  of  which  it  distinguishes  between  ἀνδρείία  and  φρόόνησις.  
37  Τhis  seems  to  be  the  reason  why  ἀνδρείία  is  relegated  to  the  fourth  rank  in  the  hierarchy  of  the  
virtues  in  in  Book  I.  The  virtue  of  ἀνδρείία  (training  against  φόόβοι)  can  be  interpreted  is  training  in  
becoming  ἄφοβος  (648b6-­‐‑c5).  Yet  ἀνδρείία  can  spill  over  into  θάάρρος,  recklessness—ἀνδρείία  itself  
does   not   entail   the   awareness   of   a   norm   or   measure.   In   this   respect   it   is   distinguished   from  
φρόόνησις  (and  likely  from  σωφροσύύνη  and  δικαιοσύύνη  too),  that  does  entail  λόόγος:  one  cannot  go  
too  far  in  σωφροσύύνη.  
38  Leg.  964a2-­‐‑4:  ᾗ  δὲ  ἓν  καὶ  ταὐτόόν,  σὺ  πάάλιν  ἀπόόδος  ἐµμοίί.  διανοοῦ  δὲ  ὡς  ἐρῶν  καὶ  ὅπῃ  τέέτταρα  
ὄντα  ἕν  ἐστι,  καὶ  ἐµμὲ  δὲ  ἀξίίου,  σοῦ  δείίξαντος  ὡς  ἕν,  (…).  
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single   goal   (σκοπόός).   This   single   goal   is   virtue   as   a   whole,   a   complex   unity,  
being  one  and  four  at  the  same  time.  The  theme  of  the  unity  of  the  virtues  thus  
enters   again   in   the   context   of   a   discussion   of   the   function   of   the   nocturnal  
council.   The   theme   of   the   unity   and   plurality   of   ἀρετήή   is   one   of   the   primary  
subjects  which  the  members  of  the  council  ought  to  comprehend.39    
  
6.1.2   The  qualifications  of  the  nocturnal  council    
In  order  to  secure  its  own  preservation,  a  polis  needs  an  element  that  knows  (τι  
τὸ  γιγνῶσκον,  962b5)  the  following  objects:  (1)  the  goal,  whatever  the  political  
goal  may  be;  (2)  in  what  manner  the  polis  may  partake  in  this  goal;  (3)  and  who  
or  which  (a)  of  the  laws  themselves,  and  (b)  of  the  citizens,  gives  right  or  wrong  
counsel.40   This   is   a   reformulation   of   the   claim,   discussed   above,   that   a   ζῷον  
needs  a  νοῦς  to  aim  at  its  σωτηρίία.  A  polis  needs  a  πολιτικὸς  νοῦς.  It  will  thus  
come  as  no  surprise   that  a  polis   lacking  such  an  element  will   invariably  act  at  
random,   being   devoid   of   both   νοῦς   and   sense-­‐‑perception   (ἄνους   οὖσα   καὶ  
ἀναίίσθητος,  962c1-­‐‑2):  it  requires  νοῦς  to  aim  at  complete  virtue.  
   But  the  council  is  not  only  to  aim  at  virtue;  it  must  also  possess  “complete  
virtue”   (δεῖ   δὴ   τοῦτον   […]   πᾶσαν   ἀρετὴν   ἔχειν,   962d1-­‐‑3)   if   it   is   to   aim   at  
σωτηρίία.41  Here   the   two   lines   of   argument   converge:   the   council  must   aim   at  
                                                                                                              
39  Cf.  MÜLLER  (1968),  26:  “Das  gesuchte  ἕν  in  den  heterogenen  Vier,  das  ja  nie  gefunden  zu  werden  
scheint,  könnte  nur  ein  τὶ  ἐν  τῇ  ψυχῇ  oder  ἕξις  ψυχῆς  sein,  also  etwas  bloßes  Formales.”      
40   Leg.   962b6-­‐‑9:   πρῶτον   µμὲν   τοῦτο   ὃ   λέέγοµμεν,   τὸν   σκοπόόν,   ὅστις   ποτὲ   ὁ   πολιτικὸς   ὢν   ἡµμῖν  
τυγχάάνει   ἔπειτα  ὅντινα   τρόόπον   δεῖ  µμετασχεῖν   τούύτου  καὶ   τίίς  αὐτῷ  καλῶς  ἢ  µμὴ  συµμβουλεύύει,  
τῶν   νόόµμων   αὐτῶν   πρῶτον,   ἔπειτα   ἀνθρώώπων·∙   The   indefinite   relative   ὅστις,   the   indefinite  
temporal  adverb  ποτέέ,  and  τυγχάάνειν  plus  participle  imply  that  the  contents  of  the  goal  are  not  a  
given,   but   up   to   the   particular   lawgiver.   Therefore   this   phrase   should   not   be   translated,   with  
ENGLAND,  as  “what  our  aim  as  politicians  is”,  but,  “was  auch  immer  dieses  Ziel  des  Staatsmannes  
für  uns  sein  mag”  (SCHÖPSDAU  [2011],  151).  
41  Leg.  962d3-­‐‑5:  ἧς  [sc.  πάάσης  ἀρετῆς]  ἄρχει  τὸ  µμὴ  πλανᾶσθαι  πρὸς  πόόλλα  στοχαζόόµμενον,  ἀλλ᾿  
εἰς  ἓν  βλέέποντα  πρὸς  τοῦτο  ἀεὶ  τὰ  πάάντα  οἷον  βέέλη  ἀφιέέναι.  “(…);  and  the  prime  virtue  is  not  to  
keep   shifting   its   aim   among   a   number   of   objects,   but   to   concentrate   its   gaze   always   on   one  
particular  mark,  and  at  that  one  mark  to  shoot,  as  it  were,  all  its  arrows  continually”  (transl.  BURY).  
Leg.  963a1-­‐‑4  recapitulates  631b3ff.  (πάάλαι  τιθέέµμενον),  which  is  also  taken  up  in  705d6-­‐‑706a4  and  ἦν  
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(στοχάάζεσθαι)  one   single  goal,  πᾶσα  ἀρετήή   (section  6.1.1).  At   the   same   time,  
the  council  also  needs  to  possess  πᾶσα  ἀρετήή  itself.  Indeed,  the  composition  of  
the  council   is  such  that   it  unites  νοῦς  and  the  two  senses  and  thus,  as  a  whole,  
possesses  complete  virtue.  We  may  recall  that  the  council  consists  of  four  types  
of  members:  [1]  the  ten  most  senior  lawguards  (961a2-­‐‑3,  cf.  951d7-­‐‑e1);  [2]  all  the  
prize-­‐‑winners  of  distinctions   in  virtue   (961a3-­‐‑4,   cf.   951d7-­‐‑8,   “of   the  priests   the  
ones   who   have   won   honours”);42   [3]   the   observers   (after   they   have   been  
scrutinized   on   their   return)   (961a4-­‐‑8);   and   [4]   a   number   of   promising   young  
men   between   the   ages   of   30   and   40,   to   be   selected   and   introduced   by   the  
aforementioned   members,   one   by   each   of   them   (961a8-­‐‑b4,   cf.   951e3-­‐‑5).43   If   a  
junior   is   found   adequate   (ἐπάάξιον)   in   both   nature   and   education   (φύύσει   καὶ  
τροφῇ),  he   is  henceforth   allowed   to   attend   the  meetings  of   the   council.  These  
νέέοι   represent   the   sense-­‐‑perceptions   in   the   council,   while   its   older   members  
represent  the  faculty  of  νοῦς,  964e2-­‐‑965a4:    
(…),   τῶν   δὲ   φυλάάκων   τοὺς   µμὲν   νέέους   οἷον   ἐν   ἄκρᾳ   κορυφῇ,  
ἀπειλεγµμέένους   τοὺς   εὐφυεστάάτους,   ὀξύύτητας   ἐν   πάάσῃ   τῇ   ψυχῇ  
ἔχοντας,   περὶ   ὅλην   κύύκλῳ   τὴν   πόόλιν   ὁρᾶν,   φρουροῦντας   δὲ  
παραδιδόόναι   µμὲν   τὰς   αἰσθήήσεις   ταῖς   µμνήήµμαις,   τοῖς   πρεσβυτέέροις   δὲ  
ἐξαγγέέλους   γίίγνεσθαι   πάάντων   τῶν   κατὰ   πόόλιν,   τοὺς   δὲ   νῷ  
ἀπῃκασµμέένους   τῷ  πολλὰ   καὶ   ἄξια   λόόγου   διαφερόόντως  φρονεῖν,   τοὺς  
γέέροντας,   βουλεύύεσθαι,   καὶ   ὑπηρέέταις   χρωµμέένους   µμετὰ   συµμβουλίίας  
τοῖς  νέέοις,  οὕτω  δὴ  κοινῇ  σῴζειν  ἀµμφοτέέρους  ὄντως  τὴν  πόόλιν  ὅλην.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
δὲ   ἡ   συγχώώρησις   ἕν   ἔχουσα   κεφάάλαιον   in   770c7   (συνεχωροῦµμεν).   On   the   συγχώώρησις   of   the  
interlocutors  to  aim  at  complete  virtue  in  770c7,  see  chapter  four,  section  4.2,  p.  152.  
42  The  prize-­‐‑winners  in  virtue-­‐‑contests:  829c2,  919e4.  As  has  been  signalled  repeatedly  (e.g.  GUTHRIE  
V   [1978],  370,  n.  2),   there   is  a  slight  discrepancy  between   the  accounts  of   the  nocturnal  council   in  
951d-­‐‑e   and   961a-­‐‑b:   at   951d   the   class   of   the   ἀριστεῖα-­‐‑winners   is   limited   to   priests.   A   second  
discrepancy   is   that   at   951e1-­‐‑3   the   current  minister   of   education   and   all   his   predecessors   are   also  
included  in  the  council  (ἔτι  ὁ  περὶ  τῆς  παιδείίας  πάάσης  ἐπιµμελητὴς  ὅ  τε  νέέος  οἵ  τε  ἐκ  τῆς  ἀρχῆς  
ταύύτης  ἀπηλλαγµμέένοι).    
43  The   two  passages   in  which  the  composition  of   the  nocturnal  council   is  described,  951d5-­‐‑e5  and  
961a1-­‐‑b6,  are  not  entirely  parallel:  see  SCHÖPSDAU  (2011),  576-­‐‑579.  “Die  Diskrepanzen  betreffen  nur  
kleinere  Details   und   lassen   sich   zwanglos   damit   erklären,   daß   der  Athener   aus   dem  Gedächtnis  
rekapituliert,   wobei   er   selber   eine   gewisse   Ungenauigkeit   der   Rekapitulation   einräumt   (vgl.  
961b8)”,  577;  see  also  the  further  references  ibid.  
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(…);  and,  of  the  wardens,  the  younger  ones,  who  are  selected  as  the  most  
intelligent  and  nimble  in  every  part  of  their  souls,  are  set,  as  it  were,  like  
the  eyes,  in  the  top  of  the  head,  and  survey  the  State  all  round;  and  as  they  
watch,   they  pass  on   their  perceptions   to   the  organs  of  memory,—that   is,  
they  report   to   the  elder  wardens  all   that  goes  on   in   the  State,—while   the  
old  men,  who  are  likened  to  the  reason  because  of  their  eminent  wisdom  
in  many  matters   of   importance,   act   as   counsellors,   and  make   use   of   the  
young  men  as  ministers  and  colleagues  also  in  their  counsels,  so  that  both  
these  classes  by  their  co-­‐‑operation  really  effect  the  salvation  of  the  whole  
State.  (Transl.  BURY)  
By   its   very   composition,   the   nocturnal   council   comprises   the   most   beautiful  
αἰσθήήσεις  and  νοῦς,  the  two  faculties  upon  which  the  σωτηρίία  of  the  polis  as  a  
whole  depends.44  We  may  recall  the  likening  of  politics  to  seafaring:  the  council  
possesses  both  the  κυβερνητικὸς  νοῦς  (of  the  steersman)  and  the  αἰσθήήσεις  (of  
the   sailors).   The   elderly   lawguards   and   prizewinners   in   virtue   and   the  
observers   embody   the   faculty   of   νοῦς.  Nοῦς   is   informed   by   the   senses:   ὄψις,  
embodied   probably   by   the   θεωροίί,   and   ὄψις   and   ἀκοήή   of   the   younger  
members.45   The   talented   younger   members   (bringing   with   them   the  
qualification   of   φύύσις,   as   they   are   required   to   be   εὐφυέέστατοι,   964e3)   will  
receive  a  kind  of  paideia  under  the  direction  of  the  council  that  will  also  prepare  
them  to  attend  the  council  once  they  are  older.46    
   We  can  now  see  that  the  council  as  a  whole  will  possess  complete  virtue.  
As   in   Books   I   and   II,   the   ἀρεταίί   are   associated   with   age   categories.   Yet   the  
distinction  between   the  virtues,  or   rather  one  cardinal  distinction  between   the  
two  most   opposite   virtues   is   not  mapped   on   the   individual   human   life   from  
infancy   to   the   end   and   the   age   categories   in   the   polis   as   a  whole,   but   on   the  
council,   i.e.   on  a   small  part  of   the  polis.  The  αἰσθήήσεις  are   represented  by   the  
younger   members   (cf.   ἀνδρείία);   νοῦς   is   represented   by   the   older   ones   (cf.  
                                                                                                              
44  Cf.  Leg.  967d7-­‐‑968a1.  
45  Cf.  SCHÖPSDAU  (2011),  580.  
46  Cf.  MÜLLER   (1968),  23,  n.  1:  “Geist  und  scharfe  Wahrnehmung  werden  hier   fast  gleichgeordnet:  
ihre  Mischung  bringt  die  Rettung  (961d).  (…)  Mögen  sie  dann  auch  nur  dienende  Funktion  haben,  
so   ist  doch  die  Bedeutung,  die  die  Wahrnehmung  auf  solche  Weise  bekommt,  schon  ein  Hinweis,  
daß  der  Geist  nicht  mehr  der  das  Eidos  schauende  Geist  ist.”  
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φρόόνησις).47  Not  only  the  council’s  function,  but  also  its  qualifications  therefore  
yields  a  picture   that   is   incompatible  with   the   function  and  qualification  of   the  
philosopher-­‐‑kings   as   described   in   Republic.   The   kind   of   knowledge   that   is  
implied   in   the   description   of   the   council   suggests   experience,   aggregated  
knowledge,   and   possibly   shared   deliberation.48   There   is   no   suggestion  
whatsoever   that   the   council   possesses   expert   knowledge   of   metaphysical  
objects,  or  that  it  requires  knowledge  of  such  a  kind  for  performing  its  function.  
Moreover,   the   age   requirement   (all  members  of   the   council  must   be   above   50  
years  of  age,  with   the  exception  of   the  “promising  young  men”)  suggests   that  
insight   is   linked  to   life  experience,   in   the  same  way  as  we  saw  that   in  chapter  
three   age   was   connected   to   φρόόνησις   and   ἀληθὴς   δόόξα;49   so   these   older  
members  have  become  distinguished  members  within  their  own  society.    
   In   further   notable   contrast   to   the   philosopher-­‐‑rulers,50   the   council  
receives   reports   from   those   officials   called   “observers”   (θεωροίί).51   The  
                                                                                                              
47  See  chapter  three,  p.  116  and  n.  137  on  p.  118.  
48   Contra   those   scholars   who   have   asserted   that   the   nocturnal   council   possesses   transcendent  
knowledge:   e.g.,   SAUNDERS’   (1962):   their   task   is   to   attain   an   “understanding   of   the  metaphysical  
basis  of  the  laws”  (54);  cf.  GUTHRIE  V  (1978),  370-­‐‑371,  the  guidance  of  the  nocturnal  council  is  based  
on   “genuine   knowledge”.   BRISSON   (2005):   Laws   and   Republic   have   the   same   objective:   “to   give  
power  to  those  who  possess  knowledge”  (contra  BOBONICH  2002),  cf.  PRADEAU  (2004),  123.  See  also  
note  51  below.  
49   RITTER   (1896),   350,   sees   another   parallel   between   Book   II   and   XII   and   supposes   that   the  
νυκτερινὸς   σύύλλογος   constitutes   “nichts   anderes   als   eine   Selekta   aus   jenem   Chore”,   i.e.,   the  
Dionysian   chorus.   The   ages   of   the   chorus   and   council   coincide:   the   members   of   both   are   to   be  
between  30  and  60.  See  also  SCHÖPSDAU  (2011),  576.  That  the  council  is  in  some  ways  analogous  to  
the  Dionysian   chorus   (which   consists  of   all   citizens  between  30/40  and  60)   says  a   lot   about  Laws’  
estimation  of  people   for   virtue.  The   council   “ist   in   seiner   ersten  Einrichtung  oder   seinen  unteren  
Stufen   schon   ein   treffliches  Mittel   dazu,   dass   in   stetigem   gegenseitigem  Umgang,   gegenseitigem  
Wetteifer   und   gegenseitiger   Beobachtung   (…)   die   Tüchtigkeit   zur   Geltung   komme   und   ihren  
gebührenden  Platz  erhalte”  (RITTER,  ibid.,  350).  
50  For  the  absence  of  the  theory  of  Forms,  see:  ZELLER  (1938),  esp.  37-­‐‑43;  LAKS  (2010),  221,  and  n.  19  
ibid.:   “The   appearance   of   the   phrase   pros   hen   blepein   (12.   962d4,   963a2-­‐‑3)   is   hardly   enough   to  
mandate  its  presence  [sc.  the  theory  of  Forms]”.  
51   Aristotle’s   remark   in   Pol.   1265a3-­‐‑4   suggests   that   he   considers   the   council   to   resemble   the  
philosopher-­‐‑kings   of   the  Republic.   Modern   equations   of   the   nocturnal   council   with   philosopher-­‐‑
kings   often   rest   on   the   basis   of   the   alleged   similarities   in   their   objects   of   study   (cf.   Arist.   Pol.  
παιδείίαν   τὴν  αὐτήήν,   1265a7):   BARKER   (1907),   202;   BARKER   (1918),   406-­‐‑410;   TAYLOR   (1926)   for   the  
claim   that   the  members  of   the   council   are  dialecticians;  GUTHRIE  V   (1978),   especially   368-­‐‑375:   the  
education  of  the  council  seems  to  be  “a  revision  of  that  of  Republic  7”,  375  (cf.  PELOSI  [2010],  116  n.  1:  
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experience  of  the  nocturnal  council  is  much  more  reminiscent  of  contemporary  
mainstream   Athenian   notions   of   philosophy   like   that   of   Isocrates.   The  
importance  of  φρόόνησις  in  Laws,  which  is  the  defining  attribute  of  the  nocturnal  
council,   and   which,   after   all,   became   the   primary   virtue   in   Aristotle’s   moral  
naturalism,   reflects   the   shift   in   orientation   from   transcendent   knowledge   to  
experience-­‐‑informed  knowledge  “embedded”  in,  and  informed  by,  human  life  
and  society  in  its  most  harmonious  and  enduring  form.        
  
  
6 . 2       The   A then ian    s t r ange r   
In  the  previous  section  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  nocturnal  council  does  not  
reintroduce  the  philosopher-­‐‑kings.  We  may  now  turn  to  the  Athenian  stranger.  
He  is  the  person  who  formulates  the  laws  in  Laws—if  Laws,  therefore,  operates  
once   again   with   the   concept   of   the   philosopher-­‐‑king,   the   Athenian   stranger  
seems   to   be   the  most   plausible   candidate.   Before  we   examine   the   role   of   the  
Athenian  as  a  lawgiver  in  the  dialogue,  we  may  first   remember  that  the  figure  
of   the   lawgiver   himself   is   not   a   topic   extensively   discussed   by   the  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Leg.  967d4-­‐‑968a1  is  a  condensed  expression  of  the  link  between  musical,  cosmological,  ethical  and  
psychical  harmony  of  Resp.  VII  and  Tim.);  KLOSKO  (1988)  assigns  the  council  the  same  powers  as  the  
philosopher-­‐‑kings;  its  introduction  “creates  a  fundamental  break  in  the  argument  of  the  Laws”,  (85),  
the  contrary  view  is  argued  for  by  LEWIS  (1998);  BRUNT  (1993)  argues  that  the  nocturnal  council  is  a  
return  to  the  “autocratic  rule  of  true  philosophers”  (250-­‐‑251);  LISI  (1998)  argues  that  the  rule  of  law  
is  temporary  and  lasts  until  the  philosophers  of  the  council  have  completed  their  education  and  can  
take   over;   NIGHTINGALE   (1999a),   104   n.   14,   assumes   that   its   members   receive   a   philosophical  
education,   which   however   does   not   entail   that   the   members   are   above   the   law   [with   ref.   to  
MORROW  (1960),  511-­‐‑514]).  See  also  the   literature  summed  up  in  LEWIS  (1998),  2  n.  1.  Others  have  
emphasized  the  distinctions  between  the  council  and  philosophers  of  the  Republic:  SAUNDERS  (1992),  
468;  COHEN  (1993)  speaks  of  a  “radical  break”  (301)  between  Republic  and  Laws.  KLOSKO  (2006),  252-­‐‑
258  argues  for  an  informal,  advisory  role  of  the  council  in  contrast  to  the  “legislative  authority”  of  
the  philosophers;  cf.  BOBONICH  (2002),  391-­‐‑395  (seconding  MORROW  [1960],  511-­‐‑514):  Plato  does  not  
have  to  be  explicit  about  the  exact  powers  of  the  council  because  Laws  is  not  to  be  understood  as  a  
blueprint:  “We  should   thus  allow   for  a   range  of  ways   in  which   the  outline  of  Magnesia   sketched  
above  can  be  realized.  They  will  fall  between  excluding  the  nocturnal  council  from  any  political  role  
at  all  and  seeing  its  members  as  philosopher  kings  in  disguise”  (395).  ZUCKERT  (2009),  132  n.  137.    
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interlocutors.52  Apart   from   the   fact   that,   in   order   for   a   law   code   to   come   into  
existence,   someone   has   to   lay   down   laws,   nothing   specific   is   said   about   what  
qualifies  a  lawgiver  needs  to  have.  The  lawgiver  is  an  argumentative  presence  
in   a   discussion   about   lawgiving.53   This   forms   a   notable   contrast   to   the  
philosopher-­‐‑king  in  Republic,  whose  qualifications,  education,  and,  to  the  extent  
possible,   object   of   knowledge,   receive   an   elaborate   discussion.   In   Laws,   by  
contrast,  the  discussion  of  lawgivers  is  very  limited.    
   In  the  text  of  Laws,  when  the  interlocutors  lay  down  a  law  code,  it  is  the  
Athenian  who  performs  the  role  of  lawgiver.  What  do  we  hear  about  him,  and  
what  qualifies  him  to  frame  laws,  albeit  in  speech  (λόόγῳ)?  Why  is  the  Athenian  
accepted  as  an  authority  by  his  interlocutors,  and  what  sort  of  authority  is  this  
supposed  to  be?      
     The  identity  of  the  anonymous  Athenian  stranger  has  been  the  object  of  
quite   some  speculation.  He   is  presented  as  an  anonymous  “stranger”   (ξέένος),  
and   he   is   the   only   interlocutor   about   whose   provenance   nothing   is   revealed  
(contrary  to  that  of  Megillus  in  642b2-­‐‑c6;  and  that  of  Cleinias  in  642d4-­‐‑e5).  Some  
interpreters,  among  whom  already  Aristotle,  have  assumed  that  the  anonymous  
Athenian   is   in   fact  Socrates.54  Others,  by  contrast,  have  drawn  attention   to   the  
                                                                                                              
52  See  chapter  three,  p.  104,  chapter  five,  p.  206.  
53   The   interlocutors   reason   about  what   “the   lawgiver”,   or   “the   sensible   lawgiver”,  will   likely   do  
about  a  particular  problem:  νοµμοθέέτης  ἀκριβήής  in  628d7;  a  lawgiver  who  is  even  σµμικρὸν  ὄφελος  
in   630c2,   647a8,   663d6;   ὀρθὸς   νοµμοθέέτης   in   660a4;   ἀγαθὸς   νοµμοθέέτης   in   671c3,   688a5,   742d4;  
µμεγαλαὶ  νοµμοθέέται  in  691d5;  νοµμοθέέται  ἔµμπειροι   in  692b4,  cf.  948d3;  νοµμοθέέτην  ἄξιον  ἐπαίίνου  
in  710c8;  νοµμοθέέτης  ἄκρος  in  710d7;  ἔµμφρων  νοµμοθέέτης  in  729b5-­‐‑6;  τὸν  ὀρθῶς  νοµμοθετοῦντα  in  
742e1;  καὶ  σµμικροῦ  νοµμοθέέτης  in  890d3.  This  sensible  lawgiver  is  merely  a  point  of  departure  for  
their   own   reasoning,   not   a   final   authority   to  whom   they   attribute   their   proposals.   Alternatively,  
NIGHTINGALE   (1993)  argues   that  “the  utterances  of   the  Athenian-­‐‑as-­‐‑lawgiver  are   invested  with  an  
authority  that  is  divine”  (299,  see  especially  284,  295,  299-­‐‑300).  Similarly,  YUNIS  (1996),  230:  “Plato’s  
lawgiver   speaks   virtually   as   the   mouthpiece   of   god,   and   thus   represents   divine   authority:   the  
source  of  the  lawgiver’s  discourse,  like  the  source  of  law  itself,  is  the  divine  reason  that  animates  the  
benign  universe”.  Cf.  JAEGER  (1945)  III,  340  n.  77:  “God  himself  is  the  ultimate  lawgiver.  The  human  
lawgiver  speaks  out  of  his  knowledge  of  God;  and  his  laws  derive  their  authority  from  God”.    
54  Pol.  1265a10.  PANGLE  (1980)   in  his  essay,  pp.  378-­‐‑379:  “nameless  old  Athenian  philosopher  who  
acts  and  talks  in  a  manner  reminiscent  of  Socrates”;  PLANINC  (1991),  26,  says  that  both  the  Republic  
and  Laws  describe  Socrates;  ROWE  (2007),  90  n.  20  “Socrates  replying”.    
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differences   between   Socrates   and   the   Athenian;   most   notably,   Socrates   never  
left  Athens,  and  it  seems  that  part  of  the  effect  of  the  Cretan  setting  is  to  suggest  
that   we   are   in   a   different   conceptual   realm.55   The   most   widely-­‐‑endorsed  
hypothesis   seems   to   be   that   the   Athenian   stranger   is   a   spokesman   for   Plato  
himself.56  However,  as  with  all  of  Plato’s  dialogues,   the  Athenian  is  a   fictional  
character  in  an  imaginary  setting.  Even  if  he  would  express  views  to  which  the  
historical  Plato  would  have  subscribed,  it  is  legitimate  to  ask,  first  and  foremost,  
how  the  Athenian   is  portrayed  as  a  character   in  a   literary  work.   It   is   true   that  
especially   in   the   discussion   in   the   first   two   books,   his   attitude   and   type   of  
remarks  (that  is,  questioning  his  interlocutors)  is  highly  reminiscent  of  Socrates.  
However,  a  specific   identification  along   the   lines  of   ‘the  Athenian   is  Socrates’,  
or   ‘the  Athenian   is  Plato’  does  not   furnish   insights   into   the  qualifications   that  
underlie  his   role   as   lawgiver   and   the  main   speaker   in   the  dialogue,   and   risks  
losing  the  dramatic  function  and  character  of  the  Athenian  out  of  sight.    
   The   Athenian   gives   long  monologues   and   expositions   of   the   laws   and  
political   magistracies.57   But   rather   than   interpreting   this   as   a   sign   of   Plato’s  
waning   faith   in   the  dialectical  method,   it   should  be  noted   that   the  expositions  
                                                                                                              
55  STRAUSS  (1959),  153-­‐‑154,  points  out  that  Socrates  did  not  make  laws;  MONOSON  (2000),  233:  “[t]he  
absence  of  Socrates  artfully  records  Plato’s  acknowledgment  of  the  limitations  of  the  life  of  Socrates  
as   a   model   for   understanding   the   full   range   of   special   knowledge   that   may   be   politically  
significant”;   ZUCKERT   (2009),   52   n.   5,   58-­‐‑62,   84-­‐‑85,   136.   Her   main   thesis   is   that   Laws   ‘predates’  
Platonic   philosophy.   The   Laws   presents   incompatible   views   of   the   universe:   the   naturalistic   of  
presocratic  philosophy,  and  the  (Socratic)  unity  of  the  virtues;  it  thus  creates  the  room  for  Platonic  
political  philosophy   to  present  a  worldview  that   integrated   the   two  (see  especially  144-­‐‑146).  “The  
Athenian  thus  sounds  very  much  like  Socrates”  (135).  
56  CICERO,  De  Legibus   1.4.15   seems   to  be   the   first  who   took   this  position.  Of   the   same  opinion  are  
GADAMER   (1980),   71,   “A   figure   in   whom   more   than   anyone   Plato   has   most   obviously   hidden  
himself”;  KLOSKO  (2006),  198:  “probably  a  stand-­‐‑in  for  Plato  himself”;  SAUNDERS  (1992),  469  “clearly  
Plato   himself”;   SCHOFIELD   (1997),   “the   figure   who   displaces   the   philosopher   in   the   Stranger’s  
account  is  the  lawgiver:  to  be  interpreted  (…)  as  a  sort  of  projection  of  Plato’s  own  authorship  of  the  
legislative  project  of  the  dialogue”  (236;  cf.  232);  and  BOBONICH  (2002),  8:  “Plato’s  spokesman  in  the  
Laws”  (cf.  BOBONICH  [1996],  254-­‐‑255,  260).  
57  BOBONICH  (1996),  259:  “(…)  even  when  [Cleinias  and  Megillus]  are  present  and  do  assent,  there  is  
little   effort   to   show   how   their   beliefs   commit   them   to   the   laws’   provisions”.   In   note   19   ibid.   he  
hypothesizes   that   this  may  partly  be  due   to   the  unfinished   state  of   the   text   (see  p.   250),  but   that,  
even   if   acts   of   assent  would  be   less   sporadic,   this  would  not  help   to   show  how   the   interlocutors  
beliefs  commit  them  to  the  laws’  provisions.    
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are  motivated  in  the  conversation  itself:  Cleinias  and  Megillus  are  eager  to  hear  
what  the  Athenian  has  to  say.  In  Book  I  the  Athenian  is  granted  permission  to  
speak   as   long   as   he   likes—which   is   not  motivated,   as   it   is   for   instance  when  
Socrates  is  compelled  to  proceed  by  telling  a  myth,  by  the  inability  or  refusal  on  
the   part   of   the   interlocutor   to   stick   to   the   rules   of   dialectic.58   In   Book   I,   the  
reason  why  the  Athenian  is  given  the  prerogative  of  speaking  as  long  as  he  likes  
is   motivated   by   his   Athenian   ethnicity.59   The   speaker   is   Megillus.   The  
terminology  is  striking,  642c6-­‐‑d1:    
(…)   τόό   τε   ὑπὸ   πολλῶν   λεγόόµμενον,   ὡς   ὅσοι   Ἀθηναίίων   εἰσὶν   ἀγαθοὶ  
διαφερόόντως   εἰσὶν   τοιοῦτοι,   δοκεῖ   ἀληθέέστατα   λέέγεσθαι·∙   µμόόνοι   γὰρ  
ἄνευ  ἀνάάγκης  αὐτοφυῶς,  θείίᾳ  µμοίίρᾳ  ἀληθῶς  καὶ   οὔτι  πλαστῶς   εἰσὶν  
ἀγαθοίί.    
(…)  but  I  regard  as  most  true  the  common  saying  that  ‘all  of  the  Athenians  
who  are  good  are   so   above  all’,   for   they  alone  are  good  not  by  outward  
compulsion   but   by   inner   disposition,   by   divine   dispensation,   and   truly  
and  not  forged.  (Transl.  BURY,  adapted)  
These   motivations   are   purely   pour   le   besoin   de   la   cause.   Plato   uses   a   fictive  
association   of   the  Athenians  with   a  natural   goodness   (possibly   as   opposed   to  
goodness  by  education)  as  the  motivation  in  the  framework  of  the  conversation.  
This  natural  goodness  is  expressed  in  a  threefold  way:  (1)  it  is  not  the  result  of  
“necessity”  (ἀνάάγκη)  but  springs  from  nature  (φύύσις)  itself;  (2)  it  comes  about  
“by  divine  dispensation”   (θείίᾳ  µμοίίρᾳ),   and   (3)   it   is  goodness  “in  a   true  way”  
                                                                                                              
58  Leg.  642d1-­‐‑2,  d3-­‐‑4.    
59  The  deviations  from  the  dialectical  exchange  are  motivated:  in  Book  X,  892d2-­‐‑893a7,  for  instance,  
by   the   trickiness   of   the   logos.   Cleinias   and   Megillus   risk   becoming   the   victim   of   a   “beguiling  
argument”  (ἀπατηλὸς  λόόγος)  if  they  follow  him  into  the  river,  and  do  well  to  wait  on  the  riverbank  
for  the  Athenian’s  signal  that  it  is  safe  for  them  to  proceed.  The  metaphor  for  the  λόόγος  is  that  of  a  
violent  river.  His  motivation  for  proceeding  momentarily  on  his  own  is  twofold:  first,  he  claims  to  
have   more   experience   than   Cleinias   and   Megillus   with   currents   (πολλῶν   ἔµμπειρος   ῥευµμάάτων,  
892d6-­‐‑7).  He  recognizes  a  risky  λόόγος  and  is  competent  to  assess  the  risk:  confronting  people  with  a  
λόόγος  that  is  beyond  them  may  cost  them  their  life.  The  second  motivation  he  is  made  to  adduce  is  
his  age:  being  the  youngest  of  the  three,  he  will  go  ahead  to  see  whether  it  is  safe  for  the  other  two  
to   cross.   If   the   river   is   fordable,   then   he   will   help   them   accross   by   his   own   experience  
(συνδιαβιβάάζειν  ἐµμπειρίίᾳ,  892e3-­‐‑4).  But  if   the  river  is   impassable,   the  risk  will  be  his  and  he  will  
have   spoken   in   due  measure   (µμετρίίως  ἂν   ἐδόόκουν   λέέγειν,   892e5)—the   standard   of   ‘due’   in   this  
context  being  what  the  interlocutors  here  can  handle.    
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(ἀληθῶς),  “not  fabricated”  (οὔτι  πλαστῶς).  (1)  and  (3)  basically  say  that  good  
Athenians   are   not   made   good   by   external   mechanisms,   such   as   laws.  
Considering  Laws’   own   conception  of  ἀρετήή  as   self-­‐‑control,   this   is   significant:  
the  Athenian  is  a  person  who  does  not  need  laws.60  In  other  Platonic  texts,  θείία  
µμοῖρα   is   opposed   to   acting   on   the   basis   of   expert   knowledge   (τέέχνη   or  
ἐπιστήήµμη).61   Something   ascribed   to   θείία   µμοῖρα   seems   to   be   a   kind   of  
disclaimer—it  is  beyond  the  realm  of  humans  to  have  insight  in  what  is  due  to  
divine   dispensation.   Socrates   in   Apology   attributes   his   awareness   of   the  
existence   of   Truth   to   θείία   µμοῖρα,   where   the   same   phrase   is   part   of   an  
enumeration  which  suggests  that  his  awareness  stems  from  sources  of  which  he  
has  no  control.  Both  the  Phaedrus   (with  its  emphasis  on  inspiration  ascribed  to  
prophets)   and   the   Ion   (which   deals   with   the   inspiration   of   poets)   assume   an  
unambiguously  ‘irrational’  conception  of  θείία  µμοῖρα,  much  like  being  in  a  state  
of  mania,62  and  being  enchanted  by  Corybantic  rites.63    
   The  Athenian,  conversely,  uses  the  term  µμαντεύύεσθαι  to  refer  to  his  own  
statements   (µμαντεύύοµμαι64),   and   both   he   and   his   interlocutors   label   his  
explanations  “oracles”,65  and  call  the  Athenian  a  “diviner”  (µμάάντις)  in  virtue  of  
his   remarkable   talent   for   interpreting   the   laws   of   the   ancient   lawgivers.66  
                                                                                                              
60  In  this  respect,  it  may  be  significant  that  he  claims  to  know  how  symposia  ought  to  be  conducted  
in   a   correct   way,   even   though   he   has   personally   only   seen   symposia   that   are   badly   regulated,  
639d5-­‐‑e3.  
61  Men.   99e6,   110b2;   Ion   536c2,   d3,   542a4;   cf.   Epist.   II,   313b5,   where   θείίᾳ   µμοίίρᾳ   is   opposed   to  
“securely  binding  fast  proofs”  (καταδέέω  τὰς  ἀποδείίξεις  βέέβαιως).  
62  Phdr.  244b6-­‐‑d5.  Μαντικήή  accrues  to  one  “by  divine  dispensation”,  θείίᾳ  µμοῖρᾳ,  244c3.  
63  Ion,  536c2.  
64  In  Leg.  694c5,  the  Athenian  divines  why  the  Persian  empire  was  ruined  under  Cyrus  while  it  was  
saved  under  Darius;  cf.  οἷον  µμαντείία  694c2;  in  885c3  he  divines  what  the  atheists  will  say  to  them  
when  they  call  their  views  misapprehensions.    
65  Leg.  712a4:  ταῦτὰ  µμὲν  οὖν  καθαπερεὶ  µμῦθόός  τις  λεχθεὶς  κεχρησµμῳδήήσθω  (the  Athenian  about  
his  own  preceding  words).    
66  Leg.  634e7-­‐‑635a2  (Cleinias):  Ὀρθόότατα  γε,  ὦ  ξέένε,  λέέγεις,  καὶ  καθάάπερ  µμάάντις,  ἀπὼν  τῆς  τόότε  
διανοίίας  τοῦ  τιθέέντος  αὐτάά,  νῦν  ἐπιεικῶς  µμοι  δοκεῖς  ἐστοχάάσθαι  καὶ  σφόόδρα  ἀληθῆ  λέέγειν.  Cf.  
chapter   three,   p.   86.   Socrates   is   also   associated   with   µμαντεύύεσθαι,   and   this   is   therefore   not   an  
absolute  point  of  distinction  between  the  Athenian  stranger  and  Socrates:  Crat.  411b4;  Phdr.  278e10-­‐‑
279a1;  Charm.  169b4-­‐‑5;  Lys.  216d5.  We  find  it  especially  often  in  Resp.:  349a4  (Thrasymachus  about  
Socrates);   394d5,   431e7,   505e2,   506a6,   506a8   (Adeimantus   about   Socrates),   523a8,   531d4,   538a9,  
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Mαντικήή   is   a   τέέχνη   of   a   radically   different   kind   than   the   τέέχνη   of   the  
philosopher-­‐‑ruler;67   the  way   in  which   the  Athenian   justifies   his   insight   comes  
closer  to  the  figure  of  Socrates  in  the  Apology  and  Crito  than  to  the  philosopher-­‐‑
king.   Socrates’   daimonion   is   concerned   purely   with   his   own   soul   and   only  
dissuades;  but   the  mantic  qualities  of   the  Athenian  seem   to  come  closer   to  an  
actual  µμαντικὴ  τέέχνη:  he   tells  others  what   they  should  and  should  not  do  on  
the   basis   of   his   (assumed)   expertise.68   The  mantis   is   often   a   “von   außerhalb  
herbeigerufen[er]”   specialist.69   Moreover,   according   to   Cicero,   the   Athenians  
consulted  a  mantis  on  all  kinds  of  official  occasions;70  besides  warfare,  they  were  
especially  connected  with  the  founding  of  a  new  colony.71    
   This   qualification   of   the   Athenian   has   several   implications.   The   first   is  
that   it   releaves   Plato   from   having   to   be  more   specific   about  what   qualifies   a  
lawgiver.  Μαντικήή  is  a  τέέχνη,  but  it  is  not  a  τέέχνη  that  can  “give  an  account”  
(διδόόναι  λόόγον)  of   its  own  procedures,  or  of  how  the  τέέχνη  may  be  acquired;  
nor  is  it  the  object  of  a  µμάάθηµμα  that  can  be  studied  and  discussed  by  the  people  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
538b7.  Cf.   furthermore  Hipp.  maior  292a3;  Plt.  289c5   (the  stranger  of  himself).  But  Socrates  himself  
claims   to   be  µμαντεύύεσθαι,   apparently   in   cases  when  he   cannot   fully   account   for   the   truth   of   his  
claim,  but  nevertheless  insists  that  it  is  true.  In  Laws,  Cleinias’  amazement  at  the  Athenian’s  µμάάντις-­‐‑
like   interpretative  abilities  has  a   function  on   the  dramatic   level  of   the  dialogue  rather   than   that   it  
asserts  the  truth-­‐‑status  of  a  statement:  it  is  part  of  the  reason  why  Cleinias  and  Megillus  agree  with  
the   Athenian   and   are   willing   to   go   along   with   him   (despite   of   the   discrepancy   between   the  
Athenian’s  proposals  and  their  own  cultural  tradition).  COLLIN  (1952)  distinguishes  three  senses  in  
which   Plato   uses   the   term   µμαντεύύοµμαι   (with   passages):   (1)   a   probable   inference   concerning   the  
future;  (2)  an  imaginative  reconstruction  of  the  past;  and  (3)  “’Intuition’”.    
67  The  word  µμάάντις  is  traced  back  to  µμαίίνεσθαι,  “prophetische  Wahnsinn”  or  “Inspiration”  in  Eur.  
Bacch.  299;  Pl.  Phdr.  244b6-­‐‑d5;  Men.  99c11-­‐‑100c2;  Tim.  71e2-­‐‑72b5.  
68  On  the  µμάάντις  see  BOUCHÉ-­‐‑LECLERQ  I-­‐‑II  (1879-­‐‑1880),  HALLIDAY  (1913),  chapter  5;  PARKER  (2005),  
chapter  6.  In  the  context  of  my  argument,  it  should  be  emphasised  that  in  everyday  (Athenian)  life,  
a  µμάάντις  is  a  religious  professional  rather  than  an  inspired,  prophetic,  figure  (an  association  found  
several   times   in   Plato,   see   n.   67).   The   µμάάντις   is   the   professional  whom  people   could   consult   for  
practical  questions.  See  VAN  STRATEN  (1995),  121-­‐‑122.  For  µμαντικήή,  see  also  chapter  one,  p.  33,  n.  
112.  For  the  areas  of  consultation,  see  PARKER  (2005),  118,  n.  11;  FLOWER  (2008),  100-­‐‑103.      
69   Hom.  Od.   17,   382-­‐‑384.  Cf.   Isocr.   19,   6.   Teisamenos   and   Aristandros   are   historical   examples   of  
“importierten  rel.  Experten”  Neue  Pauly  s.v.  mantis.  
70  De  div.  1.95.  
71  Ibid.  5;  10.  See  also  MALKIN  (1987),  8-­‐‑9,  and  chapter  2;  ZIEHEN  in  RE  s.v.  Mantis.  
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who  have  acquired  it.72  The  µμάάντις  as  a  specialist  concerned  with  matters  of  the  
organisation   of   one’s   life   in   practical   matters   may   have   rendered   him   an  
attractive  model  for  a  lawgiver.  But  the  fact  that  Plato  presents  the  interlocutors  
as  being  reminded  of  a  µμάάντις  signals  that  Laws  is  a  text  in  which  Plato  refrains  
from  making   any   definitive   statements   as   to   the   quality   of   a   good   lawgiver.  
Since   the   Athenian   Stranger   formulates   the   laws,   the   problem   of   who   is  
qualified   to   legislate   is   “solved”   as   far   as   the   dialogue   (lawgiving   λόόγῳ)   is  
concerned.    
   Second,   the   Athenian   succeeds   in   getting   his   interlocutors   on   his   side  
(inspite   of   some   initial   resistance   on   their   part).   He   demonstrates   to   his  
interlocutors   that   he   is   qualified   to   formulate   laws.   At   the   end   of   Book   II,  
Cleinias  and  Megillus  are  persuaded  of  the  sense  of  his  insights  and  agree  that  
ἀνδρείία   does   not   suffice.73   An   important   function   of   the   opening   discussion  
(Books  I-­‐‑II)  is  thus  to  show  why  the  interlocutors  are  prepared  to  go  along  with  
the  Athenian,  and  how  he  is  able  to  do  so.  The  interlocutors’  assessment  of  the  
Athenian’s   words   as   reminiscent   of   a   µμάάντις   is   part   and   parcel   of   this  
mechanism:  they  come  to  consider  his  insights  superior  to  their  own,  and  even  
superior  to  what  they  consider  it  is  humanly  possible  to  know.74  In  any  case,  the  
characterization  of  the  Athenian  seems  designed  to  make  clear  that  he  is  not  an  
expert,  and  that  we  are  not  dealing  with  a  philosopher-­‐‑king.    
  
  
                                                                                                              
72   NIGHTINGALE   (1993),   arguing   that   the   Athenian   from   the   very   beginning   construes   an   ideal  
lawgiver  (above,  n.  53,  p.  224),  claims  that  the  Athenian  must  speak  for  this  ideal  lawgiver  “but  he  
tries  to  avoid  identifying  himself  with  this  figure”.  “By  deflecting  the  authorship  of  the  laws  away  
from   the   Athenian,   Plato   makes   his   lawcode   appear   objective,   impersonal,   and   timeless.   It   is  
perhaps   for   the   same   reason   that   he   decided   to   leave   the   Athenian   nameless:   if   a   particular  
individual  had  unveiled  this  code,  it  would  have  been  less  impersonal”  (284,  with  n.  24).  The  laws  
are  thus  “divinely  authorized”  (285).  
73  See  chapter  three,  p.  108.  
74   The   fact   that   the   µμάάντις   is   a   paid   specialist   (a   fact   for  which   he   is   often   rebuked,   see   PARKER  
[2005],  116-­‐‑118)  may  perhaps  also  re-­‐‑invoke  (only  in  order  to  leave  unexplained)  the  question  of  the  
motivation  of  the  Athenian  to  engage  in  a  discussion  about  lawgiving.    
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6 . 3    Conc lus ion   
This  chapter  has  examined  two  agencies  outside  the  διέέξοδος  τῶν  νόόµμων,  the  
nocturnal  council,  part  of  the  act  νοµμοθεσίία,  and  the  anonymous  Athenian,  the  
main  speaker  in  Laws,  who  formulates  the  law  code.  We  have  argued  that  none  
of  these  two  serve  to  introduce  an  objectifying  pespective  similar  to  that  of  the  
philosopher-­‐‑king.    
   The   nocturnal   council   is   introduced   under   the   heading   of   σωτηρίία   for  
the   polis   and   laws   of   the   interlocutors.   In   the   context   of   the   discussion   of   the  
nocturnal   council,   the   complex   theme   of   the   unity   and   plurality   of   the   four  
virtues   is   resumed.  Nοῦς  mixed  with   the   αἰσθήήσεις   is   vital   for   being   able   to  
aim  at  σωτηρίία.  The  council’s  constitution,  a  combination  of  the  most  virtuous  
elderly  citizens  (νοῦς)  and  younger  citizens  (αἰσθήήσεις),  is  such  that  it  contains  
both  elements.  In  virtue  of  this,  the  council  is  able  to  aim  at,  or  “look  at”,  virtue  
as   a   whole,   πᾶσα   ἀρετήή.   The   recapitulation   of   the   theme   of   the   unity   and  
plurality  of  the  virtues  of  Books  I  and  II  is  thus  very  effective;  not  only  does  it,  
on  the  level  of  the  composition  of  the  text,  create  the  effect  of  a  ring  composition  
and   thus  provides   a   suitable   end;   it   also   endows   the  polis  with   a  body   that   is  
able   to   look  at  πᾶσα  ἀρετήή  and  aim   for  σωτηρίία.  The  nocturnal   council   is   to  
look  at  the  naturalistic  notion  of  virtue  introduced  in  Books  I  and  II.  
   This  leaves  us  with  the  Athenian,  who  formulates  the  law  code  in  Laws.  
The   qualification   of   the   Athenian   remains   vague—and   Laws   does   not   reveal  
much   about  what   qualifies   a   good   lawgiver.   A   reference   to   divine   lawgivers  
seems   to   serve   often   as   a   device   that   makes   it   possible   to   discuss   lawgiving  
without   having   to   state   anything   about   the   necessary   qualifications   for   doing  
so,  and  for  making  the  laws  themselves.  Through  the  mouth  of  his  Cretan  and  
Spartan   interlocutors,   we   hear   what   they   think   about   him—apparently,   they  
deem  him  qualified  to  discuss  the  subject  and  lay  down  laws.  This  qualification  
receives  expression  in  their  assessment  of  the  Athenian’s  insights  as  those  of  a  
µμάάντις.   But   this   association   of   the  Athenian  with   a  µμάάντις   is   founded  on   the  
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confidence  of   the   interlocutors.  The  authority  of   the  Athenian   is  not  objective,  
but  depends  upon  their  trust.  Authority  in  Laws  is  of  a  competely  different  kind  
than   the   authority   of   the   moral   expert   hypothesised   in   a   number   of   other  
Platonic  texts.  This  is  in  line  with  Laws’  pragmatic  perspective  on  lawgiving:  the  
lawgiver  is  the  one  who,  in  a  particular  situation  and  setting,  is  able  to  convice  
















The  present  study  has  taken  as  its  starting  point  a  number  of  anomalies  in  Laws.  
It   has   discussed   these   in   detail   and   attempted   to   offer   a   reading   of   Laws   in  
which   the   anomalies   can   all   be   integrated   into   a   philosophically   coherent  
argument.   The   absence   of   φιλοσοφίία   and   the   diminished   prominence   of  
δικαιοσύύνη,   the   Cretan   setting,   the   absence   of   Socrates,   the   symposion   as   a  
model   for   social   norms,   and   the   positive   attitude   to   πείίθειν—all   these   are  
features  that,  in  a  Platonic  text,  demand  explanation.      
   The  present  thesis  has  made  these  peculiarities  the  basic  ingredients  of  its  
reading.  It  has  argued  that  they  can  all  be  explained  as  reflections  of  a  pragmatic  
project.  Laws  does  not  assume,  or  appeal  to,  a  higher,  metaphysical  moral  Truth,  
and   we   encounter   the   familiar   Platonic   terminology   reappropriated   in   the  
service  of  an  un-­‐‑prototypical  political  project.  
   Some   stock   Platonic   terms,   such   as   φιλοσοφίία   and   δικαιοσύύνη,   have  
almost  disappeared  from  Laws.  Their  diminished  prominence  is  consistent  with  
our   observation   that   the   moral   norm   presupposed   in   Laws   is   not   the  
metaphysical  norm  of   the  absolute  Good,   and   that  Laws’  philosophy  does  not  
acknowledge   an   objective   moral   authority.   Φιλοσοφίία   and   δικαιοσύύνη   are  
central   notions   in   the   metaphysically   oriented   system   of   Plato’s   Republic—
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which   is,   both   in   its   plan   (the   founding   of   a   polis)   and   in   its   scale,   Laws’  
counterpart   within   Plato’s   oeuvre.   Φιλοσοφίία   and   δικαιοσύύνη   are   part   of   a  
system   with   a   metaphysical   orientation,   which   seems   to   be   the   reason   why  
these  terms  would  have  been  ill-­‐‑fitting  in  the  context  of  a  political  project  that  
operates  on  the  basis  of  a  different,  and  much  less  uniform,  kind  of  norm.    
   The   conversation   of   Laws   is   situated   on   the   island   of   Crete.   The  
interlocutors,  Cleinias  and  Megillus,   come   from  a  particular  cultural   tradition.  
Laws   is   thus   the  only   text   in  Plato’s  oeuvre   that   is  not   set   in,  or  near,  Athens;  
and  it  is  the  only  text  in  which  the  discussion  starts  off  from  the  recognition  that  
different  cultural  traditions  and  different  societies  have  different  conceptions  of  
morality  and  virtue.  The  Cretan  setting  situates  the  law  code  of  the  interlocutors  
in   a   specific   cultural   and  geographical   context.   Thus,   both   the  discussion   and  
the  action  taking  place  at  the  dramatic  level  of  Laws  reflect  the  assumption  that  
any   act   of   lawgiving   is   necessarily   endemic   in,   and   attuned   to,   a   specific,  
practical,  context.    
   Laws   is   the  only  Platonic  text   in  which  Socrates   is  absent.  The  persona  of  
Socrates  in  Plato’s  works  is  closely  connected  with  the  claim  that  there  exists  a  
higher   moral   Truth.   In   Apology   we   witness   how   Socrates   introduces   the  
awareness  of  this  Truth  to  his  fellow  citizens,  and  how  he  justifies  his  mode  of  
life  in  terms  of  it;  in  Crito,  we  witness  how  Socrates  justifies  his  refusal  to  escape  
to   the   friends  who   have   offered   to   save   him   by   appealing   to   a   higher,  more  
abstract   loyalty   than   the   loyalty   of   human   friendship;   in   Republic,   Socrates  
designs  a  truly  just  polis  (see  chapter  two).  The  absence  of  Socrates  from  Laws  is  
therefore  consistent  with  our  observation  that  the  discussion  of  good  laws  does  
not  unfold  on  the  assumption  that  there  exists  a  higher  moral  Truth.    
   The   symposion   is   introduced   in   the   opening   discussion   (Books   I-­‐‑II)   as   a  
scenario   from  which  moral   norms   can   be   derived.   The   norm   implied   by   this  
scenario  is  social  cohesion  and  the  σωτηρίία  of  the  group  as  a  whole.  A  polis  has  
to  be  livable.  The  pragmatic  norm  of  livability  sparks  off  a  whole  set  of  ideas  and  
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assumptions  about  human  virtue  and  the  well-­‐‑organized  society.  In  the  livable  
polis  social   interaction   is  characterized  by  φιλίία,   friendliness  and  benevolence.  
Virtue   is   the  quality   that  enables  human  beings   to   live   together  harmoniously  
and   peacefully,   self-­‐‑restraint.   Ἀρετήή   can   be   acquired,   and   strengthened,   by  
training.  The  pragmatic  norm  is  much  more  dynamic  and  vague  than  the  Good  
(which   only   manifests   itself   in   the   (only)   just   society   (a   static   class-­‐‑society)),  
thus   allowing   for  diversity   of,   and  gradations   in,   livable  poleis.  Consequently,  
ἀρετήή   and   the   good   polis   can   only   be   defined   by   approximation:   ἀρετήή   is  
moderate,   non-­‐‑aggressive   behaviour,   and   the   good   polis   is   a   harmonious,  
friendly  society.  
   Finally,  Laws’  positive  attitude  to  πείίθειν  can  also  be  explained  in  terms  
of  Laws’  pragmatic  project.  The  persuasive  preamble  is  presented  as  the  friendly  
legislative  alternative   to   the  directive  of   the   law  by   itself,  without  persuasion,  
which  is  a  form  of  βίία  (violence).  Again,  we  see  that  “friendliness”  determines  
interaction  (in  this  case  between  preamble  and  citizen)  in  the  polis.  At  the  same  
time,  the  conceptualization  of  πείίθειν  as  “friendly”  implies  that  self-­‐‑restraint  is  
constitutive   of   virtue.   From   the   perspective   assuming   that   the   livability   in   a  
polis  depends  upon  citizens’   success   in   restraining   themselves,  πείίθειν   is   thus  
of  crucial  importance.  (We  may  recall  that  the  Laws  in  Crito  offer  Socrates  two  
options:   to  “persuade  or  obey”.)  Πείίθειν  thus  occupies  a  centre-­‐‑stage  position  
in  the  polis  in  which  the  key  to  social  cohesion  is  the  internalization  of  the  laws  
of  the  polis.    
   In  summing  up  these  anomalies,  I  have  roughly  followed  the  sequence  in  
which   they   are   discussed   in   this   thesis.   The   aim   of   this   study   has   been   to  
determine  the  ontological  status  of  the  law  code  in  the  Laws—are  these  true,  just  
laws,  or  are  these  laws  part  of  a  different  conceptual  normative  framework?  The  
basic   puzzle   of   Laws   was   the   fact   that   the   interlocutors   in   the   dialectical  
discussion   formulate   laws   on   their   own   authority,   that   is,  without   attributing  
them  in  some  way  to  a  higher,  expert  moral  authority—in  fact,  the  figure  of  the  
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moral  expert  seemed  to  be  absent  altogether.  This  puzzle  necessitated  a  reading  
of  Laws  that  aims  to  do  justice  to  the  internal  structure  of  the  text:  how  does  the  
text   introduce,   embed,   and   justify   the   lawgiving   of   the   interlocutors?   In  
chapters   three   to   six   I  have  attempted   to  elucidate  Laws’   internal   structure,   as  
part   of   the   aim  of   this   study  has   been   to   get   a  more   firm  grasp   on  Laws   as   a  
textual  composition.  Thus,  my  reading  has  to  a  large  extent  been  guided  by  the  
sequence   of   the   conversation   of  Laws   itself,   all   the  while   bearing   in  mind   the  
question  why   Plato   has   composed   his   work   in   the   way   he   did.   At   the   same  
time,   I   have   attempted   to   present,   as   far   as   Laws’   own   dynamic   and   non-­‐‑
essentialistic   philosophy   allows,   a   coherent   account   of   the   philosophical  
underpinnings   of   the   law   code   formulated   at   the   dramatic   level,   and   of   the  
place  of  this  law  code  within  Laws’  own  philosophical  outlook.    
   The   argument   of   this   thesis   may   be   summed   up   as   follows.   In   the  
opening   discussion   of  Laws,   Plato   sets   the   scene   for   a   political   project   that   is  
unlike   anything   that  we   find   in   the   rest   of   his   oeuvre.  He   introduces   various  
unknowns  to  his  audience:  a  distant,  unfamiliar,  Cretan  setting,  an  anonymous  
Athenian  stranger,  and  two  Dorian  interlocutors.  In  this  bewildering  landscape,  
he  resumes  his  familiar  philosophical  terminology  of  the  unity  and  plurality  of  
the   virtues   to   set   off   a   discussion   about   the   basis   of   laws.   The   familiar  
terminology  is  used  to  introduce  a  new  philosophical  perspective  on  morality,  
and  a  notion  of  virtue  based  on  a  non-­‐‑metaphysical  norm.  In  a  critique  on  the  
Cretan  and  Spartan  law  codes  and  the  Cretan  and  Spartan  conception  of  ἀρετήή  
as  ἀνδρείία,  the  Athenian  is  able  to  persuade  his  interlocutors  that  ἀνδρείία  does  
not   suffice.   For   ἀνδρείία   he   substitutes   a   notion   of   ἀρετήή   firmly   grounded   in  
peace  and  internal  harmony.  All  societies  ought  to  aim  at  peace  and  friendship.    
   The  view  on  human  virtue  encountered  in  the  opening  books  is  an  ethical  
naturalist   or   biological   view.   In   ethical   naturalism   the   ultimate   norm   is   the  
preservation  of  society,  society  constituting  the  natural  environment  for  human  
beings.   Ethical   naturalism   approaches   humans   as   a   species;   it   does   not   only  
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stipulate   that   human   society   is   the   proper   environment   for   the   human  being,  
but  also  that  individual  human  excellence  (which  may  broadly  be  referred  to  as  
“rationality”)   is   the  very  behaviour   that  allows  human  beings   to   live   together  
durably.  This  entails  a  relatively  optimistic  view  of  the  human  being:  for,  since  
the   assumption   is   that   societies   are   the   natural   habitat   for   humans,   and   that  
virtue  is  the  kind  of  behaviour  that  allows  societies  to  continue  to  exist,  it  seems  
only   logical   to   assume   that   human   beings   possess   an   innate   potential   for  
rationality.  The  individual  society  befalls  the  task  of  educating  this  potential.  
   Books  I  and  II  present  us  with  a  playful  idea  of  the  form  such  almost  life-­‐‑
long  education  (παιδείία)  could  assume.  The  Athenian  has  established  a  parallel  
between   the  Cretan/Spartan   syssitia  and  his   symposia,   between  Cretan/Spartan  
gymnasia   and   his   khoreia.   The   symposia   and   khoreia   have   replaced   the   Cretan-­‐‑
Spartan   institutions   as   the   more   sufficient   education.   Paideia   is   χορείία:   a  
training  in  τάάξις,  order.   In  the  discussion  of  paideia,  we  again  encounter  traces  
of  a  naturalist  view  of  human  morality.  The  citizenry  (until  60)  is  divided  into  
three   age-­‐‑choruses   (children,   18-­‐‑30,   30-­‐‑60).   The   paideutic   mechanism   in   each  
chorus  shifts:   for  children,  χορείία  is  a  training  in  physical  restraint,  motivated  
by   the   pleasure   they   take   in   musical   order   (rhythm   and   harmony);   for   the  
elderly   citizens,   it   is   a   training   in   intellectual   restraint,   the   need   for  which   is  
motivated   by   their   simultaneous   inebriation   and   the   natural   inhibition   that  
comes  with  old  age.  The  terminology  of  the  four  virtues,  or  at  least  of  the  two  
most  opposite  virtues,  ἀνδρείία  and  φρόόνησις,   are  mapped  onto   the  ἀρετήή  of  
the   two  age  classes  most  distinct   from  each  other:   in  Book  XII,  ἀνδρείία   is   the  
virtue  associated  with  children,  φρόόνησις  is  the  virtue  associated  with  seniors.  
   The  opening  Books  (I-­‐‑III)  create  the  conceptual  room  for  the  interlocutors  
to   embark   on   their   own   legislative   project.   The   fact   that   the   interlocutors  
themselves  formulate  laws  is  telling:  lawgiving  is  apparently  not  the  preserve  of  
a  moral  expert.  The  qualified  lawgiver,  to  the  extent  that  Laws  gives  indications  
about  him,  is,  whatever  his  qualification,  not  a  moral  expert.  There  is  no  fixed  
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qualification   for   a   lawgiver—the   requirement   is  merely   that   he   aims   at  φιλίία  
for  his  polis.    
   After   the   reconstruction   of   the   philosophical   scene   of   Laws   and   its  
discussion  about  the  basis  of  laws,  we  have  proceeded  to  the  analysis  of  the  law  
code   of   the   interlocutors   on   the   dramatic   level   and   Laws’   own   notion   of  
lawgiving.  The  Athenian   introduces  an  analogy  between  the   lawgiver  and  the  
painter   immediately   before   the   interlocutors   embark   on   formulating   laws   (in  
Book  VI).  This  analogy  is  of  major  importance  for  several  reasons:  it  occurs  at  a  
crucial   place   in   the   conversation,   it   is   the   one   passage   in   Laws   in   which   the  
Athenian  presents   the  most   fully  worked-­‐‑out   analogy   for   lawgiving,   and,  not  
least,  because  the  analogy  introduces  the  conceptual  framework  that  will  prove  
to  be  of  structural  importance  for  the  interlocutors’  own  subsequent  lawgiving  
in  Books  VI-­‐‑XII.    
   The   painter-­‐‑analogy   represents   lawgiving   as   a   prolonged   process,   that,  
due  to  its  very  nature  and  subject  matter,  can  only  be  (if  at  all)  concluded  after  a  
significant   amount   of   time.   This   seems   surprising   in   the   light   of   the  mimetic  
interpretation  of  painting  in  other  dialogues,  most  notably  Republic.  But  in  Laws,  
there   is   no   hint   that   the   initial   lawgiver   is   imitating   a   fixed   model.   Instead,  
lawgiving  is  a  dynamic  process,  that  will  be  terminated  only  if  the  regulations  
on  a  certain  subject  are  sufficient.  This  sufficiency  cannot  be  attained  within  one  
generation.   The   original   lawgiver-­‐‑painter   therefore   needs   successors.   The  
Athenian  divides  the  process  of   lawgiving  in  two  phases:   first,   the  drawing  of  
an  “outline”  (περιγραφήή)  by  the  original  lawgiver,  and  subsequently,  the  filling  
in  and  amending  of  this  outline  by  the  lawgivers’  successors.    
   The  distinction  between  an  outline  and  filling  in  details  recurs  at  several  
places  in  the  interlocutors’  own  law  code,  suggesting  that  the  interlocutors  are  
the  functional  equivalent  of  the  original  lawgiver  in  the  analogy.  In  those  cases,  
the  painting  terminology  justifies  why  the  Athenian  at  that  point  refrains  from  
laying  down  down  more  specific  regulations.  These  meta-­‐‑legislative  reflections,  
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about   future  procedures   of   lawgiving,   offer   a   view  of  who   is   to   complete   the  
laws  on  certain  issues,  and  reveal  why  lawgiving  is  a  process.  Future  legislation  
is   usually   left   to   the   lawguards   in   cooperation   with   the   specialised,   local  
officials   (ἀγορανόόµμοι,   ἀστυνόόµμοι,   priests,   judges,   θεωροίί,   in   some   cases   the  
entire   δῆµμος).   This   suggests   that   the   reason   why   lawgiving   is   a   long-­‐‑term  
process   is   that  experience  and   testing  of   regulations   in  practice  are  necessary   if  
laws   are   to   become   sufficient.   Even   after   the   fixation,   however,   there   are  
indications   that   supplementation   and   revision   of   the   laws  may   go   on,   on   the  
basis   of   insights   acquired   by   the   law-­‐‑watchers   who   travel   to   other   poleis   to  
inspect   foreign   laws,  or   in   case  practice  demonstrates   that   current   regulations  
are  insufficient.    
   The   analysis   of   the   interlocutors’   own   lawgiving,   and   of   the   painter-­‐‑
analogy   that   introduces   it,   reveal  an   image  of   lawgiving  as  a  complex,  dynamic  
and  provivional  process.  This  process   involves  the   input  of  various  generations  
of   lawgivers   and  various  kinds  of  magistrates  over   a   longer   (or  perhaps  even  
indefinite)  period  of  time.  This  conception  of  lawgiving  squares  to  some  extent  
with   dialectic   as   a   philosophical   method   of   which   the   results   remain  
provisional.   The   fact   that   the  Athenian   forbears   to   fill   in   all   the   details   is   not  
problematic  in  a  dialectical  context.  
     Laying  down  laws  is  one  aspect  of  νοµμοθεσίία  (lawgiving  for  the  polis).  
But   the  Athenian   highlights   another   aspect:   νοµμοθεσίία   as   the   influencing   of,  
and   mode   of   addressing,   the   citizens   (lawgiving   within   the   polis).   From   the  
point   of   view   of   this   study,   this   discursive   aspect   of   lawgiving   is   especially  
interesting.  For   it   is   for   lawgiving   thus   conceived,   as   a  mode  of   address   from  
lawgiver  to  citizen,  that  the  Athenian  introduces  dialectic,  or  something  stongly  
resembling  dialectic,  as  the  proper  form  of  νοµμοθεσίία.  The  proper  way  for  laws  
to   address   the   citizen(s)   is   by  πείίθειν,   persuading.  The   law   is   therefore   to   be  
prefaced  with  a  persuasive  preamble.    
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   The  persuasive  preamble   is   in   turn   conceptualized,   via   the   two  doctor-­‐‑
analogies  (in  Books  IV  and  IX),  as  friendly  and  instructive  discourse,  and  comes  
to   be   modelled   on   dialectic   itself.   The   Athenian   models   the   persuasive  
preambles  upon  the  interlocutors’  own  lawgiving  λόόγῳ,  “in  speech”.  Through  a  
mise  en  abyme-­‐‑effect,  the  proper  mode  of  legislative  speech  is  made  to  resemble  
the  dialectical  conversation  of  the  interlocutors  themselves.  The  assimilation  of  
preambles   to   dialectic   is   further   strengthened   by   the   unclear   transitions   from  
the  preamble   to   the   frame  conversation.  The  authority  behind  the  preamble   is  
the  lawgiver,  but  since  the  preambles  are  in  the  conversation  formulated  by  the  
Athenian,  he  is  ultimately  the  authority  for  the  laws  in  the  Laws.  
   As  a  final  step,  we  had  to  investigate  whether  or  not  the  Athenian  is  an  
authority  of   the  kind  of   the  moral  expert.  The  same  in  fact  had  to  be  done  for  
another   entity   that  may   seem   to  be  a   reintroduction  of   the  philosopher-­‐‑kings,  
the  so-­‐‑called  nocturnal  council.  Upon  closer  analysis,  we  found  that  neither  of  
these  two  entities  is  the  equivalent  of  the  moral  expert  as  we  meet  him  in  other  
Platonic   texts.   The   function   of   the  nocturnal   council   is   to   preserve   the   politeia  
and  the  laws  that  have  been  laid  down,  which  is  why  it  is  only  fully  introduced  
after  the  discussion  of  the  laws  themselves.  There  is  no  suggestion  that  the  laws  
are   laid   down   by   the   council,   and   the   qualification   and   function   for  which   it  
needs  this  qualification  are  entirely  at  odds  with  the  idea  of  ruling  a  polis  on  the  
basis  of  philosophical  knowledge.    
   The  sort  of  authority  with  which  the  Athenian  stranger  can  be  credited  is  
of  a   fundamentally  different  kind   than   that  of   the  moral  expert.  His  authority  
ultimately  has   its   basis   in   the   impression  he  makes  on  his   interlocutors.  They  
judge  the  insight  of  the  Athenian  in  ancient  law  codes  of  a  superior  and  divine  
kind,  resembling  that  of  a  µμάάντις.  This  awe  on  the  part  of  the  interlocutors  for  
someone  who  is  able  to  proceed  on  the  road  of  lawgiving  on  the  dramatic  level  
provides   the   motivation   for   according   the   Athenian   the   role   of   lawgiver.  
Cleinias  and  Megillus  consider  the  Athenian  fit  to  lay  down  laws  on  the  basis  of  
CHAPTER   SEVEN   241  
the  discussion  until  that  point  (the  end  of  Book  III).  Thus,  Laws’  own  legislative  
project,   in   which   the   interlocutors   lay   down   laws   on   their   own   authority,  
reflects  Laws’  pragmatic  norm:   the   laws   in  Laws   are   formulated  by  a   lawgiver  
who  is  esteemed  for  his  insight  and  performs  his  role  well.    
  
The   specific   interpretive   principle   of   charity   that   I   adopt   in   this   study   gives  
precedence   to   internal   textual   consistency   and   coherence   over   doctrinal  
consistency.  This  principle  enables  us  to  see  how  the  familiar  Platonic  themes,  
analogies,  and  terminology  are  employed  in  the  service  of  a  radically  different  
message   in   Laws.   The   present   thesis   has   attempted   to   show   that   the   familiar  
Platonic   vocabulary   and   the   familiar   Platonic   antitheses   are   used   to   convey   a  
pragmatic  norm  that   is  new  in  Plato’s  oeuvre.  The  view  that  Plato’s  project   in  
Laws   is   pragmatic   challenges   the   current   assessments   of   Laws   as   a   merely  
practical  (rather  than  ideal)  and  as  a  second-­‐‑best  (rather  than  the  best)  polis.  The  
unitarian  practical  and  the  developmental  second-­‐‑best   interpretation  share  the  
assumption   that   the   ultimate   norm   for   society   and   human   virtue   is   a  
metaphysical  one—even  if  that  norm  may  be  largely  out  of  reach  and  obscured  
by  more  practical  arrangements.      
   In  this  world,  there  is  no  moral  expert,  no  objective  idea  of  justice,  and  no  
single  just  politeia.  Whereas  Republic  addresses  justice  as  an  essence  and  shapes  
its  polis  on  that  basis,  Laws   is  a  pragmatic  project.  Its   interlocutors  design  laws  
in   a  world  where   the   preservation   and   viability   of   society   are   considered   the  
highest   good.  This   entails   a  much   less  well-­‐‑defined   conception  of  what   is   good  
and   bad;   but   at   the   same   time   it   entails   a   more   optimistic   view   of   human  
capacity  for  virtue  and  for  peaceful  coexistence  in  society.  The  main  justification  
for  calling  Laws  more  optimistic  than  Republic   is   that,  according  to  the  reading  
presented   here,   Laws   assumes   that   answer   to   what   morality   and   moral  
goodness  are  given  with  mankind’s  social  nature,  and  that  the  answer  to  good  
and  bad  is  given  within  a  more  low-­‐‑brow  conception  of  the  livable  society.  The  
CONCLUS ION:   PLATO’S   PRAGMATIC   PROJECT   242  
answer  to  good  and  bad  is  not  given  by  an  a  priori  Good  in  another  world.  The  
fact  that  the  three  interlocutors  decide  among  themselves  on  a  law  code  in  Laws,  
inspired  by  the  immediate  case  of  a  future  Cretan  colony,  suggests  a  change  in  
moral  outlook.    
  
The   text-­‐‑internal   analysis   offered   in   this   thesis   of   course   raises   one   major  
question:   why   has   Plato   in   Laws,   his   last   work,   embarked   on   a   project   so  
fundamentally   at   odds   with   the   core   principles   of   his   own   philosophy?  
Tantalizingly,   however,   this   question   cannot   be   settled   in   a   definitive   way.  
Looking  at  Plato’s  presumed  biography  for  an  explanation  is  a  possible  way  of  
addressing   the   striking   discrepancy   between  Laws   and   the   rest   of   his   oeuvre,  
but  I  wish  to  confine  myself  to  what  I  consider  to  be  a  less  speculative  strategy  
of  reconciliation.    
   Laws  was  written  in  the  mid-­‐‑fourth  century  B.C.E.;  Plato  died  in  347  B.C.E.  
and,  as  we  saw  in  the  Introduction,  according  to  ancient  reports,   left  the  work  
without  having  made   the   final   correction   (διόόρθωσις).  As   I  have  suggested  at  
various  points  in  my  argument,  a  number  of  ideas  that  are  characteristic  of  Laws  
but  militate  against  core  principles  of  Plato’s  own  philosophy  in  other  works  in  
fact   strongly   resemble   the   contemporary   philosophical   discourse   of   Isocrates  
and  Aristotle  in  particular  (and,  somewhat  further  removed  in  time,  also  that  of  
Protagoras,   to  whom  Aristotle  seems  heavily   indebted).  Aristotle’s  naturalistic  
ethics,  his  idea  of  man  as  a  social  animal  and  of  virtue  understood  in  terms  of  
disposition  and  character  on   the  one  hand,1  and   Isocrates’   rhetorical  notion  of  
philosophy   and   virtue   as   being   a   composite   interaction   of   natural   giftedness,  
education,  and  practice  on  the  other,  seem  in  fact  closer  to  Laws’  construction  of  
ἀρετήή  as  self-­‐‑control  that  can,  and  must,  be  trained,  than  to  much  that  we  find  
in  Plato’s  other  work.  The   resemblance  with   Isocrates  also   lies   in   the   fact   that  
                                                                                                              
1  I  am  not  the  first  to  note  that  Laws  exhibits  some  very  striking  similarities  with  Aristotle’s  views.  
See  e.g.  BOBONICH  (2002),  chapter  5.  
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Laws   does   not   stipulate   beforehand   what   qualifications   a   good   lawgiver   is  
required   to  have,   but   entertains   the   idea   that   suitability  will  manifest   itself   in  
practice.  
   Plato’s   last   work   reflects   a   practical   notion   of   authority,   according   to  
which  the  good  lawgiver  is  the  individual  who  proves  worthy  to  perform  that  
function  well.   In  Plato’s  pragmatic  project,   the  human   life  worth   living   is   not  
determined  by  an  otherworldly  vision  that  can  only  be  an  object  of  knowledge,  
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Dit   proefschrift   presenteert   een   nieuwe   lezing   van   Plato’s   laatste   en   meest  
omvangrijke   tekst,  Wetten.   Deze   tekst   is   opgezet   als   een   dialoog   tussen   drie  
gesprekspartners:   een   Cretenzer   (Cleinias),   een   Spartaan   (Megillus),   en   een  
Athener,  die  naamloos  blijft.  Deze  drie  gesprekspartners  ontwerpen  in  de  loop  
van  hun  conversatie  een  wetscode.   In  dit  proefschrift   is  de  vraag  aan  de  orde  
wat  de  status   is  van  deze  wetten,  of,  anders  gezegd,  waar  het  gezag  van  deze  
wetten  vandaan  komt.  Op  basis  van  de  rest  van  Plato’s  oeuvre  (in  het  bijzonder  
Plato’s   in   veel   opzichten   vergelijkbare   werk   Staat),   zouden   we   immers  
verwachten  dat  normatieve  teksten  in  een  Platoons  werk  gebaseerd  zijn  op  een  
absolute   norm   (zoals   de   Idee   van   het   Goede   in   Staat),   en   worden  
gerechtvaardigd   door   middel   van   een   beroep   op   een   hoger   gezag   (zoals   de  
filosoof-­‐‑koning   in   Staat).   Dit   Idee   van   rechtvaardigheid   en   een   hoger   gezag  
lijken  in  Wetten  echter  afwezig  te  zijn.  Plato’s  Wetten  doet  daarmee  in  termen  van  
Plato’s  eigen  filosofie  vreemd  en  ontypisch  aan.  
   Dit  proefschrift  betoogt  dat  de  afwezigheid  van  een  absolute  norm  en  een  
hoger   gezag   begrepen   moeten   worden   in   het   licht   van   het   soort   project   dat  
Plato   in   Wetten   opzet.   Het   betoogt   dat   dit   een   pragmatisch   project   is.   De  
pragmatische   principes   zijn   terug   te   zien   in   de   inhoudelijke   discussie,   de  
specifieke  invulling  die  wetgeving  in  Wetten  krijgt,  en  in  de  opzet  van  de  tekst.  
Dit  wordt   beargumenteerd   aan  de  hand  van   een   analyse   van  de   structuur   en  
opbouw  van  Wetten.  De  hier  gepresenteerde  interpretatie  stelt  ons  in  staat  stelt  
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om  Wetten   als   een   coherent   opgebouwd,   kloppend,   en   volwaardig   geheel   te  
zien.    
  
In   de   Inleiding   (HOOFDSTUK   EEN)   wordt   de   methodische   grondslag   van   deze  
dissertatie   toegelicht.   Dit   proefschrift   presenteert   een   tekst-­‐‑immanente   lezing  
van   Plato’s   Wetten;   dat   wil   zeggen   dat   onduidelijkheden   louter   binnen   de  
tekstuele   “wereld”   van   Wetten   zelf   verklaard   worden,   zónder   daarbij   een  
beroep   te   doen   wat   we   over   Plato’s   filosofie   weten   op   basis   van   andere  
platoonse  werken.  Bij  een  tekst-­‐‑immanente  lezing  wordt  prioriteit  gegeven  aan  
consistentie  binnen  de  dialoog  zelf,  boven  consistentie  tussen  platoonse  teksten.  
Het  interpretatieve  “principle  of  charity”  van  dit  proefschrift  onderscheidt  zich  
daarmee   van   concurrerende   interpretaties   van  Wetten,   die   vaak   geënt   zijn   op  
het  behoud  van  consistentie  tussen  dialogen  (en  die  op  basis  daarvan  eveneens,  
hetzij  op  een  andere  manier  “charitable”  zijn).    
In  het  kader  van  een  bespreking  van  de  methodiek  wordt  ook  een  status  
quaestionis   geboden—een   overzicht   over   de   relevante   wetenschapelijke  
literatuur   tot   op   heden   en   een   beschrijving   van   hoe   het   argument   van   dit  
proefschrift   zich   daartoe   verhoudt.  Wetten   wordt   vaak,   en   terecht,   benaderd  
vanuit  een  vergelijking  met  Plato’s  Staat.  Staat  is  een  werk  met  een  vergelijkbare  
opzet,  aangezien  de  gesprekspartners  in  deze  dialoog  eveneens  een  stad  (polis)  
met  een  bepaalde  constitutie   (politeia)  ontwerpen.  Staat   is   echter  expliciet  over  
de  basis  waarop  de  voorgestelde  politeia  berust:  de   Idee  van  rechtvaardigheid.  
Meestal   wordt   aangenomen   dat   dit   Idee   van   rechtvaardigheid   ook   in  Wetten  
verondersteld   moet   worden,   maar   in   die   tekst   buiten   zicht   blijft   omdat   de  
discussie  op  een  “lager  niveau”  zou  plaatsvinden.  De  relatie  tussen  Plato’s  twee  
omvangrijke   politieke   dialogen   Staat   en   Wetten   wordt   vaak   beschreven   in  
termen  van  (respectievelijk)  “ideaal”/”praktisch”  (vanuit  een  unitarisch  model)  
of   “best”/”second   best”   (vanuit   een   ontwikkelingsmodel).   Wat   deze  
benaderingen   doen   is   verklaringen   aandragen   voor   het   feit   dat  Wetten   afwijkt  
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van  Staat.  Beide  verklaringen  zijn  gestoeld  op  de  aanname  dat  het   filosofische  
idee  van  een  stad  gebaseerd  op  metafysische  normen  in  Wetten  overeind  blijft,  
maar  er  bepaalde  concessies  gedaan  moeten  worden—een  redenering  waardoor  
Wetten   al   snel   de   status   van   een   tweederangs   ontwerp   te   beurt   valt.   Het  
specifieke,  in  dit  proefschrift  gehanteerde  “principle  of  charity”  werkt  een  meer  
autonome  lezing  van  Wetten  uit.  
Dit   proefschrift   presenteert   conclusies   op   basis   van   een   systematische  
analyse   van   het   filosofische   argument   van   Wetten.   Daarmee   wordt   ervan  
uitgegaan  dat  de  tekst  zoals  wij  die  overgeleverd  hebben  gekregen  min  of  meer  
indentiek  is  aan  hoe  deze  door  Plato  bij  zijn  dood  in  347  v.  Chr.  is  nagelaten  en  
een  (min  of  meer)  voltooid,  zinvol  geordend  geheel  vormt.  (Overigens  zonder  
uit   te  willen   sluiten  dat  de   tekst   zoals  wij  die  hebben  nog  een   laatste   redactie  
behoeft.)   Dit   verdient   expliciete   vermelding   daar   in   de   wetenschappelijke  
literatuur  wel  eens  de  neiging  bestaat  om  onduidelijkheden  toe  te  schrijven  aan  
de   vermeend   onvoltooide   staat   van   de   tekst.   Het   eerste   hoofdstuk   biedt   een  
overzicht  van  de  bronnen  uit  de  Oudheid  die  ervan  gewag  maken  dat  Plato  bij  
zijn  dood  nog  niet  de  laatste  hand  aan  de  tekst  zou  hebben  gelegd.  Een  aantal  
bronnen  bericht  dat  Wetten  onaf,  of  ingrijpend  herzien  zou  zijn  voorafgaand  aan  
de   publicatie   ervan—berichten   die   met   name   in   de   19e   eeuw   tot   de  
veronderstelling   hebben   geleid   dat  Wetten   zoals   wij   de   tekst   nu   hebben   het  
resultaat   is   van   knutselpogingen   door   een   heruitgever.   Op   grond   van   het  
materiaal  neem  ik  aan  dat,  ofschoon  niet  kan  worden  uitgesloten  dat  er  kleine  
ingrepen  door  een  editor  zijn  gepleegd,  of  dat  de  tekst  een  laatste  correctie  heeft  
moeten  ontberen,  er  onvoldoende  bewijs  bestaat  voor  de  these  dat  Wetten  na  de  
dood   van   Plato   ingrijpend   is   herzien.   Eveneens   bestaat   er   in   de   literatuur  
allerminst   consensus   over  de   vraag  welke   kenmerken   of   verschijnselen   op  de  
onvoltooide  staat  van  Wetten  zouden  wijzen.  
   Het   tweede   deel   van   de   inleiding   geeft   een   schets   van   het   conceptuele  
systeem   dat   ten   grondslag   ligt   aan   Plato’s   hantering   van   de   notie  
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“deskundigheid”   (technê).   Technê   is   een   centrale   notie   in   het   platoonse  
gedachtegoed.  De  notie  van  technê  wordt  veelvuldig  gebruikt  als  analogie  voor  
het  morele  domein.  Doordat  de  personages  in  de  platoonse  teksten  over  moraal  
praten  alsof  het  een  expertise  is,  neemt  morele  kennis  de  conceptuele  structuur  
aan   van   een   technê.   Het   soort   vermogen   van   een   morele   autoriteit   wordt  
daardoor  gelijkgesteld  aan,  bijvoorbeeld,  de  expertise  van  een  arts.  Analoog  aan  
een  arts  is  er  een  morele  expert,  iemand  die  over  menselijke  moraal  met  gezag  
uitspraken   kan   doen.  De   term   technê   activeert   een   aantal   vooronderstellingen  
(afhankelijk   van   het   soort   technê   waarop   een   beroep   wordt   gedaan).   Technê  
impliceert   dat:   (1)   het   soort   kennis   een   bestaand   specialisme   is   (bijv.  
geneeskunst),   (2)  met  een  vastliggend  object   (wat  ware  gezondheid   is),   (3)  met  
een  vastliggend  doel   (gezondheid),   (4)  dat  er  één   juiste  manier  van   toepassing  
van  die  kennis,  en  (5)  een  persoon  of  groep  die  objectief  baat  heeft  bij  die  kennis  
(de  patiënt).  Technê  vervult  daarmee  een  belangrijke  persuasieve  rol  in  het  werk  
van   Plato.   In   de   inleiding   worden   de   vooronderstellingen   van   de   technê-­‐‑
analogie   (die   in   de   teksten   vaak   impliciet   blijven)   geëxpliciteerd;   in   latere  
hoofdstukken  zal  betoogd  worden  dat  dit  model  op  cruciale  punten   in  Wetten  
op   een   heel   andere  manier   wordt   ingezet   en   daarmee   niet   volledig   overeind  
wordt  gehouden.    
   De   inleiding  geeft   eveneens  een  globaal  overzicht  van  de   structuur  van  
Wetten.   Boek   I-­‐‑III   wordt   in   dit   proefschrift   aangeduid   als   de  
“openingsdiscussie”.   In   deze   fase   van   de   conversatie   bediscussiëren   de  
gesprekspartners  meer   algemene   thema’s   als   het   doel   van  wetgeving,   het   nut  
van   een   aantal   sociale   instituties   (I-­‐‑II)   en   bestaande   constituties   (III).   Aan   het  
einde  van  boek  III  neemt  de  discussie  een  nieuwe  wending:  als  de  Athener  zich  
afvraagt  of  er  een  soort  test  is  die  hen  in  staat  stelt  om  de  werkbaarheid  van  de  
constateringen  uit   hun  discussie   tot   noch   toe   te   testen,   vertelt  Cleinias  dat   hij  
deel  uitmaakt  van  een  tienhoofdige  commissie  die  belast  is  het  het  maken  van  
een   wetscode   voor   een   nieuwe   op   Kreta   te   stichten   kolonie   vanuit   Knossos.  
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Geïnspireerd  door  deze   “case”  besluiten  de  drie   gesprekspartners  nu   zelf   een  
wetscode   te   gaan   maken   in   hun   conversatie   (logôi)—mogelijk   heeft   Cleinias  
daar  ook  nog  wat  aan  als  er  straks  écht  wetten  gemaakt  gaan  worden.  In  Boek  
IV-­‐‑VI   worden   de   geografische   ligging   en   magistraten   van   de   voorgestelde  
kolonie   besproken.   In   Boek   VI-­‐‑XII   volgt   dan   het   formuleren   van   een   serie  
wetten.   Boek   XII   sluit   af   met   de   introductie   van   de   zogenaamde   ‘nachtelijke  
raad’  en  een  overgang  naar  de  werkelijke  wetgeving  (ergôi).  
  
Om  te  kunnen  vaststellen  of  er  in  Wetten  geen  sprake  meer  is  van  een  absolute  
gezagsclaim   moet   eerst   geanalyseerd   worden   hoe   zo’n   claim   vorm   krijgt.  
HOOFDSTUK  TWEE  biedt  daarom  een  beschrijving  van  dergelijke  gezagsclaims  in  
drie  andere  platoonse  teksten:  Apologie  van  Socrates,  Crito  en  Staat.  Dit  hoofdstuk  
analyseert  hoe  in  elk  van  de  drie  tekstgenres  een  beroep  wordt  gedaan  op  een  
hoger  gezag  om  de  erin  gepresenteerde  morele  claims  te  legitimeren.    
Apologie  is  een  redevoering  die  Socrates  voor  de  Atheense  rechtbank  zou  
hebben   gehouden.   Socrates   is   op   twee   ernstige   gronden   aangeklaagd:   dat   hij  
vreemde  goden  zou  introduceren  (asebeia),  en  dat  hij  de  jeugd  verkeerde  ideeën  
zou  bijbrengen.  In  zijn  verdedigingsrede  presenteert  hij  zichzelf,  en  zijn  gehele  
levensstijl,  als  de  drager  van  een  goddelijke  missie.  Hij  claimt  dat  hij  niet  anders  
kon,   omdat   hij   de   godheid   dient.   Hij   herleidt   zijn   levensloop   tot   twee  
verschillende  goddelijke  instanties:  de  god  in  Delphi  en  zijn  goddelijke  intuïtie  
(zijn   daimonion).   Tegelijkertijd   is   deze   verdedigingsrede,   paradoxalerwijs,   een  
aanklacht   tegen   de   Atheners   die   een   vonnis   over   Socrates  moeten   uitspreken.  
Socrates  claimt  dat  hij  altijd  aan  de  kant  van  het  recht  heeft  gestaan  en  dat  het  in  
het   belang   van  de   stad   is   dat  men  hem   laat   leven:   hij   vergelijkt   zijn   publieke  
optreden  met  een  horzel  die  de  logge  Atheense  stad  alert  moet  houden.    
Crito  is  een  heel  ander  soort  tekst,  wél  een  echte  dialoog,  zoals  de  meeste  
werken   van   Plato,   en   ook   complexer   qua   opbouw   dan   Apologie.   Ook   hierin  
treffen  we  een  Socrates-­‐‑figuur  die  zich  verdedigt  voor  iets  dat  zijn  publiek  (zijn  
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vriend  Crito)  niet  begrijpt.  Socrates  is  inmiddels  ter  dood  veroordeeld,  en  Crito  
is   gekomen   om   Socrates   ervan   te   overtuigen   dat   het   beter   is   om   uit   de  
gevangenis   te   ontsnappen.   Hij   doet   een   beroep   op   de   verplichtingen   die  
Socrates   heeft   aan   zijn   vrienden   (philoi).  Volgens  de   gedachtengang  van  Crito  
zou  het  rechtvaardig  zijn  als  Socrates  uit  de  gevangenis  zou  ontsnappen  (om  in  
een  andere  stad  onderdak  te  vinden).  Socrates  weigert  dit  echter—daarmee  dus  
berustend  in  zijn  doodvonnis.  Hij  stelt  het  tegenovergestelde,  namelijk  dat  het  
onrechtvaardig  is  om  te  ontsnappen,  en  rechtvaardig  om  aan  de  wetten  van  de  
stad   te   gehoorzamen.   Hij   heeft   de   kans   gehad   de   wetten   te   overtuigen   (in  
Apologie),   maar   dat   is   hem   niet   gelukt.   Nu   heeft   hij   zich   te   schikken.   Dit  
argument  van  Socrates  wordt  verwoord  door  de  wetten  van  Athene,  die  door  
Socrates  worden   opgevoerd   als   als   zijn   eigen   opponenten.   De   speech   van   de  
Atheense   wetten   doet,   evenals   het   argument   van   Crito,   een   beroep   op  
vriendschap  en   loyaliteit   (philia).  Het  door  de  wetten  van  Athene  gehanteerde  
begrip   van   loyaliteit   is   echter   loyaliteit   aan   een   groter   belang,   namelijk   het  
belang   van   de   stad   als   geheel.   Zonder   zelf   uitspraken   te   doen   over   wat  
rechtvaardigheid  nu  écht  is,  kiest  Socrates  voor  het  standpunt  van  de  wetten  en  
laat  hij  zich  dus  uiteindelijk  leiden  door  de  loyaliteit  aan  de  stad.  Ofschoon  wel  
is   gedacht   dat   de   strijdbare   houding   van   de   Socrates-­‐‑figuur   in   Apologie  
incompatibel  is  met  zijn  minder  onbuigzame  houding  in  Crito,  laat  een  analyse  
van  de  argumenten  waarmee  Socrates  zijn  gedrag/keuze  legitimeert  zien  dat  hij  
consistent  is  in  zijn  houding  ten  opzichte  van  de  Atheense  polis.  Het  verschil  in  
argumenten   tussen   Apologie   en   Crito   wordt   verklaard   door   de   verschillende  
contexten:  Apologie   is   een   redevoering   (geen   dialoog)   voor   een  vijandige   setting  
(een   rechtbank);  Crito   is   een  dialoog  met  een  vriend   (waarin  een  beroep  op  een  
goddelijke  intuïtie  geen  effect  zou  hebben).  
De  derde   tekst   die   in   het   tweede  hoofdstuk   besproken  wordt   is   Plato’s  
dialoog  Staat   (Politeia).   In  Staat   is   de   vraag  wat   rechtvaardigheid  wérkelijk   is.  
Om   hier   achter   te   komen   wordt   een   rechtvaardige   stad   (polis)   aan   een  
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onderzoek   ontworpen:   wat   is   nu   het   kenmerk   van   een   rechtvaardige   stad,  
d.w.z.,  wat   is   het  dat   een   rechtvaardige   stad   rechtvaardig  maakt?  Deze  vraag  
wordt  beantwoord  door  uit  te  gaan  van  de  hypothese  van  een  hoger  gezag:  de  
rechtvaardige  stad  is  de  stad  waarin  de  morele  expert  het  voor  het  zeggen  heeft.  
Het   derde   deel   van   het   tweede   hoofdstuk   analyseert   hoe   dit   argument   vorm  
krijgt.  Deze  morele   expert   is   de   filosoof.  De   stad  die   bestuurd  wordt  door  de  
filosofen  heeft  een  bepaalde  klassenstructuur  (met  de  filosofen  die  het  voor  het  
zeggen  hebben).  Deze  specifieke  interne  structuur  is  wat  de  rechtvaardige  stad  
rechtvaardig  maakt,  en  het  is  vanwege  deze  structuur  dat  de  rechtvaardige  stad  
het   als   enige   verdient   om   “constitutie”   (politeia)   genoemd   te   worden.   Staat  
presenteert  een  sluitend  systeem:  we  kunnen  met  zekerheid  aannemen  dat  deze  
stad   wérkelijk   rechtvaardig   is   op   gezag   van   de   filosoof,   die   immers  
expertkennis   heeft   van   het   absoluut   Goede   en   daardoor   altijd   het   goede   zal  
doen.  
Het   tweede   hoofdstuk   biedt   een   analyse   van   hoe   claims   op   een   hoger  
gezag  in  drie  verschillende  contexten  verschillende  vormen  aannemen:  Socrates  
die   appelleert   aan  goddelijke   instanties   in  Apologie;   Socrates  die  appeleert   aan  
een   hogere   loyaliteit   aan   de   stad   en   haar   wetten   die   het   individuele   belang  
ontstijgt  in  Crito;  en  de  filosoof  wiens  gezag  berust  op  zijn  kennis  van  het  Goede  
in  Staat.    
  
Met   HOOFDSTUK   DRIE  wendt   dit   proefschrift   zich   tot  Wetten.   De  wetscode   die  
door  de  gesprekspartners  ontworpen  wordt  begint  pas  halverwege  het  werk,  in  
Boek  VI.  Hoofdstuk  drie  onderzoekt  hoe  Plato  in  de  openingsconversatie  (Boek  
I  en  II)  de  toon  zet  voor  de  rest  van  het  werk.  Waar  bevinden  we  ons,  wat  zijn  
de   thema’s   die   bediscussieerd   worden,   waar   draait   het   om   in   deze  
openingsscène?  Twee  dingen  vallen  direct  op.  Ten  eerste  de  fysieke  setting  van  
de   dialoog:   in  Wetten   bevinden   ons   op   het   eiland   Creta,   terwijl   alle   andere  
platoonse  teksten  zich  in  of,  in  één  geval  (Phaedrus),  in  de  directe  omgeving  van,  
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Athene   bevinden.   Ten   tweede   ontbreekt   de   figuur   van   Socrates,   die   in   alle  
andere  platoonse  teksten  wél  optreedt  (zij  het  in  verschillende  rollen).    
Ook   de   discussie   zelf   ontwikkelt   zich   echter   niet   zoals  men   dat   in   een  
platoonse  dialoog  zou  verwachten.  In  de  eerste  twee  boeken  van  Wetten  treffen  
we   een   discussie   aan   over   het   nut   van   symposia   (drinkgelagen)   voor   de  
opvoeding   (paideia).   Het   derde   hoofdstuk   traceert   welke   opvatting   van  
menselijke   kwaliteit   of   deugd   (aretê)   en   de   goede   samenleving   uit   deze  
discussie   spreekt.   Is  dit   nog   steeds   een  objectieve,  metafysische  norm  van  het  
goede?  De  symposia  worden  geïntroduceerd  als  de  parallel  van  de  Cretenzisch-­‐‑
Spartaanse   gymnasia   en   syssitia   (militaire   kazernes).   Het   uitgangspunt   van   de  
discussie  was  dat  de  Cretenzisch-­‐‑Spartaanse  gymnasia  erop  gericht  zijn  mensen  
te  trainen  in  wat  in  Creta  en  Sparta  geldt  als  de  hoogste  deugd:  moed  in  oorlog.  
Het   symposion   schetst   een   parallel   en   in   feite   superieur   scenario,   omdat   het  
hetzelfde  bewerkstelligt  in  een  vreedzame  context:  in  plaats  van  een  training  in  
militaire  moed   is   een   goed   geleid   symposion   een   training   in   de   deugd   van  de  
zelfbeheersing.   Dat   in   Creta   en   Sparta,   de   steden   waar   Cleinias   en   Megillus  
vandaan   komen,   drank   überhaupt   verboden   is,   zorgt   ervoor   dat   de   discussie  
een   extra   lading   krijgt:   de   Athener   probeert   zijn   gesprekspartners   ervan   te  
overtuigen  dat  een  gebruik  dat  bij  hen  uit  den  boze  is,  en  waarmee  zij  dus  van  
kinds   af   aan   zijn   opgevoed,   in   feite   juist—mits   onder   goede   begeleiding  
gedronken—van  centraal  belang  is  voor  het  welslagen  van  de  samenleving.    
Dit  scenario  van  het  symposion  als  een  gelegenheid  waarbij  deugd  wordt  
getraind  wijkt  in  belangrijke  opzichten  af  van  het  ‘gezagsmodel’  voor  deugd  en  
een   samenleving   zoals  we  dat   in  Staat   aantreffen.  Hoofdstuk  drie   betoogt  dat  
het   symposion   een   pragmatisch,  meer   common   sense-­‐‑sociaal  model   voor   ogen  
stelt.   Het   beeld   van   het   symposion   impliceert   bijvoorbeeld   dat   deugd   een  
noodzakelijke   voorwaarde   is   voor   het   voortbestaan   van   een   samenleving,   en  
dat   menselijke   deugd   dus   die   kwaliteit   is   die   de   menselijke   samenleving  
mogelijk  maakt  en  in  stand  houdt—een  gedachte  die  we  eerder  met  Aristoteles  
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(‘de   mens   is   een   politieke   diersoort’)   associeëren   dan   met   Plato.   Tevens  
impliceert   het  model   van   het   symposion   dat   het   gaat   om  menselijk  gedrag:   het  
behoud   van   de   groep   is   afhankelijk   van   hoe   mensen   zich   jegens   elkaar  
gedragen.  Een  van  de   consequenties  van  deze  analyse   is  ook  dat  de  gedachte  
van   de   driedeling   van   de   ziel   en   de   daarbij   behorende   klassen   (zoals  we   die  
aantreffen  in  teksten  als  Staat  en  Phaedrus),  incompatibel  is  met  de  psychologie  
en  ethiek  van  Wetten.  
   Zoals  gezegd  staat  in  Boek  I  en  II  van  Wetten  het  nut  van  symposia  voor  
de  opvoeding  (paideia)  centraal.  In  de  loop  van  de  discussie  worden  de  symposia  
in   retrospect   ingebed   in   een   een   diachrone   beschrijving   van   opvoeding,   van  
kind   tot   hoogbejaarde.   Paideia   wordt   hier   voorgesteld   als   een   proces   van  
socialisatie—waarbij   het   eindresultaat   (complete   deugd)   in   feite   de  
verwezenlijking   is   van   een   reeds   van   nature   en   vanaf   de   geboorte   aanwezig  
sociaal   potentieel   in   ieder  mens,   vergelijkbaar  met   het   aangeboren  menselijke  
vermogen  ritme  en  melodie  (kortom,  muziek)  waar  te  nemen.  Dit  lijkt  dus  een  
beduidend  optimistischer  geluid  te  zijn  dan  het  idee  dat  we  in  Staat  aantreffen,  
dat  het  aan  slechts  zeer  weinigen  gegeven   is  om  überhaupt  de  ware  deugd   te  
bereiken.  
   De   discussie   is   beëindigd   op   het   moment   dat   Cleinias   en   Megillus  
instemmen  met  het  nut  van  symposia.  Boek  I  en  II  vormen  daarmee  niet  alleen  
een  conceptuele  inleiding  op  het  werk  als  geheel,  maar  zijn  ook  in  termen  van  
de  dynamiek  tussen  de  gesprekspartners  van  fundamenteel  belang:  de  Athener  
slaagt  erin  zijn  gesprekspartners  te  overtuigen  van  een  standpunt  waarvan  het  
gezien  hun  achtergrond  niet   te  verwachten  was  dat  zij  dat  zouden  aannemen.  
Het   belang   hiervan   wordt   verder   toegelicht   in   hoofdstuk   6.   Een   tweede  
consequentie  is  dat  met  het  verlaten  van  het  gezagsmodel  voor  moraal,  de  weg  
nu  vrij  is  voor  de  gesprekspartners  om  zelf  wetten  op  te  stellen.    
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Na   een   analyse   van   de   openingsdiscussie   en   de   setting   van   de   dialoog   in  
hoofdstuk  drie,  richt  HOOFDSTUK  VIER  zich  op  de  vorm  van  de  wetgeving  zoals  
die  door  gesprekspartners  in  de  praktijk  wordt  gebracht.  Hoofdstuk  vier  begint  
met  een  analyse  van  de  analogie  voor  wetgeving  die  direct  aan  de  wetscode  van  
de   gesprekspartners   vooraf   gaat.   In   deze   analogie   (Boek  VI)  wordt  wetgeven  
vergeleken  met  een  specifiek  proces:  het  werken  aan  een  schilderij.  Hierbij  moet  
opgemerkt   worden   dat   analogieën   in   Plato’s   teksten   een   veel   voorkomend  
persuasief  middel  zijn  (zie  ook  boven,  hoofdstuk  een).  Zij  dienen  ertoe  om  een  
bepaalde  activiteit  A  (hier:  wetgeven)   te  modelleren  op  een  andere  activiteit  B  
(hier:  schilderen).  Hierdoor  wordt  het  mogelijk  om  in  termen  van  B  (schilderen)  
over   A   (wetgeven)   te   spreken,   en   neemt   de   structuur   van   activiteit   A  
(wetgeven)  de  structuur  van  activiteit  B  (schilderen)  aan.    
   Nu   geeft   de   schilders-­‐‑analogie   in   Boek   VI   zelf   een   enigszins   curieuze  
voorstelling   van   schilderen.   Schilderen   wordt   voorgesteld   als   een   activiteit  
zonder   duidelijk   eindpunt:   het   is   een   gefaseerd   proces   dat   wordt   begonnen  
door   een   schilder,   maar   pas   kan   worden   voltooid   (zo   voltooiing   überhaupt  
mogelijk   is—iets  wat  door  de  analogie   in  het  midden  gelaten  wordt)  door  een  
opvolger.   De   eerste   schilder   maakt   een   schets.   Deze   schets   moet   door   een  
opvolger   verder  worden   ingevuld   en   (mogelijk)   aangepast.  Wetten   is   niet   het  
enige   platoonse  werk  waarin   de   analogie   van   de   schilder  wordt   gebruikt   om  
een  analogon  (datgene  waaraan  het  analoog  is)  te  “framen”  (er  een  heel  gerichte  
voorstelling   van   te   geven).   Schilderen   wordt   in   andere   werken   doorgaans  
voorgesteld   als   “als   het   vervaardigen  van   een  kopie”.  De   schilder-­‐‑analogie   in  
Wetten  wijkt  hier  op  twee  manieren  van  af:  ten  eerste  is  het  schilderij  (analoog  
aan   een   wetscode)   geen   kopie.   Ten   tweede   wordt   schilderen   hier   niet  
voorgesteld  als  een  activiteit  met  een  duidelijk  eindpunt.  
   De  analogie  presenteert  wetgeven  als  een  langdurige  activiteit—mogelijk  
een  decennium,  potentieel  oneindig.  Deze  schilder-­‐‑terminologie  wordt  nu  ook  
gebruikt  voor  de  wetgevende  activiteit  van  de  gesprekspartners  zélf,  die  op  de  
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analogie  volgt.  Alvorens  namelijk  tot  het  daadwerkelijk  formuleren  van  wetten  
over   te  gaan,  wenden  zij  zich   tot  een  fictief  publiek.  Deze   fictieve  addressaten  
zijn  hun  opvolgers,  de  mensen  die  ná  hun  dood  geacht  worden  de  schets  van  
de  gesprekspartners  zelf  verder   in  te  vullen.  Deze  speech  tot  de  opvolgers  (en  
überhaupt  het  idee  dat  er  opvolgers  nodig  zijn)  is  overtuigend  binnen  de  logica  
van   de   zojuist   uitgewerkte   analogie.   Hieruit   blijkt   ook   dat   wat   de  
gesprekspartners   in  Wetten  zelf  doen,  de  status  heeft  van  een  eerste  schets,  en  
geen  definitieve  wetscode  is.  
   Ook   in  de   loop  van  de  wetscode  die   van  Boek  VI   tot  XII   geformuleerd  
wordt,   wordt   herhaaldelijk   teruggegrepen   op   de   schilder-­‐‑terminologie   die   in  
Boek  VI  is  geïntroduceerd.  Dit  gebeurt  op  die  plaatsen  in  de  wetscode  waarvan  
de   gesprekspartners   vaststellen   dat   op   een   later  moment   nadere   invulling   en  
afstemming   nodig   is.   De   tweede   helft   van   hoofdstuk   vier   analyseert   de  
passages  waarin  wordt  verwezen  naar  de  nadere  invulling  van  de  schets.  Deze  
passages   bieden   als   het   ware   een   raam   op   de   toekomst:   de   gesprekspartners  
doen   hier   uitspraken   over   wat   er   verder   nog   bepaald  moet   worden,   wie   dat  
moet(en)   doen,   en   wat   voor   proces   dat   is.   Wetgeven   is   nu   eenmaal   een  
langdurig   proces,   omdat   er   tijd   voor   nodig   is   om   te   testen   of   de   regels   goed  
werken,   om   vast   te   stellen   of   er   aanpassingen   nodig   zijn,   en   om   die   te  
realiseren.  Wetgeving  is  daarmee  een  dynamisch  proces,  dat  een  wisselwerking  
impliceert   tussen   de   praktijk,   de   ervaring   van   de  wetgevers,   en   de  wetscode  
zelf.  
   Het   idee   van   wetgeven   waarmee   de   gesprekspartners   werken,   en   hun  
eigen  wetscode,   reflecteren   dus   een   dynamische,   pragmatische   opvatting   van  
wetgeven.   Er   is   geen   suggestie   dat   de   basis   voor   wetten   een   hoger   idee   van  
rechtvaardigheid  zou  zijn.  De  voltooiing  van  wetscodes,  of  delen  daarvan,  lijkt  
louter  ingegeven  vanuit  pragmatisch  oogpunt:  het  zou  een  onwerkbare  situatie  
opleveren   om  altijd   dingen   te   blijven   veranderen;   het   is   in   het   belang   van  de  
samenleving  dat  er  een  stabiele  wetscode   is.  Mogelijke  veranderingen  worden  
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ingegeven   vanuit   de   praktijk   en   kunnen   alleen   met   instemming   van   de  
betrokkenen  worden  doorgevoerd.  
  
HOOFDSTUK  VIJF   onderzoekt   een   tweede   aspect   van  de  vorm  die  de  wetten   in  
Wetten   krijgen:   de   zogenaamde  preambules:   teksten  die   aan  de   eigenlijke  wet  
(het   gebod   of   verbod)   vooraf   gaan.   Dit   hoofdstuk   betoogt   dat   ook   de  
toevoeging   van   preambules   aan   wetten   in  Wetten   wijst   op   een   pragmatische  
benadering  van  wetgeving.  De  reden  voor  de  introductie  van  de  preambules  is  
namelijk   puur   pragmatisch:   zij   dragen   ertoe   bij,   dat   de   burgers   zich   aan   de  
wetten   houden.  Derhalve   is   de   vraag  wat   voor   soort   aanspreekvorm  mensen  
het  meest   volgzaam  maakt,   d.w.z.   het  meest   geneigd   om   te  doen  wat  de  wet  
wil.   Het   feit   dát   dit   überhaupt   door   de   gesprekspartners   ter   discussie   wordt  
gesteld   is   veelzeggend:   met   deze   preambules   doen   zij   een   voorstel   voor   de  
invulling  van  wetgeving  door  henzelf  in  hun  rol  van  wetgevers.    
De  kwestie  hoe  een  wetgever  burgers  het  meest  volgzaam  maakt  wordt  
in  Wetten   beslecht   door   middel   van   de   introductie   van   een   tweede   analogie  
voor  wetgeven,  een  arts-­‐‑analogie.  Hierin  worden  twee  manieren  van  wetgeven,  
(1)   zonder,   en   (2)   mét   preambules   vergeleken  met   twee   soorten   behandeling  
door  een  arts:  wetgeven  zonder  preambules   (met  alleen  een  verbod  of  gebod)  
met   een   slaven-­‐‑arts,   en  wetgeven  mét   preambules  met   behandeling   van   vrije  
patiënten   door   een   vrije   arts.   De   slavenarts   gebruikt   slechts   dreigementen   en  
heeft  altijd  haast  om  weer  naar  de  volgende  patiënt  te  gaan.  De  vrije  arts  neemt  
de   tijd   om   de   patiënt   te   overtuigen,   en   gaat   niet   over   tot   het   geven   van  
voorschriften   zónder   diens   instemming.   De   tweede   methode   zal   de   meeste  
volgzaamheid   afdwingen;   de   eerste,   die   zelfs   vergeleken   wordt   met   geweld  
(bia)  maakt  mensen   slechts  weerspanniger.  De   analogie   én   de   keuze   voor   het  
inzetten  van  preambules  wordt  dus  gemaakt  op  pragmatische  gronden.  
Er  is  echter  nog  iets  opvallend  aan  de  arts-­‐‑analogie.  De  beschrijving  van  
de  tweede,  vrije  arts,  met  de  nadruk  op  de  afwezigheid  van  tijdgebrek,  op  het  
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gebruik  van  argumenten,  en  op  het  in  gesprek  treden  van  arts  en  patiënt,  doet  
namelijk  erg  denken  aan  de  platoonse  dialectiek,  en  speciaal  aan  de  dialectische  
invulling  die  retorica  krijgt  in  Plato’s  Phaedrus.  Volgens  veel  commentatoren  is  
dit  nu  echter   juist  het  punt  waarop  de  analogie  niet  meer  stand  houdt:  wetten  
zijn  geen  gesproken  teksten;  een  burger  leest  een  wet,  en  treedt  hier  niet  mee  in  
gesprek,   zoals   de   arts-­‐‑analogie   suggereert.   Het   vijfde   hoofdstuk   presenteert  
echter  een  lezing  waarin  de  analogie  binnen  de  wereld  van  de  Wetten  overeind  
wordt   gehouden.   Ten   eerste   zijn   in   Wetten   zelf   de   wetten   die   door   de  
gesprekspartners  worden  geformuleerd  onderdeel  van  een  gesproken  tekst,  een  
dialoog.  Ten  tweede  is  de  wetscode  in  Wetten  nog  niet  de  échte  wetscode  voor  
de   nieuwe  Cretenzische   kolonie,  maar   slechts   een   oefening   van  wetgeven   “in  
speech”   (logôi).  Wetten   eindigt  met   het   idee   dat   de   gesprekspartners   nu   (pas)  
écht   wetten   gaan   maken,   d.w.z.   nu   voor   een   werkelijke   nieuwe   kolonie  
(Magnesia).   Aan   het   eind   van  Wetten   ligt   het   dus   nog   relatief   open   wat   nu  
goede  wetten  zijn—er   is   juist  géén  blueprint  van  een  wetscode  gegeven.  Deze  
opzet   van   het   werk   zou   stroken   met   het   idee   dat   het   aan   de   betrokken  
gemeenschap  zelf  is  om  wetten  neer  te  leggen,  in  plaats  van  een  situatie  waarin  
een  autoriteit  met  een  hoger  inzicht  dit  van  te  voren,  los  van  elke  context,  zou  
kunnen  bepalen.  De  dialectische  situatie  blijft  dus  tot  het  einde  toe  in  stand.  
  
HOOFDSTUK  ZES  onderzoekt  twee  in  Wetten  figurerende  instanties  van  wie  men  
zou   kunnen   denken   dat   zij   een   hogere   autoriteit   zijn:   de   wat   mysterieuze  
“nachtelijke  raad”  die  helemaal  aan  het  eind  wordt  geïntroduceerd  (in  Boek  XII)  
en  de  Atheense  vreemdeling  zelf,  die  Plato   immers  de  wetten   in  Wetten   in  de  
mond   legt.  Het  gaat  echter   in  geen  van  beide  gevallen  om  een  moreel   expert/  
een  instantie  met  morele  deskundigheid.  Hun  taken  en  kwalificaties  zijn  niet  in  
overeenstemming   met   de   filosoof-­‐‑koningen   in   de   Staat.   De   nachtelijke   raad  
wordt  geïntroduceerd  als  een  instantie  die  het  behoud  (sôtêria)  van  de  wetscode  
garanderen   kan   garanderen.   Dit   kan   zij   doen   dankzij   haar   samenstelling   uit  
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jonge  en  oude  mensen.  De  raad  bezit  daarmee  de  uiteenlopende  kwaliteiten  die  
nodig  zijn  voor  het  zelfbehoud.  De  termen  waarin  de  kwalificatie  van  de  leden  
van  de  raad  worden  beschreven  grijpen  terug  op  de  deugd  (aretê)  terminologie  
uit   Boek   I   en   II.   De   functie   van   de   raad   wordt   daarmee   geplaatst   in   een  
‘naturalistische’  kader:  het  hoogste  belang  is  het  behoud  van  een  samenleving.  
Door  het  weer  opnemen  van  de  terminologie  uit  boek  I  en  II  in  het  kader  van  de  
nachtelijke   raad   in   Boek   XII,   vormt   de   discussie   van   de   nachtelijke   raad   het  
sluitstuk  van  Wetten.  
   De  naamloos  blijvende  Athener,  die  de  positie  inneemt  die  in  veel  andere  
platoonse  werken  door  Socrates  wordt  bekleed,  blijft  de  een  mysterieuze  figuur.  
Hij   beroept   zich  niet   op   een  hogere   autoriteit.   Toch  heeft   hij  wel   degelijk   een  
bepaald   gezag   in   de   dialoog:   hij   weet   zijn   gesprekspartners   te   overtuigen   in  
Boek  I  en  II  (zie  hoofdstuk  drie),  en  wordt  door  hen  herhaaldelijk  geprezen  om  
zijn   inzicht   in   de   bedoelingen   van   wetgevers   van   lang   geleden.   Zijn   inzicht  
wordt   zelfs  vergeleken  met  dat  van   een   ‘ziener’   (mantis).  Maar  dit   is   een  heel  
andere  vorm  van  gezag  dan  dat  van  een  morele  expert:  déze  gesprekspartners  
zijn  onder  de  indruk  van  de  inzichten  van  de  Athener,  en  willen  hem  graag  bij  
het  stichten  van  Magnesia  betrekken.  In  een  dergelijke  constructie  berust  gezag  
op  het  inzicht  van  iemand  van  wie  anderen  geloven  dat  het  een  hoger  inzicht  is  
(de  Athener  wordt  door  zijn  gesprekspartners  vergeleken  met   een  mantis,   een  
ziener).  Wetten   lijkt  dus  uiteindelijk  ook  een  meer  pragmatische  opvatting  van  
gezag   te   impliceren:   mensen  moeten   gelóven   dat   iets   zal   werken   en   dat   een  
bepaald   persoon   gekwalificeerd   is   om   bij   te   dragen,   niet   op   een   gezag   dat  
bestaat   bij   gratie   van   obejctieve  morele   kennis   en  daarmee   bestaat   los   van  de  
vraag  of  anderen  zich  daardoor  daadwerkelijk  laten  leiden.  
  
De  Conclusie  (HOOFDSTUK  ZEVEN)  stelt  dat  de  hier  gepresenteerde  analyse  leidt  
tot  de  conclusie  dat  Wetten  een  ‘pragmatisch  project’  is.  Dit  betekent  dat  Wetten  
afstand  neemt  van  Plato’s  eigen  platonisme.  Dit  werpt  een  nieuw  licht  op  Plato  
NEDERLANDSE    SAMENVATTING   289  
en   zijn   filosofie.   De   logische   vervolgvraag—die   open   blijft—is   hoe   we   dit  
zouden   moeten   verklaren.   Het   feit   dát   de   hier   gepresenteerde   analyse   deze  
vraag  opwerpt   is  ondergeschikt  aan  het  belang  van  een   lezing  van  Wetten  die  
ons  in  staat  stelt  dit  werk  als  een  coherente,  weldoordachte  en  zinvolle  tekst  te  
interpreteren.  Bezien  in  het  licht  van  de  historische  context,  en  in  het  bijzonder  
van   filosofen   die   in   die   tijd   (ca.   350   v.   Chr.)   werkzaam   waren   (geweest)   in  
Athene,   Isocrates   en   Aristoteles   (die   beïnvloed   werd   door   Protagoras),   lijkt  
Plato’s   pragmatische   project   in   Wetten   minder   een   anomalie   dan   bezien   in  














Myrthe   Laura   Bartels   was   born   on   21   September   1983   in   Amsterdam,   the  
Netherlands.  Between  1995  and  2001  she  passed  through  the  gymnasium  at  the  
Fons  Vitae  Lyceum  in  Amsterdam.  Between  2001  and  2007  she  studied  Classical  
Languages  and  Literature  at  Leiden  University  (doctoraal,  with  distinction).  In  
this   period,   she   also   studied   Russian   language,   literature   and   history   (2003-­‐‑
2004),  published  poetry  in  the  literary  periodical  De  Revisor  (2003),  was  student-­‐‑
assistant   of   the   “lexico-­‐‑team”   preparing   the   new   Ancient   Greek/Dutch  
dictionary  (2006-­‐‑2007),  and  research-­‐‑assistant  of  the  project  ‘Sources  and  Echoes  
of  Protagoras’  (2006-­‐‑2007).  
   From   2007-­‐‑2012,   she   was   employed   as   AiO   (Junior   Researcher)   at   the  
Leiden  University  Institute  for  the  Arts  in  Society  (formerly  Pallas).  During  her  
doctorate,   she   also   taught   courses   on   Elementary   and   Intermediate   Classical  
Greek,  on  Sophocles’  Antigone,  and  on  several  Platonic  dialogues.  Between  2008  
and  2010,  she  was  the  national  representative  of  the  Dutch  PhD  students  in  the  
Educational  Board  of  OIKOS,  the  Dutch  national  reseach  school   in  Classics.   In  
2010,  she  co-­‐‑organized  the  bi-­‐‑annual  OIKOS-­‐‑masterclass  at  the  Dutch  Institute  
at  Athens  for  the  OIKOS  PhD-­‐‑students.  In  2011,  she  conducted  research  for  this  
thesis   at   Stanford   University,   USA,   under   the   auspices   of   Professor   Chris  
Bobonich,  funded  by  the  Prins  Bernhard  Cultuur  Fonds  (Reiman-­‐‑de  Bas  Fonds)  
and  the  Leiden  University  Fund  (LUF).  In  the  same  year  she  also  participated  in  
the  MOISA  Summer  School  on  Ancient  Greek  Music  at  the  University  of  Corfu,  
Greece.  In  2012-­‐‑2013,  she  finished  her  thesis  with  the  support  of  Professor  Ineke  
Sluiter’s   Spinoza   Prize.   Parts   of   the   research   for   this   thesis  were  presented   as  
lectures   or   at   national   and   international   conferences,   including   Amsterdam,  
Anaheim   (USA),   Philadelphia   (USA),   Tokyo   (Japan),   Stanford   (USA)   and  
Katowice  (Poland).  
  

  

  
  
